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THE 


ELEMENTS  OF  MORALITY, 


INCLUDING 


POLITY. 


BY  WILLIAM  WHEWELL,  D.D., 

AUTHOR  OF  THE  HISTORY  AND  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE 
INDUCTIVE  SCIENCES. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES. 

VOL.  II. 


Aafnradia  exovrec;  dtaducovmv  «AA^2oif. 


UX'Ltf 

NEW-YORIv: 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  82  CLIFF  STREET. 

1845. 


XI  o 

V.s. 


CONTENTS  OF  THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


BOOK  IV. 

RELIGION. 

OF  DIVINE  LAWS  AND  THEIR  SANCTION. 


FAGE 

Chap.  I.  Natural  Religion  ....  25 


Art.  566. 
567. 


568. 

569. 

570. 

571. 

572. 

573. 

574. 

575. 

576. 

577. 

578. 

579. 
5S0. 


Morality  points  to  Natural  Religion. 

The  Belief  of  Religion  comes  with  Intellectual 
and  Moral  Progress. 

God  the  Author  of  Nature. 

Intention  is  visible  in  Creation 
Intention  is  visible  in  the  Structure  of  Man’s 
Mind. 

The  Moral  Law  is  the  Will  of  God. 

Moral  Ideas  are  the  Voice  of  God. 

Rightness  points  to  Happiness, 

Divine  Rewards  and  Punishments. 

Holiness  of  God. 

Man  has  a  Soul. 

Proofs  of  this. 

Future  State.  Providence. 

The  Course  of  this  World. 

The  Use  of  Natural  Religion. 


Chap.  II.  Christian  Revelation  ...  33 


Art.  581. 

582. 

583. 

584. 

585. 


The  Revelation  of  Jesus  Christ. 

Confirming  Divine  Rewards  and  Punishments. 
Teaching  Christian  Morality. 

The  Image  of  God. 

The  Image  of  God  in  Christ 


667139 


IV 

CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Art.  586. 

Death  and  Resurrection  of  Christ. 

587. 

Atonement  of  Christ. 

588. 

Belief  and  Participation  of  the  Spirit. 

589. 

Union  of  Believers  with  Christ. 

590. 

With  each  other.  The  Church. 

591. 

Christian  Ordinances. 

592. 

Spiritual  Concerns. 

Chap.  III. 

Christian  Morality  ....  39 

Art.  593. 

The  Order  of  Rational  Morality  will  be  followed. 

594. 

System  of  Christian  Morality. 

595. 

All  Duties  are  included  in  Love. 

596. 

Enunciations  of  Relative  Duties  by  St.  Paul. 

597. 

Classes  of  Duties. 

Chap.  IV. 

Christian  Precepts  concerning 

Duties  of  the  Affections  .  42 

Art.  598. 

General  Purport  of  such  Precepts. 

599. 

Precepts  against  Anger  given  by  Christ : 

GOO. 

By  the  Apostles. 

601. 

Love  enjoined. 

602. 

Charity,  &c. 

603. 

Alms. 

604. 

Meekness. 

605. 

Mutual  Submission. 

606. 

Virtuous  Indignation. 

607. 

Earnestness. 

608. 

Appeal  to  Law. 

609. 

The  Precepts  are  exemplary. 

610. 

Reasons  of  Duties. 

611. 

Imitation  of  Christ. 

Chap.  V. 

Christian  Precepts  concerning  Pro¬ 
perty  AND  OTHER  OBJECTS  OF  DESIRE  52 

Art.  612. 

Willingness  to  give. 

613. 

Reasons  assigned. 

614. 

Common  Goods  of  Early  Christians 

615. 

Did  not  abolish  Property. 

616. 

The  Poor  to  Work. 

617. 

Men  to  provide  for  their  own. 

618. 

Hospitality  enjoined. 

619. 

Content  commended. 

620. 

Covetousness  condemned. 

621. 

Tenaciousness  condemned. 

* 

CONTENTS. 

V 

Art.  622. 

Litigation. 

PAGE 

623. 

Equity. 

624. 

The  Unjust  Steward  and  the  Unjust  Judge. 

Chap.  VI. 

Christian  Precepts  concerning 

Truth  .... 

60 

Art.  625. 

Lies  and  Fraud. 

626. 

Honesty. 

Chap.  VII. 

Christian  Precepts  concerning 

Purity . 

61 

Art.  627. 

Lasciviousness. 

628. 

Fornication. 

629. 

Other  Lusts. 

630. 

The  Conjugal  Union. 

631. 

Whether  it  were  better  to  marry. 

632. 

Religious  Significance  of  Marriage. 

633. 

Divorce  among  Jews 

634. 

Divorce  among  Christians. 

635. 

Separation  for  Unbelief. 

636. 

Moderation  of  other  Desires. 

637. 

Sobriety  of  Mind. 

638. 

Christian  Reasons  for  it. 

639. 

Moderation  in  Dress. 

640. 

Domestic  Duties. 

641. 

Obedience  to  Husbands. 

Chap.  VIII.  Christian  Precepts  concerning 

Obedience  and  Command  .  .  69 

Art.  642. 

Obedience  to  Parents. 

643. 

Piety  of  Children. 

644. 

Good  Government  of  Parents. 

645. 

Provision  for  our  Families. 

646. 

Slaves  among  Christians. 

647. 

Christian  Obedience  to  Magistrates  ; 

648. 

And  to  the  Established  Government. 

649. 

Not  limited  to  ancient  Dynasties. 

650. 

Change  not  excluded. 

651. 

Citizens  with  Political  Rights  are  among  the 
Powers  that  be. 

652. 

The  Church  makes  religious  Laws. 

Chap.  IX. 

The  Christian  Rule  of  Conscience  .  75 

Art.  653. 

The  Rule  is  the  Will  of  God. 

VOL.  IT. 

A  2 

VI  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Art.  654.  Known  to  us  in  whatever  manner. 

655.  Revelation  does  not  supersede  Reason. 

656.  Scripture  acknowledges  Reason 

657.  As  a  Guide  of  Christians. 

658.  Moral  Rules  are  not  the  main  purpose  of  Scrip¬ 

ture. 

659.  Various  kinds  of  Precepts  are  mingled  in 

Scripture. 

660.  Our  Supreme  Rule  is  derived  from  Scripture  and 

Reason  jointly. 

661.  The  Will  of  God  is  the  absolute  Rule. 

662.  Religious  Principles  of  Action.  Religious  Cul¬ 

ture. 


Chap.  X.  Natural  Piety 


81 


Art.  663.  Reverence  to  God  is  a  Duty. 

664.  This  combines  Fear  and  Love. 

665.  Obedience  to  God  is  a  Duty. 

666.  That  is  right  which  is  intended  by  God. 

667.  That  is  right  which  is  according  to  Nature 

668.  The  Will  of  God  is  the  Source  of  Duties. 

669.  Gratitude  to  God  is  a  Duty. 

670.  Filial  Affection  to  God  is  a  Duty. 

671.  Hence  men  are  our  Brethren. 

672.  Affections  to  God  may  be  expressed. 

673.  Prayers.  Thanksgivings.  Praises. 

674.  Public  Worship. 

675.  Sacred  Places,  Times,  Ceremonies. 

676.  Natural  Piety  recognized  in  Scripture. 


Chap.  XI.  Oaths  .......  89 


Art.  677.  Meaning  of  an  Oath. 

678.  It  brings  religious  Duties  home  to  us. 

679.  So  help  me  God 

680.  Is  not  an  Imprecation. 

681.  Oaths  are  not  irreverent. 

682.  They  remove  all  Excuse  for  Falsehood. 

683.  I  solemnly  affirm. 

684.  Oaths  make  Men  careful. 

685.  Oaths  of  Testimony. 

686.  Oaths  of  Assertion. 

687.  Oaths  of  Promise. 

688.  Oaths  of  Future  Conduct  in  Institutions. 

689.  A  sincere  purpose  of  Truth  is  required. 

690.  To  be  interpreted  secundum  animum  Impo¬ 

rt  entis. 


CONTENTS. 


vii 

PAGE 


Art.  691.  The  Imposer  is  the  State. 

692.  The  State  may  interpret. 

693.  The  Silence  of  the  State  may  interpret. 


694. 

695. 

696. 

697. 

698. 

699. 

700. 

701. 

702. 

Custom  may  interpret; 

If  sanctioned  by  the  State. 

Present  usage  of  words  is  not  the  interpretation. 
Revival  of  obsolete  usages  is  not  required. 

Usages  become  obsolete  without  blame. 

The  change  must  take  place  in  good  faith. 

The  Founder’s  supposed  wish  is  not  our  Rule. 
Oaths  so  observed  secure  permanence. 

Oaths  understood  in  a  forced  sense  not  lightly 
to  be  allowed. 

703. 

704. 

705. 

The  Silence  of  the  State  does  not  prove  assent. 

It  is  a  duty  to  remove  Contradictions  in  Oaths. 
This  discussion  of  Oaths  why  placed  here. 

Chap.  XII.  Christian  Piety.  ....  106 


Art.  706. 

707. 

708. 

709. 

710. 

711. 

712. 

713. 

714. 

715. 

716. 

Obedience  to  God  includes  all  Duties. 

Peculiar  Christian  Duties. 

Christian  Duty  of  Gratitude. 

Christians  are  sons  of  God. 

Christian  Filial  Obedience  to  God. 

Christian  Love  of  men  as  brethren. 

Includes  all  Duties,  and  extends  them. 

Christian  Duty  of  Prayer. 

Difficulty  respecting  Prayer. 

Christian  Resignation. 

Christian  Private  Prayer. 

Chap.  XIII.  Religious  Belief.  ...  .113 


Art.  717. 

718. 

719. 

720. 

721. 

722. 

723. 

724. 

725. 

726. 

727. 

Belief  is  necessary  for  a  Christian. 

Moral  Error  is  blameable. 

In  like  manner  Unbelief  in  God  is  blameable  : 
And  Unbelief  in  Christian  Revelation. 

The  heathen  not  liable  to  this  blame. 

But  their  Ignorance  was  their  Misfortune. 

Blame  of  rejecting  truths  when  once  discovered. 
Agrees  with  Christian  teaching. 

Those  who  reject  Christian  Truth  are  blamed. 
Those  who  accept  it  approved. 

Difference  in  progress  of  scientific  and  religious 
Truth. 

728. 

Religious  Truth  differently  expressed  in  succes¬ 
sive  Creeds. 

729. 

Religious  Belief  is  part  of  Religious  Culture. 

vin 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Chap.  XIV.  Christian  Edification  .  .  .  122 

Art.  730.  Christian  Duty  of  promoting  Christian  Progress 
in  others. 

731.  First,  Christian  Education. 

732.  Next,  Christian  Edification. 

733.  Christian  Duty  of  preserving  Christian  Truth. 

734.  Objections  to  this  Duty. 

735.  There  is  Truth  and  Falsehood,  as  well  as  Opinion. 

736.  Truth  must  include  the  Reality  of  Duty. 

737.  Atheism  has  always  been  condemned. 

738.  Christian  Belief  is  a  Duty. 

739.  The  Duty  of  Belief  does  not  destroy  Inquiry. 

740.  Ridicule  in  religious  matters  is  blameable. 

741.  Familiar  mention  of  God  blameable. 

742.  Profane  Swearing. 

743.  Christian  Duty  of  bringing  all  men  to  God. 


Chap.  XV.  Christian  Ordinances  in  General  133 


Art.  744. 

745. 

746. 

747. 

748. 

749. 

750. 

751. 

752. 

753. 

754. 

755. 

756. 

757. 

758. 


Enumeration  of  Christian  Ordinances. 

The  use  of  Christian  Ordinances  is  a  Duty. 

The  Moralist  does  not  discuss  their  Spiritual 
Efficacy. 

Four  Sources  of  Rules  of  Christian  Ordinances. 
First ;  Natural  Piety. 

Second  ;  Early  Revelation. 

Jewish  Ceremonies  are  not  binding  on  Chris¬ 
tians  ; 

But  of  weight  as  Examples. 

Jewish  Ordinances  were  types. 

Passover.  Easter. 

Pentecost.  Whitsuntide. 

Other  Ordinances. 

Third  ;  Apostolic  Institution. 

Fourth  ;  Catholic  Tradition. 

The  National  Church  appoints  National  Ordi¬ 
nances. 


Chap.  XVI.  The  Lord’s  Day  ....  139 

759.  Grounds  of  the  Ordinance. 

760.  Opinions  of  its  Authority. 

761.  Jewish  Sabbath  abolished. 

762.  Is  the  Fourth  Commandment  binding  ? 

763.  Difference  of  the  Sabbath  and  Lord’s  Day. 

764  The  Lord’s  Day  is  of  Catholic  and  Apostolic 
Authority,  and  recommended  by  early 
Revelation. 


Art.  765. 

766. 

767. 

768. 

769. 

770. 

771. 

772. 

773. 

774. 

775. 

776. 


CONTENTS.  ix 

PAGE 

Not  instituted  in  the  wilderness. 

Was  an  early  usage  in  Egypt. 

Probable  state  of  the  matter  at  the  Exodus. 

The  Form  of  the  Ordinance  to  be  fixed  by  the 
Church. 

Christians  have  no  right  to  alter  the  Form. 

To  be  observed  as  a  day  of  Prayer,  &c. 
According  to  National  Rules. 

Individuals  ought  to  conform  to  Rules. 

External  Observances  are  not  the  essential  points. 
Individuals  ought  to  conform  to  Usages. 

For  Edification’s  sake. 

But  not  so  as  to  promote  Error. 


Chap.  XVII.  Consecrated  Places  .  .  .  149 

Art.  777.  Grounds  of  their  sacredness. 

778.  Duty  of  Reverence  in  Individuals. 

Chap.  XVIII.  Forms  of  Prayer  .  .  .  151 

Art.  779.  Have  been  generally  used. 

780.  Reasons  for  Forms. 

781.  Examples  in  the  Old  Testament. 

782.  in  the  New. 

783.  Ancient  Liturgies. 

784.  Liturgy  of  the  Church  of  England. 

Chap.  XIX.  Baptism  .....  155 

Art.  785.  A  Natural  Rite. 

786.  A  Christian  Rite. 

787.  Early  use  of  Infant  Baptism. 

788.  Christian  Necessity  of  Baptism. 1 

Chap.  XX.  The  Lord’s  Supper  .  .  .  158 

Art.  789.  Institution  of  the  Rite. 

790.  Communion.  Lord’s  Supper.  Eucharist. 

791.  Constant  use  of  the  Rite. 


Chap.  XXL  Marriages  of  Christians  .  .  160 

Art.  792.  Marriage  a  Religious  union. 

793.  Christian  usage. 

794.  Reason  for  it. 


X 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 


Art.  795. 
796. 


Separation  on  religious  grounds. 
Mixed  Marriages. 


Chap.  XXII.  Funeral  Rites  of  Christians 


Art.  797. 

798. 

799. 

800. 
801. 


Funerals  are  Religious  Services. 
Christian  Funerals. 

Christian  Funeral  Service. 
Cemeteries.  Church-yards. 
Christian  Duty  of  Funerals. 


Chap.  XXIII.  Oaths  of  Christians 


163 


165 


Ai  t.  802. 

Christian  Oaths. 

803. 

Grounds  of  the  usage. 

804. 

Jewish  Oaths. 

805. 

Christ’s  teaching  respecting  them. 

806. 

Refers  to  familiar  Oaths. 

807. 

Judicial  Oaths  sanctioned  by  Christ. 

'  808. 

St.  James  condemns  familiar  Oaths. 

809. 

St.  Paul’s  Asseverations. 

810. 

Forms  of  Oaths. 

Chap.  XXIV.  Christian  Ministers  .  .  .  171 


Art.  811. 
812. 

813. 

814. 

815. 

816. 
81  7. 
818. 

819. 

820. 
821. 
822. 

823. 

824. 

825. 

826. 

827. 

828. 


Reasons  for  a  Christian  Clergy. 

Jewish  Priesthood. 

Christian  Presbyters. 

Maintained  by  their  flocks. 

A  paid  Ministry  a  Christian  Ordinance. 
Deacons, 

Bishops, 

Are  a  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Ordinance 
Ordination. 

General  notion  of  a  Priest. 

Is  not  that  of  a  Christian  Minister. 

Divine  Commission  of  Christian  Ministers. 
Ordination  by  laying  on  hands. 

Bishops  only  can  ordain. 

Ordination  requires  a  local  Title. 

Patron.  Advowson. 

Simony. 

Sale  of  Advowsons  is  not  Simoniacal. 
Ecclesiastical  Polity. 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


Chap.  I. 

Art.  829. 

830. 

831. 

832. 

833. 

834. 

835. 

836. 

837. 

838. 

839. 

840. 

841. 

842. 

843. 

844. 

845. 

846. 


Chap.  II. 

Art.  847. 
S48. 
819. 

850. 

851. 

852. 

853. 

854. 

855. 

856. 
S57. 

858. 

859. 

860. 

Chap.  III. 
Art.  861. 


HOOSt  V. 

POLITY. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE. 

PAGE 

The  Rights  of  the  State  .  .  .  181 

The  State 

Is  the  Source  of  Authority. 

There  are  peculiar  State  Rights. 

First :  a  Right  to  the  National  Territory . 
There  can  be  no  Rights  to  land  without  this. 
Rights  of  Civilized  States  against  Savages. 
Second :  the  Right  of  making  War 
Does  not  arise  from  the  Rights  of  individuals. 

Is  involved  in  the  Right  of  Territory. 

Third  :  the  Right  of  Capital  Punishment 
Is  necessary  to  the  safety  of  the  State. 

Does  not  arise  from  the  Rights  of  Individuals. 
Fourth :  the  Right  of  imposing  Oaths 
Is  necessary  to  the  Safety  of  the  State. 

Requires  a  Formula. 

Does  not  arise  from  the  Rights  of  Individuals. 
Does  not  arise  from  the  Religion  of  Individuals. 
State  Rights  are  distinct  from  Individual  Rights. 

The  Obligations  of  the  State  .  193 

The  Obligation  of  Self-preservation. 

The  Duty  of  Self-preservation.  Higher  Duties. 
The  Obligation  of  National  Defence. 

The  Obligation  of  upholding  Law. 

May  be  partially  fulfilled. 

The  Obligation  of  repressing  Sedition. 

First :  Armed  Sedition. 

Treason  is  regarded  as  Treachery. 

Conspiracy.  Rebellion. 

Second :  Political  Sedition. 

Third:  Religious  Sedition. 

The  State  has  a  Right  to  repress  Religious  Se¬ 
dition. 

Religious  Sedition  ought  to  be  prevented  by 
Education. 

Atheism  has  generally  been  punishable. 

The  Moral  Character  of  the  State  202 
Upon  whom  do  the  Obligations  of  the  State  tall  ? 


Xll 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  862. 

863. 

864. 

865. 

866. 
867 


PAGE 

Upon  each  man,  as  the  Duties  of  his  Station. 
Upon  whom  do  the  Duties  of  the  State  fall  ? 
Upon  the  Governors  acting  as  for  the  State. 

The  Governors  must  aim  at  Intellectual  Pro¬ 
gress,  acting  as  for  the  State. 

But  the  Moral  and  Intellectual  Progress  of  the 
Governors  and  of  the  State  are  not  identical. 
Has  the  State  a  Conscience  ? 


Chap.  IV.  The  Social  Contract  .  .  .  210 


Art.  868. 

869. 

870. 

871. 

872. 

873. 

874. 

875. 

876. 

877. 

878. 

879. 

880. 
881. 

882. 

883. 

884. 

885. 

886. 

887. 


The  Conception  of  Government. 

Order  and  Fredom  to  be  combined. 

SotJie  regard  merely  the  External  Fact  of  Go¬ 
vernment. 

This  is  expressed  by  the  Patriarchal  System , 
And  by  the  Divine  Right  of  Governors. 

Others  regard  the  Internal  Act  of  Will. 

This  is  expressed  by  the  Social  Contract, 

And  by  the  Rights  of  Man. 

Both  Theories  need  modification. 

Government  is  never  merely  an  External  Fact. 
Not  even  according  to  the  Patriarchal  System. 
The  Patriarchal  System  is  incomplete  in  itself. 
Is  not  applicable  after  Usurpations. 

The  Doctrine  of  Divine  Right  is  equally  incom¬ 
plete. 

Government  is  never  merely  a  Contract. 

If  a  tacit  Contract,  it  leads  to  no  results. 

The  Doctrine  of  Rights  of  Man  is  useless. 

Each  Theory  must  admit  the  opposite  Principle. 
The  Social  Contract  may  supply  convenient  ex¬ 
pressions. 

The  Social  Contract  not  merely  a  Contract. 


Chap.  V.  The  Social  Contract  is  the  Con¬ 
stitution  ....  219 


Art.  888.  The  “  Social  Contract”  was  appealed  to  at  the 
Revolution  of  1688, 

889.  To  mark  the  condemnation  of  James  II. 

890.  Inconvenience  of  the  language. 

891.  Revolution  does  not  admit  of  Rules. 

892.  Example  of  such  a  Question  ; 

893.  And  its  Decision. 

894.  Temper  of  the  Delil 

895.  Revolutions  are  Cas. 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  896. 

897. 

898. 

899. 

900. 

901. 

902. 


903. 

904. 

905. 


Xlll 
PAGE 

The  “  Social  Contract”  is  appealed  to  in  Ame¬ 
rican  Codes. 

There  it  is  the  Constitution. 

A  Compact  of  each  with  all. 

Hence  it  is  the  same  in  other  States. 

The  Social  Contract  contains  many  Articles. 

Is  not  annulled  by  one  Breach. 

The  Social  Contract  has  been  so  understood 
here. 

This  view  does  not  diminish  the  Reverence  for 
the  Constitution. 

Such  Reverence  acknowledged  in  free  States. 

Import  of  this  Doctrine. 


Chap.  VI. 


Objections  Considered 


228 


Art.  906. 

907. 

908. 

909. 

910. 

911. 

912. 

913. 

914. 

915. 

916. 

917. 

918. 

919. 

920. 

921. 

922 

923. 

924. 

925. 

926. 

927. 

928. 


Paley’s  Objections. 

“  The  Social  Compact  not  a  Fact,  therefore 
useless.” 

It  may  be  useful,  though  not  a  Fact. 

It  is  a  Fact. 

“  Men  have  not  given  their  Consent  to  the  So¬ 
cial  Compact.” 

Consent  is  often  presumed. 

Paley  rejects  the  sacredness  of  the  Constitution. 

“  The  Social  Compact  forbids  putting  down 
Despotism.” 

All  Morality  forbids  Armed  Reform. 

“  The  Social  Contract  offers  arguments  for  Sedi¬ 
tion  not  more  than  Justice  or  Right  does. 

The  Social  Contract  did  not  tend  to  Sedition 
in  1688  ; 

Nor  in  Sacheverell’s  Trial; 

Nor  in  Burke’s  writings. 

The  Doctrine  of  “  The  People”  is  inapplicable. 

Attempts  to  apply  it  assume  a  Social  Contract. 

Whether  Government  is  to  be  upheld  for  its 
Benefits  ? 

Or  for  its  Utility  ? 

Paley’s  doctrine  of  Resistance 

Makes  Sedition  Blameless : 

Though  not  so  held  by  Paley. 

The  Constitution  is  referred  to  by  Paley, 

As  a  natural  Rule  of  Rights. 

Paley’s  sentiments  are  not  bounded  by  expedi¬ 
ency. 


VOL.  II 


B 


xiv 

Chap.  VII. 

Art.  929. 

930. 

931. 

932. 

933. 

934. 

935. 

936. 

937. 

938. 

939. 

940. 

941. 

942. 

943. 

944. 

945. 

946. 

947. 

948. 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Natural  Progress  of  Government  243 

\ 

The  Patriarchal  State. 

Aristocracy  of  Birth  and  Wealth. 

Hero  Sway  and  Piero  Worship  : 

Requires  to  be  succeeded  by  Reverence  for  Ideas. 
Government  of  Judges. 

National  Existence 
Demands  Kings. 

Difference  of  Classes 
Historically  established. 

Difference  of  Political  Rights  of  Classes. 

It  is  possible  that  the  King  may  do  wrong. 

Hence  Checks  and  Balances  needed. 

A  Senate. 

Political  Rights  of  the  People. 

Democracy  required. 

Monarchy,  Aristocracy,  and  Democracy  required; 
Though  one  of  these  may  be  obscure. 
Aristocracy  and  Democracy  tend  to  a  Struggle. 
Conservative  and  Movement  Party. 

The  Struggles  of  Parties  in  the  Assemblies. 


Chap.  VIII.  The  Representative  System  of 

Government  ....  254 


Art.  949.  The  Representatives  or  Estate  of  the  Commons. 

950.  Advantages  of  a  Representative  Body. 

951.  Advantages  to  the  People. 

952.  The  Representative  must  not  be  a  Delegate. 

953.  Parties  in  the  Representative  Body. 

954.  The  Progress  of  Order  and  Freedom  must  be 

gradual. 

955.  An  Upper  House  needed. 

956.  Struggles  of  Parties  may  lead  to  Revolution. 


Chap.  IX.  Actual  Progress  of  Government  in 

Ancient  Rome  and  in  England  .  259 


Art.  957.  Patricians  and  Plebs. 

958.  Roman  Constitution  at  its  best. 

959.  Italian  Claims  of  Political  Rights. 

960.  The  Emperor 

961.  Was  Absolute  and  Sacred. 

962.  The  Germans  were  Free. 

963.  The  German  Antrustiones  or  Vassi. 

964.  Land  held  as  Fief. 


CONTENTS. 


XV 

PAGE 


Art.  965.  The  Feudal  System. 

966.  New  Forms  of  Political  Struggle. 

967.  Anglo-Saxon  Wittenagemote. 

968.  Royal  Charters.  Magna  Charta. 

969.  Taxation  made  to  depend  on  Parliament. 

970.  Rise  of  the  House  of  Commons. 

971.  Importance  of  Parliament. 

972.  Privileges  of  Parliament. 

973.  Election  of  Members. 

974.  A  free  Constitution  established  in  England. 

975.  Testimony  of  Fortescue, 

976.  And  of  Philip  de  Comines. 

977.  The  Constitution  under  the  Tudors. 

978.  Testimony  of  Aylmer. 

979.  James  I.  Protestation  of  the  Commons. 

9S0.  Charles  I.  Petition  of  Right. 

981.  Recognition  of  the  Constitution  in  the  Common¬ 

wealth. 

982.  Charles  II.  Great  Power  of  Parliament. 

983.  The  Revolution  of  1688. 

984.  William  III.  Declai-ation  of  Rights. 

985.  Appropriation  of  the  Revenue  by  Parliament. 

986.  Act  of  Settlement. 

987.  Demand  of  a  Reform  of  Parliament. 

988.  Earlier  extensions  of  Parliament. 

989.  Kinds  of  Electors  of  Members. 

990.  The  Reform  Bill  of  1831. 

991.  The  Future. 


Chap.  X.  Duties  of  the  State  in  general 


284 


Art.  992. 

993. 

994. 

995. 

996. 


The  State  has  Duties. 

Proved  by  Examples. 

By  the  Influence  of  Associations  for  moral  and 
religious  Objects. 

By  the  Use  of  Oaths. 

Kinds  of  Duties  of  the  State. 


Chap.  XI.  Duties  of  the  State.  Justice  and 

Truth  ......  290 


Art.  997. 

998. 

999. 
1000. 
1001. 


External  Duties  of  Justice  and  Truth. 
Justice  in  the  State. 

Truth  in  the  State. 

Enforcement  of  Engagements. 

Of  Promises  of  Marriage. 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

ChAp.  XII.  Duties  of  the  State — Humanity.  293 


Art.  1002. 
1003. 
J  004, 

1005. 

1006. 

1007. 

1008. 

1009. 

1010. 
1011. 
1012. 

1013. 

1014. 

1015. 

1016. 

1017. 

1018. 

1019. 

1020. 
1021. 
1022. 

1023. 

1024. 

1025. 

1026. 


What  Rights  ought  the  State  to  give  ? 

It  ought  to  abolish  Slavery. 

To  improve  the  Condition  of  the  Lower  Orders. 
To  teach  Foresight  and  Thrift. 

Should  there  be  a  State  Provision  for  the  Poor  ? 
Yes,  in  necessary  Cases. 

But  so  as  not  to  encourage  Improvidence  and 
Idleness. 

The  Poor  may  be  employed  on  Public  Works. 
Relief  of  the  Poor  by  Parishes. 

What  if  the  number  of  Poor  be  very  great  ? 
There  is  a  tendency  to  throw  Labourers  out  of 
given  Employment ; 

But  a  tendency  to  multiply  Employments  ; 
Which  in  England,  has  gone  far  in  Agriculture, 
And  in  Manufactures: 

Yet  may  not  absorb  the  Population. 

Ought  the  People  to  limit  their  own  Numbers  ? 
Harshness  of  this  Advice. 

Is  Emigration  a  Resource  ? 

Not  generally. 

Relief  of  aged  and  infirm  Poor. 

Does  State  Relief  destroy  Private  Charity  ? 

Not  if  the  Relief  be  given  for  the  Citizens. 

As  appears  in  England. 

Charity  to  the  Poor  enjoined  by  Christian 
Teaching. 

Cruelty  to  Animals. 


Chap.  XIII.  Duties  of  the  State — Purity  .  311 


Art.  1027. 
1028. 

1029. 

1030. 

1031. 

1032. 

1033. 

1034. 


1035. 

1036. 


Marriage  must  be  sanctioned  and  elevated. 

May  Divorce  be  allowed  ? 

The  Principle  that  Marriage  is  merely  a  Con¬ 
tract, 

Fully  applied,  makes  Marriage  useless. 

The  Children’s  Interest  are  not  fully  provided 
for  by  a  Contract. 

Their  Case  different  under  Divorce  and  Widow 
hood. 

Is  an  Engagement  of  constant  Affection  absurd  r 

Laws  must  condemn,  but  not  necessarily  forbid. 
Divorce. 

Christ’s  Teaching  concerning  Divorce. 

This  view  does  not  reject  second  Marriages. 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  1037. 
1033. 

1039. 

1040. 

1041. 

1042. 

1043. 


xvji 

PAGE 

Punishment  of  Adultery. 

Incest. 

The  Ground  of  the  Law  is  Fraternal  Guardian¬ 
ship. 

The  Prohibited  Relations  may  vary. 

Supposed  physiological  ground  of  the  Law. 

May  a  man  marry  his  Deceased  Wife’s  Sister  ? 
Arguments  from  the  Consequences. 


Chap.  XIV. — Duties  of  the  State — Order  .  .  321 


Art.  1044. 

1045. 

1046. 

1047. 

1048. 

1049. 

1050. 

1051. 

1052. 

1053. 

1054. 

1055. 


1056. 

1057. 

1058. 

1059. 

1060. 


Of  Punishments. 

Punishments  are  Duties  of  the  State. 

Punishments  are  Moral  Lessons. 

This  appears  by  the  Lex  Talionis. 

Is  this  inconsistent  with  Modern  Laws  ? 

Nor  in  the  Case  of  aggravated  Punishments  for 
Facility  of  Crime  : 

Nor  for  Combination. 

Punishments  affect  the  moral  views  of  the 
People. 

Punishment  of  Coining  and  Forgery. 

Not  to  be  needlessly  severe. 

Necessary  severity  claims  public  sympathy. 

Want  of  public  sympathy  with  punishment 
produces  disorder. 

The  Feeling  against  Punishment  is  a  per¬ 
verted  one. 

Infamy  is  a  Punishment. 

Punishment  made  a  Discipline. 

Is  Capital  Punishment  necessary  ? 

Some  Punishments  are  directly  moral  Lessons. 

Punishments  are  very  imperfect  as  moral  Edu¬ 
cation. 


Chap.  XV.  How  can  the  State  educate  the 

People  ?  .  .  .  .  .  331 


Art.  1061 

1062. 

1063. 

1064. 

1065. 

1066. 
1067. 


The  State  cannot  conduct  Moral  Education 
directly, 

But  by  the  means  of  the  Religious  Teachers. 
Especially  Christian  Teachers. 

The  Terms  of  their  aid  to  be  defined. 

Religious  Education  requisite  for  the  preserva¬ 
tion  of  the  State. 

And  for  its  Higher  Duties. 

Can  the  State  educate  directly  ? 

2  b  2 


VOL.  II. 


XV111 


CONTENTS. 


Art.  1068. 
1069. 


Chap.  XVI. 


Art.  1070. 

1071. 

1072. 

1073. 

1074. 

1075. 

1076. 

1077. 
3078. 

1079. 

1080. 
1081. 
1082. 

1083. 

1084. 

1085. 

1086. 

1087. 

1088. 

1089. 

1090. 

1091. 

1092. 

1093. 

1094. 

1095. 

1096. 

1097. 

1098. 

1099. 
3100. 
1101. 
1102. 

1103. 

1104. 
1305. 
1106. 
1107. 


TAOE 

Only  when  the  State  and  Church  are  identified ; 
And  then,  imperfectly  only. 

The  Relations  of  the  Church  to  the 
State  .....  337 

Man  is  a  member  of  a  Political  and  a  Religious 
Community. 

Hence  we  must  consider  the  Relations  of  the 
two. 

First :  the  Polity  of  Indifference. 

Is  possible. 

But  full  of  danger. 

Second :  the  Polity  of  Protection. 

Its  supposed  advantages. 

Its  disadvantages.  Irreligion. 

Conflicts  between  the  Clergy  and  the  State. 
Higher  Education  made  atheistic  by  Indif¬ 
ference, 

Or  by  Sectarianism. 

Education  by  the  Voluntary  System  imperfect. 
A  mere  Secular  Education  worthless. 

Conflicts  between  the  Clergy  and  Ministry  of 
Education. 

Summary  of  the  Evils  of  mere  Protection. 
Third:  the  Polity  of  an  Established  Church 
Makes  the  State  Religious. 

Parishes. 

Bishops  and  Clergy. 

Historical  Rights  of  the  Clergy. 

Rights  of  the  State  over  the  Church. 

The  Legislature  must  be  friendly  to  the  Church. 
Tests.  Liturgies  and  Articles. 

The  Existence  of  Dissenters 
Makes  State  Education  difficult. 

Political  Struggles  of  Dissenters. 

The  Established  Church  can  educate  the  People. 
Ought  to  be  enabled  to  do  so. 

Ought  to  be  a  Home  Missionary. 

This  course  is  difficult ; 

But  ought  to  be  pursued  steadily. 

The  Established  Church  of  a  Minority, 

Leads  to  difficulty  if  not  extended. 

Several  Established  Churches  in  one  State. 

The  Governors  judge  of  Religious  Truth. 

Effects  of  Dissent  on  Political  Parties. 

The  Church  in  the  Colonies. 

Private  acts  of  members  of  the  Church 


CONTENTS.  Xix 

PAGE 

Art.  1108.  May  supply  defects  in  Public  Acts. 

1109.  Fourth:  the  Polity  of  Ecclesiastical  Supre¬ 

macy 

1110.  Has  the  advantage  of  an  Established  Church, 
111].  And  offers  a  Tribunal  for  States. 

1112.  Has  never  been  completely  accepted. 

1113.  Has  not  corresponded  to  the  Idea. 

1114.  The  Romish  Church  the  Ally  of  Despotism  or 

Democracy. 

1115.  Hence  political  violence. 

1116.  Papacy  contrary  to  the  progress  of  nations. 

1117.  An  Established  Church  the  best  Polity. 


Chap.  XVII.  Duty  of  the  Church  as  to  its  Rela¬ 
tions  to  the  State  .  .  371 


Art.  1118. 

1119. 

1120. 
1121. 
1122. 

1123. 

1124. 

1125. 

1126. 

1127. 

1128. 
.1 129. 

1130. 

1131. 

1132. 

1133. 

1134. 

1135. 


The  State  may  offer  Establishment. 

May  the  Church  accept? 

Texts  explained. 

Maintenance  of  Pastors. 

Dignity  of  Clergy. 

Texts  explained. 

Offices  held  by  Clergy. 

Supremacy. 

Foreign  Supremacy  may  be  held  ; 

But  not  by  caprice  of  Sovereign. 

Religious  grounds  of  the  Supremacy. 

St.  Peter’s  Primacy  is  false. 

The  Perpetuity  of  the  Office  is  false. 

The  Pope’s  Succession  is  false. 

Constant  Struggle  of  the  Pope  with  National 
Sovereigns. 

National  Churches. 

Established  Churches. 

Are  the  best  for  Nations. 


BOOK  VI. 

INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 
RIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS  BETWEEN  STATES. 
Chap.  I.  International  Law.  383 

Art.  1136.  Morality  applies  to  Nations. 


XX 

CONTENTS. 

PAOE 

Art.  1137. 

Hence  International  Jus. 

1138.. 

Which  implies  International  Law. 

1139. 

The  Law  of  Nations. 

1140. 

Jus  Gentium  and  Jus  JYaturce. 

1141. 

The  Law  of  Nations  improves  the 
Nature. 

Law  of 

1142. 

The  Law  of  Nature  improves  the 
Nations. 

Law  of 

1143. 

International  Law  is  progressive. 

1144. 

War  and  Peace  imply  a  moral  nature. 

Chap.  II.  The  Rights  of  War  ....  389 


Art.  1145. 

1146. 

1147. 

1148. 

1149. 

1150. 

1151. 

1152. 

1153. 

1154. 

1155. 
1150. 

1157. 

1158. 

1159. 

1160. 
1161. 
1162. 


A  Condition  previous  to  War  and  Peace. 

Bellum  est  contentio  publica,  armata,  justa.” 
War  involves  mutual  Obligations. 

Combatants  and  Non-combatants. 

Surrender. 

Assassins,  &c. 

Stratagems. 

Spies,  &c. 

Quarter,  & c. 

Storm. 

Contributions,  &c. 

Captures  at  Sea. 

Privateers,  &c. 

Towns  reduced  by  famine. 

Guerillas,  & c. 

Bombardment,  &c. 

Formalities  of  War. 

Other  Classes  of  International  Rights. 


Chap.  III.  International  Rights  of  Property  398 


Art.  1163.  Right  to  the  National  Territory. 

1164.  Prescription  valid  for  Nations. 

1165.  Right  of  Discovery. 

1166.  Right  of  Conquest. 

1167.  Maxims  respecting  Rights  of  Territory. 

1168.  Bays,  &c. 

1169.  A  league  from  Shore. 

1170.  The  King’s  Chambers. 

1171.  The  Narrow  Seas. 

1172.  A  River. 

1 173.  Rights  of  War  and  Rights  of  Commerce. 

1174.  “  Enemies’  ships  make  enemies’  goods.” 

1175.  “  Neutral  ships  make  neutral  goods,” 

1176.  The  Right  of  Blockade. 


CONTEXTS. 


XXL 

PAGE 


Art.  1177. 

.  PAGE 

Question  of  neutral  ships. 

1178. 

“  The  Rule  of  1756.” 

1179. 

The  Right  of  Search. 

Chap.  IV. 

International  Rights  of  Jurisdiction  406 

Art.  1180. 

Right  of  National  Jurisdiction. 

1131. 

Is  a  ship  part  of  the  National  Territory  t 

1 182. 

Piracy. 

1183. 

The  meaning  of  making  the  Slave-trade  Piracy. 

1184. 

Has  the  Slave-trade  been  made  Piracy  ? 

1185. 

The  Right  of  Mutual  Search. 

1186. 

Extra-national  Rights  of  States. 

1187. 

Two  maxims  of  International  Jurisdiction. 

1188. 

A  third  is  the  Comity  of  Nations. 

1189. 

Why  so  called. 

1190. 

Conflict  of  Laws. 

1191. 

Lex  loci  rei  sitce. 

1192. 

Lex  domicilii. 

1193. 

Definition  of  Domicile. 

1194. 

Lex  loci  contractus. 

1195. 

Lex  fori. 

1196. 

Right  of  holding  Land. 

1197. 

Droit  d'aubaine . 

1198. 

Laws  of  status. 

1199. 

As  to  Marriage. 

1200. 

Extradition  of  Criminals. 

1201. 

Allegiance. 

1202. 

May  Subjects  renounce  Allegiance  ? 

1203. 

Who  are  Subjects? 

1204. 

Local  Allegiance. 

Chap.  V.  ] 

International  Rights  of  Intercourse  419 

Art.  1205. 

National  Intercourse. 

1206. 

The  Right  of  Legation. 

1207. 

Recognition  of  Slates. 

1208. 

To  be  made  on  moral  grounds. 

1209. 

Kinds  of  Ministers. 

1210. 

Ambassadors. 

1211. 

Who  may  make  Treaties  ? 

1212. 

Conventions.  Fsedera. 

1213. 

Guarantee. 

1214. 

Intervention, 

1215. 

Moral  Progress  of  International  Law. 

1216. 

Prospect  for  the  Future. 

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BOOK  IV. 


RELIGION. 

OF  DIVINE  LAWS  AND  THEIR  SANCTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATURAL  RELIGION. 

566.  The  Moral  State  and  Moral  Progress  of 
each  man  are  maintained  by  his  conviction  of  certain 
Truths  which  are  the  foundations  of  Morality  ;  and 
among  these  Truths,  one  of  the  most  important  is 
this  :  that  the  course  of  action  which  is  his  Duty,  is 
also  his  Happiness,  when  considered  with  reference 
to  the  whole  of  his  being  (546).  This  conviction, 
men  for  the  most  part  derive  from  Religion  ;  that  is, 
from  their  belief  respecting  God,  and  his  govern¬ 
ment  of  Man.  We  believe  God  to  be  the  Governor 
of  Man,  as  a  moral  being  (93).  The  Moral  Law  is 
his  Command  ;  Conscience  is  his  voice  ;  He  sees 
and  knows  all  the  internal  actions  of  which  we  our¬ 
selves  are  conscious ;  He  possesses  an  unbounded 
power  to  determine  the  Happiness  or  Misery  of 
every  one  of  us  ;  He  exercises  this  power  so  as  to 
give  a  sanction  to  his  Laws  ;  appointing  misery  as 
the  punishment  of  transgressions,  and  making  a  con¬ 
formity  to  his  Laws  lead  us  to  Happiness ;  which  Hap¬ 
piness  will  continue  in  another  life  when  this  life  is 
past. 

YOL.  II. 


c 


26 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


This  is  Natural  Religion  ;  but  further,  as  we  have 
seen  (357),  we  require  to  be  taught  by  Religion  how, 
when  we  have  transgressed,  Repentance  and  Amend¬ 
ment  can  avail,  as  a  remedy  for  the  sin  committed  ; 
how  they  can  restore  the  health  of  man’s  moral  life, 
and  avert  from  man’s  condition  and  destination  the 
consequences  of  sin.  We  also  (367)  require  from 
Religion  the  hope  of  some  power,  in  addition  to  the 
ordinary  powers  of  our  own  minds,  which  is  to  be 
exercised  upon  us,  in  order  to  enlighten  and  instruct 
our  conscience,  and  to  carry  on  our  moral  progress. 
These  requirements  are  responded  to  by  Revealed 
Religion. 

567.  The  belief  which  constitutes  Natural 
Religion,  takes  possession  of  men’s  minds,  in  the 
course  of  their  intellectual  and  moral  progress.  The 
idea  of  God  is  unfolded  and  fixed,  and  the  points  of 
belief  which  we  have  stated,  are  established,  by  the 
intellectual  and  moral  culture  of  the  mind.  The 
steps  of  thought,  which  lead  to  these  points  of  belief, 
may  be  different  in  different  minds,  according  to  the 
course  which  their  intellectual  and  moral  culture 
takes.  In  the  mode  of  arriving  at  a  belief  in  God, 
and  in  his  moral  government,  the  procedure  of  one 
mind  is  not  a  rule  for  other  minds.  To  some  per¬ 
sons,  the  Truths  of  Natural  Religion  may  seem  to 
be  self-evident  ;  to  other  persons,  they  may  become 
more  evident,  when  connected  by  various  steps  of 
analogy  and  reasoning.  We  shall  state  some  of  the 
reasonings  respecting  God  and  his  Government, 
which  may  prove  the  doctrines  we  have  stated,  to 
the  satisfaction  of  those  persons  who  require  proofs 
of  them. 

We  proceed  with  these  reasonings. 

568.  From  the  existence  of  the  world,  we  ne¬ 
cessarily  infer  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being, 
who  is  the  Cause  of  the  world’s  existence.  The 
Assemblage  of  things  and  events  which  we  describe 


CHAP.  I.] 


NATURAL  RELIGION. 


27 


by  the  abstract  term  Nature,  directs  us  to  a  belief 
in  an  Author  of  Nature.  Everything  and  ever}'' 
event  must  have  a  Cause  ;  that  Cause  again  must 
have  its  Cause,  and  so  on.  But  this  Series  must 
terminate:  there  must  be  a  First  Cause.  This  Su¬ 
preme  Being,  this  Author  of  Nature,  this  First 
Cause,  is  God ;  the  Creator  of  the  World  and  of  all 
that  it  contains,  including  Man. 

569.  But  further  ;  in  many  things  which  exist, 
and  in  many  events  which  take  place  in  the  world, 
we  see  irresistible  evidence,  not  only  of  a  Cause,  but 
of  a  Final  Cause.  We  discern  an  End,  an  Inten¬ 
tion,  of  the  Creator  of  the  world.  Things  are  con¬ 
structed  so  as  to  answer  a  Purpose,  and  we  cannot 
help  believing  that  they  were  intended  to  answer  this 
Purpose.  The  eyes  are  made  so  that  we  can  see  ; 
and  on  examining  their  structure,  we  are  irresistibly 
led  to  believe  that  they  were  made  in  order  that  we 
might  see.  In  the  same  way  by  an  examination  of 
the  structure  of  man’s  body,  we  are  led  to  believe 
that  the  muscles  were  made  in  order  to  move  the 
limbs  ;  and  that  the  nerves  were  made,  among  other 
purposes,  in  order  to  excite  the  muscles  to  action. 

That  we  see  with  our  eyes  ;  that  the  nerves  ex¬ 
cite  the  muscles,  and  the  muscles  move  the  limbs  ; — 
these  are  Laws  of  our  Nature.  But  these  Laws 
indicate  the  Intention  of  the  Author  of  Nature. 
They  are  his  Laws;  the  manifestation  of  his  Pur¬ 
pose  ;  the  expression  of  his  Will. 

570.  The  Structure  of  our  Minds,  as  well  as 
of  our  bodies,  is  the  work  of  God  the  Creator.  Our 
Appetites,  Desires,  Affections,  Reason,  are  given  to 
us  by  him,  as  well  as  our  Organs,  Muscles,  Nerves, 
Brain.  And  in  the  structure  of  our  minds,  as  in 
that  of  our  bodies,  the  faculties  were  assigned  with 
intention  and  purpose.  It  was  intended  that  Appe¬ 
tite  should  operate  for  the  preservation  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual  ;  that  the  Affections  should  collect  men  into 


/ 

28  RELIGION.  [BOOK  IV. 

Families  and  Societies;  that  the  Reason  should  di¬ 
rect  and  control  both  the  Appetites  and  the  Affec¬ 
tions  ;  that  the  Sentiments  of  Approbation  and  Dis¬ 
approbation  should  aid  the  Reason  in  this  office.  It 
was  intended,  for  instance,  that  Shame  should  prevent 
our  doing  shameful  actions. 

571.  Further;  in  virtue  of  his  Reason,  man 
seeks  objects,  as  Means  to  Ends.  We  cannot  believe 
otherwise  than  that  it  was  intended,  by  his  Creator, 
that  he  should  do  this  ;  and  should  conform  to  Rules 
of  action,  derived  from  his  doing  this  (18).  It  was 
intended,  therefore,  that  he  should  conform  to  the 
Supreme  Rule  of  Action ;  which  is  a  necessary  condi¬ 
tion  of  these  subordinate  Rules  (72).  Consequently, 
this  Supreme  Rule  of  Action,  namely  the  Moral  Law, 
is  the  Law  intended  for  him  by  his  Creator.  The 
Moral  Law  is  the  Law  of  God,  and  the  Will  of  God. 

572.  The  Moral  Law  is  expressed  by  means 
of  certain  Moral  Ideas,  namely,  Benevolence,  Jus¬ 
tice,  Truth,  Purity,  and  Order  (232).  These  Ideas, 
therefore,  express  the  Will  of  God,  with  regard  to 
human  actions.  These  Ideas  were  given  to  man,  in 
order  that  he  might,  by  them,  direct  his  Actions. 
And  when  man  frames  his  internal  Standard  of  Ac¬ 
tion,  his  Conscience,  in  conformity  with  these  Ideas, 
his  internal  Standard  represents  the  Will  of  God  ; 
and  his  Conscience  may  be  considered  as  the  Voice 
of  God  (371). 

573.  But  again  ;  human  action  may  be  con¬ 
templated,  not  only  as  governed  by  Rules,  succes¬ 
sively  subordinate  to  each  other,  and  ultimately,  by 
a  Supreme  Rule ;  but  also,  as  directed  to  objects 
successively  subordinate  to  each  other,  and  ulti¬ 
mately  to  a  Supreme  Object  (73). 

The  Supreme  Object  of  human  action  is  Happi¬ 
ness.  Happiness  is  the  object  of  human  action  con¬ 
templated  in  its  most  general  form,  and  approved  by 
Reason  (544). 


CHAP.  I.J 


NATURAL  RELIGION. 


29 


The  Subordinate  Rules  of  human  action  are  en¬ 
forced  and  sanctioned  by  the  belief  of  success  or 
failure,  in  the  pursuit  of  some  corresponding  object. 
Thus,  the  Rule,  that  the  Appetites  must  be  controlled 
by  the  Reason,  is  enforced  by  our  expectation  of  ob¬ 
taining  health  and  comfort,  if  we  obey  the  Rule,  and 
of  forfeiting  these  benefits  if  we  disregard  the  Rule. 
In  like  manner,  the  Rule  that  we  must  respect  the 
Rights  of  all  men,  is  enforced  by  the  hope  of  Secu¬ 
rity  and  Tranquillity,  which  the  general  observance 
of  such  a  Rule  produces  ;  by  the  prospect  of  the 
Turbulence  and  Insecurity  which  exist  in  rude  states 
of  Society ;  and  by  the  fear  of  the  condemnation 
and  punishment  which,  in  more  settled  Society,  the 
violation  of  Rights  produces  to  the  offender. 

In  like  manner,  the  Supreme  Rule  of  Human  Ac¬ 
tion  is  enforced  and  sanctioned  by  a  belief  that  it 
leads  to  the  Supreme  Object  of  Human  Action.  As 
the  Rule  of  Temperance  points  to  Health  and  Com¬ 
fort  ;  as  the  Rule  of  Respect  for  Rights  points  to 
Security  and  Tranquillity ;  so  the  Supreme  Rule  of 
Rightness  points  to  Happiness,  which  includes  all 
other  objects ;  and  which  is  an  internal  Comfort  and 
Tranquillity  requiring  nothing  beyond  itself. 

574.  The  Subordinate  Rules  are  enforced  and 
sanctioned  by  the  belief  that  they  lead  to  their  re¬ 
spective  objects  ;  and  this  belief  is  confirmed  and 
verified  by  the  result.  Temperance  does,  as  a  gene¬ 
ral  Rule,  lead  to  Health  and  Comfort.  Respect  for 
legal  Obligation  does  maintain  social  Tranquillity 
and  individual  Security.  By  the  analogy  of  these 
Cases,  we  are  confirmed  in  our  belief  that  Moral 
Rightness  leads  to  Happiness. 

The  Rules  of  Human  Action,  approved  by  the 
Reason,  may  be  considered  as  Laws  given  to  man 
by  God  ;  and  the  Objects  of  Human  Action,  which 
are  foreseen  and  obtained  by  conforming  to  such 
Rules,  may  be  considered  as  Promises  to  man  made 


30 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


and  fulfilled  by  God.  The  general  declarations  of 
God  to  men,  made  through  his  Reason,  may  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  conditional  Promises.  “  If  you  are  tem¬ 
perate,  you  shall  be  healthy.”  “  If  you  conform  to 
the  laws  of  Society,  you  shall  enjoy  the  benefits  of 
Society.”  In  like  manner,  there  is  a  conditional 
Promise  made  to  man  through  his  Reason,  that  con¬ 
formity  to  the  Supreme  Rule  will  be  attended  with 
the  Supreme  Good  of  his  Nature.  “  If  you  are  vir¬ 
tuous,  you  shall  be  happy.”  And  as  the  Promises, 
thus  made  in  the  other  cases,  are  verified  by  the  re¬ 
sult,  we  are  led  to  believe,  by  analogy,  that  the  Pro¬ 
mise,  in  the  last  case,  will  also  be  verified  by  the 
result. 

Hence  the  results  of  obeying  and  violating  Moral 
Rules  of  Action,  made  known  to  us  by  our  Reason, 
may  be  considered  as  Rewards  and  Punishments 
appointed  by  God.  And  thus  we  are  led  to  look 
upon  Happiness  as  the  appointed  Reward  of  Virtue, 
and  Unhappiness  as  the  appointed  Punishment  of 
Vice. 

575.  We  conceive  not  only  Will  and  Purpose, 
as  residing  in  God,  but  also  Affections.  His  crea¬ 
tion  abounds  in  Contrivances,  which  have,  for  their 
objects,  the  health,  comfort,  and  enjoyment,  of  his 
creatures  ;  and  nowhere  exhibits  Contrivances  which 
have,  for  their  object,  pain  or  disease.  Hence,  we 
conceive  God  as  benevolent  towards  his  creatures. 
Moreover,  being  led,  as  we  have  just  said,  to  believe 
him  to  exercise  a  Moral  Government,  in  which  he 
rewards  Virtue  and  punishes  Vice,  we  conceive  him 
as  loving  virtuous  men,  and  hating  vicious  men ; 
and  as  loving  Virtue  and  hating  Vice,  in  the  abstract. 
We  conceive  Benevolence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purity 
and  Order,  as  the  objects  of  his  Love.  And  we  are 
thus  led  to  conceive  these  Ideas,  as  elements  in  our 
Idea  of  God.  We  conceive  him  as,  in  the  most 


CHAP.  I.] 


NATURAL  RELIGION. 


31 


perfect  degree,  Benevolent,  Just,  True,  Pure,  and 
Wise.  This  Moral  Perfection  is  Holiness. 

576.  Benevolence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purity,  and 
Order,  are  the  proper  objects  of  our  Love  (233)  ; 
and  therefore  God,  in  whom  these  Ideas  are  all  com¬ 
prehended,  is  the  proper  object  of  Love.  With  the 
Idea  of  God  in  our  minds,  the  Love  of  God  becomes 
a  part  of  our  Moral  Progress.  Our  belief  in  the  Holi¬ 
ness  of  God,  and  our  Love  of  Him,  confirm  and  uphold 
our  expectation  and  belief  that  Happiness  is  the  ap¬ 
pointed  Reward  of  Virtue,  and  Unhappiness  the 
appointed  Punishment  of  Vice. 

577.  The  expectation  and  belief  which  are  sup¬ 
ported  by  these  reasonings  and  analogies,  become 
constantly  stronger,  as  our  moral  and  intellectual 
culture  proceed.  But  though  men  have  such  a 
general  and  settled  expectation  and  belief,  that  Hap¬ 
piness  is  the  appointed  Reward  of  Virtue  ;  it  is  a 
matter  of  great  doubt  and  obscurity,  to  the  eye  of 
Reason,  in  what  manner  this  is  to  be  brought  to  pass. 
Some  have  taught  that  the  virtuous  man  is  always 
happy,  by  that  condition  of  his  mind  which  Virtue 
produces.  Some  have  inferred  that,  since  happiness 
is  not  always  the  Reward  of  Virtue  in  the  life  of 
men  ;  this  life  must  be  succeeded  by  another  life,  in 
which  the  Promise  is  fulfilled,  and  the  Reward  be¬ 
stowed.  They  have  taught  that  man  has  a  Soul, 
which  is  not  destroyed  by  the  accidents  which  hap¬ 
pen  to  the  body  ;  and  that  the  Soul,  surviving  the 
death  of  the  mortal  Body,  is  the  subject  of  God’s 
Rewards  and  Punishments  in  another  world. 

578.  The  doctrine  that  man  has  a  Soul,  of  which 
Consciousness,  Will,  Reason,  Affections,  Memory, 
Imagination,  are  Faculties,  as  Motion,  Sensation, 
Nutrition,  are  Faculties  of  the  Body,  has  been  gene¬ 
rally  believed  on  other  grounds  also.  I  am  conscious 
of  remaining  the  same  person ;  while  my  body  is 
constantly  changing  by  the  process  of  nutrition.  I 


32 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


will  certain  acts ;  in  which  the  body  is  only  the  in¬ 
strument  of  the  will.  I  reason  ;  and  in  doing  so, 
refer  to  Ideas,  or  principles  of  Reasoning,  common  to 
me  along  with  all  mankind  ;  these  Ideas  or  princi¬ 
ples  cannot  be  conceived  as  residing  in  the  body.  I 
love  my  parents,  my  brothers,  and  sisters,  my  chil¬ 
dren  ;  these  affections  do  not  belong  to  the  body.  By 
acts  of  duty,  habits  of  duty  and  virtue  are  formed  ; 
which  are  not  habits  of  mere  bodily  action.  And  by 
all  these  processes, — Will,  Reason,  Affection,  Acts 
of  Duty, — permanent  effects  are  produced  upon  our 
being,  which  can  be  understood  most  simply  as  effects 
produced  on  the  Soul.  It  is  the  Soul,  which  is  per¬ 
manently  affected  by  the  intellectual  and  moral  cul¬ 
ture  of  which  we  have  spoken  (293) ;  as  the  body  is 
permanently  affected  by  bodily  exercises.  It  is  the 
Soul,  which  is  tainted  and  distempered  by  transgres¬ 
sion  (349) ;  and  it  is  the  Soul  which  is  to  be  restored 
by  Repentance  and  Amendment,  if  restoration  be 
possible  (357).  It  is  the  Soul,  in  which  must  take 
place  the  constant  and  unlimited  moral  progress,  of 
which  we  have  spoken  (300)  :  which,  as  we  have 
said,  must  go  forwards  to  the  very  end  of  life.  And 
it  is  very  natural  to  suppose  that  by  this  Progress, 
the  Soul  is  fitted  for  Another  Life,  in  which  its  con¬ 
dition  will  correspond  with  the  nature  of  its  Moral 
Progress  in  this  life.  If  the  Soul  have  reached  a 
high  point  of  Moral  Progress  on  this  side  of  death, 
we  may  suppose  that  it  will,  on  the  other  side  of 
death,  if  not  on  this,  find  a  corresponding  state  of 
Happiness.  If,  on  the  contrary,  habits  of  virtue  have 
been  neglected,  transgressions  committed,  and  habits 
of  vice  formed  here,  the  Soul  must  be  unfitted  for 
enjoying,  hereafter,  any  Happiness,  such  as  we  can 
suppose  God  to  give  to  men’s  Souls. 

579.  Thus  we  are  led  to  believe  in  a  Future  State 
of  being,  in  which  God’s  Moral  Government  will  be 
carried  on  to  its  completion.  But  even  in  this  present 


CHAP.  II.] 


CHRISTIAN  REVELATION. 


33 


state  of  being,  we  must  conceive  ourselves  and  the 
world  to  be  under  the  Government  of  God.  God 
must  be  the  Governor,  as  he  is  the  Creator,  of  the 
world  ;  for  as  the  Creator,  he  formed,  and  placed  in 
it,  those  Springs  of  Progress  by  which  its  course  is 
carried  on  and  regulated.  We  cannot  help  believing 
that,  like  all  other  parts  of  the  Creation,  the  course 
of  the  world  of  human  doing  and  suffering  must  have 
a  Purpose  ;  and  this  Purpose  must  be  in  harmony 
with  the  Moral  Government  of  God,  to  the  belief  of 
which  we  have  already  been  led  (574).  The  Course 
of  this  world,  we  cannot  but  believe,  is  directed  by 
God’s  Providence.  It  is  a  Divine  Dispensation. 

580.  The  doctrines  of  Natural  Religion,  as  we 
have  stated  them,  thus  present  to  us  these  Ideas ;  the 
Moral  Government  of  God  and  his  Providence.  So 
far  as  we  borrow  our  Light  from  Natural  Religion, 
we  assume  these  Ideas,  of  Moral  Government  and 
Providence,  to  be  realized  in  the  World  to  Come  ; 
and  we  regard  this  world  as  the  Prelude  and  Prepa¬ 
ration  to  that.  But  we  cannot  reasonably  be  satisfied 
with  a  mere  Idea  of  the  Course  of  this  World.  We 
must  attend  to  the  Fact  also,  that  is,  to  the  History  of 
the  World  :  and  thus  we  are  led  to  Revealed  Religion. 


CHAPTER  II. 

CHRISTIAN  REVELATION. 

581.  The  Idea  of  the  Course  of  the  World,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Natural  Religion,  is,  that  it  is  directed  by 
God’s  Providence  so  as  to  be  in  harmony  with  his 
Moral  Government.  The  Fact  which  corresponds  to 
this  Idea  is  supplied  to  us  by  the  Scriptures  of  the 
Old  and  New  Testament. 

3 


VOL.  II. 


34 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


We  learn,  from  these  Scriptures,  that  besides  the 
transactions  of  men  with  men,  the  course  of  the  world 
has  also  included  transactions  of  God  with  men. 
There  have  taken  place,  in  the  History  of  the  World, 
Revelations  of  the  Commands  and  Promises  of  God, 
and  of  the  Methods  by  which  men  are  to  be  enabled 
to  obey  these  Commands,  and  to  receive  the  benefit 
of  these  Promises. 

The  central  point  of  these  Revelations  is  the  com¬ 
ing  of  Jesus  Christ  upon  Earth.  To  this  point,  all 
ancient  History  converges,  by  means  of  Early  Re¬ 
velations  ;  Prophecies ;  the  Selection  of  a  special 
nation,  the  Jews,  as  the  depositaries  of  Prophecy  ; 
and  the  successive  failure  of  all  attempts,  made  by 
moral  and  philosophical  teachers,  in  other  nations,  to 
solve  the  perplexities  of  man’s  condition,  by  the  light 
of  Reason,  without  the  aid  of  Revelation.  From  this 
point,  a  new  Dispensation  begins. 

582.  A  Revelation  was  made  from  God  to  man, 
through  Jesus  Christ.  And  this  Revelation  amply 
and  entirely  confirms  the  expectation  and  belief  which 
Natural  Religion  offers  to  us  (574,  578),  that  Hap¬ 
piness  is  the  appointed  Reward  of  Virtue,  Unhappi¬ 
ness  the  appointed  Punishment  of  Sin  ;  that  there  is 
a  life,  after  this,  in  which  this  Promise  and  this 
Threatening  are  realized ;  that  the  Soul  survives  the 
death  of  the  present  Body,  and  is  the  subject  of  God’s 
Rewards  and  Punishments  in  another  world. 

583.  Along  with  this  confirmation  of  the  ex¬ 
pectation  and  belief  which  Natural  Religion  offers, 
the  Revelation  made  to  man,  through  Jesus  Christ 
and  his  Disciples,  conveys  to  us  many  Precepts  of 
Duty,  and  Doctrines  concerning  the  grounds  of  Duty, 
and  concerning  the  best  means  of  attaining  Virtue. 
These  Precepts  and  Doctrines  confirm  the  Precepts 
and  Doctrines  of  Morality  which  we  have  delivered, 
as  far  as  these  go:  but  the  Christian  Revelation 
offers  to  us  mRny  Truths  concerning  the  grounds  of 


CHAP.  II.] 


CHRISTIAN  REVELATION. 


35 


Duty,  and  the  means  of  attaining  Virtue,  which 
Morality  alone  cannot  arrive  at.  These  Precepts 
and  Doctrines  constitute  Christian  Morality . 

584.  The  ground  of  our  Duty,  as  presented  to 
us  by  Religious  Teaching,  is,  that  it  is  the  Will  of 
God.  The  Will  of  God  is  the  Supreme  Rule  of  our 
Being. 

But  we  also  conceive  (517)  the  Ideas  which  are 
contained  in  the  Supreme  Rule  of  our  Being,  namely, 
Benevolence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purity,  and  Order,  as 
parts  of  the  Character  of  God.  Hence,  to  conform 
our  minds  to  those  Ideas,  is  to  conform  our  character 
to  the  Character  of  God.  To  approach  to  this  Cha¬ 
racter,  is  to  approach  to  the  Image  of  God  j  and  our 
Moral  Progress  may  be  spoken  of  as  an  approach  to 
the  Image  of  God.  But  in  using  such  language,  we 
must  ever  bear  in  mind  the  Supreme  Reverence 
which  is  due  to  God,  as  the  Perfect  and  Central 
Source  of  those  moral  qualities,  in  which  we  very 
imperfectly  and  distantly  participate. 

585.  The  Character  of  Jesus  Christ,  while 
upon  the  earth,  was  a  Human  Character  of  the 
highest  Benevolence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purit^,  and 
Obedience  to  Law.  In  his  Character,  we  have  the 
moral  perfections,  which  we  conceive  in  God,  embo¬ 
died  and  realized  in  man.  Hence,  the  Image  of  God 
in  Christ  is  the  summit  of  the  Moral  Progress,  which 
it  is  our  Duty  to  pursue  :  and  this  object  is  presented 
to  us  by  Christian  teaching,  as  the  aim  and  end  of 
our  moral  career. 

586.  But  Jesus  Christ  did  not  only  teach  the 
Will  of  God,  and  exemplify  the  highest  moral  excel¬ 
lence  of  man.  He  also  suffered  death  upon  the 
cross  ;  was  buried  ;  rose  again  the  third  day  ;  and 
ascended  into  heaven.  And  we  learn,  from  Christian 
teaching,  that  these  events  were  most  important  and 
essential  parts  of  the  New  Dispensation.  We  learn, 


RELIGION . 


[BOOK  IV. 


that,  through  the  efficacy  of  these  events,  we  may  be 
saved  from  the  consequences  of  our  sins. 

587.  This  part  of  Christian  doctrine  contains 
an  answer  to  the  inquiries  which,  as  we  have  already 
said,  the  Moralist  is  driven  to  make  of  the  Religious 
teacher,  respecting  the  efficacy  of  Repentance,  and 
the  provision  made  by  God  for  saving  man  from  the 
effects  of  sin  (357).  The  Christian  Revelation  speaks 
to  us  of  God’s  Pardon  and  Forgiveness  of  Sins, 
through  which  those  who  have  transgressed  and  re¬ 
pented  of  their  transgressions,  may  in  some  cases  be 
saved  from  the  punishment  of  sin,  and  restored  to 
his  favour.  It  teaches  us  also*  that  the  Rules  of 
God’s  Government  are  such  as  not  to  admit  of  par¬ 
don  directly  and  immediately  upon  Repentance,  or 
by  the  sole  efficacy  of  it.  But  it  teaches,  at  the 
same  time,  what,  without  a  Revelation,  we  could 
only  have  hoped,  that  the  Moral  Government  of  the 
world  from  the  beginning  was  such  as  to  admit  of 
an  interposition  which  might  avert  the  fatal  conse¬ 
quences  of  vice ;  and  that  vice,  by  that  means,  does 
admit  of  pardon.  Christian  Revelation  teaches  us, 
that  the  Laws  of  God’s  Government  are  compassion¬ 
ate,  as  well  as  simply  good  ;  and  that  he  has  provided 
an  interposition,  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  human 
kind  by  the  infliction  of  merited  punishment,  what¬ 
ever  that  destruction,  if  not  prevented,  would  have 
been.  It  was  a  part  of  the  teaching  of  Jesus  Christ, 
that  (John  iii.,  15)  God  so  loved  the  world ,  that  he 
gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth 
in  him  should  not  perish,  but  have  everlasting  life. 
God  sent  not  his  Son  into  the  world  to  condemn  the 
world,  but  that  the  world  through  him  might  be  saved. 
He  interposed  by  sending  his  son  Jesus  Christ,  so  as 
to  prevent  that  execution  of  justice  upon  Sinners, 
which  must  have  followed,  if  it  had  not  been  for  such 
interposition. 


*  Butler,  Anal.,  B.  ii.,  c.  5. 


CHAP,  n.j 


CHRISTIAN  REVELATION. 


37 


588.  Further:  the  Christian  Revelation  con¬ 
tains  important  teaching  upon  another  of  the  difficul¬ 
ties  of  Morality  (367) ;  namely,  the  means  provided 
for  carrying  on  our  moral  progress,  in  addition  to 
the  ordinary  powers  of  our  own  minds. 

Natural  Religion  suggests  to  us  (578),  that  by  this 
Progress  the  Soul  is  fitted  for  another  Life;  but  we 
learn  from  Christian  Revelation,  that  there  are  con¬ 
ditions  of  this  Progress,  of  which  Natural  Religion 
and  Morality  cannot  inform  us.  These  means  are 
described  to  be  ;  a  Belief  in  Jesus  Christ,  the  Son  of 
God ;  and  a  Participation  in  the  Spirit  which  God 
sent  upon  earth  at  his  coming,  and  infused  into  the 
Souls  of  his  Disciples.  In  the  same  portion  of 
Christian  teaching  to  which  we  have  already  refer¬ 
red,  it  is  said  (John  iii.,  18  and  3b),  He  that  believeth 
on  him  is  not  condemned  ;  but  he  that  believeth  not  is 
condemned  already ,  because  he  hath  not  believed  in  the 
name  of  the  only-begotten  Son  of  God.  .  .  .  He  that  be¬ 
lieveth  on  the  Son  hath  everlasting  life  ;  and  he  that 
believeth  not  the  Son  shall  not  see  life  :  but  the  wrath 
of  God  abideth  on  him.  Jesus  Christ  himself  said 
(John  iii.,  5)  :  Except  a  man  be  born  of  water  and  of 
the  Spirit,  he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God. 
He  promised  to  his  Disciples  a  Spirit  which  was  to 
guide  them  into  all  truth  (John  xvi.,  13).  They  were 
taught  that  it  helped  their  infirmities  (Rom.  viii.,  26). 
Hence  this  Spirit  was  called  the  Comforter  (John 
xiv.,  16),  and  was  to  dwell  in  them  (Rom.  viii.,  9) : 
and  when  Jesus  Christ  left  the  earth,  his  parting 
command  was  (Matth.  xxviii.,  19),  Go  ye  and  teach 
all  nations,  baptizing  them  in  the  name  of  the  Father, 
and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit  :  and,  lo,  I  am 
with  you  always  to  the  end  of  the  world. 

589.  By  the  help  of  the  means  thus  provided 
by  God,  and  by  the  aid  of  this  Spirit,  a  Christian  man 
is  led  to  approach  to  the  Image  of  God  in  Christ 
(524) :  he  is  in  a  special  sense  united  with  Christ,  as 

VOL.  II.  D 


38 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


the  branch  is  united  with  the  tree  (John  xv.,  5),  or 
as  the  members  are  united  with  the  body  (1  Cor. 
xii.,  27  ;  Eph.  v.,  30).  His  Soul  receives  nutriment 
from  Christ ;  which  is  expressed  by  saying,  that  he 
feeds  upon  Christ  (John  vi.,  51)  :  and  is  symbolically 
expressed  by  eating  bread  and  drinking  wine,  in  re¬ 
membrance  of  him  (Luke  xxii.,  19),  and  in  obedi¬ 
ence  to  his  command. 

590.  Believers  in  Christ,  thus  united  with  him, 
are  united  with  each  other,  as  members  of  a  living 
Body  (Rom.  xii.,  4 ;  1  Cor.  xii.,  12 ;  Eph.  iv.,  25). 
This  Body,  of  which  Christ  is  the  head,  is  the  Church 
(Col.  i.,  18).  He  is  the  head,  of  the  body  of  the  Church. 
To  this  Body,  thus  united  in  Christ,  belong  unity  in 
itself,  perpetual  existence,  and  the  possession  of  reli¬ 
gious  Truth,  through  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
This  Body  is  the  Universal  or  Catholic  Church  of 
Christ. 

591 .  The  Association  of  Believers  in  Christ, 
of  which  we  have  spoken,  the  Church,  is  bound  toge¬ 
ther  by  means  of  certain  habitual  formal  social  acts. 
There  is  one  such  act  by  which  members  of  the 
Church  are  admitted  into  it,  namely,  Baptism.  There 
is  another  such  act  by  which  they  commemorate 
their  union  with  Christ  according  to  his  Command, 
namely,  the  Lord’s  Supper.  There  are  acts  by  which 
they  express  their  affections  towards  God,  namely, 
acts  of  worship,  Prayer  and  Praise.  There  are  acts 
in  which  they  express  their  Christian  belief,  or 
receive  Christian  Instruction  from  their  Teachers  ; 
Profession  of  Faith,  and  Preaching.  All  these  are 
Christian  Ordinances. 

592.  The  Souls  of  men  are  often  also  called 
their  Spirits  ;  especially  when  they  are  considered  as 
the  subjects  of  God’s  government.  His  government 
extending  over  such  subjects  is  his  Spiritual  King¬ 
dom.  Hence  religious  matters  are  called  Spiritual : 
and  to  these,  as  the  concerns  of  an  eternal  world,  are 


CHA1\  111. J 


CHRISTIAN  MORALITY. 


39 


opposed  temporal  or  secular  matters,  which  belong 
only  to  time  or  to  this  world  ( tempus ,  seculum). 


CHAPTER  III. 

CHRISTIAN  MORALITY. 

593.  We  have  now  to  treat  of  Christian  Mo¬ 
rality  ;  not  as  being  a  different  Morality  from  that 
Rational  Morality  of  whicrh  we  have  hitherto  treated  ; 
but  as  throwing  new  light  upon  the  Morality  of  mere 
Reason,  and  giving  it  new  supports.  The  Christian 
Religion  recognizes  the  same  Duties,  which  we  have 
put  forward  on  grounds  of  Reason  ;  Duties  of  Bene¬ 
volence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purity,  Order ;  and  the 
general  Duty  of  Moral  and  Intellectual  Progress. 
But  the  Christian  Religion  invests  all  these  Duties 
with  new  Sanctions  ;  and  carries  our  Progress  much 
further,  by  making  it  not  only  a  moral  and  intellec¬ 
tual,  but  a  Religious  Progress.  The  Religious  Pro¬ 
gress  of  our  affections  and  thoughts  carries  us 
towards  a  condition,  in  which  all  Special  Duties  are 
the  necessary  development  and  manifestation  of  Re¬ 
ligious  Principles  of  Action.  If  we  had,  in  this  work, 
to  treat  of  Religion  as  our  primary  and  principal 
subject,  it  might  be  the  more  proper  course  to  begin 
with  Religious  Principles  of  Action,  and  from  them, 
to  deduce  Special  Rules  of  Action.  Such  is  the 
course  often  followed  by  Religious  Teachers.  But 
since  our  primary  and  principal  subject  is  Morality, 
we  shall  adopt,  in  treating  of  Religious  Morality,  that 
order  of  matters  which  we  have  already  found  to  be 
presented  to  us,  by  the  nature  of  our  subject. 

594.  We  may  add,  that  Christian  Teaching  no¬ 
where  presents  to  us  any  Authoritative  Scheme  or 


40 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


System  of  Duties  and  Principles,  which  we  reject,  in 
taking  the  guidance  of  our  own.  The  indications  of 
System,  in  the  notices  which  we  have  on  such  sub¬ 
jects,  in  the  New  Testament,  are  vague  and  various. 
Christ,  in  his  teaching,  recognizes  the  division  of  Du¬ 
ties,  into  Duties  towards  God,  and  Duties  towards 
our  neighbours.  Matt,  xxii.,  37  :  Thou  slialt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart ,  and  with  all  thy  soul, 
and  with  all  thy  mind.  This  is  the  first  and  great  com¬ 
mandment.  And  the  second  is  like  unto  it :  Thou  shall 
love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself  '.  On  these  two  command¬ 
ments  hang  all  the  Law  and  the  Prophets.  And  in 
like  manner,  in  Mark  xii.,-30.  This  is  said  of  the 
Law  of  Moses  ;  but  it  is  spoken  of  that  Law  as  be¬ 
ing,  what  in  the  apprehension  of  the  Jews  it  was,  a 
complete  body  of  human  Duties.  We  shall  explain 
our  Duties  towards  God,  when  we  come  to  speak  of 
our  Religious  Culture.  Taking  the  Ten  Command¬ 
ments  as  the  summary  of  the  Law  of  Moses,  the  first 
four  refer  to  Duties  towards  God.  The  fifth,  sixth, 
seventh,  eighth  and  ninth  commandments,  declare 
Obligations,  rather  than  Duties.  We  have  already 
referred  to  the  Rules,  Thou  shalt  obey  thy  Parents  ; 
Thou  shall  not  kill ;  Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery  ; 
Thou  shalt  not  steal ;  Thou  shalt  not  utter  a  solemn 
falsehood  ;  as  expressions  of  the  Rights  of  Obedience, 
Personal  Security,  Marriage,  Property,  Contract. 
The  tenth  commandment,  Thou  shalt  not  covet ,  is, 
however,  a  Moral  Precept,  and  not  a  Law,  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term. 

595.  The  Christian  teachers  justly  considered 
that  Obligations  are  included  in  Duties,  and  do  not 
need  to  be  separately  enjoined  by  the  Moralist.  They 
also  conceived  all  Duties  to  be  included  in  the  Duty 
of  Benevolence.  Thus  St.  Paul  says  (Rom.  xiii.,  8), 
Owe  no  man  anything  (that  is,  reckon  no  Duty),  but 
to  love  one  another.  He  that  loveth  others  hath  ful¬ 
filled  the  Law.  This,  Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery, 


CHAP.  III.]  DUTIES  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 


41 


Thou  shalt  not  kill,  Thou  shalt  not  steal,  Thou  slialt 
not  hear  false  witness,  Thou  shalt  not  covet,  and  if 
there  he  any  other  commandment,  it  is  brief  y  compre¬ 
hended  in  this  saying,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour 
as  thyself.  When  we  come  to  treat  of  our  religious 
progress,  we  shall  have  to  speak  of  this  Benevolence 
or  Love,  as  a  Christian  Principle  of  action. 

596.  In  following  out  the  moral  Principles  of 
action  into  their  results,  in  special  Duties,  the  Rela¬ 
tive  Duties  formerly  mentioned  (278)  are  naturally 
arranged  according  to  the  Relations  to  which  they 
belong.  Accordingly,  we  have  enumerations  of  the 
principal  Relations,  with  their  corresponding  Duties, 
in  various  parts  of  the  New  Testament;  especially 
in  the  two  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  to  the  Ephesians 
(chap,  vi.),  and  to  the  Colossians  (chapters  ii.,  iii). 
These  two  enumerations  agree  very  nearly  :  and 
state  the  Relative  Duties  of  Wives  and  Husbands; 
Children  and  Parents;  Servants  and  Masters.  In 
the  Epistle  to  the  Romans  (chap,  xiii.),  we  have  the 
relative  Duties  summarily  enjoined  ;  Render  unto  all 
their  dues  ;  with  an  especial  notice  of  the  Duty  of 
Obedience  to  government. 

Duties,  as  enjoined  upon  us  by  Christian  teaching, 
and  on  Christian  grounds,  are  Christian  Duties. 

597.  We  shall  now  proceed  to  collect  the 

principal  Precepts  with  regard  to  Duties,  which  oc¬ 
cur  in  the  New  Testament :  arranging  them  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Heads  of  Duty  which  we  have  already 
found  it  convenient  to  adopt :  namely  ;  Duties  of  the 
Affections :  Duties  respecting  Property  and  other 
objects  of  Desire :  Duties  connected  with  Truth  : 
Duties  connected  with  Purity :  Duties  of  Obedience 
and  Command.  We  had,  besides  these,  to  speak  of 
Intellectual  Duties,  and  in  doing  this  we  were  led  to 
speak  of  man’s  Moral  Education  and  of  Religion,  as 
a  necessary  part  of  this  (565).  The  Duties  thus 
arising  have,  for  their  object,  man’s  Religious  Pro¬ 
gress.  d  2 


42 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

CHRISTIAN  PRECEPTS  CONCERNING  DUTIES  OF 
THE  AFFECTIONS. 

598.  The  Christian  Precepts  concerning  Du¬ 
ties  of  the  Affections  include  the  Moral  Precepts 
formerly  given  (273 — 282) ;  but  carry  the  teaching 
farther,  both  as  to  its  requirements  and  its  motives. 
Beginning  from  the  obligation  to  abstain  from  all 
violence,  these  precepts  inculcate  the  duty  of  con¬ 
trolling  and  repressing  all  intention  of  violence,  and 
the  affections  which  give  rise  to  such  intentions  :  they 
inculcate  also  the  duty  of  fostering  and  exercising 
affections  of  good-will  with  corresponding  intentions 
and  actions.  They  enjoin  the  virtues  which  consist 
in  the  habits  of  such  affections,  intentions,  and  ac¬ 
tions.  These  duties  and  these  virtues  are  enforced 
by  motives  depending  upon  religious  truths.  Some 
of  these  Precepts  are  the  following. 

599.  In  Matth.  v.,  21,  Christ  says,  Ye  have 
heard  it  was  said  hy  them  of  old  time ,  Thou  shalt  not 
kill ,  and  whosoever  shall  kill  shall  he  in  danger  of  the 
judgment.  This  is  the  command  of  law ;  but  the 
precept  of  duty  goes  much  further  :  Whosoever  shall 
he  angry  with  his  brother  man  without  a  cause ,  or  who 
shall  use  reviling  and  contemptuous  words  to  him, 
shall  he  in  danger  of  the  judgment  of  God  and  the  fire 
of  hell.  And  again,  ver.  24,  Leave  thy  gift  before 
the  altar ,  and  go  thy  way :  first  he  reconciled  to  thy 
brother ,  and  then  come  and  offer  thy  gift ,  and  hope  for 
the  favour  of  God.  And  these  duties  extend  to  ad¬ 
versaries  as  well  as  to  friends.  Thus,  ver.  25,  Agree 
with  thine  adversary  quickly  whiles  thou  art  in  the  way 
with  him.  Be  ready  to  dismiss  thine  enmity,  and  to 
disclaim  it  on  the  first  occasion.  It  is  a  duty  to  dis¬ 
miss  from  our  hearts  all  desires  of  revenge  and 


CHAP.  IV.]  DUTIES  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 


43 


retaliation.  Thus,  ver.  38,  Ye  have  heard  that  it 
hath  been  said  (in  the  Law  of  Moses),  An  eye  for  an 
eye  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth  ;  hut  I  say  unto  you ,  that 
ye  make  not  any  such  rule  the  measure  of  your 
affections.  Instead  of  retaliating  evil,  be  ready  to 
submit  to  it.  Resist  not  evil ;  but  whosoever  shall 
smite  thee  on  the  right  cheek ,  turn  to  him  the  other 
also.  Suppress  all  emotions  of  anger,  even  such  as 
are  excited  by  personal  violence,  so  far  as  your 
personal  resentments  are  concerned.  Not  only  is 
anger  to  be  thus  suppressed,  but  the  opposite  affec¬ 
tion  of  love  is  to  be  entertained  instead.  Thus, 
ver.  43,  Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said ,  Thou 
shalt  love  thy  neighbour  and  hate  thine  enemy  :  but  I 
say  unto  you,  Love  your  enemies.  Bless  them  that 
curse  you  ;  do  good  to  them  that  hate  you ,  and  pray 
for  them  that  despitefully  use  you  and  persecute  you  ; 
that  ye  may  be  the  children  of  your  Father  which  is  in 
heaven  :  for  he  maketli  his  sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and 
on  the  good ,  and  sendeth  rain  on  the  just  and  the  un¬ 
just.  These  precepts  are  also  recorded  in  St.  Luke 
vi.,  29 — 35,  where  they  are  summed  up  with  this 
(verse  36),  Be  ye  merciful ,  as  your  Father  also  is 
merciful. 

609.  The  like  precepts  against  revenge  and 
anger  are  given  by  the  Apostles  of  Christ.  Thus  St. 
Paul  says  to  the  Romans  (xii.,  19),  Dearly  beloved , 
avenge  not  yourselves ,  but  rather  give  place  unto 
wrath  :  (either,  give  way  to  the  wrath  of  an  adver¬ 
sary,  or  rather  leave  the  punishment  of  wrong  to 
God  ;  according  to  what  follows  :)  for  it  is  written , 
Vengeance  is  mine ;  I  will  repay ,  saith  the  Lord. 
In  like  manner  he  writes  to  the  Thessalonians  (1 
Thess.  v.,  14),  Be  patient  toward  all  men  :  see  that 
none  render  evil  for  evil  to  any  man.  And  St.  Peter 
(1  Pet.  iii.,  9)  says  the  same  thing,  Not  rendering 
evil  for  evil ,  or  railing  for  railing  :  but  contrariwise , 
blessing  ;  knowing  that  ye  are  thereunto  called  that  ye 


44 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


should  inherit  a  blessing.  St.  James  (i.,  19)  says, 
Let  every  man  be  slow  to  wrath  :  for  the  wrath  of 
man  worketh  not  the  righteousness  of  God.  St.  Paul 
says  to  the  Ephesians  (Eph.  iv.,  31),  Let  all  bitter¬ 
ness,  and  wrath,  and  anger,  and  clamour  be  put  away 
from  you,  with  all  malice.  He  gives  the  same  in¬ 
junction  in  nearly  the  same  words  to  the  Colossians 
(Col.  iii.,  8).  To  the  Corinthians  he  says  (1  Cor. 
xiv.,  20),  In  malice  be  ye  children,  but  in  understand¬ 
ing  be  ye  men.  He  calls  the  angry  affections  carnal  ( 1 
Cor.  iii.,  3  ;  so  St.  James  iv.,  1) ;  and  speaks  of  the 
works  of  the  fiesh  (Gal.  v.,*19),  among  which  he 
mentions  hatred,  variance,  wrath,  strife,  seditions, 
heresies,  envyings,  murders.  The  forgiveness  of  in¬ 
juries  is  inculcated.  Christ  taught  his  disciples 
(Matt,  vi.,  14),  If  ye  forgive  men  their  trespasses, 
your  heavenly  Father  will  also  forgive  you  :  but  if  ye 
forgive  not  men  their  trespasses,  neither  will  your 
Father  forgive  your  trespasses.  And  accordingly, 
St.  Paul  says  (Col.  iii.,  12),  Put  on  therefore,  as  the 
elect  of  God,  holy  and  beloved,  bowels  of  mercies, 
kindness,  humbleness  of  mind,  meekness,  longsuffer - 
ing  ;  forbearing  one  another,  and  forgiving  one 
another,  if  any  man  have  a  quarrel  against  any  ;  even 
as  Christ  forgave  you,  so  also  do  ye. 

601.  The  opposite  affection,  Love,  is  incul¬ 
cated  by  Christ,  at  first  as  including  in  its  spirit  our 
obligations  towards  men :  as  in  Matth.  xix.,  19,  and 
xxii.,  39.  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself  : 
on  these  commandments  hang  all  the  Law  and  the 
Prophets.  So  Mark  xii. ,  31.  Yet  in  referring  to 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  affection  which  he  en¬ 
joined,  he  called  it  a  new  commandment.  (John 
xiii.,  34),  A  new  commandment  I  give  unto  you,  That 
ye  love  one  another  ;  as  I  have  loved  you,  that  ye  also 
love  one  another :  which  again  is  repeated  John  xv., 
12,  and  again  xv.,  17.  Accordingly  St.  John  often 
repeats  such  injunctions  in  his  Epistles ;  as  1  John 


CHAP.  IV.]  DUTIES  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 


45 


iii.,  11.  This  is  the  message  that  ye  heard  from  the 
beginning ,  that  we  should  love  another.  And  so,  2 
John  5,  and  1  John  ii.,  7.  Though  the  command¬ 
ment  was  old,  the  light  which  Christ  had  brought 
into  the  world  made  it  new.  1  John  ii.,  8,  A  new 
commandment  I  write  unto  you ,  because  the  dark¬ 
ness  is  past  and  the  true  light  now  shineth.  He  that 
saith  he  is  in  the  light ,  and  hateth  his  brother ,  is  in 
darkness  even  until  now.  He  that  lovetli  his  brother 
abideth  in  the  light.  But  he  that  hateth  his  brother  is 
in  darkness.  Again,  1  John  iv.,  7,  Beloved ,  let  us 
love  one  another  :  for  love  is  of  God  ;  and  every  one 
that  loveth  is  born  of  God ,  and  knowetli  God.  He 
that  loveth  not  knoweth  not  God ;  for  God  is  love. 
And  after  referring  to  the  love  of  God  for  us  as 
shown  in  his  sending  his  Son  to  be  the  propitiation  for 
our  sins ,  he  adds,  ver.  11,  Beloved ,  if  God  so  loved 
us,  we  ought  also  to  love  one  another. 

St.  John  extends  his  injunctions  to  actions  (1  John 
iii.,  18,  17,  16),  My  little  children,  let  us  not  love  in 
word,  neither  in  tongue,  but  in  deed  and  in  truth. 
Whoso  hath  this  world’s  goods,  and  seeth  his  brother 
have  need,  and  shutleth  up  his  bowels  of  compassion 
from  him,  how  dwelleth  the  love  of  God  in  him  ?  We 
ought  to  lay  doivn  our  lives  for  the  brethren.  In  the 
same  manner,  St.  Paul  says  (Rom.  xiii.,  8,  9,  10, 
and  Gal.  v.,  14),  that  all  the  commandments  are  com¬ 
prehended  in  this  one  saying,  Thou  shalt  love  thy 
neighbour  as  thyself :  that  he  that  loveth  another  hath 
fulfilled  the  Law  :  for  he  adds  (Rom.  xiii.,  10),  Love 
worketh  no  ill  to  his  neighbour,  therefore  love  is  the 
fulfilling  of  the  law.  To  the  Ephesians  he  says 
(Eph.  v.,  2),  Walk  in  love,  as  Christ  also  hath  loved 
us.  To  the  Thessalonians  (1  Thess.  iii.,  12),  The 
Lord  make  you  to  increase  and  abound  in  love  one 
tovmrds  another  :  and  in  many  other  places  St. 
James  calls  the  precept  above  referred  to  a  Royal 
Law,  as  governing  all  our  duties.  James  ii.,  8,  If 


46 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


ye  fulfil  the  royal  law  according  to  the  Scripture,  Thou 
shall  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself,  ye  do  well. 

602.  The  affection  here  inculcated  is  described 
also  by  other  names,  as  brotherly  love  (cpiXade'Xcpia) 
(Heb.  xiii.,  1).  The  term  particularly  used  by  the 
Apostles,  and  especially  by  St.  Paul,  is  that  which 
we  usually  translate  charity  ( ayairn ,  translated  in  the 
Latin  charitas ,  from  charus  or  carus,  whence  charity ). 
St.  Paul  (1  Cor.  xiii.,  4)  describes  this  affection ; 
Charity  suffereth  long ,  and  is  kind ;  envieth  not ; 
vaunteth  not  itself ;  is  not  puffed  up  ;  doth  not  seek 
her  own  ;  is  not  easily  provoked  ;  thinketh  no  evil ; 
[ beareth  all  things  irdvra  crfyei ;]  hopeth  all  things  ; 
enduretli  all  things.  And  this  virtue  he  describes  as 
a  proper  object  of  Christian  pursuit  (1  Cor.  xiv.,  1), 
Follow  after  Charity.  (Col.  iff.,  14),  Above  all  these 
things,  put  on  charity,  which  is  the  bond  of  perfect¬ 
ness.  So  1  Tim.  vi.,  11,  2  Tim.  iff,  22,  where  the 
word  is  the  same,  though  translated  love  in  the  former 
place.  So  Peter  (2  Pet.  i.,  7),  Add  to  brotherly 

kindness,  charily  ( im%opriyr)oaTC...lv  tv  <pi\ade\({>ia  ayonrriv ) 

as  an  additional  step  in  Christian  virtue.  And  this 
is  the  word  which  is  translated  love  in  many  of  the 
passages  above  quoted,  as  1  John  iv.,  8,  6  0£«f  ay  dm] 

early. 

Other  terms  are  also  used  for  the  affections  of 
this  kind.  Thus,  Matth.  v.,  7,  Blessed  are  the  mer¬ 
ciful,  for  they  shall  obtain  mercy  ( l\d]poves :  but  in 
Luke  vi.,  36,  the  Greek  word  is  oiKTippovei).  H^ay^va 
o'lKTippuv,  bowels  of  mercies ,  are  enjoined  (Col.  iff., 
12).  In  1  Pet.  iff.,  8,  we  have  a  similar  expression 
translated  pitiful  (even \ay%voi) ;  but  Eph.  iv.,  32, 
tender-hearted.  Compassionate,  avpnaQe'is  (1  Pet.  iff., 
8),  is  a  term  also  used. 

603.  The  word  for  pity  (iXcnpoorvvr,')  came  to 
signify  the  evidence  of  pity  which  is  given  by  bounty 
to  the  poor.  It  had  this  signification  among  the 
Jews.  So  Matth.  i.,  1,  Take  heed  that  ye  do  not 


CHAP.  IV. j  DUTIES  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 


47 


your  alms  before  men  to  be  seen  of  them.  The  word 
alms  is  contracted  from  tAc^oo-uj/E,  eleemosyne  ;  as  is 
the  case  with  the  corresponding  words  in  other  Eu¬ 
ropean  languages  (Ital.  Elimosina,  Lmiosina.  Span. 
Limosna.  Old  Fr.  Almosne,  Aujnosne,  whence  mo¬ 
dern  Fr.  Aumone.  German  Almosen.  Anglo-Saxon 
JElmesse ,  LElmes).  In  Luke  xi.,  41  ;  xii.,  33,  we 
have  give  alms.  (So  Actsiii.,  2  ;  ix.,  36  ;  x.,  2,  4, 
31  ;  xxiv.,  17.)  In  like  manner  the  word  charity  in 
English  is  often  used  in  the  sense  of  alms. 

604.  Meekness  is  a  Christian  virtue  often  en¬ 
joined.  Thus  Matth.  v.,  5,  Blessed  are  the  meek,  for 
they  shall  inherit  the  earth  ( ol  vpads).  And  xi.,  29, 
Learn  of  me,  for  I  am  meek  and  lowly  in  heart :  and 
ye  shall  find  rest  unto  your  souls.  St.  Paul  (Gal.  v., 
23)  enumerates  meekness  among  the  fruits  of  the 
spirit,  and  enjoins  it  in  many  places  (Gal.  vi.,  1 ; 
Eph.  iv.,  2;  Col.  iii.,  12;  1  Tim.  vi.,  11  ;  2  Tim. 

11.,  25 ;  Tit.  iii.,  2  ;  Jam.  i.,  21,  and  iii.,  13  ;  1  Pet. 

111.,  15). 

605.  We  are  to  be  meek  as  to  our  own  claims, 
and  attentive  to  the  claims  of  others.  (Phil,  ii.,  4), 
Look  not  each  man  on  his  own  things,  but  each  on  the 
things  of  others.  (Eph.  v.,  21),  Submitting  your¬ 
selves  one  to  another  in  the  fear  of  God.  (1  Pet.  v., 
5),  Yea,  all  of  you  be  subject  one  to  another,  and  be 
clothed  with  humility.  (Phil,  ii.,  3),  In  lowliness  of 
mind  let  each  esteem  other  better  than  themselves. 
(Rom.  xii.,  10),  Be  kindly  affectioned  one  to  another 
( <tu\oaTopyoi ),  with  brotherly  love,  in  honour  preferring 
one  another.  So  (Rom.  xiii.,  7),  Render  honour  to 
whom  honour  is  due.  Which  St.  Peter  (1  Pet.  ii.,  17) 
puts  more  largely,  Honour  all  men.  The  expression 
of  this  feeling  is  courtesy.  (1  Pet.  iii.,  8),  Be  courte¬ 
ous  (<[>i\6(ppov£s).  Other  marks  of  good  will  are  in¬ 
culcated  ;  as  to  exercise  hospitality  (1  Pet.  iv.,  9), 
Use  hospitality  one  to  another  without  grudging  :  to 


48 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


avoid  quarrels.  (Rom.  xii.,  18),  If  it  be  possible , 
as  much  as  lieth  in  you,  live  peaceably  with  all  men. 

606.  The  above  precepts  condemn  anger  when 
it  is  caused  by  something  which  thwarts  our  desires. 
But  religion,  as  well  as  morality,  encourages  virtu¬ 
ous  indignation  against  what  is  wrong ;  and  permits 
the  expression  of  this  affection  by  words  and  acts. 
Of  this  we  have  examples  in  Jesus  Christ  himself 
(Mark  iii.,  5),  He  looked  round  about  him  on  them 
with  anger,  being  grieved  at  the  hardness  of  their 
hearts.  And  the  like  feeling  is  expressed  (Matth. 
xxiii.,  13 — 17)  in  words,  where  he  says.  Woe  unto 
you,  Scribes  and  Pharisees,  hypocrites  ;  Woe  unto  you 
blind  guides  ;  Ye  fools  and  blind.  And  this  lan¬ 
guage  he  uses  even  to  his  disciples  (Luke  xxiv.,  25), 
O  fools  and  slow  of  heart  to  believe  all  that  the  pro¬ 
phets  have  spoken.  St.  Paul  uses  the  like  language 
(Gal.  iii.,  1),  O  foolish  Galatians,  who  hath  bewitched 
you,  that  ye  should  not  obey  the  truth.  St.  James’s 
expression  is  nearly  equivalent  (Jam.  ii.,  20),  Wilt 
thou  know,  O  vain  man,  that  faith  without  works  is 
dead.  We  have  the  like  feeling  expressed  in  act 
(John  ii.,  15),  When  he  had  made  a  scourge  of 
small  cords,  he  drove  them  out  of  the  temple,  and 
poured  out  the  changers’  money,  and  overthrew  the 
tables -  St.  Paul  recognizes  blameless  anger,  and 
only  limits  its  duration  (Eph.  iv.,  26),  Be  ye  angry 
and  sin  not ;  let  not  the  sun  go  down  upon  your  wrath. 
And  to  the  Corinthians  (2  Cor.  vii.,  11)  he  reckons 
certain  feelings  of  this  kind  among  the  results  of 
godly  sorrow.  What  carefulness  it  wrought  in  you, 
yea,  what  clearing  of  yourselves,  yea,  what  indigna¬ 
tion,  yea,  what  fear,  yea,  what  vehement  desire,  yea , 
what  zeal,  yea,whatrevenge.  (  touy]v  cirov&hv,  aW a  airoXoyiav, 
a\\a  (lyav&KTriaiv,  aXXa  (pofiov,  aXXa  lirin66ri<Tiv,  aXXa  £rjXov,  aXXa 

IkSiktioiv).  And  he  rejoices  that  they  had  vindicated 
themselves  with  such  feelings.  Indignation,  and 
carefulness,  or  earnestness,  are  here  combined  with 


CHAP.  IV.]  DUTIES  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 


49 


zeal ;  which  is  often  mentioned  as  a  term  of  praise 
(Rom.  x.,  2),  I  bear  them  (the  Jews)  record ,  that 
they  have  a  zeal  of  God ,  but  not  according  to  know¬ 
ledge.  So  (2  Cor.  ix.,  2),  Your  zeal  hath  ■provoked 
many.  And  so  in  other  places  (Acts  xii.,  3,  Phil, 
iii.,  6),  Zeal  is  spoken  of  approvingly,  so  far  as  it 
is  Zeal,  though  condemned  as  Mistaken  Zeal.  The 
term  is  used  with  reference  to  special  objects.  Thus 
to  the  Corinthians  (1  Cor.  xiv.,  12),  Forasmuch  as 
ye  are  zealous  of  spiritual  gifts ,  seek  that  ye  may 
excel  to  the  edifying  of  your  church.  (Tit.  ii.,  14), 
He  gave  himself  for  us  that  he  might  redeem  us  from 
all  iniquity ,  and  purify  unto  himself  a  peculiar  people 
zealous  of  good  works. 

607.  Earnestness  is  enjoined  in  other  expres¬ 
sions,  as  (2  Cor.  viii.,  16),  God  put  the  same  earnest 
care  in  the  heart  of  Titus  for  you  (<nroi<J<>).  (Heb.  ii., 
1),  We  ought  to  give  the  more  earnest  heed  to  the 
things  which  we  have  heard ,  lest  at  any  time  we  let 
them  slip  (irtpiacortpus  hpas  itpoce^tiv).  (Jude  3),  Be¬ 
loved,  when  I  gave  all  diligence  to  write  unto  you  of 
the  common  salvation,  it  was  needful  for  me  to  write 
unto  you  and  exhort  you  that  ye  should  earnestly  con¬ 
tend  for  the  faith  which  teas  once  delivered  unto  the 
saints  (htayavi^aBat).  Expressions  including  the  no¬ 
tion  of  striving  and  contending  are  often  used.  As 
(Luke  xiii.,  24),  Strive  to  enter  in  at  the  strait  gate 
(dyuvtSecOe).  So  1  Tim.  vi.,  12,  Fight  the  good  fight 
of  faith,  lay  hold  on  eternal  life  (uyu>vi£ov  top  Ka\dv  ayuva.) 
And  2  Tim.  iv.,  7,  I  have  fought  a  good  fight,  I  have 
finished  my  course ,  I  have  kept  the  faith.  (Col.  i., 
29),  That  we  may  present  every  man  perfect  in  Christ 
Jesus.  Whereunto  I  also  labour,  striving  according 
to  his  working,  which  worketh  in  me  mightily  (dywvi$6- 
pepot  Hard  t'iV  cvepyeiap  avrovj.  Also  (2  Pet.  iii.,  14),  Be 
diligent  that  ye  may  be  found  of  him  in  peace,  without 
spot  and  blameless  ( anovSdcra re).  2  Cor.  viii.,  7),  Ye 
VOL.  II.  4  E 


RELIGION. 


50 


[book  IV. 


abound  in  everything ,  in  faith ,  in  utterance ,  in  know¬ 
ledge ,  in  all  diligence  (iracr;)  crrovdrj). 

608.  The  injunctions  not  to  return  evil  for  evil, 
and  rather  (1  Cor.  vi.,  7),  to  take  wrong ,  and  to  sub¬ 
mit  to  revilings  and  blows,  do  not  prohibit  Christians 
from  protecting  themselves  by  the  aid  of  laws  against 
violence  and  contumely.  The  Magistrate  is  described 
by  St.  Paul  as  a  minister  of  God,  appointed  to  execute 
wrath  on  the  man  that  doeth  evil  (Rom.  xiii.,  1)  ;  and 
by  St.  Peter,  as  sent  for  the  punishment  of  evil-doers 
(3  Pet.  ii.,  13).  Accordingly,  we  find  St.  Paul  ap¬ 
pealing  to  the  existing  laws,  and  expressing  indigna¬ 
tion  at  the  violation  of  them.  Thus  when  the  ma¬ 
gistrates  who  had  put  St.  Paul  and  St.  Peter  in 
prison  at  Philippi,  offered  to  release  them  (Acts  xvi., 
37),  Paul  said  unto  them,  they  have  beaten  us  openly 
uncondemned,  being  Romans,  and  have  cast  us  into 
prison  :  and  now  do  they  thrust  us  out  privily  ?  nay 
verily  ;  but  let  them  come  themselves  and  fetch  us  out. 
When  Ananias  commanded  those  who  stood  near 
Paul  to  smite  him  on  the  mouth  (Acts  xxiii.,  3), 
Paul  said  unto  him,  God  shall  smite  thee,  thou  whited 
wall :  for  sittest  thou  to  judge  me  after  the  law,  and 
commandest  me  to  be  smitten  contrary  to  the  law  ? 
And  when  at  Caesarea  Paul  was  urged  to  go  to  Jeru¬ 
salem,  to  be  there  tried  on  the  charges  which  were 
brought  against  him  by  the  Jews,  he  protected  him¬ 
self  by  his  legal  privilege,  and  said,  I  appeal  unto 
C cesar. 

609.  These  precepts  which  have  been  ad¬ 
duced  are  not  to  be  received  as  positive  and  l'igorous 
laws  which  are  to  be  applied  literally  to  external 
acts.  When  they  make  mention  of  external  acts  ; 
as  in  the  precept,  Whosoever  shall  smite  thee  on  the 
right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  left.  And  if  any  man  will 
sue  thee  at  the  law,  and  take  away  thy  coat,  let  him 
have  thy  cloak  also  :  that  these  precepts  are  not  to  be 
thus  literally  interpreted,  is  evident  from  what  has 


CHAP.  IV.]  DUTIES  OF  THE  AFFECTIONS. 


51 


been  said  respecting  the  conduct  of  the  Apostles 
themselves.  The  precepts  are  to  be  understood  as 
Moral  Precepts  ;  that  is,  as  enjoining  internal  acts, 
control  of  the  will  and  intention,  a  discipline  of  the 
affections,  and  the  promotion  of  a  certain  disposition. 
The  precepts  indicate  the  disposition  at  which  Chris- 
tians  are  to  aim,  as  the  opposite  of  that  resentful  un¬ 
yielding  temper,  which  would  return  a  blow  for  a 
blow,  and  would  insist  on  every  particle  of  its  right. 

610.  The  reasons  which  in  these  precepts  are 
connected  with  the  injunction,  must  be  accepted  in 
several  cases  as  imperfectly  expressing  the  Christian 
ground  of  the  duty.  Thus,  in  the  injunction,  Matth. 
v.,  25.  Agree  with  thine  adversary,  it  is  added,  lest 
at  any  time  the  adversary  deliver  thee  to  the  judge,  and 
the  judge  deliver  thee  to  the  officer,  and  thou  be  cast 
into  prison  ;  verily  I  say  unto  thee,  Thou  shalt  by  no 
means  come  out  thence,  till  thou  hast  paid  the  uttermost 
farthing .  Such  a  suggestion  must  be  considered  as 
recommending  a  placable  disposition  for  its  external 
advantages,  in  the  first  place  ;  in  order  that  the  ac¬ 
quisition  of  such  a  disposition  on  grounds  of  prudence, 
might  prepare  the  way  for  a  true  application  of  it  on 
grounds  of  religion.  In  like  manner,  he  who  is  an¬ 
gry  with  his  brother  without  a  cause,  and  who  reviles 
him,  is  said  to  be  in  danger  of  the  judgment  and  of 
the  council,  that  is,  of  human  tribunals ;  but  from 
the  context  it  appears,  that  the  condemnation  of  God 
is  implied,  as  the  true  ground  of  the  warning,  in  these 
clauses,  as  well  as  where  it  is  expressed  by  the  fire 
of  hell.  The  Benevolent  Affections  are  enjoined  as 
the  command  of  God. 

611.  But  further:  Christians  are  urged  to  imi¬ 
tate  their  heavenly  Father  and  their  Saviour  Christ. 
Do  good  to  them  that  hate  you,  that  ye  may  be  the 
children  of  your  Father  which  is  in  heaven:  Be  ye 
merciful,  as  your  Father  also  is  merciful.  If  ye 
forgive  men  their  trespasses,  your  heavenly  Father  will 


52 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


also  forgive  you  :  forgiving  one  another ,  even  as  Christ 
also  forgave  you .  So  St.  Peter  (1  Pet.  ii.,  23), 
Christ  left  us  an  example ,  who,  when  he  teas  reviled , 
reviled  not  again  :  when  he  suffered,  he  threatened 
not.  And  Christ  enjoins,  as  I  have  loved  you,  that 
ye  also  love  one  another.  So  St.  John,  if  God  so  love 
us,  we  ought  to  love  one  another.  Love  is  of  God. 
God  is  love.  Again,  our  love  of  our  neighbour  is  the 
evidence  of  our  love  of  God.  Whoso  shutteth  up  his 
compassion  from  his  brother,  how  dwelleth  the  love  of 
God  in  him?  So  (1  John  iv.,  20),  If  a  man  say  I 
love  God,  and  hateth  his  brother,  he  is  a  liar  :  for  he 
that  loveth  not  his  brother  whom  he  hath  seen,  how  can 
he  love  God  whom  he  hath  not  seen  ?  And  this  com¬ 
mandment  have  we  from  him ,  That  he  who  loveth  God 
love  his  brother  also.  Christians  are  also  reminded 
that  they  are  brothers,  by  being  all  children  of  one 
Father;  and  as  brothers,  bound  to  love  one  another. 
In  opposition  to  the  works  of  the  Spirit  (Gal.  v.,  22) 
which  are  required  of  Christians,  and  which  are  love , 
joy,  peace,  long-suffering,  gentleness,  goodness,  faith, 
meekness,  temperance  ;  all  angry  affections  are  called 
works  of  the  flesh,  as  it  is  declared  that  they  which  do 
such  things  shall  not  inherit  the  kingdom  of  God. 


CHAPTER  V. 

CHRISTIAN  PRECEPTS  CONCERNING  PROPERTY 
AND  OTHER  OBJECTS  OF  DESIRE. 

612.  Such  kindly  affections  towards  our  neigh¬ 
bours  as  have  been  above  spoken  of,  show  themselves 
in  giving  to  them  what  they  need :  and  Christian 
Precepts  enjoining  such  duties  are  mixed  with  those 
just  quoted.  But  the  kindly  affections  were  there 


CHAP.  V.] 


DUTIES  CONCERNING  PROPERTY. 


53 


urged  upon  us  in  opposition  to  the  angry  ones;  we 
are  now  to  consider  the  precepts  in  which  they  are 
urged  in  opposition  to  the  love  of  property,  which, 
when  predominant,  is  covetousness.  Thus  in  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount  (Matth.  v.,  42),  Give  to  him 
that  asketh  thee ,  and  from  him  that  would  borrow  of 
thee  turn  thou  not  away.  So  (Luke  xiv.,  13),  When 
thou  makest  a  feast,  call  the  poor,  the  maimed,  the  lame , 
the  blind :  and  thou  slialt  be  blessed,  for  they  cannot 
recompense  thee  :  for  thou  shalt  be  recompensed  at  the 
resurrection  of  the  just.  (Acts  xx.,  35),  Paul  says  to 
the  Ephesian  elders,  I  have  showed  you  all  things , 
hoiv  that  labouring  ye  ought  to  support  the  weak,  and 
to  remember  the  words  of  the  Lord  Jesus,  that  it  is 
more  blessed  to  give  than  to  receive.  So  to  the  Co¬ 
rinthians  (2  Cor.  ix.,  6,  9),  He  which  sowetli  sparingly , 
shall  reap  also  sparingly  ;  and  he  which  sowetli  boun¬ 
tifully,  shall  reap  also  bountifully.  Every  man, 
according  as  he  purposeth  in  his  heart,  so  let  him  give  ; 
for  God  loveth  a  cheerful  giver.  And  God  is  able  to 
make  all  grace  to  abound  toward  you,  that  ye  always 
having  all  sufficiency  in  all  things  may  abound  to 
every  good  work.  So  Paul  commends  the  Philip- 
pians  fo»  their  sending  him  assistance :  and  says 
(Phil,  iv.,  17),  Not  because  I  desire  a  gift,  but  I  de¬ 
sire  fruit  that  may  abound  to  your  account.  He  calls 
it  a  sacrifice  acceptable,  well-pleasing  to  God  :  and 
adds,  But  my  God  shall  supply  all  your  need  accord¬ 
ing  to  his  riches  in  glory  by  Christ  Jesus.  So  (1  Tim. 
vi.,  17 — 19),  Charge  them  that  are  rich  in  this  world, 
that  they  be  not  highminded ,  nor  trust  in  uncertain 
riches,  but  in  the  living  God,  who  giveth  us  richly  all 
things  to  enjoy ;  that  they  do  good ;  that  they  be  rich  in 
good  works ;  ready  to  distribute,  willing  to  communi¬ 
cate  ;  laying  up  in  store  for  themselves  a  good  founda¬ 
tion  against  the  time  to  come,  that  they  may  lay  hold  on 
eternal  life.  (Heb.  xiii.,  16),  To  do  good  and  to  com¬ 
municate  forget  not ,  for  with  such  sacrifices  God  is 


54 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


well  pleased.  And  St.  James  (Jam.  ii.,  15,  16),  If 
a  brother  or  sister  be  naked  and  destitute  of  daily  food, 
and  one  of  you  say  unto  them ,  Depart  in  peace ,  be  ye 
warmed  and  filed  (that  is,  express  a  good  wish  for 
them)  ;  notwithstanding  ye  give  them  not  those  things 
which  are  needful  for  the  body ,  what  doth  it  profit?  So 
St.  John  (1  John  iii.,  17),  Whoso  hath  this  world's 
good,  and  seeth  his  brother  have  need,  and  shuttelh  up 
his  bowels  of  compassion  from  him,  how  dwelleth  the 
love  of  God  in  him ;  and  St.  Peter  says  (1  Pet.  iv., 
10),  As  every  man  hath  received  the  gift,  even  so  let 
him  minister  the  same,  one  to  another ,  as  good  stewards 
of  the  manifold  grace  of  God. 

613.  The  considerations  by  which  these  duties 
are  urged  upon  Christians,  are,  that  they  are  the 
means  of  obtaining  God’s  favour.  In  some  of  the 
passages,  it  might  appear  as  if  the  act  of  giving  mo¬ 
ney  were  represented  as  directly  leading  to  a  reward 
in  heaven :  as  when  Christ  (Luke  xvi.,  9)  exhorts 
his  disciples,  Make  to  yourselves  friends  of  the  unrigh¬ 
teous  Mammon.  So  St.  Paul  (2  Cor.  ix.,  6,  9),  He 
which  soweth  sparingly,  shall  reap  also  sparingly,  and 
he  which  soweth  bountifully,  shall  reap  also  bountifully. 
(Heb.  vi.,  10),  God  is  not  unrighteous  to  forget  your 
work  and  labour  of  love,  which  ye  have  showed  toward 
his  name,  in  that  ye  have  ministered  to  the  saints  and 
do  minister.  But  it  is  evident,  by  the  general  ten¬ 
dency  of  Scripture,  that  such  acts  are  enjoined,  as 
evidences  of  our  love  to  men  ;  and  thus,  of  our  love 
to  God.  St.  Paul  says,  that  when  they  are  not  the 
results  of  such  affections  they  are  valueless.  (1  Cor. 
xii.,  3),  Though  I  bestow  all  my  goods  to  feed  the  poor , 
and  have  not  charity,  it  profteth  me  nothing. 

614.  The  first  Christians  were  a  small  portion 
of  the  civil  community  in  which  they  lived  ;  and  had 
it  for  a  main  object  of  their  lives,  to  exhibit  their  ab¬ 
horrence  of  the  prevailing  vices  of  the  society,  out 
of  which  they  had  been  called.  Among  these  vices, 


CHAP.  Y.j  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PROPERTY.  55 

love  of  money  and  want  of  compassion  for  the  poor 
had  a  prominent  place.  The  Christians  made  their 
protest  against  these  vices,  by  discarding  all  regard 
for  money.  Christ  had  said  to  the  rich  young  man 
who  asked  what  he  should  do  to  attain  eternal  life 
(Matth.  xix.,  21 ;  Mark  x.,  21 ;  Luke  xviii.,  22),  If 
thou  wilt  be  perfect ,  go  and  sell  all  that  thou  hast ,  and 
give  to  the  poor ,  and  thou  shalt  have  treasure  in  heaven. 
And  in  pursuance  of  such  injunctions  the  early 
Christians  had  their  property  common  (Acts  iv.,  32), 
The  multitude  of  them  that  believed  were  of  one  heart 
and  of  one  soul ;  neither  said  any  of  them  that  ought  of 
the  things  which  he  possessed  was  his  own ;  but  they 
had  all  things  common. 

615.  Still  this  was  not  carried  so  far  as  to  put 
an  end  to  difference  of  wealth.  Peter  said  to  Ana¬ 
nias,  respecting  his  property  :  (Acts  v.,  4),  Whiles 
it  remained ,  was  it  not  thine  own  ?  and  after  it  was 
sold ,  was  it  not  in  thine  own  power?  For  (Acts  xi., 
29)  The  disciples  (at  Antioch),  every  man  according 
to  his  ability  (which  was  therefore  various),  deter¬ 
mined  to  send  relief  unto  the  brethren  which  dwelt  in 
Judeea.  So  (1  Cor.  xvi.,  2),  Upon  the  first  day  of 
the  week  let  every  one  of  you  lay  by  him  in  store ,  as 
God  hath  prospered  him  (for  the  collection  for  the 
saints)  ;  which  expression  implies  that  each  person 
possessed  the  produce  of  his  own  employments.  So 
(1  Tim.  vi.,  17),  Charge  them  that  are  rich  in  this 
world ,  implies  that  some  Christians  were  rich. 

616.  It  is  evident  that  St.  Paul  did  not  approve 
of  the  poor  living  at  the  expense  of  the  rich  ;  for  even 
though  engaged  in  the  labours  of  his  ministry,  he 
wrought  for  his  own  living,  and  repeatedly  urges  his 
example  upon  his  converts  (Acts  xx.,  34,  35).  Ye 
yourselves  know  that  these  hands  have  ministered  unto 
my  necessities,  and  to  them  that  were  with  me.  I  have 
showed  you  all  things,  how  that  so  labouring  ye  ought 
to  support  the  weak,  and  to  remember  the  words  of  the 


56 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


Lord  Jesus,  how  he  said ,  It  is  more  blessed  to  give  than 
to  receive.  (So  1  Thess.  ii.,  9),  Labouring  night  and 
day ,  because  we  would  not  be  chargeable  unto  any  of 
you ,  we  preached  unto  you  the  gospel  of  God.  And 
(2  Thess.  iii.,  8),  Neither  did  we  eat  any  man's  bread 
for  nought,  but  wrought  with  labour  and  travail  night 
and  day ,  that  we  might  not  be  chargeable  to  any  oj 
you  :  not  because  we  have  not  power,  but  to  make  our¬ 
selves  an  ensample  unto  you  to  follow  us.  For  even 
when  we  were  with  you ,  this  we  commanded  you,  that  if 
any  would  not  work,  neither  should  he  eat.  And  thus 
(Eph.  iv.,  28),  Let  him  that  stole,  steal  no  more ,  but 
rather  let  him  labour,  working  with  his  hands,  that  he 
may  have  to  give  him  that  needeth.  So  (Tit.  iii.,  14), 
Let  our  people  learn  honest  works  ( or  trades)  that  they 
be  not  unfruitful.  The  Corinthians  are  repeatedly 
reminded  that  he  had  not  been  burdensome  to  them 
(2  Cor.  xi.,  9;  xii.,  13).  And  he  adds  (14),  Behold, 
the  third  time  I  am  ready  to  come  unto  you  ;  and  1  will 
not  be  burdensome  to  you :  for  the  children  ought  not 
to  lay  up  for  the  parents ,  but  the  parents  for  the 
children. 

617.  As  each  person  was  thus  exhorted  to 
support  himself,  so  was  it  urged  as  his  duty  to  sup¬ 
port  the  members  of  his  family.  (1  Tim.,  v.  8), 
If  any  provide  not  for  his  own,  and  specially  for  those 
of  his  own  house ,  he  is  worse  than  an  infidel.  (16), 
If  any  man  or  woman  that  believeth  have  widows ,  let 
them  relieve  them,  and  let  not  the  church  be  charged , 
that  it  may  relieve  them  that  are  widows  indeed  ;  that 
is,  that  are  destitute  of  natural  supporters.  And 
(4),  If  any  widow  have  children  or  nephews,  let  them 
(the  children)  learn  first  to  show  piety  at  home,  and 
to  requite  their  parents  ;  for  that  is  good  and  accepta¬ 
ble  before  God. 

618.  Hospitality  is  often  recommended  in  such 
passages.  Hospitality  to  our  friends  is  a  practice 
that  does  not  need  a  religious  sanction.  Hospitality 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PROPERTY. 


57 


to  strangers  was  urged  upon  the  early  Christians 
with  some  reference  to  their  special  circumstances, 
and  those  of  the  times.  Thus  (1  Pet.  iv.,  9),  Use 
hospitality  one  to  another ,  without  grudging.  (Heb. 
xiii.,  2),  Be  not  forgetful  to  entertain  strangers  :  for 
thereby  some  have  entertained  angels  unawares.  (Rom. 
xii.,  13),  Distributing  to  the  necessity  of  the  saints  ; 
given  to  hospitality. 

619.  With  regard  to  riches,  Content  is  recom¬ 
mended.  1  Tim.  vi.,  6,  Godliness  with  contentment 
is  great  gain  ;  for  we  brought  nothing  into  this  world , 
and  it  is  certain  that  we  can  carry  nothing  out.  And 
having  food  and  raiment ,  let  us  be  therewith  content. 
St.  Paul  urges  this  by  his  own  example  (Phil,  iv., 
11),  I  have  learned ,  in  whatever  state  I  am,  therewith 
to  be  content. 

620.  In  connexion  with  such  precepts,  are  the 
warnings  to  Christians  not  to  set  their  hearts  on 
riches.  (Matth.  iv.,  19),  Lay  not  up  for  yourselves 
treasures  upon  earth,  where  moth  and  rust  doth  corrupt , 
and  where  thieves  break  through  and  steal.. ..for  where 
your  treasure  is,  there  will  your  heart  be  also.  And 
to  this  effect  is  the  saying  of  Jesus  after  his  answer 
to  the  rich  young  man  (Matth.  xix.,  23  ;  Mark  x., 
23  ;  Luke  xviii.,  24),  How  hardly  shall  they  that 
have  riches  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God!  which  is 
more  distinctly  explained  in  (Mark  x.,  24),  How  hard 
is  it  for  them  that  trust  in  riches  to  enter  into  the  king¬ 
dom  of  God !  This  is  further  illustrated  by  St.  Paul 
(1  Tim.,  vi.,  9),  They  that  will  be  rich,  fall  into  a 
temptation  and  a  snare,  and  into  many  foolish  and 
hurtful  lusts ,  which  drown  men  in  destruction  and  per¬ 
dition.  For  the  love  of  money  is  the  root  of  all  evil; 
which  while  some  have  coveted  after,  they  have  erred 
from  the  faith,  and  pierced,  themselves  through  with 
many  sorrows.  So  (Luke  xii.,  15),  Take  heed,  and 
beware  of  covetousness ;  for  a  man's  life  consistelh 
not  in  the  abundance  of  the  things  which  he  possesseth. 


58 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


And  covetousness  is  enumerated  among  the  vices 
(Rom.  i.,  28  ;  1  Cor.  v.,  11  ;  vi.,  10).  And  (Eph. 
v.,  5  ;  Col.  iii.,  5),  we  are  told,  that  a  covetous  man 
is  an  idolator,  and  that  covetousness  is  idolatry ; 
money  being  the  idol. 

Christians  are  to  be  not  greedy  of  filthy  lucre 
(aiffXpoKepdcif)  •  this  is  said  of  bishops  (1  Tim.  iii.,  2 ; 
Tit.  i.,  7),  of  deacons  (1  Tim.  iii.,  8),  of  elders 
(1  Pet.  v.,  2). 

621.  Christians  are  warned,  not  only  against 
the  love  of  money,  but  also  against  tenaciousness 
with  regard  to  their  rights.  Thus  (1  Cor.  x.,  24), 
Let  no  man  seek  his  own ,  but  every  man  another's  ad¬ 
vantage.  (xiii.,  5),  Charity  seeketh  not  her  own. 
(vi.,  7),  Now  therefore  there  is  utterly  a  fault  among 
you ,  because  ye  go  to  law  with  one  another.  Why  do 
ye  not  rather  take  wrong  ?  Why  do  ye  not  rather  suf¬ 
fer  yourselves  to  be  defrauded  ? 

622.  When  the  desires  and  affections  with  re¬ 
gard  to  human  possessions  are  thus  controlled  and 
subdued,  it  becomes  easy  to  carry  into  effect  the 
rules  of  justice  relative  to  such  matters.  Accord¬ 
ingly  St.  Paul  reproves  the  Corinthians  for  finding 
any  difficulty  in  doing  this.  (1  Cor.  vi.,  5,  4),  1 
speak  to  your  shame.  Is  it  so,  that  there  is  not  a  wise 
man  among  you  ?  no,  not  one  that  shall  be  able  to  judge 
between  his  brethren  ?  If  ye  have  judgments  of  things 
pertaining  to  tins  life,  set  them  to  judge  ivho  are  least 
esteemed  in  the  church.  The  most  eminent  persons 
in  the  early  church  had  higher  offices  than  judging 
concerning  property.  The  objects  of  Christian 
teaching,  at  that  time,  were  not  the  reformation  and 
pure  administration  of  the  laws,  for  which  civil  so¬ 
ciety  itself  provides ;  but  the  reformation  and  puri¬ 
fication  of  men’s  hearts.  Hence,  we  do  not  find  in 
the  New  Testament  such  earnest  and  frequent  con¬ 
demnation  of  injustice  and  false  judgment  as  are 
common  in  the  Old  Testament.  These  latter  refer 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PROPERTY.  59 

to  a  community,  in  which  religion  was  the  acknow¬ 
ledged  basis  of  law  ;  and  where,  therefore,  the  just 
administration  of  law  was  a  high  religious  duty. 

623.  Justice,  in  the  wider  sense  of  Equity,  is 
enjoined.  (Col.  iv.,  1),  Masters ,  give  unto  your  ser¬ 
vants  that  which  is  just  and  equal,:  knowing  that  ye 
also  have  a  Master  in  heaven.  (Phil,  iv.,  8),  Things 
which  are  just  are  recommended  along  with  things 
which  are  true ,  honest ,  lovely ,  of  good  report.  And 
(Tit.  i.,  8),  A  bishop  must  be  just ,  as  well  as  a  lover 
of  hospitality ,  a  lover  of  good  men. 

624.  Perhaps  to  some  readers,  justice  in  mat¬ 
ters  of  property  may  seem  to  be  made  light  of,  in 
the  parable  of  the  unjust  steward,  whom  the  lord 
(that  is,  his  lord)  commended  (Luke  xvi.,  8),  and  of 
the  unjust  judge  (Luke  xviii.,  6)  of  whom  Christ 
said,  Hear  what  the  unjust  judge  saith.  But  it  is  to 
be  recollected  that  a  parable  is  a  mode  of  illustrating 
some  one  truth ;  and  is  not  to  have  its  subordinate 
parts  drawn  into  inferences.  The  parable  of  the 
unjust  steward  is  put  forward  to  illustrate  the  duty 
of  foresight ;  the  prudence  of  godliness.  The  stew¬ 
ard’s  lord  commended  him  as  having  acted  with 
foresight  and  prudence,  which  evidently  he  had, 
though  not  with  honesty.  The  parable  is  intended, 
not  to  illustrate  the  relative  value  of  prudence  and 
honesty,  but  of  prudence  and  that  imprudence  which 
disregards  a  future  life.  The  unjust  steward  is  put 
forward  as  an  example  of  the  children  of  this  world , 
who  are  opposed  to  the  children  of  light.  They  are 
the  wiser  of  the  two  in  their  generation  ;  but  if  we 
look  beyond  their  generation,  their  wisdom  is  folly. 
In  the  same  manner,  the  parable  of  the  unjust  judge 
is  put  forth  to  illustrate  the  efficacy  of  prayer,  and 
not  the  character  to  which  prayer  is  addressed,  as  it 
is  stated  (ver.  1),  He  spake  a  parable  to  them  to  this 
end ,  that  men  ought  always  to  pray,  and  not  to  faint. 


60 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

CHRISTIAN  PRECEPTS  CONCERNING  TRUTH. 

625.  The  same  desires  and  affections  which 
tend  to  the  appropriation  of  the  property  of  others, 
often  lead  to  fraud  and  falsehood  ;  and  thus,  the 
warnings  to  Christians  already  quoted,  bear  upon 
the  subjects  now  under  consideration.  But  there 
are  many  precepts  more  especially  directed  to  these 
subjects  ;  as  (1  Thess.  iv.,  6),  This  is  the  will  of 
God :  that  no  man  go  beyond  and  defraud  his  brother 
in  any  matter :  because  that  the  Lord  is  the  avenger  of 
all  such,  as  we  also  have  forewarned  you  and  testified. 
And  to  the  Corinthians  he  says  reproachfully  (1 
Cor.  vi.,  8),  Ye  do  wrong ,  and  defraud ,  and  that  your 
brethren.  Know  ye  not  that  the  unrighteous  shall  not 
inherit  the  Kingdom  of  God?  To  the  Ephesians 
(Eph.  iv.,  25),  Putting  away  lying,  speak  every  man 
truth  with  his  neighbour,  for  we  are  members  one  of  an¬ 
other.  And  the  Colossians  (Col.  iii.,  9),  Lie  not  one 
to  another ,  seeing  ye  have  put  off  the  old  man  with  his 
deeds  ;  and  have  put  on  the  new  man,  which  is  renew¬ 
ed  in  knowledge  after  the  image  of  him  that  created 
him. 

626.  Such  attributes  as  true ;  faithful  as  a 
promiser  (Heb.  x.,  23  ;  xi.,  11)  ;  faithful  to  him  that 
appointed  him  (Heb.  iii.,  2)  ;  sincere  ;  are  constantly 
used  as  praise.  It  is  mentioned  among  the  signs  of 
the  perilous  times  that  shall  come  (2  Tim.  iii.,  2), 
that  men  shall  be  truce-breakers,  false  accusers 
(«C77 tovSh,  6id/3o'Xoi).  But  such  terms  as  faithful ,  sin¬ 
cere,  and  the  like,  are  more  commonly  used  with  re¬ 
ference  to  the  relation  between  God  and  man.  The 
constant  exhortations  of  Christian  teachers  to  the 
love  of  our  neighbour,  and  their  warnings  against 
those  desires  which  lead  to  fraud,  lying,  breach  of 


CHAP.  VII.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PURITY.  61 

promise,  and  the  like  ;  make  it  almost  unnecessary 
for  them  to  condemn  such  offences  expressly.  The 
words  which  are  translated  by  honest  in  our  version, 
are,  for  the  most  part,  such  as  imply  qualities  re¬ 
spected  and  admired  by  men,  like  honcstum  in  Latin  ; 
as  Ka\a  in  (Rom.  xii . ,  17),  Provide  things  honest  in 
the  sight  of  all  men.  (2  Cor.  viii.,  21),  Providing  for 
honest  things ,  not  only  in  the  sight  of  the  Lord ,  hut 
also  in  the  sight  of  man.  (xiii.,  7),  1  pray  to  God  that 
ye  do  no  evil. ...but  that  ye  should  do  that  which  is 
honest.  (1  Pet.  ii.,  11),  1  beseech  you ,  abstain  from 
lusts.... having  your  conversation  honest  among  the 
Gentiles  ;  that,  whereas  they  speak  against  you  as  evil¬ 
doers,  they  may  by  your  good  works,  which  they  shall 
behold,  glorify  God.  So  <renvd  (Phil,  iv.,  8),  Finally , 
brethren,  whatsoever  things  are  true,  whatsoever  things 
are  honest,  whatsoever  things  are  just,  whatsoever 
things  are  pure,  whatsoever  things  are  lovely,  whatso¬ 
ever  things  are  of  good  report ;  if  there  be  any  virtue , 
and  if  there  be  any  praise,  think  on  these  things.  (1 
Tim.  ii.,  2),  Pray  for  kings,  and  for  all  that  are  in 
authority :  that  we  may  lead  a  quiet  and  peaceable  life 
in  all  godliness  and  honesty  (asuvuT^n). 


CHAPTER  VII. 

CHRISTIAN  PRECEPTS  CONCERNING  PURITY. 

627.  The  Christian  is  enjoined  to  be  free  from 
the  dominion  of  sensual,  as  well  as  covetous,  desires ; 
pure,  as  well  as  honest.  These  epithets  are  joined 
(Phil,  iv.,  8),  Whatsoever  things  are  honest ,  whatso¬ 
ever  things  are  pure  (&ra  ciyva).  The  same  word  is 
used  (1  Tim.  v.,  22),  Keep  thyself  pure.  (1  John  iii., 


RELIGION. 


62 


[book  IV. 


3),  Every  man  that  hath  this  hope  in  him  purijieth  him¬ 
self,  even  as  he  is  pure. 

The  same  word  is  used  to  express  conjugal  chas¬ 
tity  (Tit.  ii.,  5  ;  1  Pet.  iii.,  1).  But  much  more  than 
mere  observance  of  legal  obligation  is  required,  in 
this  as  in  other  cases.  (Matth.  v.,  27),  Ye  have  heard 
that  it  was  said  hy  them  of  old  time ,  Thou  shalt  not 
commit  adultery :  hut  I  say  unto  you ,  That  whosoever 
looketh  on  a  woman  to  lust  after  her,  hath  committed 
adultery  with  her  already  in  his  heart.  And  if  thy 
right  eye  offend  thee,  pluck  it  out ,  and  cast  it  from 
thee ;  for  it  is  prof  table  for  thee  that  one  of  thy  mem¬ 
bers  should  perish,  and  not  that  thy  whole  body  should 
be  cast  into  hell.  So  by  St.  Paul  lasciviousness 
(dcre'XyELa)  is  condemned,  as  well  as  the  acts  to  which 
it  leads,  Gal.  v.,  19).  The  works  of  the  flesh  are 
manifest,  which  are  these:  Adultery,  fornication,  un¬ 
cleanness,  lasciviousness  ...of  the  which.  I  tell  you  before , 
as  I  have  told  you  in  time  past ,  that  they  which  do  such 
things  shall  not  inherit  the  kingdom  of  God.  So  (  1 
Cor.  vi.,  9,  10).  Also  (Eph.  v.,  3),  Fornication  and 
all  uncleanness  ...let  it  not  be  once  named  among  you  ; 
as  becometh  saints;  neither  filthiness  nor 

foolish  talking  and  jesting,  which  are  not  convenient. 
(Col.  iii.,  5),  Mortify  your  members  ivhich  are  upon  the 
earth ;  fornication ,  uncleanness,  inordinate  affection 
(ird0of),  evil  concupiscence  (^imQvplav  KdK>ivf..  for  which 
things'  sake  the  wrath  of  God  cometh  on  the  children  of 
disobedience. 

Other  expressions  are  also  used  ;  as  (1  Tim.  v., 
6),  She  that  liveth  in  pleasure  is  dead  while  she  liveth 
(o-T raraXwo-a).  This  word  is  also  used  by  St.  James  in 
denunciation  of  woe  against  luxurious  and  tyranni¬ 
cal  men.  (James  v.,  5),  Ye  have  lived  in  pleasure  in 
the  earth ,  and  been  wanton  {irpv^ctaTe  nai  £<nraraX/jcrarf;). 

628.  Christian  teaching  urges  an  especial  ar¬ 
gument  against  fornication  (1  Cor.  vi.,  15-20),  What l 
know  ye  not  that  your  body  is  the  temple  of  the  Holy 


CHAP.  VII.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PURITY. 


63 


Ghost  which  is  in  you ,  which  ye  have  of  God ;  and 
ye  are  not  your  own  ?  for  ye  are  bought  with  a  price  : 
tlieref  ore  glorify  God  in  your  body ,  and  in  your  spirit, 
which  are  God’s.  The  same  argument  is  used  (1 
Cor.  iii.,  16),  Know  ye  not  that  ye  are  the  temple  of 
God  ?  If  any  man  defle  the  temple  of  God,  him 
shall  God  destroy. 

629.  Other  sins  of  lust  are  spoken  of  as  the 
extremes  of  human  depravity,  when  God  gives  men 
up  unto  vile  affections  (Rom.  i.,  20,  and  1  Cor.  vi.,  9). 

630.  The  conjugal  union  is  commended,  and 
its  duties  sanctioned.  (Heb.  xiii.,  4),  Marriage  is 
honourable  in  all,  and  the  bed  undefiled.  (1  Cor.  vii., 
3),  Let  the  husband  render  unto  the  wife  due  benevo¬ 
lence  ;  and  likewise  also  the  wife  unto  the  husband. 
The  wife  hath  not  power  of  her  own  body,  but  the  hus¬ 
band  :  and  likewise  also  the  husband  hath  not  power 
of  his  own  body,  but  the  wife.  (1  Thess.  iv.,  3), 
This  is  the  will  of  God,  even  your  sanctification,  that 
ye  should  abstain  from  fornication  :  that  every  one  of 
you  should  know  how  to  possess  his  own  vessel  in  sanc¬ 
tification  and  honour  ;  not  in  the  lust  of  concupiscence, 
even  as  the  Gentiles  which  know  not  God.  (1  Tim. 
v.,  14),  I  will  that  the  younger  women  marry,  bear 
children,  guide  the  house. 

631.  There  are  passages  in  which  St.  Paul 
intimates  it  to  be  his  private  opinion,  that,  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  time,  it  was  better  then  for 
Christians  to  abstain  from  marriage  :  but  he  does  not 
deliver  this  as  the  Divine  command.  Thus  (1  Cor. 
vii.,  25),  Concerning  virgins,  I  have  no  commandment 
of  the  Lord  ;  yet  I  give  my  judgment  as  one  that  hath 
obtained  mercy  of  the  Lord  to  be  faithful.  I  suppose 
therefore  that  this  is  good  for  the  present  distress  ;  1 
say,  that  it  is  good  for  a  man  so  to  be  ;  namely,  to 
be  a  virgin  or  unmarried.  In  verses  32,  33,  he  ex¬ 
plains  further  the  reasons  of  this  advice,  which  be¬ 
long  especially  to  the  condition  of  his  disciples  as 


64 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


Christians,  occupied  by  religious  duties.  I  would 
have  you  without  carefulness .  He  that  is  unmarried 
caretli  for  the  things  that  belong  to  the  Lord,  how  he 
may  please  the  Lord.  But  he  that  is  married  careth 
for  the  things  that  are  of  the  world,  how  he  may 
please  his  wife.  He  adds  (28),  But  and  if  thou 
marry,  thou  hast  not  sinned  ;  and  if  a  virgin  marry , 
she  hath  not  sinned.  He  had  in  the  previous  part  of 
the  chapter  (6-9)  given  the  same  advice  to  unmar¬ 
ried  and  widows,  with  the  same  limitation  :  I  speak 
this  by  permission,  and  not  of  commandment  :  and  he 
repeats  it  again  in  like  manner  in  the  end  of  the 
chapter. 

632.  The  conjugal  union  is  further  invested 
with  a  religious  significance.  (1  Cor.  xi.,  11),  Nei¬ 
ther  is  the  man  without  the  woman ,  neither  the  woman 
without  the  man,  in  the  Lord.  For  as  the  woman  is 
of  the  man,  even  so  is  the  man  also  by  the  ivoman. 
(Eph.  v.,  23),  The  husband  is  the  head  of  the  wife, 
even  as  Christ  is  the  head  of  the  church.  .  .  Husbands, 
love  your  wives,  even  as  Christ  also  loved  the  Church , 
and  gave  himself  for  it.  .  .  .So  ought  men  to  love  their 
wives  as  their  own  bodies.  He  that  loveth  his  wife 
loveth  himself.  For  no  man  ever  yet  hated  his  oivn 
flesh  :  but  nourislieth  and  cherisheth  it,  even  as  the 
Lord  the  Church.  For  we  are  members  of  his  body, 
of  his  flesh,  and  of  his  bones.  For  this  cause  shall 
a  man  leave  his  father  and  mother,  and  shall  be  joined 
unto  his  wife,  and  they  two  shall  be  one  flesh.  This 
passage  (Gen.  ii.,  24)  had  already  been  quoted  by 
Christ  (Matth.  xix.,  4;  Mark  x.,  5),  He  answered 
and  said  unto  them,  Have  ye  not  read  that  he  which 
made  them  at  the  beginning  made  them  male  and  fe¬ 
male  ;  and  said,  For  this  cause  shall  a  man  leave 
father  and  mother,  and  shall  cleave  to  his  wife  ;  and 
they  twain  shall  be  one  flesh.  Wherefore  they  are  no 
more  twain,  but  one  flesh.  What  therefore  God  hath 
joined  together,  let  not  man  put  asunder. 


CHAP.  VII.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PURITY. 


65 


633.  The  precepts  of  the  New  Testament 
which  speak  of  cases  in  which  marriage  may  be  an¬ 
nulled,  have  reference  to  the  law  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment.  Moses  had  commanded  (Deut.  xxiv.,  1),  That 
if  a  man  marry,  and  his  wife  find  no  favour  in  his 
eyes ,  he  should  write  her  a  bill  of  divorcement,  and 
send  her  away.  After  this,  she  might  be  married  to 
another  man,  but  never  to  her  former  husband.  The 
practices  which,  in  virtue  of  this  law,  prevailed 
among  the  Jews  at  the  time  of  Christ’s  coming,  led 
to  a  question  which  was  proposed  to  him  (Matth.  xix., 
3  ;  Mark  x.,  2),  The  Pharisees  came  unto  him ,  tempt¬ 
ing  him ,  and  saying  unto  him ,  Is  it  lawful  for  a  man 
to  put  away  his  wife  for  every  cause  ?  He  answered 
as  in  the  passage  just  quoted,  referring  to  the  first 
institution  of  marriage  by  God,  and  ending,  What 
therefore  God  hath  joined  together  let  not  man  put 
asunder.  They  say  unto  him ,  Why  did  Moses  then 
command  to  give  her  a  writing  of  divorcement ,  and  to 
put  her  away  ?  He  saith  unto  them  ;  Moses,  because 
of  the  hardness  of  your  hearts ,  suffered  you  to  put 
away  your  wives  ;  but  from  the  beginning  it  was  not 
so.  And  I  say  unto  you,  Whosoever  shall  put  away 
his  wife,  except  it  be  for  fornication,  and  shall  marry 
another,  committeth  adultery,  and  whoso  marrietli  her 
which  is  put  away  doth  commit  adultery. 

634.  The  part  of  this  passage  in  which  it  is 
said  that  Moses  gave  the  Jews  his  command  because 
of  the  hardness  of  their  hearts,  appears  to  imply, 
like  the  rest  of  Christ’s  teaching,  that  the  Christian 
was  to  aim  at  a  higher  degree  of  moral  purity  than 
was  placed  before  the  Jew.  The  Jew  was  com¬ 
manded  or  permitted  to  put  away  his  wife  if  she  found 
no  favour  in  his  eyes :  the  Christian  was  enjoined  to  aim 
at  making  the  marriage  union  as  complete  as  it  was 
in  the  beginning,  at  its  first  institution.  The  latter 
part  of  the  passage  appears,  to  some  commentators, 
to  refer  to  a  case  in  which  the  putting  away  the  wife 

VOL.  II.  5  f  2 


66 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


and  the  marrying  another  are  part  of  the  same  de¬ 
sign ;  such  a  design  is  declared  to  be  adulterous. 
They  urge,  that  if  the  passage  be  understood  with¬ 
out  this  connexion,  the  Law  of  Moses  permitted  or 
commanded  adultery.  They  also  urge,  that  a  set¬ 
tled  unfitness  in  the  minds  of  two  persons  may  be  a 
greater  obstacle  to  the  ends  of  marriage,  than  the 
condemnation,  mistrust,  and  grief  occasioned  by  a 
bodily  sin.  But  to  this  latter  argument,  it  may  be 
replied,  that  bodily  sin  may  properly  be  made  the 
ground  of  a  judicial  proceeding,  because  it  is  a  thing 
capable  of  proof,  and  for  the  most  part  operating 
inevitably  upon  all  persons’  minds  in  the  same  man¬ 
ner,  in  virtue  of  the  universal  affections  and  habits 
of  mankind  :  but  that  the  permanent  unfitness  of 
two  minds  to  the  conjugal  union  is  not  capable  of 
proof,  since  the  effects  of  transient  passion,  caprice, 
or  design,  are  not  distinguishable  from  permanent 
unfitness  of  mind  ;  and  further,  that  it  does  not  ap¬ 
pear  that,  in  any  case,  such  unfitness  may  not  be 
overcome,  by  cultivating  those  affections  which  re¬ 
ligion  and  morality  enjoin  us  to  cultivate  ;  kindness, 
gentleness,  meekness,  patience,  cheerfulness.  It 
may  also  be  remarked,  that  the  cultivation  of  such 
affections,  in  such  a  case,  will  be  prosecuted  more 
resolutely  and  successfully,  if  the  parties  believe 
that  the  marriage  cannot  be  dissolved,  merely  be¬ 
cause  this  task  of  self-cultivation  is  imperfectly 
executed  ;  and  if  they  further  believe  that  such  an 
ordinance  respecting  marriage  is  sanctioned  by  the 
Divine  command. 

635.  It  was  a  question  among  the  early  Chris¬ 
tians,  whether  religious  disbelief  in  Christ,  on  the 
one  side,  annulled  the  marriage.  St.  Paul  gives  his 
opinion,  not  the  Divine  Command.  (1  Cor.  vii.,  12), 
To  the  rest  speak  I,  not  the  Lord :  If  any  brother 
hath  a  wife  that  believeth  not,  and  she  be  pleased  to 
dwell  with  him ,  let  him  not  put  her  away.  And  the 


CHAT.  VII.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  PURITY. 


6T 


woman  which  hath  an  husband  that  believeth  not,  and 
if  he  be  pleased  to  dwell  with  her,  let  her  not  leave 
him.  For  the  unbelieving  husband  is  sanctified  by  the 
wife,  and  the  unbelieving  wife  is  sanctified  by  the  hus¬ 
band  :  else  were  your  children  unclean,  but  now  are 
they  holy.  For  what  knowest  thou,  O  wife,  whether 
thou  shalt  save  thy  husband  ?  Or  how  knowest  thou , 
O  man,  whether  thou  shalt  save  thy  wife  ?  It  is  to  be 
observed,  that  the  Greek  word  by  which  the  consent 
is  expressed  (owsvSoksi)  implies  mutual  consent,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  opinion  of  some. 

It  would  appear,  however,  that  if  the  wife  or  the 
husband  were  deserted  on  this  account,  St.  Paul  held 
the  marriage  bond  to  be  broken.  Verse  15,  Bui 
if  the  unbelieving  depart,  let  him  depart ;  a  brother 
or  a  sister  is  not  under  bondage  in  such  cases  ;  but 
God  hath  called  us  to  peace. 

636.  Christian  teaching  exhorts  us  to  moderate, 
and  rightly  direct,  other  bodily  desires,  as  well  as 
those  which  belong  to  the  conjugal  state.  Christians 
are  enjoined  to  be  sober  and  temperate.  Thus 
(1  Tim.  iii .,  2,  and  Tit.  i.,  7),  A  bishop  must  be 
blameless  as  the  steward  of  God  ;  not  self-willed,  not 
soon  angry,  not  given  to  wine,  no  striker,  not  given  to 
filthy  lucre,  but  a  lover  of  hospitality,  a  lover  of  good 
men,  sober,  temperate.  So  (Tit.  ii.,  2),  Teach  that 
the  aged  men  be  sober,  grave,  temper  ate.... The  aged 
women  likewise  that  they  be  in  behaviour  as  becometh 
holiness,.,  .not  given  to  much  wine,  teachers  of  good 
things  ;  that  they  teach  the  young  women  to  be  sober . 
(1  Tim.  iii.,  8),  Likewise  must  the  deacons  be  grave, 
not  double-tongued,  not  given  to  much  wine,  not  greedy 
of  filthy  lucre.  And  (ver.  11),  Even  so  must  their 
wives  be  grave,  not  slanderers,  sober,  faithful  in  all 
things.  (Eph.  v.,  18),  Be  not  drunk  with  wine, 
wherein  is  excess  (aowria,  intemperance),  but  be  filled 
with  the  Spirit. 

637.  But  the  exhortations  to  Sobriety  imply  ge- 


68 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


nerally  Sobriety  of  Mind,  as  well  as  bodily  temper¬ 
ance.  We  see  that  grave  is  joined  with  sober.  So 
(Eph.  v.,  4),  the  Apostle  forbids  foolish  talking  and 
jesting  ynwpo\oyia  Kai  evTpaire\ia'j  :  though  the  latter  dis¬ 
position,  in  Aristotle’s  Ethics  (there  usually  trans¬ 
lated  facetiousness ,  pleasantry ,  wit),  is  enumerated 
among  the  virtues,  and  described  as  intermediate 
between  the  opposite  vices  of  and  a yponcta, 

buffoonery  and  churlishness. 

638.  The  Christian  condition  affords  special 
reasons  for  this  sobriety  of  mind.  Thus  (1  Thess.  v., 
5),  Ye  are  all  the  children  of  light ,  and  the  children 
of  the  day  :  we  are  not  of  the  night  nor  of  darkness. 
Therefore  let  us  not  sleep  as  do  others ,  but  let  us 
watch  and  be  sober.  (1  Pet.  i.,  13),  Gird  up  the  loins 
of  your  mind ,  and  be  sober,  (iv.,  7),  The  end  of  all 
things  is  at  hand  :  be  ye  therefore  sober ,  and  watch 
unto  prayer,  (v.,  8),  Be  sober,  be  vigilant  ;  because 
your  adversary  the  devil ,  as  a  roaring  lion ,  walketh 
about ,  seeking  whom  he  may  devour.  (Tit.  ii.,  11,  12), 
The  grace  of  God  that  bringeth  salvation  hath  appear¬ 
ed  to  all  men ,  teaching  us  that ,  denying  ungodliness 
and  worldly  lusts ,  we  should  live  soberly ,  righteously , 
and  godly ,  in  this  present  world. 

639.  Moderation  in  dress  and  ornaments  is  also 
enjoined.  (1  Tim.  ii.,  9),  1  will  that  women  adorn  them¬ 
selves  in  modest  apparel ,  with  shamefacedness  and 
sobriety  :  not  with  broidered  hair ,  or  gold ,  or  pearls , 
or  costly  array.  (  Pet.  iii.,  3),  Ye  wives ;  your 
adorning  let  it  not  be  that  outward  adorning  of  plait¬ 
ing  the  hair,  and  of  wearing  of  gold,  or  of  putting  on 
of  apparel. 

640.  In  addition  to  this,  are  enjoined  regard  to 
domestic  duties,  and  moderation  in  the  enjoyment  of 
company  (Tit.  ii.,  3),  Teach  the  young  women  to  be 
sober,  to  love  their  husbands,  to  love  their  children,  to 
be  discreet,  chaste,  keepers  at  home  ( oUovpovt ). 

641.  Among  the  duties  thus  enjoined  upon  wo- 


CHAP.  VIII. J  DUTIES  CONCERNING  OBEDIENCE. 


69 


men,  is  that  of  being  obedient  to  their  own  husbands 
(Tit.  ii.,  3).  So  (1  Pet.  iii.,  1),  Likewise  ye  wives, 
be  in  subjection  to  your  own  husbands.  And  St.  Paul 
says  (Eph.  v.,  22),  Wives,  submit  yourselves  unto 
your  own  husbands,  as  unto  the  Lord.  For  the  hus¬ 
band  is  the  head  of  the  wife,  even  as  Christ  is  the 
head  of  the  Church.  In  (1  Cor.  xi.,  7),  St.  Paul 
says,  The  man  is  the  image  and  glory  of  God,  but  the 
woman  is  the  glory  of  the  man.  For  the  man  is  not 
of  the  woman,  but  the  woman  of  the  man. 

This  duty,  however,  more  properly  belongs  to  the 
next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CHRISTIAN  PRECEPTS  CONCERNING  OBEDIENCE 

AND  COMMAND. 

642.  The  duty  of  obedience  of  children  towards 
their  parents,  which  is  recognized  by  the  laws  and 
customs  of  all  countries,  is  sanctioned  by  Christian 
teaching.  (Matth.  xv.,  3),  Christ  said  unto  them,  Why 
do  ye  transgress  the  commandment  of  God  by  your 
tradition  ?  For  God  commanded,  saying,  honour 
thy  father  and  mother,  and,  He  that  curseth  father  or 
mother,  let  him  die  the  death  :  but  ye  say,  that  if  a 
man  refuse  to  his  parents  what  they  require  on  pre¬ 
tence  that  he  has  vowed  it  to  sacred  uses,  and  honour 
not  his  father  or  mother,  he  shall  be  free.  Thus  have 
ye  made  the  commandment  of  God  of  none  effect  by 
your  tradition.  And  St.  Paul,  in  the  same  manner, 
refers  to  this  part  of  the  law  of  Moses  (Eph.  vi.,  1), 
Children,  obey  yonr  parents  in  the  Lord,  for  this  is 
right.  Honour  thy  father  and  mother  ;  which  is  the 
frst  commandment  with  promise  :  that  it  may  be  well 


70 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


with  thee ,  and  thou  mayest  live  long  on  the  earth.  So 
(Col.  iii. ,  20),  Children ,  obey  your  parents  in  all 
things ,  for  this  is  well-pleasing  unto  the  Lord.  And 
disobedience  is  mentioned  (2  Tim.  iii.,  2)  among  the 
signs  of  the  perilous  times  that  shall  come.  Men 
shall  be  lovers  of  their  own  selves ,  covetous ,  boasters , 
proud ,  blasphemers ,  disobedient  to  parents ,  unthank¬ 
ful ,  unholy ,  without  natural  affection. 

643.  Natural  affection,  thus  sanctioned  by  re- 
ligion,  is  termed  piety  by  the  Christian  teachers  ;  as 
it  was  by  the  Roman  and  Greek  writers.  This  piety 
must  show  itself  in  acts.  (1  Tim.  v.,  4),  If  any  widow 
have  children ,  or  nephews ,  let  them  learn  frst  to  show 
piety  at  home ,  and  to  requite  their  parents  ;  for  that  is 
good  and  acceptable  before  God. 

644.  Along  with  the  duty  of  obedience  in 
children,  is  inculcated  the  duty  of  good  and  gentle 
government  in  parents.  (Eph.  vi.,  4),  Ye  fathers, 
provoke  not  your  children  to  wrath ,  but  bring  them  up 
in  the  nurture  and  admonition  of  the  Lord.  (Col.  iii., 
21),  Fathers ,  provoke  not  your  children  to  anger,  lest 
they  be  discouraged. 

645.  There  are  other  duties  of  the  heads  of 
families:  as  provision  for  bodily  needs.  (1  Tim.  v., 
8),  If  any  provide  not  for  his  own,  and  especially  for 
those  of  his  own  house,  he  is  worse  than  an  infidel. 
And  (though  said  in  the  way  of  illustration)  (2  Cor. 
xii.,  14),  The  children  ought  not  to  lay  up  for  the  pa¬ 
rents,  but  the  parents  for  the  children.  Also  govern¬ 
ment  (1  Tim.  iii.,  4),  A  bishop  must  be  one  that  ruleth 
well  his  own  house,  having  his  children  in  subjection 
with  all  gravity .  A  family  contains  servants,  as  well 
as  children  ;  and  Christian  teaching  enjoins,  between 
them  and  the  masters,  the  duties  of  obedience  on  one 
side,  and  good  government  on  the  other.  (Eph.  vi., 
5),  Servants,  be  obedient  to  them  that  are  your  masters 
according  to  the  flesh ,  with  fear  and  trembling,  in 
singleness  of  your  heart,  as  unto  Christ :  not  with 


CHAP.  VIII.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  OBEDIENCE.  71 

eye-service  as  men-pleasers,  but  as  the  servants  of 
Christ,  doing  the  will  of  God  from  the  heart  ■:  with 
good  will  doing  service,  as  to  the  Lord,  and  not  to 
men  .  .  .  And,  ye  masters,  do  the  same  things  unto 
them,  forbearing  threatening  :  knowing  that  your 
Master  also  is  in  heaven,  neither  is  there  respect  of 
persons  with  him.  Nearly  the  same  precepts  and 
reasons  are  given  (Col.  iii.,  22  ;  iv.,  1).  So  (Tit.  ii., 
9),  Exhort  servants  to  be  obedient  unto  their  own  mas¬ 
ters,  and  to  please  them  well  in  all  things,  not  answer¬ 
ing  again ;  nor  purloining,  but  showing  all  good 
fidelity,  that  they  may  adorn  the  doctrine  of  God  our 
Saviour  in  all  things.  Also  (1  Pet.  ii.,  18),  Servants, 
be  subject  to  your  masters  with  all  fear  ;  not  only  to 
the  good  and  gentle,  but  also  to  the  froward.  For 
this  is  thankworthy ,  if  a  man  for  conscience  towards 
God  endure  grief,  suffering  ivrongfully .  For  what 
glory  is  it,  if,  when  ye  be  buffeted  for  your  faults,  ye 
shall  take  it  patiently  ?  but  if,  when  ye  do  well  and 
suffer  for  it,  ye  take  it  patiently,  this  is  acceptable 
with  God. 

In  this  passage  in  St.  Peter,  the  word  translated 
servant  is  oIkst domestic  ;  in  the  passage  from  St. 
Paul,  it  is  tovXos,  slave. 

646.  Some  of  the  precepts  respecting  servants 
have  an  especial  reference  to  their  being  bound  to 
their  masters  as  slaves  ;  and  also  to  the  change 
which,  it  appears  to  have  been  expected  by  some, 
the  acceptance  of  Christianity  by  masters  and  ser¬ 
vants  might  produce  in  their  domestic  relation.  (1 
Tim.  vi.,  1),  Let  as  many  servants  as  are  under  the 
yoke  (slaves),  count  their  own  masters  worthy  of  all 
honour,  that  the  name  of  God  and  his  doctrine  be  not 
blasphemed.  And  they  that  have  believing  masters, 
let  them  not  despise  them,  because  they  are  brethren 
(Christians),  but  rather  do  them  service ,  because  they 
are  faithful  and  beloved,  partakers  of  the  benefit  (of 
the  Gospel).  And  (1  Cor.  vii.,  21),  Art  thou  called 


72 


KELIGIOX. 


[book  IV. 


being  a  servant  (a  slave)  1  care  not  for  it :  but  if  thou 
mayest  be  made  free,  use  the  opportunity,  rather  than 
omit  to  do  so.  For  he  that  is  called  in  the  Lord,  being 
a  bondman,  is  the  Lord’s  freeman  :  likewise  he  that  is 
called,  being  free,  is  Christ’s  bondman.  Ye  are 
bought  with  a  price  (by  Christ) ;  therefore,  be  not  the 
servants  of  men,  so  that  this  shall  interfere  with  your 
service  of  Christ. 

647.  As  Christians  were  thus  enjoined  to  ob¬ 
serve,  respect,  and  heartily  conform  to  the  relations 
in  families  which  were  at  that  time  established  by 
law  or  usage,  so  were  they  enjoined  to  do  the  same 
with  respect  to  the  relations  established  in  the  State. 
Thus,  Christ  paid  tribute  to  the  State  (Matth.  xvii., 
24-27),  saying  to  Peter,  Lest  we  should  offend  them , 
go  thou... thou  shalt  ffnd  a  piece  of  money,  that  take , 
and  give  unto  them  for  me  and  thee.  And  (xxii.,  21), 
he  enjoined  others  to  pay  tribute  :  Render  unto  Ccesar 
the  things  that  are  Caesar’s.  So  St.  Paul  (Rom.  xiii. 
7),  Render  to  all  their  dues :  tribute  to  whom  tribute 
is  due  ;  custom  to  whom  custom  ;  fear  to  whom  fear  ; 
honour  to  whom  honour.  And  this  is  joined  with 
general  injunctions  of  obedience  to  magistrates, 
(xiii.,  1—5),  Let  every  soul  be  subject  to  the  higher 
powers.  For  there  is  no  power  but  of  God :  the 
powers  that  be  are  ordained  of  God.  Whosoever 
therefore  resisteih  the  power,  resisteth  the  ordinance 
of  God;  and  they  that  resist  shall  receive  to  them¬ 
selves  damnation.  For  rulers  are  not  a  terror  to 
good  works,  but  to  the  evil.  Wilt  thou  then  not  be 
afraid  of  the  power  ?  do  that  which  is  good,  and  thou 
shalt  have  praise  of  the  same  :  for  he  is  the  minister 
of  God  to  thee  for  good.  But  if  thou  do  that  which 
is  evil,  be  afraid  ;  for  he  beareih  not  the  sword  in 
vain  :  for  he  is  the  minister  of  God,  a  revenger  to 
execute  wrath  upon  him  that  doeth  evil .  Where¬ 
fore  ye  must  needs  be  subject,  not  only  for  wrath , 
but  also  for  conscience  sake.  And  (Tit.  iii.,  1), 


CHAP.  VIII.]  DUTIES  CONCERNING  OBEDIENCE.  73 

Put  them,  in  mind,  to  he  subject  to  governments  (apxaIs) 
and  powers ,  to  obey  magistrates.  Also  St.  Peter 
(1  Peter  ii.,  13),  Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordi¬ 
nance  of  man ,  for  the  Lord’s  sake  :  whether  it  be 
to  the  king ,  as  supreme  ;  or  unto  governors ,  as  unto 
them  that  are  sent  by  him  for  the  punishment  of  evil¬ 
doers,  and  for  the  praise  of  them  that  do  well.  For 
so  is  the  will  of  God,  that  with  well-doing  ye  may  put 
to  silence  the  ignorance  of  foolish  men,  who  speak  of 
you  as  bad  subjects.  As  free  (in  spirit),  and  not 
using  your  liberty  for  a  cloke  of  ivickedness  (or  sedi¬ 
tion)  (xa/a'as)  but  as  the  servants  of  God.  Honour  all 
men.  Love  the  Brotherhood.  Fear  God.  Honour 
the  King. 

648.  The  early  Christians  are  here  enjoined 
submission  to  the  magistrates,  as  a  course  not  only 
prudent,  but  also  right  and  religious;  not  only  for 
wrath  (by  reason  of  the  menace  of  punishment),  but 
also  for  conscience  sake  :  for  the  Lord’s  sake.  These 
powers,  and  the  higher  powers  especially,  are  said 
to  be  of  God  ;  to  be  ordained  of  God  ;  to  be  the  min¬ 
isters  of  God  :  to  resist  them  is  to  resist  the  ordinance 
of  God,  and  to  incur  danger  of  damnation. 

The  powers  to  which  this  applied,  as  appears  by 
the  condition  of  the  early  Christians,  and  by  the  facts, 
are  the  powers  of  the  established  government ;  they 
are  called  by  St.  Paul  the  powers  that  be  ;  and  by  St. 
Peter,  every  ordinance  of  man.  The  term  King  ap¬ 
pears  to  be  also  used,  only  because  it  was  the  name 
of  the  supreme  magistrate  at  that  time  in  that  country. 

649.  And  thus,  in  general,  it  is  a  Duty  to  obey 
the  government  established  in  the  land  where  the 
Christian  resides.  The  passages  just  quoted  do  not 
restrict  this  Duty  to  any  form  of  government ;  and 
from  the  history  of  the  times,  we  may  infer  that  it  is 
not  confined  to  cases  in  which  the  ancient  constitution, 
or  the  ancient  line  of  sovereigns,  subsists.  For  the 
constitution  of  the  Roman  State  had  recently  been 

VOL.  II.  G 


74 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


altered  by  violence,  from  a  republican  to  an  imperial 
form  ;  and  the  ancient  line  of  kings  no  longer  ruled 
in  Judaea. 

Such  passages,  therefore,  cannot  afford  any  reason 
for  imagining  a  religious  Duty  to  oppose  or  disturb 
the  existing  government,  in  order  to  restore  an  ancient 
Constitution  or  an  ancient  Dynasty. 

650.  On  the  other  hand,  these  passages  do  not 
at  all  show  that,  in  any  State,  it  may  not  be  the  duty 
of  the  poicers  that  he  to  alter  the  laws,  to  appoint  new 
magistrates,  new  magistracies,  and  the  like  ;  and 
allowable  in  extreme  cases,  in  cases  of  necessity 
(424),  to  alter  the  Constitution  of  the  country,  or  to 
depose  the  Sovereign.  Whether  this  is  the  case, 
must  depend  upon  considerations  belonging  to  Polity  ; 
in  which  religious  as  well  as  civil  Polity  must  be 
taken  into  the  account. 

651.  In  a  constitutional  form  of  government,  in 
which  the  whole  or  a  large  part  of  the  citizens  pos¬ 
sess  more  or  less  political  power,  the  Constitution,  as 
much  as  the  person  or  family  of  the  Sovereign,  may 
be  considered  as  the  ordinance  of  man,  to  which  all 
are  commanded  to  commit  themselves.  And  every 
citizen,  who  thus  possesses  by  Law  a  share  of  politi¬ 
cal  power,  is  one  of  the  'powers  that  he.  Every  Chris¬ 
tian,  in  such  a  situation,  may  and  ought  to  exert  his 
constitutional  Rights,  so  far  as  they  extend,  both  to 
preserve  the  State  and  the  Laws  from  all  needless  and 
hasty  innovation,  and  to  affect  such  improvements  in 
both  as  time  and  circumstances  require  ;  using  the 
light  of  Religion  as  well  as  of  Morality  and  Polity,  to 
determine  what  really  is  improvement  (see  334). 

652.  It  is  the  office  of  the  State  to  make  Laws 
regulating  the  details  of  its  Institutions,  and  the  Duty 
of  the  Citizen  to  obey  them  (330).  In  like  manner, 
in  religious  matters,  it  is  the  office  of  the  Church  to 
make  laws  respecting  the  detail  of  its  Institutions  ; 
and  it  is  the  Duty  of  the  Christian  to  conform  to  such 


CHAP.  IX.] 


CHRISTIAN  RULE  OF  CONSCIENCE.  75 


Laws.  Laws,  Rules,  and  Customs  on  such  subjects, 
are  Christian  Ordinances ;  and  will  be  treated  of 
hereafter. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  CHRISTIAN  RULE  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

653.  We  have  already  spoken  of  Conscience  ; 
and  have  distinguished  it  into  Conscience  as  Law,  and 
Conscience  as  Witness  (361).  We  have  further 
stated,  that  our  Conscience  as  Law,  is  that  view  at 
which  we  have  arrived,  of  the  Supreme  Law  of  our 
being  ;  and  is  thus  a  stage  in  our  Moral  and  Intel¬ 
lectual  Progress  (336).  We  have  added,  that  we 
can  never  rightly  assume  that  we  have  reached  an 
ultimate  stage  in  this  Progress  ;  we  must  always 
continue  to  labour  further  to  enlighten  and  to  instruct 
our  Conscience  (366).  We  have  further  added,  in 
anticipation  of  the  present  part  of  our  work,  that  in 
attempting  constantly  to  carry  on  this  process  to¬ 
wards  its  completion,  we  find  the  need  of  light  and 
power  which  we  can  only  hope  to  obtain  from  Reli¬ 
gion  (367). 

Religion  presents  to  us  the  Supreme  Law  of  our 
being  as  the  Will  of  God  ;  and  hence,  if  we  now  in¬ 
quire  what  is  the  Supreme  Rule  of  Conscience,  the 
answer  can  only  be,  that  it  is  the  Will  of  God.  But 
the  Will  of  God  becomes  the  Rule  of  our  Conscience, 
only  by  becoming  known  to  us  ;  and  it  is  an  impor¬ 
tant  question,  where  we  are  to  look  for  that  know¬ 
ledge  of  the  Will  of  God,  which  is  to  be  the  Rule  of 
our  Conscience.  Religion  is  to  aid  us  to  instruct  and 
enlighten  our  Conscience  \  and  we  are  led  to  inquire 


RELIGION. 


76 


[book  IV. 


in  what  forms  this  instruction,  and  this  light,  are  to 
be  obtained. 

654.  The  answer,  in  a  general  shape,  can  be 
no  other  than  this  :  that  the  Will  of  God,  so  far  as  it  is 
made  known  to  man,  in  whatever  manner,  is  the  Rule 
of  man’s  Conscience.  Conscience,  as  Law,  is  Mo¬ 
rality,  the  Law  of  our  being.  But  we  have  already 
seen,  that  we  are  led  to  consider  Morality  under  two 
main  aspects  ;  the  Morality  of  Reason,  and  Christian 
Morality :  both  these  give  us  a  knowledge  of  the 
Will  of  God  ;  and  these  are  the  two  main  portions  of 
the  Supreme  Rule  of  Conscience. 

655.  Christian  Morality  is  the  Will  of  God  as 
revealed  to  us  by  the  coming  of  Christ ;  of  which 
Revelation,  the  authoritative  account  is  contained  in 
the  Scriptures.  We  here  include  the  Scriptures  of 
the  Old,  as  well  as  the  New  Testament,  for  both  are 
parts  of  the  same  revelation.  The  Christian  Mo¬ 
rality,  thus  revealed,  includes  and  comprises  rational 
Morality ;  carries  its  claims  much  deeper  into  our 
Spiritual  being  ;  and  invests  it  with  far  more  certain 
and  more  powerful  sanctions.  Hence  it  may  per¬ 
haps  be  thought  by  some,  that  Christian  Morality  su¬ 
persedes  the  Morality  of  Reason  ;  and  that  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  alone  may  be  declared  to  be  the  Supreme  Rule 
of  the  Christian’s  Conscience. 

But  a  little  consideration  will  show  us  that  we 
cannot  look  upon  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New 
Testament  as  the  Supreme  Rule  of  Conscience  ;  that 
is,  as  the  sole  and  complete  Rule  of  Human  Action. 

656.  This  will  appear  from  the  Scriptures 
themselves,  as  well  as  from  the  reason  of  the  case. 
The  Scriptures  themselves  take  for  granted  the  light 
of  reason,  and  the  natural  knowledge  of  moral  rules 
to  which  men  are  thus  led.  Thus  St.  Paul  says 
(Rom.  ii.,  14),  When  the  Gentiles,  which  have  not  the 
law  (of  the  Scriptures),  do  by  nature  the  things  con¬ 
tained  in  the  law ,  these ,  having  not  the  law ,  are  a  law 


CHAP.  IX.]  CHRISTIAN  RULE  OF  CONSCIENCE.  77 

unto  themselves.  They  show  the  work  of  the  law 
written  in  their  hearts  ;  their  conscience  also  hearing 
witness ,  and  their  thoughts  the  meanwhile  accusing  or 
else  excusing  one  another.  The  precepts  of  Scrip¬ 
ture  cannot  be  a  rule  to  those  who  have  not  received 
the  Scripture  :  and  such  persons  have  for  their  proper 
guide  the  suggestions  of  reason,  the  law  written  in 
their  hearts.  The  writings  of  heathen  moralists,  and 
the  whole  history  of  heathen  life,  show  that  the 
heathen  were  aware  of  a  moral  rule,  and  of  the  guilt 
incurred  by  its  violation.  The  conception  of  sin 
implies  the  assumption  of  a  law  :  as  St.  Paul  says 
(Rom.  iv.,  15),  Where  no  law  is,  there  is  no  trans¬ 
gression.  As  St.  John  also  says  (1  John  iii.,  4),  Sin 
is  the  transgression  of  the  law.  Since  then  we  ascribe 
sin  to  heathens,  we  must  suppose  them  to  have  a 
moral  law  ;  and  this  law  cannot  be  the  precepts  of 
Scripture,  which  have  not  found  the  way  to  them. 
The  precepts  of  Scripture  are  not  the  sole  rule  of 
action  for  mankind. 

657.  But  further;  even  Christians  are  referred 
to  the  natural  sense  of  right  on  many  occasions. 
Thus  Christ  says  (Luke  xii.,  57),  Why  even  of  your¬ 
selves  judge  ye  not  what  is  right?  St.  Paul  says  (1 
Cor.  xi.,  13,  14),  Judge  in  yourselves  .  .  .  doth  not 
nature  itself  teach  you  !  and  again  (1  Cor.  x.,  15), 
I  speak  as  to  wise  men  ;  judge  ye  what  I  say.  And 
the  same  application  of  the  light  of  the  reason,  to 
judge  of  right  and  wrong,  is  implied,  whenever  Christ 
and  his  Apostles  express  indignation  at  offences,  not 
expressly  forbidden  in  Scripture,  but  only  necessarily 
condemned  by  inference  from  commands  which  are 
given.  But  it  is  to  be  remarked  that,  in  Scripture, 
appeals  to  the  natural  conscience  of  man  are  very 
much  mixed  up  with  references  to  the  revealed  Di¬ 
vine  commands.  This  results  from  the  nature  of  the 
case  ;  since  the  Divine  commands  contain  a  distinct 
promulgation  of  the  main  points  of  the  natural  moral 

o  2 


78 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


law  ;  and  the  law  thus  promulgated  was  appealed 
to,  both  as  agreeable  to  reason,  and  enjoined  by  the 
will  of  God. 

The  religious  teacher,  instead  of  looking  upon  the 
moral  law  as  the  dictates  of  man’s  Reason,  considers 
it  as  the  law  of  God,  who  gave  to  man  his  Reason. 
But  this  does  not  prevent  his  recognizing  the  law 
written  on  the  heart  of  man,  as  well  as  the  law  in¬ 
scribed  on  the  tables  of  the  Mosaic  covenant. 

658.  There  is  another  reason  why  we  should 
not  look  upon  the  precepts  of  Scripture  as  the  sole 
and  complete  rule  of  human  action.  Namely  this: 
it  was  not  the  main  object  of  the  Scriptures  to  pro¬ 
mulgate  laws  of  human  action,  but  to  publish  the 
mode  by  which  men  were  to  find  favour  with  God. 
St.  Paul  describes  this  very  distinctly  when  he 
speaks  to  Timothy  (2  Tim.  iii.,  15)  of  the  Scriptures, 
which  are  able  to  make  thee  wise  to  salvation.  For 
this  purpose,  Scripture  has  to  teach  us  Doctrines, 
such  as  have  already  been  spoken  of,  which  the 
light  of  human  reason  could  not  discover.  And  the 
rules  of  human  duty  are  there  set  forth,  rather  in 
proportion  as  their  connexion  with  those  Doctrines 
requires,  than  in  such  manner  as  to  produce  a  com¬ 
plete  body  of  moral  rules,  requiring  nothing  besides 
itself  for  the  guidance  of  human  life. 

659.  Further  :  if  we  consider  the  form,  charac¬ 
ter,  and  spirit  of  the  books  of  Scripture,  it  will  ap¬ 
pear  that  we  cannot  expect  to  find  in  them  a  com¬ 
plete  and  systematic  body  of  moral  rules.  For  the 
precepts  which  the  Scriptures  contain  are  of  various 
kinds  ;  some  refer  to  moral  conduct,  others  to  cere¬ 
monies  :  some  apply  to  all  men,  others  to  particular 
persons ;  some  are  temporary,  others  perpetual  com¬ 
mands.  Some  precepts  are  delivered  by  opinion,  or 
by  permission.  1  Cor.  vii.,  6,  I  speak  this  by  permis¬ 
sion  (*ara  avyyvwjxhv) :  and  verse  40,  After  my  judg¬ 
ment  (xara  r/jr  e^.v  yvco/xijv'),  as  counsels  directed  to  par- 


CHAP.  IX. j  CHRISTIAN  RULE  OF  CONSCIENCE.  79 

ticular  times  and  conditions  ;  other  precepts  are 
delivered  by  commandment  (1  Cor.  vii.,  6)  (*ar  emmyi/v), 
as  to  be  observed  by  all  at  all  times.  We  must  dis¬ 
tinguish  these  kinds  of  precepts  from  each  other  ; 
the  particular  from  the  general,  the  temporary  from 
the  perpetual ;  and  this  must  be  done  by  the  light 
of  reason. 

Scripture  itself  does  not  always  separate  these 
kinds  of  precepts.  Thus  (Levit.  xix.,  18),  we  have 
the  general  precept,  Thou  shall  love  thy  neighbour 
as  thyself ;  and  in  the  next  verse  we  have,  Thou 
shall  not  sow  thy  field  ivith  mingled  seed ,  neither 
shall  a  garment  mingled  of  linen  and  woollen  come 
upon  thee.  No  one  will  doubt  that  the  former  pre¬ 
cept  is  a  command  for  all  men  at  all  times,  the  latter 
a  ceremonial  command  confined  to  the  Jews.  We 
allow  the  common  reason  of  mankind  to  draw  this 
distinction  between  the  obligation  imposed  by  these 
two  successive  verses  ;  and  we  thus  recognize  the 
authority  of  human  reason  conjointly  with  that  of 
Scripture,  in  defining  the  rules  of  human  action. 

660.  Thus  the  precepts  of  Scripture  are  not  the 
complete  and  sole  Rule  of  human  action  for  us,  be¬ 
cause  they  are  evidently  not  intended  by  God  to  be 
so.  The  Will  of  God,  in  whatever  manner  made 
known  to  us,  whether  by  Scripture,  or  by  Reason, 
or  by  the  joint  light  of  the  two,  is  our  Rule  of  action. 
That  by  taking  advantage  of  both,  we  may  obtain  a 
body  of  rules  of  action  in  harmony  with  the  will  of 
God  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  we  have  endeavoured 
to  show,  in  the  Chapters  on  Christian  Morality. 

661.  This  body  of  morality  is  enjoined  upon  us 
as  a  part  of  man’s  salvation.  James  iv.,  12,  There 
is  one  lawgiver,  who  is  able  to  save  and  to  destroy. 
And  any  part  of  the  legislation  which  thus  expresses 
the  will  of  God,  cannot  be  superseded  by  any  other 
obligation.  Thus  St.  Peter  and  the  Apostles  de¬ 
clared  (Acts  v.;  29),  We  ought  to  obey  God  rather 


80 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


than  men.  And  (iv.,  19),  Whether  it  he  right  in  the 
sight  of  God  to  hearken  unto  you  more  than  unto 
God,  judge  ye. 

662.  Having  thus  taken  a  survey  of  the  Christian 
Precepts  which  relate  to  special  classes  of  Duties, 
we  have  still  to  speak  of  those  religious  Principles  of 
action,  of  which  all  Duties  are  manifestations  and 
developments  (565).  Our  Progress  towards  the 
condition  in  which  such  Principles  become  operative 
in  us,  is  our  Religious  Progress  ;  as  our  progress 
towards  the  condition  in  which  Moral  Principles  be¬ 
come  operative  in  us,  is  our  Moral  Progress.  It  is 
a  duty  to  aim  at  Religious  Progress,  as  it  is  a  Duty 
to  aim  at  Moral  Progress ;  for  our  Moral  Progress  is 
incomplete,  except  it  go  onwards  so  as  to  be  also 
Religious  Progress.  A  Belief  in  God  is  a  part  of 
our  Moral  and  Intellectual  Progress  ;  and  this  Belief, 
once  arrived  at,  gives  a  new  aspect  to  our  views  of 
Duty  and  its  foundations.  We  cannot  stop  short  of 
this  belief,  and  of  its  influence,  without  making  the 
progress  of  thought  with  regard  to  the  foundations 
of  Duty  come  to  a  termination ;  and  to  acquiesce  in 
such  a  termination,  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the 
moral  and  intellectual  progress  at  which  we  are 
bound  to  aim. 

Our  endeavours  to  promote  this  religious  Progress 
in  ourselves,  or  in  others,  may  be  termed  Religious 
Culture.  Such  Religious  Culture  is  one  of  our 
Duties  ;  and  as  was  said  before  of  the  Duty  of  Moral 
Culture  (305),  this  Duty  is  of  so  fundamental  and 
comprehensive  a  character  as  to  include  all  other 
Duties.  We  must  now  attend  to  some  of  the  parts 
of  this  Duty  of  Religious  Culture  of  ourselves. 


CHAP.  X.] 


NATURAL  PIETY. 


81 


CHAPTER  X. 

NATURAL  PIETY. 

663.  The  belief  in  God,  which  most  men  pos¬ 
sess,  as  a  part  of  their  mental  habits,  from  the  first 
dawn  of  thought ;  which  is  unfolded  into  a  distinct 
form  in  the  course  of  their  moral  and  intellectual 
culture  ;  and  which  is  supported  and  confirmed  by 
many  reasonings,  drawn  both  from  the  material  and 
the  moral  world,  brings  with  it  corresponding  Duties 
of  the  affections.  We  have  already  said  (283)  that 
man  has,  among  his  natural  affections,  a  deference 
for  something  better,  wiser,  more  stable,  more  per¬ 
manent  than  himself.  This  feeling  finds  its  employ¬ 
ment  in  our  regards  towards  human  Authority, 
especially  when  this  Authority  is  manifestly  com¬ 
bined  with  Goodness  and  Justice  ;  and  makes 
Reverence  and  Obedience  to  such  Authority  to  be 
Duties.  But  in  order  that  our  view  of  Duty  may 
be  consistent  with  itself,  these  Affections  of  Rever¬ 
ence  and  Justice  must  be  conceived  as  equally  due, 
wherever  these  conditions  of  Authority,  combined 
with  Goodness  and  Justice,  are  conceived  to  exist ; 
and  as  due  in  a  greater  and  greater  degree,  in  pro¬ 
portion  as  the  Authority,  the  Goodness,  and  the 
Justice,  are  more  complete.  In  our  Idea  of  God, 
we  include  Supreme  Authority  over  his  creatures, 
along  with  perfect  Goodness  and  Justice.  To  him, 
therefore,  in  an  eminent  and  especial  manner,  Rever¬ 
ence  and  Obedience  are  due. 

664.  This  Duty  has  been  acknowledged  by  the 
universal  feelings  of  mankind  in  all  nations  and  in 
all  ages.  Men  have  always  and  everywhere  de¬ 
clared  their  belief  in  God.  and  have  looked  upon 
him  as  the  proper  object  of  the  most  profound  Rever¬ 
ence.  In  rude  nations,  whose  moral  and  intellectual 

VOL.  II.  6 


82 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IY. 


nature  was  very  imperfectly  developed,  the  idea  of 
God  has  been  entertained  in  a  coarse  and  confused 
manner,  under  the  forms  of  Polytheism,  Hero-Wor¬ 
ship,  and  the  like.  In  such  cases,  the  Character 
ascribed  to  Deity  has  been  Power,  rather  than 
Authority,  Justice,  and  Goodness  ;  and  the  Affec¬ 
tion  has  corresponded  to  the  conception  of  the 
Character,  and  has  been  Fear,  rather  than  Rever¬ 
ence.  But  when  the  moral  attributes  of  God  are 
more  steadily  apprehended,  the  Fear  receives  a 
mixture  of  Love,  and  becomes  Reverence.  And  in 
proportion  as  the  Goodness  of  God  becomes  more  and 
more  fixed  in  man’s  belief,  Love  predominates  over 
Fear  in  the  feelings  which  they  have  respecting 
him. 

665.  In  like  manner,  Obedience  to  God  has 
everywhere  been  recognized  as  a  Duty.  That  he 
has  made  us  what  we  are,  and  given  us  the  faculties 
which  we  have,  makes  it  right  that  we  should 
obey  him  ;  for  the  Supreme  Rule  of  our  being,  ac¬ 
cording  to  which  right  things  are  right,  is  what  He 
has  made  it  by  his  Will.  The  Rule  of  human 
action  has  been,  in  all  stages  of  man’s  progress, 
commonly  apprehended  as  identical  with  the  Will 
of  God.  In  proportion  as  the  Rule  of  human  action 
has  been  more  completely  conceived,  and  reduced 
to  the  Moral  Principles  of  which  we  have  spoken, 
Benevolence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purity,  and  Order, 
those  Principles  have  been  conceived  as  attributes 
of  God.  And  this  identity,  between  the  Will  of  God 
and  the  Supreme  Rule  of  Human  Action,  being 
assumed,  any  special  indications  of  the  Will  of  God 
have  been  accepted,  as  having  a  supreme  claim  to 
our  Obedience. 

666.  This  is  universally  recognized  with  regard 
to  those  indications  of  the  Will  of  God,  which  we 
discern  in  the  constitution  and  circumstances  of 
man.  That  man  was  intended  by  God,  or  by  Pro- 


CHAP.  X.] 


NATURAL  PIETY. 


83 


vidence,  to  follow  this  or  that  course,  if  the  inten¬ 
tion  be  allowed,  is  universally  accepted  as  proving 
it  right  that  he  should  follow  such  course.  There 
are  many  indications  of  this  kind,  which  all  thought¬ 
ful  men  agree  in  acknowledging.  We  cannot  doubt 
whether  it  was  intended  by  the  Creator  that  certain 
kinds  of  birds  should  do  what  they  invariably  do  ; — 
build  nests,  pair,  feed  their  young,  live  in  flocks,  mi¬ 
grate.  And  when  we  look  at  man,  as  the  naturalist 
looks  at  him,  and  find  that  property,  marriage,  civil 
society,  trade,  are  habits  of  men  quite  as  universal 
as  the  habits  of  birds  just  mentioned,  we  cannot 
doubt  that  the  institutions  are  a  part  of  the  intention 
of  Providence  in  the  Creation  of  man,  just  as  the 
habits  of  birds  are  a  part  of  the  intention  of  Provi¬ 
dence  in  the  creation  of  birds.  And  this  intention 
of  Providence  makes  it  right  that  man  should  con¬ 
form  himself  to  these  institutions,  and  to  the  Rules 
which  are  necessarv  for  the  existence  of  the  Institu- 
tions  of  each  community.  We  do  not  say  that  it  is 
right  for  mere  animals  to  conform  themselves  to 
these  intentions  of  Providence  ;  because  for  animals 
there  is  no  rightness.  They  act  by  Instinct,  which 
feels,  not  by  Reason,  which  sees,  a  Rule.  They 
are  driven  forward  by  implante'd  impulses,  men  by 
conscious  intention.  But  man,  himself  capable  and 
conscious  of  intention,  can  apprehend  the  existence 
of  intention  in  his  Maker,  and  cannot  help  appre¬ 
hending  it  as  a  paramount  Rule  for  his  own  inten¬ 
tion. 

667.  The  acknowledgment  of  the  intention  of 
the  Creator  as  the  proper  Rule  of  man’s  actions,  has 
sometimes  been  expressed  by  saying  that  man  ought 
to  live  according  to  Nature  ;  and  that  Virtue  and 
Duty  are  according  to  Nature,  Vice  and  moral 
Transgression  contrary  to  Nature.  For  man’s  na¬ 
ture  is  a  Constitution,  in  which  Reason  and  Desire 
are  elements  ;  but  of  these  elements,  it  was  plainly 


84 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IY. 


intended  that  Reason  should  control  Desire,  not  that 
Desire  should  overmaster  Reason.  And  in  a  like 
form  might  be  presented  some  of  the  reasonings 
which  we  have  employed.  In  order  to  establish  the 
Duties  of  the  Affections,  for  instance,  we  might  have 
said,  that  it  is  plainly  according  to  nature  that  men 
should  be  drawn  together  by  Affection,  and  yet 
should  possess  distinct  Rights  ; — that  therefore  those 
benevolent  Affections  are  Duties,  which  draw  men 
together,  as  family  affection,  and  the  like ;  and  those 
defensive  Affections  are  also  Duties,  which  tend  to 
the  maintenance  of  Rights,  as  indignation  at  wrong. 

668.  The  acknowledgment  of  the  Intention  of 
the  Creator,  as  the  proper  Rule  of  our  being,  implies 
the  acknowledgment  of  Obedience  to  his  Will  as  our 
Duty,  and  as  the  Source  of  Duties.  When  we  in¬ 
clude  in  our  view  the  Idea  of  God,  his  Will,  whether 
learnt  from  Revelation,  or  from  reasoning,  and  from 
whatever  course  of  reasoning,  becomes  the  Supreme 
Rule  of  Human  action,  and  that  from  which  all 
other  Rules  are  derived.  He  it  is  who  makes  our 
Duty  and  our  Happiness  coincide  ;  and  whether  we 
say  that  Moral  action  will  lead  to  Happiness  be¬ 
cause  it  is  our  Duty,  or  that  it  is  our  duty  because 
it  will  lead  to  Happiness,  we  rest  the  reality  and 
force  of  our  Moral  Rules  upon  the  idea  of  God,  who 
has  established  this  coincidence  of  Duty  and  Happi¬ 
ness. 

669.  But  we  are  not  bound  to  God  merely  by 
the  bonds  of  the  Duty  of  Obedience.  There  are 
Affections  which  are  naturally  and  necessarily  due 
to  him,  and  which  further  bind  us  to  him.  We  are 
bound  to  him  by  the  ties  of  Gratitude  for  innumera¬ 
ble  and  immeasurable  benefits  which  we  have  re¬ 
ceived  ;  for  from  him  we  have  received  all  that  we 
have  or  are.  We  are  bound  to  him  by  relations  of 
Order,  as  being,  by  the  nature  of  things,  our  Sove¬ 
reign  Master  and  Lord.  We  are  bound  to  him  by 


CHAP.  X.] 


NATURAL  PIRTY. 


85 


Love  and  Admiration,  as  containing  in  his  essence 
the  perfection  of  that  Goodness  and  Justice  which 
are  the  proper  objects  of  Love  and  Admiration. 

670.  This,  our  Connexion  with  God  by  ties  of 
Dependence,  Obedience,  and  Affection,  is  often  and 
fitly  expressed  by  speaking  of  him  as  our  Father, 
and  the  Universal  Father  of  mankind.  We  are  his 
children,  and  he  is  the  proper  object  of  our  Filial  Af¬ 
fection  ;  only,  that  our  filial  affection  to  Him  may  as¬ 
sume,  and  ought  to  assume,  a  character  of  entire  and 
confiding  Reverence,  which  has  no  reserve,  doubt,  or 
limit ;  as  the  affection  to  our  human  parents  some¬ 
times  may  or  must  have. 

671.  Looking  upon  God  as  our  Father,  and  the 
Father  of  all  men,  we  are  naturally  led  to  look  upon 
all  men  as  our  Brethren.  All  mankind  form  one 
great  Family  ;  and  as  all  the  mutual  Duties  and 
Services  between  the  Members  of  a  Family  become 
manifestations  and  results  of  the  Family  Affec¬ 
tions,  when  these  are  fully  and  freely  unfolded,  so 
all  Duties  and  Services  between  the  members  of  the 
Great  Human  Family  (291)  become  results  of  the 
fraternal  love  which  belongs  to  their  condition  as 
common  children  of  one  universal  Father. 

672.  A  sense  of  our  Dependence,  our  Grati¬ 
tude,  our  Reverence,  when  these  feelings  exist  to¬ 
wards  men,  find  their  expression  in  various  forms  of 
language  and  other  indications.  God  does  not  pre¬ 
sent  himself  to  us  as  a  Person  to  whom  we  can  speak 
face  to  face.  We  conceive  him  as  an  Energy  and 
Intelligence,  producing,  upholding,  pervading,  seeing, 
knowing,  and  judging  all  things.  He  created  and 
unfolded,  he  continually  preserves,  continually  ob¬ 
serves  us.  In  him  we  live  and  move.  He  is  not  far 
from  every  one  of  us.  He  is  acquainted  with  our 
thoughts  and  feelings,  as  soon  as  they  arise  in  our 
minds.  Hence,  when  our  feelings  of  Dependence, 
Gratitude,  and  Reverence,  take  any  definite  shape  in 

VOL.  u.  H 


86. 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


our  thoughts,  and  become  clothed  in  Conceptions  and 
Images,  we  may  conceive  that  these  forms  of  our 
affection  become  known  to  him  of  themselves,  with¬ 
out  the  use  of  words  on  our  parts.  But  in  fact,  our 
affections  cannot  be  very  definitely  clothed  in  con¬ 
ceptions  and  images,  without  at  least  the  mental 
use  of  words  ;  and  for  the  most  part,  these  forms  of 
feeling  become  more  distinct  by  being  uttered  and 
heard  by  men  among  men.  Besides,  in  the  common 
participation  of  such  feelings,  and  in  the  common 
contemplation  of  the  conceptions  and  images  in  which 
they  are  clothed,  there  is  an  influence  by  which  they 
become  more  intense  in  men’s  minds,  and  are  com¬ 
municated  from  one  mind  to  others.  Hence,  to  mould 
our  feelings  of  Gratitude  and  Reverence  towards 
God  into  words,  will  tend  to  cultivate  these  feelings 
both  in  our  own  minds  and  in  the  minds  of  other  men. 
Such  feelings  are  Natural  Piety  ;  and  this  Piety  may 
be  promoted,  by  being  expressed  both  in  solitude  and 
in  the  company  of  men. 

673.  But  we  may  not  only  express  our  feelings 
of  Piety  ;  we  may  direct  these  expressions  to  God. 
God  is  a  Mind,  in  which  are  Intelligence,  Purpose, 
Will,  Thought,  as  in  our  own.  We  necessarily 
conceive  him  as  a  person,  and  we  can  address  our¬ 
selves  to  him  as  a  Person  ;  this  address  must  be  made 
in  our  thoughts  ;  for  though  God  is  near  to  each  of 
us  here,  he  is  far  off,  or  rather  unapproachable,  as 
an  object  of  outward  apprehension.  And  our  inter¬ 
nal  addresses  to  God  must  necessarily  be  such  as  to 
imply  that  entire  Dependence  upon  him,  which  is  the 
first  of  the  affections  due  to  him.  This  may  be  im¬ 
plied,  by  humbly  asking  from  him  some  of  the  bene¬ 
fits  which  he  can  give  us.  Such  internal  address  of 
our  thoughts  to  God,  in  which  our  dependence  is 
expressed  by  words  of  Petition,  are  Prayers.  Bene¬ 
fits,  as  they  come  from  him,  and  express  his  Bene¬ 
volence  to  us,  are  Blessings.  And  as  we  pray  to 


CHAP.  X.j 


NATURAL  PIETY. 


87 


God  for  future  or  continued  Blessings,  we  express 
our  gratitude  for  past  Blessings  in  Thanksgivings. 
We  express  our  admiration  of  God’s  character  in 
Praises.  Such  expressions  of  Natural  Piety  have 
been  common  in  all  ages  ;  although,  for  the  most 
part,  mixed  with  vague  or  arbitrary  images  and  con¬ 
ceptions,  arising  from  the  imperfection  of  men’s 
moral  and  intellectual,  and  still  more  of  their  reli¬ 
gious  culture. 

674.  Prayer,  Thanksgiving  and  Praise,  are 
properly  and  primarily  the  language  of  each  man’s 
thoughts  to  God  ;  when  the  feelings  of  Natural  Piety 
have  been  duly  unfolded.  A  man,  in  his  Private 
Prayers,  asks  for  Blessings  for  himself,  and  especially 
for  such  Blessings  as  may  aid  him  in  his  moral  pro¬ 
gress  ;  for  strength  to  resist  temptation,  and  to  elevate 
and  purify  his  mind.  But  also,  since  the  affections 
which  are  due  to  God,  arise  from  the  condition  of 
human  nature  which  is  common  to  all  men,  men  feel 
that  a  common  expression  of  such  feelings  by  assem¬ 
blies  of  men  is  also  suitable  to  their  condition.  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  Public  Prayer,  by  assemblies  of  men,  and 
other  public  expressions  of  religious  feelings,  have 
been  employed  in  all  ages  and  nations.  Such  ac¬ 
knowledgments  of  the  dependence  of  man  on  God, 
and  man’s  reverence  for  God,  expressed  in  words  or 
by  other  indications,  are  Worship  ;  and  men  have  in 
all  times  and  places  worshipped  God  ;  although  their 
notions  of  Deity  have  often  been  gross  and  fantasti¬ 
cal,  and  their  worship  often  inconsistent  with  moral 
and  rational  views. 

675.  Public  Worship  by  assemblies  of  men 
necessarily  implies  Places  and  Times  appointed  for 
such  Ceremonies :  and  these  Places,  Times,  and 
Ceremonies  themselves  are  naturally  looked  upon  by 
men  with  a  religious  reverence  :  they  are  fixed  by 
rule,  and  separated  from  all  common  uses ;  they  are 
Sacred.  Special  Sacred  Places,  as  Temples;  fixed 


88 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


Sacred  Times,  as  Festivals;  appear  to  be  universal 
dictates  of  Natural  Piety.  Religious  Ceremonies 
are  very  various  in  various  countries  ;  but  some, 
which  may  appear  to  our  Reason  to  be  arbitrary, 
prevailed  very  extensively  among  the  ancient  nations, 
and  from  the  earliest  times;  as  Sacrifices  of  Animals. 
These  Sacrifices  were  understood  as  an  acknow¬ 
ledgment  of  Sin  on  the  part  of  the  Worshippers,  a 
Supplication  for  Forgiveness,  and  a  Means  of  Pro¬ 
pitiation. 

676.  The  Natural  Piety,  of  which  we  have 
spoken,  is  a  part  of  our  Duty  ;  for  it  is  a  part  of  the 
Christian  Piety,  of  which  we  shall  have  to  speak. 
Paul  spoke  to  the  people  of  Lystra  of  God,  as  mani¬ 
fested  to  man’s  natural  reason  by  the  works  of 
nature.  God,  he  said,  even  before  the  teaching  of 
Revelation,  left  not  himself  without  witness ,  in  that  he 
did  good ,  and  gave  us  rain  from  heaven ,  and  fruitful 
seasons,  filing  our  hearts  with  food  and  gladness 
(Acts  xiv.,  17).  And  when  he  preached  to  the 
Athenians,  taking  occasion  from  an  altar  with  the 
inscription  to  the  Unknown  God,  he  said  (Acts  xvii., 
23),  Whom  ye  ignorantly  worship,  him  declare  I  unto 
you.  And  he  went  on  to  deliver  the  views  of  Natu¬ 
ral  Piety :  God  that  made  the  world  and  all  things 
therein... hath  made  of  one  blood  all  nations  of  men  for 
to  dwell  upon  the  face  of  the  earth  ;  and  hath  deter¬ 
mined  their  appointed  time,  and  the  bounds  of  their 
habitation  :  that  they  might  seek  the  Lord,  if  haply  they 
might  feel  after  him  till  they  found  him.  And  yet  he 
is  not  far  from  every  one  of  us  ;  for  in  him  we  live, 
and  move,  and  have  our  being  ;  as  certain  also  of  your 
own  poets  have  said,  For  we  are  his  offspring.  So  too 
the  Psalms  of  David,  which  are  adopted  and  confirm¬ 
ed  by  Christ  and  his  disciples  as  a  part  of  the  Reve¬ 
lation  of  God,  are  full  of  the  Recognition  of  God  and 
his  character,  as  manifested  in  the  works  of  his  cre¬ 
ation.  In  these  songs  of  Praise,  God  is  constantly 


CHAP.  XI.] 


OATHS. 


89 


spoken  of,  as  alike  declared  to  us  by  the  visible  hea¬ 
vens  and  earth  which  surround  us,  and  by  the  moral 
law  which  is  within  us  ;  as  in  the  nineteenth  Psalm  ; 
The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of  God ,  and  the  firma¬ 
ment  showeth  his  handy-work  ;  and  a  few  verses  later, 
The  Law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect ,  converting  the  soul. 
And  Jesus  Christ  himself  speaks  to  us  of  God  who 
clothes  the  lilies  of  the  field ,  and  without  whom  not  a 
sparrow  falls  to  the  ground.  Thus  the  convictions  of 
Natural  Piety  are  adopted  as  a  fundamental  part  of 
that  belief  which  Christ  and  his  Apostles  taught. 

The  dictates  of  Natural  Piety,  in  so  far  as  they 
direct  us  to  fixed  times,  places,  and  forms  of  worship, 
are  also  adopted  and  carried  into  detail  by  Christian 
teachers,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

OATHS. 

677.  There  is  another  expression  of  our  feel¬ 
ings  and  convictions  respecting  God,  which  has  found 
a  place  among  the  usages  of  all  nations,  and  may 
therefore  be  considered  as  a  result  of  Natural  Piety. 
I  speak  of  Oaths.  As  we  have  already  said  (318), 
we  may  make,  or  may  wish  to  make,  a  promise  or  a 
declaration  in  a  manner  more  earnest,  more  conside¬ 
rate,  more  solemn ,  than  ordinary.  Natural  Piety 
suggests,  as  the  most  solemn  way  in  which  this  can 
be  done,  the  doing  it  with  express  reference  to  our 
belief  in  God,  in  the  presence  of  other  men,  in  some 
form  of  this  kind  :  I  promise,  or  I  declare,  in  the  pre¬ 
sence  of  God  ;  as  God  is  my  Witness  ;  as  God  is  my 
Judge.  We  stated  that,  in  the  violation  of  a  solemn 
promise  or  declaration,  the  transgression  of  morality 

h  2 


90 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


is  very  great,  because  we  have  willingly  and  pur¬ 
posely  rested  a  great  share  of  our  moral  progress  upon 
our  truthfulness  in  this  instance.  It  is  consistent 
with  this  view  to  confirm  a  solemn  promise  by  an 
Oath.  For  in  the  eye  of  the  religious  man,  the  end 
and  aim  of  our  moral  progress  is  the  happiness  which 
God  makes  to  be  the  consequence  of  moral  progress 
rightly  pursued.  By  acting  as  in  his  presence,  by 
purposely  referring  to  him  as  our  Witness,  and  as 
our  Judge,  we  involve  in  the  consequences  of  our 
acts,  so  far  as  we  can,  our  total  future  happiness  in 
this  world  and  the  next.  If  we  transgress,  we  re¬ 
nounce  our  claim  to  the  happiness  which  God  will 
give  to  Truthfulness,  without  which  no  character 
can  be  otherwise  than  depraved. 

678.  It  may  perhaps  be  objected  to  the  use  of 
such  expressions  as  this ;  In  the  presence  of  God  ; 
and  the  like,  we  make  a  difference  between  one  ac¬ 
tion  and  another,  which  we  ought  not  to  make  ;  since 
a  religious  man  will  do  all  things  as  in  the  presence 
of  God.  But  to  this  the  reply  is  obvious  ;  that  the 
use  of  such  words  brings  the  thought  more  home  to 
us,  for  the  moment,  however  familiar  it  may  com¬ 
monly  be  ;  and  that  such  public  references  to  the 
truths  which  we  believe  in  common  with  other  men, 
are  among  the  means  by  which  the  belief  becomes 
specially  effective  on  our  actions.  We  may  add,  that 
in  those  acts  which  especially  consist  of  words,  as 
promises  and  assertions,  the  religious  thought,  which 
ought  to  accompany  our  words,  may  very  justly  be 
also  expressed  in  words.  To  avoid  sins  of  thought, 
it  may  be  enough  that  we  think  ourselves  in  the  pre¬ 
sence  of  God :  but  when  we  have  to  speak,  we  may 
utter  this  thought  among  the  rest,  and  say  that  we 
speak  as  in  the  presence  of  God. 

679.  As  an  Oath  implies  hope  of  the  happiness 
which  God  gives  to  virtue  ;  it  implies  also  fear  of  the 
unhappiness  with  which  he  will  punish  falsehood,  and 


ciiap.  xi.  j 


OATHS. 


91 


especially  falsehood  committed  in  a  case  in  which  he 
has  been  thus  appealed  to  by  an  Oath.  God  is  re¬ 
garded  as  the  avenger  of  Perjury.  And  this  has 
sometimes  been  expressed  in  the  Oath  ;  God  being 
spoken  of,  not  only  as  the  Judge  of  men,  but  as  the 
Punisher  of  Falsehood.  In  some  cases,  there  have 
been  added  Imprecations ,  that  is,  prayers  for  evils 
upon  the  swearer,  if  he  break  his  Oath.  But  it  is 
more  suitable  to  the  Reverence  which  we  owe  to  God 
as  our  Judge,  that  we  should  leave  the  details  and 
mode  of  his  Justice  to  him.  On  the  other  hand, 
an  oath  seems  to  imply  a  prayer  for  Divine  assist¬ 
ance  to  enable  us  to  keep  our  Oath.  Man’s  com¬ 
mand  over  his  future  actions,  still  more  over  his 
alfections  and  wishes,  is  not  absolute  ;  and  tempta¬ 
tions  may  occur,  when  the  assistance,  which  religious 
men  seek  to  obtain  by  prayer,  may  be  needed,  in 
order  that  the  sworn  man  may  keep  his  Oath  invio¬ 
late.  This  appears  to  be  implied  in  the  phrase 
used  in  many  Oaths,  So  help  me  God  ;  ita  me  Deus 
adjuvet. 

680.  It  has  been  said  by  some,  that  these 
phrases  mean  :  On  that  condition  alone,  and  no  other, 
may  God  help  me  :  If  I  break  this  oath,  may  he  cease 
to  help  me,  and  leave  me  to  misery.  On  this  view, 
the  Clause,  So  help  me  God ,  has  been  spoken  of  as  a 
kind  of  Imprecation.  But  it  is  difficult  to  accept 
this  view.  If  this  were  the  sense  intended,  the  more 
proper  expression  would  be,  So  bless  me  God,  So  re¬ 
ward  me  God,  or,  So  save  me  God  ;  expressions  which 
are  not  commonly  used  in  Oaths.  The  expression, 
So  help  me  God,  agrees  very  well  with  the  view  which 
we  have  given  of  a  solemn  promise,  that  upon  our 
truthfulness  in  this  instance,  we  are  willing  to  risk 
our  whole  moral  progress ;  or,  as  the  religious  man 
rather  views  the  matter,  our  favour  in  the  eyes  of 
God,  and  the  happiness  which  he  can  give.  For  in 
incurring  suoh  a  risk,  a  man  may  well  say,  “  May 


92 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


God  help  me  to  escape  this  danger.”  And  the  word 
So,  in  this  formula,  must  then  mean ;  “  May  God  so 
truly  strengthen  me  when  I  am  weak,  as  I  truly  in¬ 
tend  to  use  all  my  strength  in  order  to  keep  my  oath.” 

681.  It  has  sometimes  been  objected  to  the  use 
of  Oaths,  that  it  is  irreverent  towards  God,  to  employ 
his  name,  and  invoke  his  agency,  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  on  human  affairs.  But  we  reply  to  this, 
that  an  Oath  is  really  an  act  of  reverence.  We  do 
not  doubt  that  God  docs  so  far  attend  to  human  affairs, 
that  he  judges  our  actions,  and  will  punish  us  if  we 
commit  wilful  and  deliberate  falsehood.  We  do  not 
pretend  to  call  in  his  agency  ;  but  to  express  our 
conviction  that  he  will  act  as  our  judge.  A  false¬ 
hood,  uttered  with  this  thought  brought  before  us,  is 
really  a  more  flagrant  sin  against  him,  and  must  be 
supposed  to  draw  upon  us  heavier  punishment  than 
an  offence  done  thoughtlessly.  In  short,  in  an  oath 
we  do  not  pretend  to  direct  the  attention  of  God  to 
man,  but  the  attention  of  man  to  God. 

682.  We  may  add,  that  an  Oath,  by  referring 
the  matter  to  the  Providence  of  God,  secures  us  from 
all  claim  of  regard  to  man.  If  we  had,  unsworn,  to 
give  evidence  which  would  inflict  loss  or  disgrace 
upon  a  very  powerful  man,  or  a  very  dear  friend, 
the  person  might,  if  he  were  one  who  thought  that 
some  falsehoods  are  excusable,  expect  us  to  with¬ 
hold  or  distort  the  truth,  for  his  benefit  or  exculpa¬ 
tion  ;  but  no  one  holds  Perjury  to  be  excusable  ;  and 
the  fact  of  our  giving  our  evidence  on  Oath,  at  once 
destroys  all  expectation  that  we  will  violate  or  trifle 
with  the  truth.  It  destroys  this  expectation  so  com¬ 
pletely,  that  even  the  person  proved  to  be  guilty, 
feels  commonly  no  resentment  against  the  Witnesses 
who  prove  him  so.  This  could  result  from  nothing 
hut  from  the  establishment  of  an  absolute  and  su¬ 
preme  obligation  to  tell  the  truth,  such  as  an  Oath 
alone  can  establish. 


CHAP.  XI.] 


OATHS. 


93 


683.  Instead  of  using  the  name  of  God,  the 
phrase  I  solemnly  affirm,  and  the  like,  have  some¬ 
times  been  used.  The  reason  for  this  substitution 
would  be  intelligible,  if  the  phrase  were  employed  to 
avoid  a  recognition  of  the  existence  of  God  :  but 
among  men  who  believe  that  God  will  judge  them,  it 
does  not  appear  what  sense  can  be  conveyed  by  the 
word  solemnly,  except  that  they  recollect  that  there 
will  be  such  a  judgment.  If  the  expression  do  not 
excite  the  same  thought  as  if  they  had  said,  In  the 
presence  of  God,  it  does  not  seem  to  have  any 
meaning. 

684.  It  is  sometimes  said,  that  if  a  man  cannot 
be  believed  upon  his  word,  he  cannot  be  believed 
upon  his  oath  ;  that  if  he  will  commit  falsehood,  he 
will  commit  perjury.  And  undoubtedly,  a  perfectly 
good  man  is  as  incapable  of  the  one,  as  of  the  other. 
A  person  in  whom  the  operative  principle  of  Truth 
is  completely  established  and  developed,  will  not  tell 
a  lie  ;  and  on  him,  an  Oath  would  produce  no  effect 
which  could  not  be  produced  without  it.  But  the 
world  is  not  composed  of  perfectly  good  men.  The 
moral  culture  of  many,  we  may  say  of  most  per¬ 
sons,  is  very  imperfect,  with  regard  to  Truth.  Be¬ 
sides  that  they  often  speak  thoughtlessly,  there  are 
kinds  and  occasions  of  falsehood,  which  they  deem 
allowable  or  excusable.  We  have  noticed  some  of 
these,  in  speaking  of  Cases  of  Conscience  respecting 
Truth.  We  have  there  stated  that  our  moral  culture 
requires  entire  truthfulness  ;  or,  as  the  religious  man 
will  express  this,  that  God’s  approval  cannot  be  given 
to  anything  short  of  entire  truthfulness.  But  men, 
in  their  common  daily  actions,  do  not  think  much  of 
their  moral  culture,  and  of  God’s  approval.  The 
object  of  an  Oath  is,  to  raise  them  from  their  com¬ 
mon  mood,  in  which  they  claim  excuses  and  allow¬ 
ances  for  falsehood,  into  that  state  of  mind  which  the 
thought  of  God’s  judgments  is  fitted  to  call  forth. 


94 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


And  Oaths  do  produce  this  effect.  Men’s  minds  are 
solemnized  by  this  form  of  an  engagement.  Under 
this  impression  of  an  Oath,  they  no  longer  claim  ex¬ 
cuses  and  allowances  for  their  falsehood.  They 
speak  with  consideration  and  gravity.  If  they  give 
testimony  on  Oath,  they  are  careful  in  their  recollec¬ 
tion  of  the  fact.  If  they  promise  on  Oath,  they  are 
watchful  over  themselves  for  the  future. 

685.  The  Oaths  commonly  in  use  among  men 
are  principally  of  the  two  kinds  just  referred  to; 
Oaths  of  Testimony  or  Assertion,  and  Oaths  of  Pro¬ 
mise  or  Engagement  for  the  future.  Oaths  of  Testi¬ 
mony  impose  upon  us  an  especial  duty  of  careful 
recollection  and  exact  narration.  The  formula  used 
in  the  administration  of  English  law  expresses  this  ; 
it  requires  men  to  speak  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
nothing  but  the  truth,  touching  the  matter  in  question. 
But  in  the  cases  in  which  this  is  employed  judicially, 
it  is  for  the  Tribunal,  rather  than  for  the  Witness,  to 
determine  what  is  the  whole  truth  touching  the  matter 
in  question  :  and  the  English  Courts  of  Law  expect 
only  that  the  Witness  shall  answer  the  questions  put 
to  him.  They  also  excuse  him  from  doing  this,  when 
the  answer  would  criminate  himself.  These  defini¬ 
tions  of  the  Obligation  of  the  Witness,  are  also  the 
definitions  of  his  Duty  as  a  Witness.  As  a  lover  of 
Justice,  it  will  often  be  right  for  a  man  to  do  much 
more  than  this. 

686.  In  the  same  manner,  Oaths  of  Assertion  ; 
as  when  we  declare  the  value  of  our  income,  or  of 
anything  belonging  to  us  ;  impose  upon  us  a  Duty 
of  careful  examination  of  the  matter  concerning 
which  we  assert ;  and  an  entire  sincerity  in  assert¬ 
ing,  without  reserve,  equivocation,  or  straining  of  the 
truth.  Thus  an  Oath  that  we  have  not  received  or 
paid  money,  or  reward  (as  in  oaths  against  bribery  at 
elections,  sale  of  ecclesiastical  offices,  and  the  like), 
is  violated  not  the  less,  if  the  money  be  received  and 


CHAP.  XI.] 


OATHS. 


95 


paid  by  some  contrivance  which  escapes  detection,  or 
evades  the  Law. 

687.  Oaths  of  Promise  with  regard  to  special 
acts  are  not  much  in  use  among  us.  We  do  not  re¬ 
quire  a  man  to  swear  that  he  will  perform  a  contract, 
or  resign  an  office,  or  the  like.  The  law  has  other 
ways  of  enforcing  its  Will,  on  such  points.  Our 
Oaths  of  Engagement  for  the  future  are,  for  the 
most  part,  promises  of  a  general  course  of  action ; 
and  promises  of  certain  dispositions  as  suitable  to  the 
condition  to  which  we  look  forward.  Thus  we  have 
Oaths  of  Office  administered  to  Magistrates,  Judges, 
Jurymen,  Legislators,  and  to  the  sovereign  himself; 
and  Oaths  of  Allegiance,  administered  to  the  subject. 
In  these  Oaths,  the  swearer  engages  to  conform  to 
the  Laws  of  the  Land  in  the  discharge  of  his  office ; 
and  also,  generally,  to  act  with  care,  impartiality, 
and  equity.  He  promises  to  be  faithful  to  the  law, 
and  the  intention  of  the  law  ;  which  intention  is 
understood  to  be,  the  administration  of  justice.  The 
subject  promises  Allegiance  to  the  Sovereign  ;  which 
was  formerly  further  explained  in  the  Oath  itself :  I 
promise  to  be  true  and  faithful  to  the  King ,  and  not  to 
know  of  any  ill  or  damage  intended  him  without  de¬ 
fending  him  therefrom.  These  Oaths  all  engage  the 
swearer  to  that  conduct,  and  those  dispositions,  which 
morality  would  require  without  the  Oath.  For  the 
Magistrate’s  Duty  is  generally  to  administer  the  law, 
to  regard  the  intention  of  the  law,  and  to  identify 
this  intention  with  justice  (333).  And  the  Subject’s 
Duty  is  generally,  as  we  have  already  said  (309),  a 
willing  obedience  to  the  laws,  an  affection  for  his 
country,  a  love  of  its  institutions  and  of  its  constitu¬ 
tion,  a  loyalty  to  its  sovereign.  There  may  be 
special  cases  of  exception  to  these  Duties  ;  as  when 
the  Magistrate  cannot  look  upon  a  particular  law  as 
other  than  unjust:  or  when  the  Duty  of  Allegiance 
is  broken,  under  the  pressure  of  a  case  of  extreme 


96 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


necessity.  Oaths  such  as  we  have  just  mentioned, 
which  engage  the  Swearer  to  that  course  of  action 
which  forms  the  General  Rule  of  Morality,  are  in¬ 
consistent  with  a  contemplation  of  the  cases  of  Ex¬ 
ception,  as  prominent  or  frequent.  A  person  cannot, 
without  the  guilt  of  Perjury,  take  an  Oath  to  ad¬ 
minister  the  laws  faithfully  and  justly,  if  he  believe 
that  to  administer  the  laws  faithfully  will  be  to  com¬ 
mit  habitual  injustice.  A  Subject  cannot  swear 
allegiance  to  the  reigning  Sovereign,  if  he  not  only 
believe  him  to  be  an  usurper,  but  if  he  also  be  ready 
to  join  in  a  scheme  for  deposing  him,  if  a  favourable 
occasion  should  arise.  Oaths  of  Office,  of  Allegi¬ 
ance,  and  the  like,  are  to  be  taken  in  such  a  manner, 
as  to  identify  the  citizen’s  Duties  with  his  Obliga¬ 
tions :  and  by  being  Oaths,  they  further  express  his 
conviction  that  the  discharge  of  Duties,  and  there¬ 
fore  of  legal  Obligations,  is  the  only  way  to  obtain 
the  approval  of  God,  and  the  happiness  which  he 
bestows  with  his  appreval. 

688.  Besides  the  general  moral  engagements 
contained  in  Oaths  of  Office,  such  Oaths  often  in¬ 
clude  some  specification  of  a  particular  subject, 
with  a  prescribed  course  of  action  relative  to  it ; 
thus,  the  English  Sovereign,  at  his  Coronation,  swears 
that  he  will  maintain  the  Protestant  Reformed  Reli¬ 
gion  established  by  Law  :  Members  of  Parliament 
take  a  similar  Oath  :  Officers  of  special  bodies,  as 
Colleges  and  Corporations,  in  many  cases  take  Oaths 
to  observe  the  Special  Laws  of  their  body,  to  main¬ 
tain  its  privileges,  and  the  like.  Along  with  the 
Oath  of  Allegiance  to  the  Sovereign,  there  has  often 
been  demanded  an  Oath  of  Allegiance  also  to  his 
Heirs  ;  or  an  Oath  of  Renunciation  of  the  Obligation 
of  Obedience  to  some  rival  Authority  :  as  in  this 
country,  we  have,  in  addition  to  the  Oath  of  Allegi¬ 
ance,  the  Oath  of  Abjuration,  in  which  we  abjure  the 
Authority  of  the  Pope. 


CHAP.  XI.] 


OATHS. 


97 


689.  All  such  Oaths  require  of  him,  who  takes 
them,  a  sincere  and  unchanging  purpose  to  do  what 
he  thus  engages  to  do. 

For  instance,  If  an  officer  of  a  corporation,  having 
sworn  to  maintain  the  Protestant  Religion,  should 
afterwards  endeavour  to  overthrow  it ;  it  would  be 
no  exculpation  for  him  to  say  that  he  had  become 
convinced  that  the  Protestant  Religion  was  erroneous. 
If  a  man  has  entered  upon  an  office  engaging  him¬ 
self  to  a  certain  course  of  conduct,  and  afterwards 
thinks  such  conduct  wrong;  he  is  bound  by  Justice 
and  Truth  to  give  up  his  office  ;  and  cannot  honestly 
pursue  any  other  course.  In  this  case,  as  in  others, 
Law  supplies  the  definition,  which  is  requisite  to  give 
form  to  Justice.  The  Oath  of  Office  is  the  expres¬ 
sion  of  a  Contract  between  the  Body  and  the  individu¬ 
al.  If  he  breaks  the  Contract,  and  keeps  his  share 
of  the  advantage  which  it  gave,  he  is  guilty  of  fraud 
and  falsehood,  aggravated  by  Perjury. 

690.  An  important  question  in  many  cases  of 
this  kind  is,  how  the  Oath  is  to  be  interpreted.  Of 
course,  a  Promise  so  made,  like  other  Promises,  is  to 
he  interpreted  according  to  the  common  intention  of 
the  two  parties  ;  or  according  to  what  is  the  intention 
of  the  party  imposing  the  Oath,  and  is  understood  to 
be  its  intention  by  the  party  taking  the  Oath.  And 
this  is,  accordingly,  the  Rule  generally  given.  The 
Rule  is  stated  by  saying  that  the  Oath  is  to  be  un¬ 
derstood  secundum  animum  imponentis.  But  here  the 
question  occurs,  in  the  Oaths  of  office,  and  the  like, 
Who  are  the  Parties  between  whom  the  transaction 
takes  place  ?  Who  is  the  Imposer  of  the  Oath  ? 

691.  We  reply,  that  in  Oaths  of  Office,  the 
Imposer  is  The  State  ;  which  we  have  already  de¬ 
scribed  as  a  permanent  Moral  Agent ;  and  which  is, 
of  course,  capable  of  being  Party  to  a  Contract. 
The  State  is  the  Imposer  of  all  such  Oaths  ;  for  all 
Offices  derive  their  Authority  from  the  State,  and 

VOL.  II.  7 


98 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


all  Special  Corporations  derive,  from  the  State,  their 
power  of  making  Laws  ;  and  therefore,  the  Authority 
of  their  Laws.  Hence  these  Oaths,  which  express 
the  conditions  on  which  the  authority,  or  the  advan¬ 
tages  of  the  Office,  are  assigned  to  the  individual, 
express  the  conditions  imposed  upon  him  by  the  State. 

692.  The  State,  as  we  have  said  (470),  is  one 
and  permanent,  while  the  persons  of  whom  it  consists 
are  many  and  transitory.  The  Intention  of  the  State 
is  expressed  in  the  language  of  the  Oath  ;  and  if 
there  be,  in  this,  anything  which  requires  interpreta¬ 
tion,  the  Laws  and  Legislative  Proceedings  which 
accompanied  the  enactment  of  the  Oath  may  often 
aid  in  pointing  out  the  right  interpretation.  But  this 
is  not  the  main  source  of  interpretation.  The  State 
continues  to  exist  after  each  such  act  of  Legislation  : 
and  the  State  which  to-day  imposes  the  Oath,  is  not 
identical  with  the  Legislature  which,  many  years, 
perhaps  centuries  ago,  enacted  it.  The  State  may 
itself  interpret  the  Oath,  by  a  Declaratory  Act  ,*  and 
may  often  prefer  this  course  to  the  substitution  of  a 
new  and  clearer  Oath  ;  on  the  ground  of  many  in¬ 
conveniences  which  attend  the  change  of  ancient  and 
usual  forms.  There  are  also  other  ways,  in  which 
the  State  may  give  its  interpretations  of  the  Oaths 
which  it  imposes  ;  as  in  the  decisions  of  Courts  of 
Law,  and  the  like.  But  yet,  if  these  interpretations 
be  in  apparent  contradiction  with  the  most  obvious 
meaning  of  the  words  of  the  Oath,  religious  men 
and  lovers  of  truth,  especially  if  they  have  not  fully 
considered  the  difficulties  of  such  legislation,  will  be 
shocked  with  the  incongruity ;  and  the  offence  thus 
given  to  them,  may  be  a  reason  for  the  State  chang¬ 
ing  the  form  of  the  Oath. 

693.  There  are  cases  in  which  even  the  silence 
and  inaction  of  the  State  may  be  looked  upon  as  im¬ 
plying,  in  some  measure,  its  view  of  the  meaning  of 
an  Oath.  If  an  Oath  contain  clauses  which  plainly 


CHAP.  XI.] 


OATHS. 


99 


imply  usages  or  conditions  notoriously  obsolete,  and 
if  it  be  still  enforced  by  Authority ;  it  may  be  rea¬ 
sonably  supposed  that  the  State,  the  Imposer  of  the 
Oath,  is  aware  of  the  practical  omission  of  what  is 
obsolete,  and  acquiesces  in  it.  But  here,  also,  when 
the  discrepance  between  the  words  of  the  Oath  and 
the  practice  becomes  glaring,  it  is  desirable,  on  that 
account,  to  alter  the  words,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
shock  which  the  incongruity  causes  to  religious  men 
and  lovers  of  truth,  who  have  not  fully  considered 
the  difficulties  of  such  legislation. 

694.  Yet  there  may  be  other  reasons  which 
may,  for  a  time,  balance  this;  and  may  reasonably 
prevent  the  change  from  taking  place.  The  doc¬ 
trine,  that  an  implication  of,  and  reference  to,  obso¬ 
lete  conditions,  in  the  words  of  an  Oath,  renders  it 
desirable  or  right  to  alter  the  Oath,  cannot  be  carried 
out  rigorously.  For  such  is  the  constant  progress 
of  human  affairs,  and  such,  in  consequence,  the  con¬ 
stantly  proceeding  changes  in  the  use  of  terms,  that 
we  cannot  employ  words  which  will  not,  after  a  time, 
imply  something  no  longer  existing  in  practice.  And 
this  implication  of  obsolete  things  does  not  necessa¬ 
rily  make  the  words  of  an  Oath  unfit  to  be  retained. 
When  we  swear  Allegiance  to  our  Sovereign  Lord 
the  King,  the  terms  Allegiance ,  and  Sovereign  Lord, 
imply  the  relations  of  the  feudal  system  ;  but  the 
Oath  has  been  still  properly  retained  ;  it  being  un¬ 
derstood,  by  the  State  and  by  the  Swearer,  that  the 
fidelity  which  is  thus  denoted,  is  such  as  suits  the 
altered  relations  of  the  Governor  and  the  Governed  ; 
and  this  has  been  supposed,  at  every  step  of  the 
gradual  change,  from  the  original  to  the  present  con¬ 
dition  of  the  Constitution.  The  same  implication 
would  be  involved  in  an  Oath  in  which  the  terms 
fealty ,  loyalty ,  homage,  should  occur ;  but  such  an 
Oath  would  not,  on  that  account,  be  a  bad  one.  In 
like  manner,  if  the  term  of  an  ancient  form  should 


loo 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


engage  us  to  worship  a  person,  the  sense  being  to 
show  personal  respect  and  regard  (as  in  the  English 
Marriage  Service),  we  might  still  use  the  form  with 
a  safe  conscience.  And  thus,  when  the  terms  of  an 
Oath  have  gradually  changed  their  meaning,  or  be¬ 
come  obsolete,  or  inapplicable  to  the  existing  state  of 
things,  if  the  State  continue  to  impose  the  Oath,  it 
may  be  supposed  that  in  imposing  it,  the  State  assents 
to  the  modification  of  meaning  which  is  necessary, 
in  order  to  make  the  declaration  significant  and  ap¬ 
plicable.  And  the  person  taking  the  Oath,  if  he 
intends  to  fulfil  the  engagement  as  nearly  as  the 
altered  condition  of  things  allows  him  to  do,  may  be 
considered  as  taking  it  in  the  sense  of  the  Imposer  ; 
and  therefore  may  do  so  with  a  good  conscience. 

695.  If  it  be  objected  to  this,  that  we  thus  make 
Custom  the  Interpreter  of  the  Law,  instead  of  making 
Law  the  Regulator  of  the  Custom  ;  we  reply,  that 
the  Custom,  which  we  take  for  this  purpose,  is  Cus¬ 
tom  sanctioned  by  the  State ;  that  is,  by  the  Giver 
and  Guardian  of  the  Law.  We  may  add,  that  to  a 
great  extent  we  cannot  avoid  making  Custom,  or, 
more  properly  speaking,  History,  the  Interpreter  of 
the  Law ;  for  Custom  and  History  determine  the 
meaning  of  words  and  phrases  ;  and  often  determine 
them  to  have  a  different  sense,  when  used  in  official 
formulae,  and  when  used  in  common  speech  ;  as  we 
see  in  innumerable  examples  in  laws  and  law  pro¬ 
ceedings.  History  modifies  the  relations  of  men, 
classes,  offices,  and  occupations,  from  time  to  time ; 
and  must  necessarily  modify  the  meaning  of  the  lan¬ 
guage  in  which  such  things  are  spoken  of. 

696.  If  we  were  to  insist  upon  this  ; — that  Laws 
and  Oaths  should  always  be  interpreted  according  to 
the  common  usage  of  speech  at  the  present  day  ; — 
we  should  make  it  necessary  to  alter  a  great  part  of 
our  present  law  language  ;  and  on  such  a  supposition, 
no  oaths  could  be  employed,  except  their  terms  were 


CHAT.  XI.] 


OATHS. 


101 


— either  so  general  as  to  apply  alike  to  all  periods  of 
history,  which  would  deprive  them  of  all  special 
meaning,  and  of  all  effect ;  or  else,  except  their 
terms  were  constantly  changed,  as  fast  as  common 
Language  and  the  relations  of  men  change  ;  and 
the  changes  thus  requisite  would  need  to  be  made 
every  few  years.  This  would  defeat  the  purpose  of 
many  of  our  Oaths  ;  which  is,  to  produce  a  perma¬ 
nence,  and  continuity,  in  the  general  structure  of 
our  institutions  (as,  for  instance,  Colleges),  in  spite 
of  the  constantly  proceeding  historical  changes. 
Such  a  course  of  public  administration  would  require 
a  perpetual  interference  of  the  Legislature,  for  the 
purpose  of  remodeling  Oaths  ;  which  interference 
would,  in  fact,  be  a  constant  innovation.  Those  who 
wish  for  the  permanence  of  ancient  Institutions,  are 
aware  of  this  ;  and  are  very  reluctant  to  alter  ancient 
forms  ;  and  Oaths  among  the  rest. 

697.  If  the  person,  taking  an  Oath,  of  which 
the  object  is  plainly  the  permanence  of  the  Institu¬ 
tions  to  which  it  refers,  assent  cordially  to  this  pur¬ 
pose,  this  cordial  agreement  in  purpose  with  the 
Imposer  (for  the  State,  by  retaining  the  Oath,  must 
be  supposed  to  assent  to  the  object  of  the  Oath),  will 
enable  the  Juror  to  interpret,  also,  in  the  sense  of  the 
Imposer,  the  parts  of  it  which  are  obsolete  and  inap¬ 
plicable.  He  will  necessarily  interpret  such  parts, 
so  that  they  shall  be  in  consistency  with  the  main 
purpose.  There  are  many  cases,  in  which  great 
changes  have  been  gradually  effected  in  the  Institu¬ 
tions  to  which  Oaths  refer ;  changes,  not  produced  at 
any  period  wilfully,  but  brought  in  necessarily,  in 
order  to  keep  the  Institutions  in  coherence  with  the 
general  state  of  the  nation,  and  to  carry  on  the  design 
and  business  of  the  Institution.  It  is  evident,  that  in 
such  cases,  to  revive,  at  the  present  day,  the  obsolete 
usages  and  conditions  which  the  terms  of  such  Oaths 
originally  denoted,  would  be  to  defeat  the  main  pur- 

i  2 


10*2 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


pose  of  the  Oaths  ;  namely,  the  Stability  of  the  Insti¬ 
tutions.  Such  restoration  of  Antiquity  would  be  a 
most  perilous  innovation.  Such  a  literal  fidelity 
would  be  a  real  treachery,  or  at  least  a  practical 
hostility,  to  the  purpose  of  the  Founders. 

698.  Even  if  the  predecessors  of  the  present 
generation  were  to  blame  in  admitting  such  changes 
(although  in  many  cases  they  had  no  choice  in  the 
matter),  still  the  present  generation  have  inherited 
the  changed  state  of  the  Institution,  and  cannot,  how¬ 
ever  much  they  might  wish  and  try  to  do  so,  recall 
the  original  condition  of  things.  All  they  can  do,  so 
long  as  the  State  does  not  change  the  Oaths,  is  to 
observe  them,  interpreting  them  in  good  faith,  ac¬ 
cording;  to  existing  conditions,  notorious  to  the  State 
as  well  as  to  the  jurors.  But  probably,  in  such 
cases,  there  may  be  no  need  to  blame  preceding 
generations,  in  order  to  exculpate  the  present.  Pro¬ 
bably  each  generation,  in  its  turn,  has  had  the  same 
excuse.  The  changes  were  gradual ;  each  genera¬ 
tion  interpreted  the  ancient  Oath  in  good  faith  ;  and 
intended  to  fulfil  it,  as  nearly  as  altered  circumstances 
permitted,  in  the  sense  of  the  Founders  :  and,  there¬ 
fore,  as  we  have  said,  truly  in  the  sense  of  the  Im¬ 
poses  And  if  there  have  been  this  continued  good 
faith,  regulating  the  practice  of  succeeding  genera¬ 
tions,  such  practice  may  be  taken  as  an  Interpretation 
of  the  engagement,  sanctioned  by  the  Imposer. 

699.  It  is,  however,  quite  necessary  to  attend 
carefully  to  the  condition,  that  the  practice  of  each 
generation  should  be  adopted  in  good  faith  :  in  order 
to  give  it  authority  as  an  Interpretation.  If  men  de¬ 
viate  from  the  course  which  the  terms  of  their 
engagement  imply,  wantonly,  carelessly,  or  unneces¬ 
sarily,  they  are,  no  doubt,  guilty  of  breaking  their 
engagement ;  and  if  an  Oath  have  been  taken  as  a 
confirmation  of  it,  guilty  of  Perjury.  If  they  have 
disregarded  both  the  Purpose  of  the  Founder  and 


CHAP.  XI. J 


OATHS. 


103 


the  Letter  of  the  Oath  which  he  framed,  they  are 
without  any  excuse.  The  changed  circumstances  of 
the  times,  which  make  literal  observance  of  the 
engagement  impossible,  do  not  thereby  make  the 
Oath  unmeaning.  It  must  be  carefully  interpreted 
according  to  the  intention  of  the  Founder  ;  admit¬ 
ting,  into  the  Interpretation,  only  such  changes  of  the 
meaning  of  terms  and  details  as  have  been  produced 
by  the  general  progress  of  change  ;  and  not  by  any 
purposes  different  from  those  of  the  Founder.  Each 
generation  of  the  members  of  an  Institution,  endea¬ 
vouring,  in  care  and  good  faith,  to  conform  to  their 
engagements,  may  have  authority  as  Interpreters  of 
their  own  Rules,  but  not  as  Rivals  of  the  Founder. 

700.  Moreover,  in  order  thus  to  act  in  good 
faith,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  existing  members  of 
the  Institution  so  conduct  it,  and  so  apply  its  Laws, 
that  they  do  what  they  conceive  the  Founder  would 
have  wished  to  be  done,  if  he  had  lived  in  present 
times.  This  Supposition,  of  what  the  Founder  would 
have  wished ,  is  far  too  vague  to  afford  any  good 
ground  of  action.  To  make  such  a  Supposition  the 
Interpretation  of  the  engagements  prescribed  by  the 
Founder,  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  an  engagement. 
In  a  Contract,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  do  what  we  sup¬ 
pose  the  other  party  would  wish  ;  we  must  do  what 
we  have  contracted  to  do.  The  same  is  the  case  in 
an  Institution  with  written  Laws,  which  we  have 
engaged  to  observe.  The  Founder  has  made  his 
body  of  Laws,  and  his  Oaths,  because  he  was  not 
content  with  a  general  statement  of  the  purposes 
which  he  wished  to  promote  ;  just  as  all  Legislators 
prescribe  detailed  modes  of  action,  and  not  merely 
general  courses  of  action.  The  Founder  has  pre¬ 
scribed  means,  in  subservience  to  his  end.  If  some 
of  these  have  been  silently  excluded  by  time,  without 
any  choice  of  ours,  we  may  blamelessly  acquiesce  in 
the  exclusion :  and  perhaps  we  may  deem  the 


104 


RELIGION. 


[LOOK  IV. 


Founder  short-sighted ;  as,  in  truth,  no  Legislator 
is  long-sighted  and  sagacious  enough  to  provide  for 
all  the  changes  which  arrive.  But  we  may  not, 
without  blame,  substitute  other  means  for  his,  when 
we  have  a  choice.  We  may  not,  after  engaging  to 
conform  to  his  plan,  reject  it,  and  substitute  one  of 
our  own. 

701.  What  degree  of  particularity  it  is  pru¬ 
dent  to  introduce  into  the  special  Laws  of  Institutions, 
with  a  view  to  their  permanence,  is  a  question  of 
Polity,  which  we  shall  not  here  consider.  But  it  is 
evident  that  if  particular  details  and  arrangements, 
which  are  judicious  at  first,  are  prescribed  by  Laws  ; 
and  if  the  Laws  are  interpreted  according  to  the 
Rules  above  laid  down  ;  such  Laws  will  contribute 
greatly  to  the  permanence  of  the  Institutions,  so  regu¬ 
lated  ;  and  will  tend  to  secure  their  consistent  effec¬ 
tiveness  in  promoting  their  original  object,  amid  the 
external  changes  which  the  course  of  the  national 

C? 

history  brings. 

702.  But  though  we  must  thus  allow  to  the 
State,  the  Imposer  of  the  Oaths,  and  other  engage¬ 
ments,  which  we  are  now  speaking  of, — some  range 
of  power,  in  interpreting  the  terms  of  such  engage¬ 
ments  in  a  sense  different  from  the  original  sense  ; 
and  though  we  must  hold  that  the  Interpretation  of 
the  Imposer  relieves  the  Conscience  of  the  Juror; 
we  must  not  carry  this  doctrine  and  its  application 
too  far.  There  are  strong  moral  reasons  for  being 
careful  on  that  side.  The  State  may  be  regarded 
as  having,  for  one  of  its  objects,  the  moral  Education 
of  the  people  ;  and  its  Laws,  and  the  administration 
of  its  Laws,  are  among  the  means  by  which  it  pro¬ 
motes  this  object.  And  it  will  fail  in  teaching  les¬ 
sons  of  Truthfulness  by  its  Laws,  if  it  lightly  sanc¬ 
tions  an  interpretation  of  an  Oath  which  differs  from 
the  obvious  sense  of  the  words.  By  the  currency  of 
such  forced  interpretations,  so  sanctioned,  many 


CHAP.  XI. j 


OATHS. 


105 


persons  will  be  led  to  carelessness  and  indifference 
about  Truth,  in  taking  such  engagements  ;  and  thus 
the  State  becomes  a  Teacher  of  immorality. 

703.  And  again,  on  the  other  part ;  though  the 
Juror’s  conscience  may  be  relieved  in  such  cases, 
it  can  hardly  be  quite  satisfied  ;  especially  when  the 
interpretation  is  only  presumed ,  from  the  silent 
acquiescence  of  the  State  in  notorious  changes.  For 
the  notoriety  may  be  imperfect,  and  the  acquiescence 
must  be  more  or  less  doubtful.  The  silence  of  the 
State  may  imply,  not  that  it  acquiesces  in  the  existing 
practice,  but  that,  though  it  disapproves  of  the  prac¬ 
tice,  the  time  and  the  occasion  tor  legislative  inter¬ 
ference  have  not  yet  arrived.  In  this  case,  the  Juror 
does  not  swear  according  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
Imposer ;  and  his  conscience  must  be  the  more  dis¬ 
turbed,  according  as  this  is  more  probably  the  case. 

704.  Hence,  in  all  cases  in  which  there  is  a 
manifest  contradiction  between  the  words  of  an  en¬ 
gagement,  and  the  sense  in  which  it  is  commonly 
performed  ;  and  especially  if  there  has  not  been  any 
authoritative  sanction  of  the  usual  practice ;  it  is 
desirable,  on  moral  grounds,  to  alter  the  words,  so  as 
to  remove  the  contradiction.  The  Legislators  ought 
to  endeavour  to  do  this,  as  acting  for  the  State,  and 
being,  on  its  behalf,  desirous  of  promoting  Truthful¬ 
ness  and  Integrity.  The  Jurors  ought  to  aim  at  the 
like  alteration,  as  being  desirous  of  having  no  grounds 
for  dissatisfaction  in  their  consciences.  And  since 
in  England,  every  man  has,  by  Petition  or  other¬ 
wise,  the  means  of  seeking  a  Legislative  change  ; 
the  persons  who  are  required  to  take  an  Oath  or  an 
Engagement,  under  circumstances  such  as  have 
been  described,  are  bound  in  conscience,  when  the 
contradiction  between  the  words  and  the  practice  is 
apparent,  and  still  more,  if  all  sanction  of  the  prac¬ 
tice  be  wanting,  to  aim,  by  constitutional  means,  at 
the  removal  of  the  contradiction. 


106 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


705.  Ill  this  discussion  on  the  subject  of  the 
interpretation  of  Oaths  and  Engagements,  we  have 
had  to  touch  upon  questions  which  rather  concern 
the  Duties  of  Truth,  than  the  subject  of  Natural 
Piety,  with  which  we  began.  But  this  could  not 
easily  be  avoided  :  for  the  Duties  of  Truth,  though 
they  belong  to  all  our  engagements,  are  never  so 
carefully  studied  as  when  they  depend  upon  our  most 
solemn  engagements;  namely,  those  which  are  con¬ 
firmed  by  Oaths.  And  though  the  breaking  of  an 
Oath  is  an  offence  against  Piety,  a  transgression  of 
the  Reverence  due  to  God,  and  a  disregard  of  the 
Fear  of  his  Punishment;  it  is  so,  because  he  is  the 
God  of  Truth,  and  will  punish  Perjury  as  aggravated 
Falsehood. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CHRISTIAN  PIETY. 

706.  The  Duties  and  Affections  which  belong 
to  Natural  Piety  are  also,  as  we  have  said  (676),  a 
part  of  Christian  Piety.  The  Duty  of  Obedience  to 
God  (654)  is  the  foundation  and  measure  of  all  other 
Duties.  That  which  is  wrong,  is  so  because  it  is 
contrary  to  his  Will.  Moral  Transgression  derives 
an  especial  depravity  from  its  being  Sin  against  God. 
Sin  is  the  object  of  his  condemnation  ;  it  is  spoken 
of,  in  figures  borrowed  from  the  constitution  of  hu¬ 
manity,  as  the  object  of  his  Anger.  Obedience  to 
his  Will,  and  the  Dispositions  which  produce  such 
Obedience,  are  the  object  of  his  Love.  Sin  will  be 
the  subject  of  his  Punishment,  Obedience  of  his  Re¬ 
ward.  There  will  be  a  Resurrection  of  the  Dead 
to  this  end  (John  v.,  28) :  The  hour  is  coming,  when 


CHAP.  XII.] 


CHRISTIAN  PIETY. 


107 


all  that  are  in  the  graves  shall  hear  the  voice  of  the 
Son  of  God,  and  shall  come  forth  :  they  that  have 
done  good  unto  the  Resurrection  of  Life,  and  they 
that  have  done  evil  to  the  Resurrection  of  Damnation. 
And  the  life  here  spoken  of  is  elsewhere  called  Eter¬ 
nal  Life.  Thus  the  Supreme  Rule  of  Human  Ac¬ 
tion,  on  which  the  final  happiness  or  misery  of  each 
man  depends,  is  identified  with  the  Will  of  God,  and 
receives  its  Sanction  and  its  force  from  this  identity. 

707.  The  Will  of  God  with  regard  to  Human 
Actions  is  known  to  man,  partly  by  Reason,  and 
partly  by  Revelation.  We  have,  in  the  preceding 
Book,  given  a  view  of  that  Morality  which  is  sup¬ 
plied  to  us  by  our  Reason  ;  and  in  the  present  Book, 
we  have  added  to  it  a  view  of  Christian  Morality,  as 
it  is  supplied  to  us  by  the  Scriptures  of  the  New 
Testament.  The  Precepts  there  given  point  out  the 
Christian’s  duties,  as  they  are  expressed  by  means  of 
special  Precepts. 

But  the  general  views  which  the  Christian  Reve¬ 
lation  discloses  to  us,  also  give  us  new  light  with 
regard  to  our  Duties,  and  with  regard  to  the  Dispo¬ 
sitions  which  are  to  lead  us  to  perform  them.  We 
are  taught,  That  our  failures  in  Obedience  to  God’s 
Will,  our  Sins,  are  to  be  repented  of;  that  our  Re¬ 
pentance  must  necessarily  be  addressed  to  God,  and 
must  take  the  form  of  a  Supplication  for  his  Mercy 
and  Forgiveness,  to  be  extended  to  us,  notwithstand¬ 
ing  our  Sins  :  that  (587)  God  has  provided  a  means 
by  which  we  may  find  Mercy  and  Forgiveness  ; 
namely,  the  sending  of  his  Son  Jesus  Christ  upon 
earth  to  suffer  death  for  our  sins,  and  to  rise  again 
for  our  Justification  (Rom.  iv.,  25).  We  are  taught 
further  (588),  that  God  has  provided  means  not  only 
for  our  Justification,  but  for  our  Sanctification  ;  not 
only  for  the  Remission  of  our  sins,  but  also  for  eleva¬ 
tion  of  our  nature  to  that  Holiness  (575)  without 
which  we  cannot  be  admitted  to  his  Blessedness. 


108 


11ELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


708.  These  provisions  for  the  Instruction,  Par¬ 
don,  and  Sanctification  of  man,  impose  upon  us  a  far 
larger  Duty  of  Gratitude  than  the  benefits  which 
Natural  Piety  contemplates  ;  inasmuch  as  the  eternal 
life,  and  blessedness  of  the  soul,  thus  provided  for, 
are  far  greater  benefits  and  evidences  of  God’s  Love, 
than  mere  human  life,  with  its  accompaniments  as 
discerned  by  reason.  The  Christian’s  gratitude  to 
God  is  founded  mainly  on  his  Christian  blessings ; 
and  ought  to  be  infinite  as  those  blessings  are  infi¬ 
nite. 

709.  The  Christian  is  especially  taught  to  look 
upon  God  as  his  Father.  Christ  taught  his  disciples 
to  begin  their  prayers  with  a  recognition  of  this  rela¬ 
tion  :  Our  Father,  which  art  in  Heaven.  The  special 
manner  in  which  Christians  become  the  sons  of  God, 
is  often  referred  to.  Thus  1  John  iii.,  1,  Behold , 
what  manner  of  love  the  Father  hath  bestowed  upon  us, 
that  we  should  he  called  the  sons  of  God. 

This  privilege  of  being  the  sons  of  God  implies, 
we  are  told,  not  only  that  we  have  had  great  benefits 
brought  within  our  reach  by  his  coming  on  earth, 
but  that  we  may,  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  these 
benefits,  become  like  him.  Thus  in  the  passage  just 
quoted,  St.  John  adds:  Therefore  the  world  knoweth 
us  not,  because  it  knew  him  not.  Beloved,  now  are 
we  the  sons  of  God  :  and  it  doth  not  yet  appear  what 
we  shall  be  :  but  we  know  that  when  he  shall  appear 
we  shall  be  like  him.  St.  Paul  carries  this  further 
(Rom.  viii.,  14)  :  As  many  as  are  led  by  the  Spirit 
of  God,  they  are  the  sons  of  God.  For  ye  have  not 
received  the  spirit  of  bondage  again  to  fear  (ye  are 
not  in  the  condition  of  slaves,  who  obey  through  fear 
merely)  ;  but  ye  have  received  the  spirit  of  adoption , 
whereby  we  cry,  Abba,  Father.  The  Spirit  itself 
beareth  witness  with  our  spirit  that  we  are  the  children 
of  God  ;  and  if  children,  then  heirs  ;  heirs  of  God 
and  joint-heirs  with  Christ;  if  so  be  that  we  suffer 


CHAP.  XII.] 


CHRISTIAN  PIETY. 


109 


with  him ,  that  we  may  he  also  glorified  together.  And 
in  the  same  way  elsewhere  (Gal.  iv.,  5)  we  are  told 
that  God  sent  forth  his  Son... that  we  might  receive  the 
adoption  of  sons.  And  because  ye  are  sons,  God  hath 
sent  forth  the  Spirit  of  his  Son  into  your  hearts,  cry¬ 
ing,  Abba,  Father.  Wherefore  thou  art  no  more  a 
servant,  but  a  son  ;  and  if  a  son,  then  an  heir  of 
God  through  Christ.  And  the  Apostles  naturally 
and  forcibly  urge  this  as  a  ground  of  the  Love  of 
God  :  as  1  John  iv.,  9, 19,  In  this  was  manifested  the 
love  of  God  toward  us,  because  that  God  sent  his 
only -begotten  Son  into  the  world,  that  we  might  live 
through  him  . . .  And  we  love  him,  because  he  first 
loved  us. 

710.  The  Love  of  God,  our  heavenly  Father, 
like  the  love  of  a  Human  Father,  tends  to  produce 
an  Obedience  of  the  Heart  (284).  So  far  as  the 
Love  of  God  is  unfolded  and  established  in  the  Chris¬ 
tian’s  heart,  it  supersedes  all  other  motives  to  obedi¬ 
ence  to  the  Moral  Law,  and  becomes  his  constant 
and  universal  Principle  of  Action. 

711.  The  relation  of  Christians  to  each  other, 
as  Children,  in  an  especial  manner,  of  God  their 
common  Father,  is  urged  upon  them  by  the  Apostles, 
as  a  motive  for  a  brotherly  Love,  which  ought  to 
exist  between  them,  and  out  of  which  all  Duties  to 
men  must  spring.  Thus  St.  John  says,  in  a  passage 
lately  quoted  (1  John  iv.,  11),  Beloved,  if  God  so 
loved  us,  we  ought  also  to  love  one  another.  This  mu¬ 
tual  Love  is  constantly  enjoined  by  the  same  Apostle 
as  the  evidence  of  our  Love  of  God:  (1  John  iv., 
20),  If  a  man  say,  I  love  God,  and  liateth  his  brother, 
he  is  a  liar.  The  same  is  the  general  tenour  of  the 
whole  of  the  Epistles  of  St.  John.  St.  Paul,  follow¬ 
ing  the  teaching  of  Christ,  says  (Gal.  v.,  14),  that 
all  the  commandments  are  comprehended  in  this  one 
saying,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself. 

712.  This  Christian  Love  of  men  as  our 

VOL,  II.  K 


110 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


brethren  includes,  as  St.  Paul  states  in  the  pas¬ 
sage  just  cited,  all  other  duties;  and  includes  them 
in  a  form  more  complete  than  mere  Morality  can 
give  them.  This  love  will  necessarily  exclude  all 
thought  of  mutual  injustice  and  falsehood.  The 
Christian  teacher  says  (Acts  vii.,  26),  Ye  are  brethren ; 
why  do  ye  wrong  one  to  another?  And  (Eph.  iv., 
25),  Speak  every  man  truth  to  his  neighbour  ;  for  we 
are  members  one  of  another.  Christianity  taught 
men  that  they  were  to  reject  the  tenacity  of  their 
own  Rights,  out  of  which  opposition  and  unkindness 
rise,  and  were  to  seek  each  other’s  good  as  members 
of  one  family.  The  effect  of  this  teaching  showed 
itself  in  the  manner  in  which,  at  the  first  preaching 
of  the  Apostles,  the  converts  threw  their  possessions 
into  the  common  stock  (Acts  iv.,  34)  ;  and  has  con¬ 
stantly  operated  since,  to  make  those  who  are  Chris¬ 
tians  in  spirit  ready  to  give  and  glad  to  distribute, 
and  specially  careful  of  the  interests  and  comforts 
of  their  neighbours.  In  this  respect  Christian  Mo¬ 
rality  has  introduced  into  the  world  a  standard  much 
higher  than  the  Morality  of  Reason. 

713.  The  Duty  of  Prayer  to  God,  which  is  sug¬ 
gested  by  the  feelings  belonging  to  Natural  Piety,  is 
confirmed  and  more  strongly  enjoined  by  Revealed 
Religion.  The  Old  Testament  contains  the  account 
of  God’s  more  especial  dealings  with  men,  as  shown 
in  the  History  of  the  Jews,  the  nation  selected  to  be 
the  especial  channel  of  his  Dispensations.  The  pas¬ 
sages  in  the  Old  Testament,  which  enjoin  or  take  for 
granted  this  Duty,  are  too  numerous,  and  too  familiar 
to  our  minds,  to  require  to  be  cited.  In  the  New 
Testament,  this  duty  is  still  more  earnestly  enjoined. 
Christ  taught  his  disciples  (Luke  xviii.,  1),  That  men 
ought  always  to  pray ,  and  not  to  faint  in  such  exer¬ 
tions.  And  he  himself  taught  his  disciples  how  to 
pray  ;  and  spoke  of  many  special  occasions  of  prayer  : 
thus  (Matth.  v.,  44),  Pray  for  them  that  despitefully 


CHAP.  XII.] 


CHRISTIAN  PIETY. 


Ill 


use  you.  (Matth.  ix.,  38),  Pray  ye  the  Lord  of  the 
harvest ,  that  he  will  send  forth  labourers  into  his  har¬ 
vest.  And  he  was  himself  frequently  engaged  in 
earnest  prayer.  (Matth.  xiv.,  23.  Mark  vi.,  46. 
Luke  vi.,  12  ;  ix.,  28.  John  xiv.,  16  ;  xvi.,  26  ; 
xvii.,  9.  Matth.  xxvi.,  36.  Mark  xiv.,  32).  The 
injunctions  and  examples  of  the  Apostles  on  this  sub¬ 
ject  are  perpetual.  The  same  is  the  case  with 
Thanksgiving.  Christ  says  (Matth.  xi.,  25),  I  thank 
thee ,  O  Father ,  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth.  And 
(John  xi.,  41),  I  thank  thee ,  Father ,  that  thou  hearesi 
me.  In  Acts  xvi.,  25,  Paul  and  Silas  prayed ,  and 
sang  praises  to  God  :  and  so  on,  in  innumerable  other 
places.  No  duty  is  more  frequently  and  strongly 
enjoined  than  these  are. 

714.  It  has  been  suggested,  as  a  difficulty  re¬ 
specting  the  Duty  of  Prayer,  that  in  prayer  we  desire 
God  to  alter  the  course  of  the  world,  in  order  to  com¬ 
ply  with  our  wishes,  as  if  we  mistrusted  his  good¬ 
ness  and  wisdom.  But  to  this  we  reply,  that  the 
things  which  we  desire  of  God  in  our  prayers  are, 
for  the  most  part,  spiritual  blessings.  Forgive  us 
our  trespasses.  Lead  us  not  into  temptation.  Deliver 
us  from  evil.  The  course  of  things  to  which  these 
events  belong  is  the  Spiritual  Government  of  God 
(592),  and  to  that  Spiritual  Government  our  prayers 
also  belong.  In  the  spiritual  world,  the  prayers  of 
believers  are  events  as  real  as  their  temptations,  their 
deliverance,  their  forgiveness  ;  and  the  former  events 
may  very  naturally  be  conceived  to  produce  an  ef¬ 
fect  upon  the  latter.  There  is,  therefore,  in  such 
prayers,  nothing  inconsistent  with  our  belief  in 
God’s  goodness  and  wisdom.  And  prayers  for  tem¬ 
poral  blessings,  as,  Give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread, 
are  rather  to  be  understood  as  expressing  our  sense 
of  our  dependence  upon  God,  than  our  desire  that  he 
should  direct  the  course  of  the  world  according  to 
our  wishes.  Such  prayers  are  the  expressions  by 


112 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


which  our  mere  natural  desires  show,  that  though 
submitted  to  the  will  of  God,  they  are  not  annihilat¬ 
ed.  We  know  that,  except  through  the  goodness  of 
God,  we  cannot  receive  even  our  daily  bread  ;  and 
the  desire  of  life,  and  of  the  supports  of  life,  which 
religion  cannot  and  does  not  seek  to  extinguish,  she 
converts  into  a  desire  that  God  would  give  us  what 
we  need. 

715.  We  are  taught  to  combine,  with  our 
prayers  to  God,  a  Resignation  to  his  will,  whatever 
it  may  be,  and  a  belief  that  what  he  does  is  for  the 
best  ;  whether  he  grant  or  refuse  our  prayers,  and 
whether  he  give  or  take  away  apparent  benefits.  In 
the  Prayer  which  Christ  taught  his  Disciples  to  offer, 
he  bids  them  say,  Thy  will  he  done  in  earth  as  it  is 
in  heaven.  And  though  this  clause  expresses  our 
Hope  of  the  religious  progress  of  men  on  earth,  it 
also  expresses  our  Acquiescence  and  Submission  to 
the  Will  of  God,  whatever  it  may  be.  And  Jesus 
Christ  himself  used  this  language  in  prayer  as  an 
expression  of  Resignation  (Matth.  xxvi.,  42).  The 
same  lesson  is  enforced  by  the  Apostles  in  their  teach¬ 
ing.  Thus  (1  Pet.  v.,  6),  Humble  yourselves  under 
the  mighty  hand  of  God ,  that  he  may  exalt  you  in  due 
time ;  casting  all  your  care  upon  him,  for  he  car- 
eih  for  you.  And  so  iv.,  19,  Let  them  that  suffer 
according  to  the  Will  of  God,  commit  the  keeping  of 
their  souls  to  him  in  well-doing,  as  unto  a  faithful 
Creator. 

716.  A  main  use  of  Prayer,  however  uttered, 
is  to  express  and  confirm  a  habit  of  Mental  Worship. 
Christ  himself  said,  when  speaking  of  external  forms 
of  worship  (John  iv.,  24),  God  is  a  Spirit,  and  they 
that  ivorship  him  must  worship  him  in  spirit  and  in 
truth.  And  in  comparison  with  the  practice  of  os¬ 
tentatious  individual  prayer  which  prevailed  among 
the  Jews,  he  enjoined  Private  Prayer  (Matth.  vi.,  5). 
Such  Private  Prayer  is  indeed  the  natural  utterance 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


113 


of  piety,  as  we  have  already  said.  And  this  utter- 
ance  will  be  both  more  significant  and  more  likely 
to  confirm  the  affections  of  piety,  if  it  form  a  part  of 
the  business  of  each  day.  Private  Prayer  every 
Morning  and  Evening  may  be  so  employed,  as  to 
tend  to  fix  upon  our  minds  the  thought  of  God,  of  his 
blessings,  his  laws,  and  the  hopes  and  encourage¬ 
ments  which  he  sets  before  us  ;  and  thus  may  aid  in 
giving  a  moral  and  religious  turn  to  our  disposition 
and  will  during  the  whole  course  of  our  days. 

O  *> 

Public  Prayer  and  the  other  acts  of  Public  Wor¬ 
ship,  which,  as  we  have  said,  are  universally  prac¬ 
tised  among  nations  through  the  impulse  of  Natural 
Piety,  are  also  recommended  by  other  considerations, 
so  that  they  become  Christian  Duties.  Of  these  how¬ 
ever  we  shall  speak,  under  the  Head  of  Christian 
Ordinances. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 

717.  In  order  that  the  Christian  may  have  the 
benefit  of  God’s  provisions  for  his  justification,  sanc¬ 
tification,  and  final  blessedness,  the  relation  between 
God  and  himself  must  be  brought  home  to  his  mind. 
He  must  believe  in  God  the  Father,  and  in  Jesus 
Christ  his  Son  our  Saviour,  as  we  have  already  said 
(587,  588).  Such  belief  is  so  essential  to  the  Chris¬ 
tian’s  condition,  that  the  terms  Believers  and  Unbe¬ 
lievers  are  employed  to  describe  those  who  are  truly 
Christians  and  those  who  are  not.  The  Christian 
may  say,  as  St.  Paul  says  (Gal.  ii.,  20),  I  live  by 
faith  in  the  Son  of  God. 

This  Belief,  or  Faith,  includes  an  act  of  the  Intel- 
VOL.  ii.  8  k  2 


114 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


lect  by  which  Truths  regarding  man's  relation  to 
God  are  assented  to  and  accepted :  and  thus  such 
Assent  and  Belief  are  Duties  of  the  Christian. 

We  have  already  stated  (446),  that  a  Beliefinthe 
Principles  of  Morality  is  requisite,  in  order  that  a 
man’s  character  may  be  moral.  We  have  remark¬ 
ed,  also,  that  this  Belief  must  be,  finally  and  specially, 
a  man’s  own  internal  act  (563),  although  he  may  be 
led  to  his  belief  by  various  external  influences,  which 
constitute  his  Education  (564). 

718.  The  Effect  of  a  man’s  Education  in  the 
formation  of  his  Belief  is  so  great,  that  it  sometimes 
appears  to  amount  to  an  invincible  cause  of  Error 
or  Ignorance  ;  and  such  causes,  as  we  have  said, 
(440),  render  Ignorance  and  Error  excusable. 
Hence  it  may  appear  that  Christian  Teaching,  when 
it  represents  Belief  in  Christian  Verities  as  necessary 
to  a  man’s  salvation,  is  opposed  to  the  Morality  of 
Reason. 

But  we  have  already  said  (446),  that  Ignorance 
and  Error  with  regard  to  Moral  Principles  are  not 
acknowledged,  either  by  Moralists,  or  by  men  in  ge¬ 
neral,  to  be  invincible,  and  therefore  excusable.  We 
have  stated  that  there  is  a  Duty  of  thinking  ration¬ 
ally  ;  and  that  a  man  is  not  excusable  who  denies 
the  Duties  of  Kindness,  Justice,  and  Truth.  We 
further  remarked  (445),  that  if  such  Error  were 
not  an  offence,  it  would  be  a  calamity  which  must 
produce  the  same  effect  as  an  offence,  upon  man’s 
destination.  It  must  exclude  him  from  that  consum¬ 
mation  of  a  good  man’s  life,  whatever  it  be,  to  which 
a  continual  moral  progress  leads  ;  and  to  miss  which 
is  unhappiness 

719.  What  was  thus  said  of  Moral  Error, 
must  be  said  also  of  Religious  Unbelief.  A  man  is 
not  excusable  who  disbelieves  the  Existence  of  God, 
for  this  is  to  disbelieve  the  identity  of  Virtue  with 
happiness  (565),  and  consequently  the  reality  of 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


115 


Morality.  A  man  is  not  excusable  who  disbelieves 
the  Providential  Government  of  the  world  ;  for  we 
cannot  believe  God’s  Government  to  be  a  Moral 
Government,  and  yet  to  have  no  influence  on  the 
course  of  the  world  which  he  has  created. 

720.  And  the  same  must  be  extended  to  Dis¬ 
belief  in  Revealed  Religion.  For  the  Christian  Re¬ 
ligion  is  the  necessary  completion  of  Natural  Reli¬ 
gion.  The  History  of  Christ  and  of  Christianity  is 
the  Fact,  by  which  alone  the  Idea  of  the  Providen¬ 
tial  Government  of  the  world  is  realized  (581). 
Christian  Morality  is  the  necessary  confirmation  and 
purification  of  the  Morality  of  Reason.  And  the 
Christian  view  of  God’s  Provisions,  for  the  salvation 
of  men’s  souls,  is  necessary  to  give  effect  to  men’s 
Repentance,  and  to  their  efforts  at  Continual  Moral 
Progress.  A  person,  therefore,  to  whom  the  Truths 
brought  to  light  by  the  Christian  Revelation  have 
been  fully  presented,  and  who  disbelieves  them,  is  as 
blameable,  or  as  unhappy,  as  a  man  would  be,  who 
should  deny  the  Government  of  Providence,  the 
reality  of  Morality,  the  necessity  of  Repentance  in 
Transgressors,  and  of  moral  Progress  in  all  men. 

721.  It  may  be  objected  to  this,  that  a  large 
portion  of  the  human  race  lived  before  the  coming  pf 
Christ  on  earth  ;  and  a  large  portion  of  those  who 
have  lived  since  that  event,  have  not  had  Christian 
Doctrine  presented  to  them  ;  that  for  the  former, 
there  was  no  Christian  Revelation  to  believe  ;  and 
for  the  latter,  no  means  of  coming  to  the  belief  of  it : 
that  belief  in  the  Christian  Religion  could  not  be  ne¬ 
cessary  for  the  moral  progress  and  final  happiness  of 
those  portions  of  mankind  ;  and  therefore,  cannot 
be  generally  necessary  for  the  moral  progress  and 
final  happiness  of  man  ;  that  therefore,  Belief  in 
Christian  Doctrine  canno.t  be  a  Duty,  nor  Unbelief 
culpable. 

To  this  we  reply,  that  those  who  have  not  had 


116 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


Christian  Truths  presented  to  them,  are  not  blame- 
able  for  their  ignorance  of  them.  Christianity  is  a 
Fact :  the  coming  of  Christ  on  earth  is  a  Fact ;  and 
the  Disclosures  made  by  him  and  his  Disciples,  con¬ 
cerning  God’s  dealings  with  men,  are  Facts,  which 
men  could  not  know  by  the  aid  of  Reason  alone.  In¬ 
voluntary  Ignorance  of  Facts  is  not  culpable,  as  we 
have  already  said  (439).  But  this  does  not  excuse 
those  to  whom  these  Facts  have  been  presented  with 
adequate  evidence.  Such  persons  fall  under  the 
blame  which  lies  upon  all  persons  who  neglect  or 
reject  the  evidence  of  Facts,  which  are  of  the  high¬ 
est  importance  in  the  right  conduct  of  their  lives. 

722.  When  it  is  said,  that — because  the  belief 
in  Christian  Religion  was  not  necessary  for  the  moral 
progress  and  final  happiness  of  the  ancients,  or  the 
heathen,  who  never  heard  of  Christ — therefore  it 
cannot  be  necessary  for  us  ;  we  reply,  that  our  moral 
progress  is  checked  and  destroyed,  if  we  willingly 
stop,  when  we  might  go  further  ;  and  if  we  do  not 
use  means  of  advance  which  are  presented  to  us. 
Christianity  affords  to  us  means  of  moral  progress, 
which  the  ancients  and  the  heathen  had  not.  If  we 
refuse  these,  we  are  not  in  the  condition  in  which 
they  were,  who  never  had  them  offered.  If  we  re¬ 
ject  the  opportunity  of  becoming,  in  the  especial 
Christian  sense,  the  sons  of  God,  we  are  in  a  very 
different  condition  from  the  pious  heathen,  who  did 
all  that  their  light  enabled  them  to  do,  in  order  to 
approach  to  God.  And  this  may  be  said,  without  our 
knowing,  what  perhaps  the  Christian  revelation  does 
not  very  distinctly  teach  ;  the  nature  of  the  advan¬ 
tage,  in  the  condition  of  final  happiness  to  which 
man’s  moral  and  religious  progress  leads,  which  the 
man,  who  has  lived  in  Christian  light,  has,  over  the 
devout  heathen  who  lived  in  unavoidable  darkness. 

723.  In  stating  that  men  are  blameable  in  dis¬ 
believing  truths,  after  they  have  been  promulgated, 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


117 


though  they  are  ignorant  without  blame,  before  the 
promulgation  ;  we  follow  the  judgment  of  mankind, 
as  formed  in  other  similar  cases.  We  attribute  to  a 
man  an  intellectual  fault,  we  despise  him  as  ignorant 
and  confused  in  his  thoughts,  who  thinks  the  earth  to 
be  flat,  now,  that  it  has  so  long  been  ascertained  to 
be  globular.  We  regard  him  as  blind  and  foolish,  if 
now  he  is  not  satisfied  that  the  earth  moves  round  the 
sun  :  though  for  so  many  centuries,  the  wisest  and 
most  clear-sighted  of  men  never  doubted  that  the 
earth  was  at  rest.  When  such  truths  are  once  indis¬ 
putably  established  as  facts,  we  cannot  help  con¬ 
demning  those  who  reject  the  evidence  of  them. 
They  violate  the  Duty  of  rational  thought,  of  which 
we  have  spoken  (446).  And  this  is  still  more  the 
case,  in  regard  to  moral  truths.  We  excuse  those 
who  in  early  and  rude  stages  of  society  practise  or 
praise  plunder  of  strangers,  slavery,  polygamy,  con¬ 
cubinage  ;  but  when  the  progress  of  the  Standard  of 
Morality  (461)  has  shown  that  such  things  are  im¬ 
moral  ;  if  any  one  among  us  defends  such  practices, 
we  no  longer  think  him  free  from  blame.  We  are 
indignant  at  the  low  morality  of  his  doctrines  ;  or  at 
least  we  lament  his  moral  blindness  as  his  calamity. 
And  in  like  manner  with  regard  to  Religion,  although 
we  do  not  blame,  for  their  religious  ignorance,  the 
ancients,  who  could  not  know  the  Revelation  of 
Christ ;  and  the  heathen,  to  whom  it  has  not  been 
preached  ;  we  do  not  excuse  the  moderns,  who,  now 
that  there  has  taken  place  this  great  Revelation,  ele¬ 
vating  the  moral  views  and  spiritual  hopes  of  men, 
refuse  to  believe  the  Truths  thus  established.  They 
who  do  this,  reject  a  light  which  has  come  into  the 
world  ;  and  the  blindness  in  which  they  remain  is 
not  only  their  misfortune,  but  their  fault. 

724.  This  view  of  the  Duty  of  accepting 
Christian  Truth  ;  namely,  that  the  Duty  is  incum¬ 
bent  upon  men  according  to  the  opportunities  which 


118 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


belong  to  their  condition  ;  agrees  with  the  lessons  of 
the  Ghristian  teachers.  The  duty  of  Believing  in 
Christ,  of  accepting  Religious  Truth  in  general,  is 
strongly  urged  by  Christ  and  his  Apostles.  Yet  this 
is  not  urged  without  regard  to  difference  of  opportu¬ 
nities.  Christ  taught  (Luke  xii.,  48),  Unto  whomso¬ 
ever  much  is  given ,  of  him  shall  he  much  required. 
When  St.  Paul  preached  to  the  Athenians,  after  de¬ 
scribing  their  past  idolatry,  he  added  (Acts  xvii.,  30), 
And  the  times  of  this  ignorance  God  winked  at ;  hut 
now  commandeth  all  men  everywhere  to  repent.  To 
the  same  effect,  he  preached  at  Lystra  (xiv.,  15), 
The  living  God ,  which  made  heaven,  and  earth,  and 
the  sea,  and  all  things  that  are  therein :  in  time  past 
suffered  all  nations  to  walk  in  their  own  ways  :  never¬ 
theless  he  left  not  himself  without  witness.  This  was 
joined  with  an  exhortation  to  turn,  now  at  length,  to 
the  living  God.  The  whole  scheme  of  the  Christian 
Religion  represented  the  Jewish  Dispensation  as  an 
inferior  and  preparatory  condition  ;  in  which  men 
did  not  see  the  meaning  and  tendency  of  the  com¬ 
mands  which  they  obeyed,  and  were  to  be  judged 
according  to  the  imperfect  light  which  they  thus 
possessed.  The  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  states  this. 
(Heb.  i.,  1),  God,  who  at  sundry  times  and  in  divers 
manners  spake  in  times  past  hy  the  prophets,  hath  in 
these  last  days  spoken  to  us  hy  his  Son ;  and  then 
goes  on  to  explain  the  superiority  of  Christ,  in  nature 
and  office,  to  the  ministers  of  the  Old  Testament. 
Again,  St.  Paul  says  (Rom.  ii.,  12),  As  many  as 
have  sinned  without  law  (the  law  of  Moses),  shall  also 
perish  without  law ;  and  as  many  as  have  sinned  in 
the  law,  shall  he  judged  hy  the  law.  So  in  St.  John 
(xv.,  22),  Christ  says,  If  I  had  not  come  and  spoken 
to  them  they  had  not  had  sin,  hut  now  have  they  no  ex¬ 
cuse  {*p6$acriv)  for  their  sin. 

725.  When  the  Truth  of  the  Gospel  is  pre¬ 
sented  to  men,  those  who  do  not  accept  it  are  charged 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


119 


with  blindness  and  hardness  of  heart.  Thus  (Mark 
vi.,  52),  They  considered  not  the  miracle  of  the 
loaves,  for  their  heart  was  hardened.  And  when  the 
Disciples  referred  his  warnings  to  earthly  matters, 
Christ  said  (Mark  viii.,  17),  Perceive  ye  not,  neither 
understand  ?  Have  ye  your  heart  yet  hardened  ? 
Having  eyes,  see  ye  not  ?  and  having  ears,  hear  ye 
not?  So  (Mark  iii.,  5).  And  (John  xii.,  40),  the 
expressions  of  Isaiah  are  applied  to  the  Jews  who 
had  seen  the  miracles  of  Christ,  and  did  not  be¬ 
lieve  :  He  hath  blinded  their  eyes,  and  hardened  their 
heart :  that  they  should  not  see  with  their  eyes,  nor 
understand  with  their  heart,  and  be  converted.  So 
(Acts  xix.,  9),  Divers  were  hardened,  and  believed 
not.  And  Christ  (Mark  xvi.,  14)  appeared  unto  the 
eleven  as  they  sat  at  meat,  and  upbraided  them  with 
their  unbelief,  and  hardness,  of  heart,  because  they 
believed  not  them  which  had  seen  him  after  he  was 
risen.  And  to  the  two  disciples  on  the  way  to  Em- 
maus  he  said  (Luke  xxiv.,  25),  O  fools,  and  slow  of 
heart  to  believe  all  that  the  prophets  have  spoken  / 

726.  As  in  these  and  many  other  passages, 
blame  is  imputed  to  men  when  they  reject  revealed 
truth,  so  is  it  represented  as  a  merit  to  believe  and 
accept  such  truth.  Thus  Acts  xvii.,  11.  The 
Berean  Jews  were  more  noble  (evyevioTepoi,  of  a  better 
disposition)  than  those  in  Thessalonica,  in  that  they 
received  the  word  with  all  readiness  of  mind,  and 
searched  the  Scriptures  daily,  whether  these  things 
were  so.  And  this  is  implied  in  all  the  commenda¬ 
tion  bestowed  upon  faith  ;  which,  although  it  be  not 
merely  a  speculative  belief,  includes  belief  of  Chris¬ 
tian  truths.  And  as  unbelief  is  threatened  with 
punishment  (Matth.  xi.,  21 ;  Luke  x.,  13),  Woe  un¬ 
to  thee,  Chorazin  !  woe  unto  thee,  Bethsaida  !  so  is 
belief  represented  as  the  occasion  of  God’s  favour. 
(John  i.,  12),  As  many  as  received  him .  to  them  gave 


KELIGION. 


120 


[BOOK  IV. 


7ie  power  to  become  the  sons  of  God,  even  to  them  that 
believe  on  his  name. 

727.  We  have  spoken  (723)  of  the  Progress 
of  Science,  as  illustrating  the  manner  in  which  er- 
rours  which  are  excusable  at  an  earlier  time,  are 
inexcusable  at  a  later  period,  when  the  truth  has 
been  more  fully  discovered  and  promulgated. 

There  is  one  material  difference,  however,  be¬ 
tween  the  course  of  truth  and  knowledge,  in  Science 
and  in  Religion.  In  the  knowledge  of  scientific 
truth,  men  go  on  from  step  to  step,  at  every  step 
advancing  to  the  knowledge  of  a  new  truth  ;  which 
new  truth  includes  all  that  was  true  in  previous 
knowledge,  while  it  adds  to  it  something  more.  Thus, 
the  cycles  and  epicycles  in  which,  according  to  the 
Ptolemaic  system  of  astronomy,  the  planets  moved 
round  the  earth,  explained  their  motions,  for  the 
most  part.  The  step  made  by  Copernicus  consisted 
in  adopting  this  explanation  ;  adding  to  it  the  new 
truth,  that  the  sun,  not  the  earth,  was  the  centre  of 
the  motions.  Kepler  still  retained  the  same  explana¬ 
tion  of  the  motions  ;  but  added  again  the  new  truth, 
that  the  epicycloid  motion,  duly  corrected,  might  be 
conceived  as  elliptical  motion.  Such  is  ever  the 
progress  of  human  knowledge,  retaining  old  truths, 
in  spite  of  their  mixture  with  errour  ;  and  correct¬ 
ing  them,  where  they  are  erroneous,  by  means  of 
new  truths.  The  last  true  doctrine  contains  all  the 
previous  true  doctrines  in  the  most  general  form ; 
and  contains,  moreover,  the  new  general  truth. 

But  in  Revealed  Truth,  the  case  is  necessarily 
different  from  this.  There  the  Revelation  contains 
all  the  Truth ;  and  to  this  Truth,  succeeding 
thoughts  of  men  cannot  add,  though  they  may  de- 
velope  and  methodize  it.  The  Doctrine,  as  revealed, 
contains  all  the  true  Doctrines  which  can  be  un¬ 
folded  out  of  it.  The  first  form  of  the  Truth  is, 
here,  the  most  comprehensive  and  fundamental.  In 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


RELIGIOUS  BELIEF. 


121 


Science,  earlier  views,  so  far  as  they  are  true,  are 
summed  up  in  the  latest  Discovery.  In  Religion, 
later  views  are  true,  so  far  as  they  are  derived  from 
the  original  Revelation.  If  Christianity  were  a 
Science,  additions  might  be  made  to  it  from  time  to 
time ;  but  as  it  is  a  Revelation,  we  can  only  have, 
from  time  to  time,  new  expressions,  arrangements, 
and  combinations,  of  the  same  original  fundamental 
Truths. 

728.  We  may,  however,  observe  further,  that 
the  progress  of  moral  and  intellectual  culture  among 
men,  and  the  changes  which  philosophical  opinions 
undergo,  may  make  it  necessary,  for  the  sake  of  a 
due  apprehension  of  the  truth,  and  for  the  sake  of  a 
mutual  understanding  among  men,  that  the  original 
and  fundamental  Truths  of  the  Christian  religion 
should  be  expressed  in  various  manners,  on  various 
occasions,  and  at  various  times.  Abstract  terms, 
and  especially  those  which  contain  a  reference  to 
the  powers  of  the  mind,  the  operations  of  thought, 
and  the  most  general  relations  of  things,  derive  their 
significance  and  force,  in  a  great  measure,  from  the 
prevalent  systems  of  philosophy.  Such  terms  are 
necessarily  employed,  in  expressing  the  relation  of 
man  to  God,  and  the  facts  which  affect  the  religious 
condition  of  the  human  soul.  Hence,  it  may  be 
necessary  to  modify  the  expression  of  religious  be¬ 
lief,  in  consequence  of  revolutions  in  philosophy,  or 
other  changes  in  the  prevalent  habits  of  thought. 
Statements,  which,  at  one  time,  did  not  convey  an 
erroneous  meaning,  may  come  to  be  assertions  of 
errour ;  if  the  significations  of  the  terms  which  they 
involve  be,  in  the  course  of  years,  so  limited  or  en¬ 
larged,  so  defined  and  distinguished,  that  the  state¬ 
ments  declare  more  or  less  than  the  truth.  In  such 
cases  the  Creed ,  or  formal  Declaration  of  Religious 
Belief,  may  need  to  have  some  Articles  added  or 
altered.  But  it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  such  addi- 

VOL.  II.  L 


122 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


tional  Articles  are  not  additions  to  the  matter,  but 
corrections  of  the  form,  of  the  Creed.  They  do  not 
denote  the  acceptance  of  Truths  hitherto  unknown, 
but  the  exclusion  of  Errours  hitherto  unnoticed. 
The  Truths  of  Revelation  are  always  the  same  ; 
but  the  means  which  man  possesses,  to  express  them 
without  Errour,  vary,  as  the  habits  of  thought  and 
of  language  vary ;  and  it  has  been  possible,  and 
being  possible,  it  has  been  the  Duty  of  the  Church 
of  Christ  to  make,  from  time  to  time,  such  altera¬ 
tions  in  her  Creeds,  that  they  might  express,  with 
more  complete  exclusion  of  Errour,  the  Truth  as 
revealed  by  God  to  man. 

729.  Our  Religious  Belief  is  a  part  of  that 
Religious  Culture,  of  which  we  have  spoken  (565). 
A  true  apprehension  of  our  relation  to  God,  and  of 
the  conditions  of  his  dealings  with  us,  is  the  founda¬ 
tion  and  source  of  the  Affections  of  Christian  Piety, 
which  we  have  already  noticed. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CHRISTIAN  EDIFICATION. 

730.  As  it  is  our  business  to  seek  a  knowledge 
of  Christian  Truth,  and  to  aim  at  Christian  Disposi¬ 
tions  for  ourselves ;  so  is  it  our  Duty,  also,  to  en¬ 
deavour  to  impart  these  benefits  to  other  persons. 
As  it  is  (346)  a  Moral  Duty  to  promote  the  Moral 
Progress  of  other  men,  as  well  as  our  own  ;  so  is  it 
a  Christian  duty  to  promote  the  Christian  Progress 
of  other  men.  Christian  Love  is  a  stronger  motive 
for  doing  this  than  any  other  kind  of  benevolence 
can  be ;  and  the  Christian  Progress  of  the  Soul  is  a 
so  much  higher  object  to  aim  at,  than  mere  moral 


CHAP.  XIV.]  CHRISTIAN  EDIFICATION. 


123 


progress  of  the  Mind,  that  it  may  very  fitly  excite 
men  to  more  strenuous  exertions.  The  Christian, 
who  has  made  any  progress  in  Christian  knowledge 
and  Christian  dispositions,  cannot  help  wishing  that 
all  other  men  should  be  as  he  is.  He  has  received  a 
Gospel  of  Good  Tidings,  which  he  must  needs  impart 
to  all  whom  he  loves ;  and  this  very  Gospel  has 
taught  him  to  love  all  men.  He  would,  if  possible, 
communicate  to  every  human  creature  the  Call  to 
Repentance,  the  Offer  of  Pardon,  the  Light,  the  Pu¬ 
rification,  the  Hope,  and  the  Joy,  which  he  has,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  found. 

731.  This  Christian  desire  impels  men  to  teach 
Christian  truths  and  Christian  precepts,  to  those  who 
are  under  their  more  immediate  influence  ;  to  their 
children,  and  their  dependents.  They  bestow,  on 
those  who  thus  belong  to  them,  Christian  Education. 
They  employ  themselves  in  forming,  in  such  persons, 
Christian  Dispositions,  and  in  unfolding  their  minds 
to  the  Truths  of  the  Christian  Revelation.  But  fur¬ 
ther  ;  the  Christian  is  naturally  impelled  by  Chris¬ 
tian  love  to  endeavour  to  promote  a  Christian  pro¬ 
gress,  not  only  in  those  whose  Education  in  some 
measure  especially  belongs  to  him,  but  also  in  all 
whom  he  has  any  occasion  of  influencing  ;  his  neigh¬ 
bours,  his  fellow-citizens,  the  whole  world,  so  far  as 
his  opportunities  extend.  He  is  bound  to  aim  at  the 
Christian  improvement  of  those  with  whom  he  has 
intercourse  ;  to  teach  them,  if  by  position  or  gifts  he 
be  especially  qualified  as  a  Christian  Teacher : 
above  all,  to  avoid  doing  or  saying  anything  which 
may  interfere  with  their  Christian  progress. 

This  duty  of  mutual  religious  improvement  and 
Christian  culture  is  frequently  enjoined  in  the  Scrip¬ 
ture.  (Eph.  vi.,  4),  Parents  are  directed  to  bring 
up  their  children  in  the  nurture  and  admonition  of  the 
Lord.  The  Colossians  are  exhorted  (Col.  iii.,  16), 
Let  the  word  of  Christ  dwell  in  you  richly  ....teaching 


124 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


and  admonishing  one  another.  And  Heb.  iii.,  13, 
Exhort  one  another  daily ;  (x.,  24),  Let  us  consider 
one  another ,  to  provoke  unto  love  and  good  works. 
Thus  the  Christians  were  to  exhort  each  other  to 
what  was  good;  to.  admonish  and  warn  them  who 
were  in  danger  of  transgression  ;  and  if  need  were, 
to  rebuke  transgressors  (1  Tim.  v.,  20). 

732.  The  notion  of  Mutual  Instruction  in  Re¬ 
ligion  so  familiarly  occurs  in  the  writings  of  the 
Apostles,  that  the  metaphor  by  which  it  is  expressed 
no  longer  suggests  the  figure  from  which  it  was  ori¬ 
ginally  derived.  A  Christian’s  mind  is  edified,  that 
is,  literally,  built  up,  by  religious  instruction  :  indeed 
the  term  instruction  itself  has,  originally,  nearly  the 
same  sense.  Thus  Acts  xx.,  32,  The  word  of  his 
grace  is  able  to  build  you  up.  Col.  ii.,  7,  Walk  ye 
in  Christ,  rooted  and  built  up  in  him.  And  in  this 
sense,  the  term  Edification  (otWo//i/)  is  commonly 
used  ;  as  1  Cor.  xiv.,  3,  He  that  prophesieth  speaketh 
to  edification* 

733.  As  a  necessary  requisite  of  their  common 
and  mutual  culture,  it  is  the  duty  of  Christians  to 
preserve,  unimpaired  and  pure,  the  Truth  originally 
revealed  through  Christ.  (Jude  3),  It  was  needful 
for  me  to  write  unto  you  and  exhort  you  that  ye  should 
earnestly  contend  for  the  faith  which  was  once  delivered 
to  the  saints.  St.  Paul  says  to  Timothy  (2  Tim.  i., 
10),  Hold  fast  the  form  of  sound  words  which  thou 
hast  heard  of  me,  in  faith  and  love,  which  is  in  Christ 
Jesus.  That  good  thing  which  was  committed  unto 
thee  keep  by  the  Holy  Ghost  which  dwelleth  in  us.  It 

*  In  other  cases,  however,  the  metaphor  is  differently  ap¬ 
plied,  when  mention  is  made  of  building  up  a  Church,  as  a 
body  of  Christians  ;  as  Rom.  xv.,  20  ;  and  under  this  form  of 
expression,  the  duty  is  often  enjoined;  as  Eph.  iv.,  29,  Let 
no  corrupt  communication  proceed  out  of  your  mouth ,  but 
that  which  is  good  to  the  use  of  edifying  ( rrpos  oXnoionnv  rns 
Xpew)-  So  Rom. xiv.,  19;  xv.,  2.  1  Cor.  xiv.,  5.  1  Thess.  v.,  11. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  CHRISTIAN  EDIFICATION. 


125 


is  plain  that  the  good  thing  thus  committed  to  Chris¬ 
tian  ministers  was  Christian  Truth.  So  St.  Paul 
again  (1  Tim.  i.,  11  and  18),  The  glorious  gospel  of 
the  blessed  God  which  was  committed,  to  my  trust.... 
This  charge  commit  I  unto  thee ,  son  Timothy.  And 
those  who  deviate  from  the  truth  of  the  Gospel,  are 
spoken  of  with  strong  condemnation.  Thus  (Gal.  i., 
7),  Inhere  are  some  that  trouble  you ,  and  would  pre¬ 
vent  the  gospel  of  Christ.  But  though  we ,  or  an  angel 
from  heaven,  preach  any  other  gospel  than  that  ye  have 
received ,  let  him  be  accursed  :  which  condemnation  he 
instantly  and  emphatically  repeats  (ver  9).  St.  Pe¬ 
ter  says  (2  Pet.  ii.,  1),  There  shall  be  false  teachers 
among  you  who  shall  privily  bring  in  damnable  here¬ 
sies,  even  denying  the  Lord  that  bought  them.  St. 
John  (2  John  10),  If  there  come  any  man  to  you,  and 
bring  not  this  doctrine,  receive  him  not  in  your  house , 
neither  bid  him  God  speed. 

Thus,  as  unbelief  and  false  doctrine  are  calamities 
to  our  own  souls,  and,  in  that  sense  at  least,  trans¬ 
gressions  against  ourselves ;  the  promulgation  of 
false  doctrine,  or  of  unbelief  among  others,  are  evil 
done  to  them,  and  violations  of  Christian  Duty. 

734.  To  this  condemnation  of  religious  unbe¬ 
lief  and  false  doctrine,  objections  are  sometimes 
urged  of  the  following  kind :  That  thus  to  declare 
one  selected  form  of  Opinion  to  be  the  only  form 
which  men  can  blamelessly  entertain,  is  hurtful  to 
the  Progress  of  Truth ;  for  the  Progress  of  Truth 
among  men  requires  free  Inquiry  and  Freedom  of 
Opinion  :  that  free  Inquiry  is  a  Right,  and  the  Love 
of  Truth  a  Duty  ;  both  of  which  are  infringed  by 
proscribing  certain  condemned  Opinions,  since  these 
may  be  the  very  Opinions  to  which  the  Love  of 
Truth  and  the  pursuit  of  Inquiry  lead  some  men  : 
that  our  supposition  that  our  Opinions  are  true,  and 
the  contrary  ones  false,  is  mere  assumption,  which 
may  with  equal  Right  be  made  on  the  other  side : 

l  2 


126 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


and  that  a  condemnation  of  men,  founded  upon  this 
assumption,  is,  therefore,  unjust  and  unreasonable. 

735.  In  reply  we  say,  that,  in  other  subjects 
than  Religion,  men  do  not  proceed  on  the  supposition 
that  persons  holding  two  opposite  Opinions  have  each 
an  equal  Right  to  assume  his  Doctrine  to  be  the  true 
one  :  that  on  the  contrary,  we  go  upon  the  supposi¬ 
tion  that  there  is  Truth  and  Falsehood,  as  well  as 
mere  Opinion  ;  and  we  condemn  the  man  who  holds 
false  opinions,  when  he  has  had  the  means  of  know¬ 
ing  the  Truth.  If  a  geographer  reasons  on  the  hypo¬ 
thesis  that  the  earth  is  flat,  not  round  ;  if  a  physician 
gives  his  direction  on  the  supposition  that  a  well- 
known  poisonous  drug  is  harmless :  we  do  not  say 
that  he  is  blameless,  and  has  a  Right  to  his  Opinion. 
We  think  him  foolish  and  irrational  ;  and  if  his  error 
lead  to  mischief,  we  blame  him  as  criminal.  In  like 
manner  we  go,  and  must  go,  upon  the  supposition 
that,  in  Morality  and  Religion,  as  well  as  Geography 
and  Physiology,  there  is  a  Truth  which  it  is  the  Du¬ 
ty  of  every  one  to  hold  ;  or,  at  least,  without  which 
his  Progress  towards  Truth  is  altogether  incomplete. 
If  a  man  stop  short  of  this  point,  or  turn  aside  in  any 
other  direction,  he  must  be  in  the  wrong.  Whether 
we  call  him  culpable  or  unhappy,  he  is  at  least  not 
moral  and  religious.  And  when  he  attempts  to  draw 
other  people  after  him  in  his  error,  we  cannot  abstain 
from  condemning  him. 

736.  The  belief  in  the  coincidence  of  Virtue 
with  Happiness,  in  the  long  run,  depends  upon  the 
belief  in  God’s  government  of  the  world ;  and  thus, 
this  belief  is  the  foundation  of  Morality.  Without 
this  belief,  the  Conceptions  of  Duty,  and  of  right  and 
wrong,  have  no  reality  and  no  force.  When  we  say 
that  the  Love  of  Truth  is  a  duty,  we  cannot  so  un 
derstand  the  word  Truth ,  that  there  shall  be  no  such 
thing  as  Duty.  If  the  Love  of  Truth  be  a  Duty, 
Truth  must  include  the  foundation  of  the  reality  of 


CHAP.  XIV.]  CHRISTIAN  EDIFICATION. 


127 


Duty  ;  which  is,  as  we  have  said,  the  belief  in  God. 
And  so,  of  the  Right  of  free  Inquiry  ;  there  cannot 
be  a  Right  of  free  Inquiry  in  such  a  sense,  that  In¬ 
quiry  may  lead  to  the  result  that  nothing  is  right  or 
wrong.  If  there  be  a  Right  of  Inquiry,  there  must 
be  some  real  basis  of  Rights ;  which,  without  the 
belief  in  God,  there  cannot  be. 

737.  The  general  judgment  of  mankind  has 
given  its  sanction  to  these  views.  As  we  have 
already  said  (405),  men  do  not  consider  those  per¬ 
sons  to  be  blameless  who  hold  immoral  Principles  : 
and  in  like  manner,  they  have  always  bestowed 
strong  condemnation  on  those  persons  who  have 
rejected  or  opposed  that  belief  in  God,  which,  in 
common  apprehension,  as  in  reality,  is  the  necessary 
basis  of  Morality.  Atheists  have  always  been  odious. 
The  universal  voice  of  human  nature  has  pronounced 
condemnation  on  those  who  say,  “  There  is  no  God.” 
The  Right  and  the  Duty  of  Inquiry  have  always 
been  asserted  in  vain,  when  Inquiry  has  led  to  this 
result.  Men  have  constantly,  and  everywhere,  felt 
that  the  Right  and  Duty  of  Inquiry  could  not  be 
things  more  certain,  than  the  being  of  God,  who  made 
them  able  to  inquire  and  to  conceive  Duty.  And  the 
Atheist  has  been  regarded  as  a  man  who  broke  a 
universal  and  fundamental  tie,  by  which  all  mankind 
are  held  together  ;  and  hence  has  been  looked  upon 
as  a  common  enemy. 

738.  The  mere  belief  in  God,  on  grounds  of 
Reason,  is  too  vague  and  incomplete  a  doctrine  to 
satisfy  men.  If  there  be  a  Creator  and  Moral 
Governor  of  the  world,  there  must  be  also  a  Provi¬ 
dential  Government  of  the  world.  The  History  of 
Man  must  bear  traces  of  the  Mind  of  God.  The  first 
origin  of  man  on  earth,  for  instance,  cannot  be  an 
event  in  the  common  course  of  things  ;  and  we  can 
easily  conceive  this  origin  of  man  to  have  been 
accompanied  by  something  of  the  nature  of  a  Reve- 


128 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


lation.  Men  have  everywhere  felt,  thoughtful  men 
still  feel,  the  need  of  something  more  than  our  natural 
powers  afford,  to  purify  and  elevate  their  minds. 
To  carry  on  the  Moral  Progress  of  man,  the  Ancient 
World  needed  to  be  transformed  into  the  Modern 
World;  but  this  could  not  take  place  by  natural 
means.  The  Christian  sees  the  only  consistent  and 
possible  solution  of  these  difficulties,  in  the  Christian 
Revelation  ;  according  to  which  the  coming  of  Christ 
upon  earth  is  the  Central  Point  in  the  Providential 
History  of  the  world ;  giving  definiteness  to  the 
relations  of  God  and  man  ;  and  supplying  the  needs 
of  man’s  spiritual  nature.  Thus,  he  sees,  in  Revealed 
Religion,  the  necessary  completion  of  Natural  Reli¬ 
gion  ;  and  is  compelled  to  look  upon  the  infidel,  who 
does  not  believe  in  Christ,  as  believing  in  God  to  no 
purpose.  The  Christian  judges,  as  we  have  already 
said,  that  such  unbelief  is  either  a  violation  of  Duty, 
or  a  calamity  which  produces  the  same  effect  upon 
the  person’s  mind  as  a  transgression  of  Duty  ;  since, 
without  a  belief  in  Christ,  a  man  cannot  have  the 
benefits  which  Christ’s  coming  brings  to  believers. 
And  the  promulgation  of  such  infidel  doctrines,  he 
deems  to  be  a  heavy  calamity  to  those  who  fall 
under  such  influence.  The  tie  of  a  common  belief 
in  God  is,  among  Christians,  identified  with  the  tie  of 
a  common  belief  in  Christ ;  and  hence,  he  who  denies 
the  truth  of  the  Christian  Revelation,  is  necessarily 
looked  upon  in  nearly  the  same  light  as  the  Atheist. 

739.  It  by  no  means  follows,  that  we  check  or 
limit  the  Progress  of  Speculative  Truth  among  men, 
when  we  condemn  the  denial  of  certain  fundamental 
Principles  which  are  assumed  in  the  very  idea  of 
Speculative  Truth.  Such  Principles  are  these  : — 
that  there  is  a  difference  of  true  and  false  ;  a  dis¬ 
tinction  of  right  and  wrong  ;  that  there  is  a  God  who 
gives  reality  to  that  distinction  ;  that  there  is  a  duty 
of  unlimited  progress  towards  what  is  right.  These 


CHAP.  XIV.] 


CHRISTIAN  EDIFICATION. 


129 


doctrines  being  assumed  as  steadfast  and  unquestion¬ 
able,  there  is  still  abundant  room  for  Inquiry  ;  and 
for  various  views  to  which  Inquiry  may  lead.  The 
wide  space  between  General  Principles  and  Special 
Instances,  is  occupied  by  a  region  of  obscurity  and 
confusion,  in  which  we  need  all  the  clearness  which 
we  can  give  to  our  intermediate  chain  of  conceptions, 
in  order  that  our  reasonings  may  be  coherent  and 
conclusive.  Different  minds  may  form  such  chains 
of  conceptions,  various,  yet  each  consistent  with 
itself;  and  depending  for  their  variety,  only  upon 
different  kinds  of  intellect  and  of  intellectual  culture. 
It  is  our  business  to  seek  to  establish  such  a  clear 
and  firm  connexion  among  our  thoughts.  It  is  a  part 
of  the  Duty  of  Intellectual  Culture,  of  which  we 
formerly  spoke  (342).  The  pursuit  of  speculative 
Truth,  under  the  conditions  already  stated,  and  in 
proportion  to  our  powers  and  habits  of  speculation, 
is  a  part  of  the  life  of  a  good  man.  He  must  think, 
as  well  as  feel.  As  we  have  said  (338  and  446),  it 
is  his  duty  to  act  and  to  think  rationally  ;  and  what 
is  rational  thought,  he  can  know  only,  by  carefully 
unfolding  his  Reason.  So  far  as  he  really  arrives  at 
Speculative  Truth,  he  will  see  more  distinctly  the 
Supreme  Law  of  his  Being,  and  will  have  increased 
means  of  conforming  to  it.  It  is  his  business  constantly 
to  aim  at  Truth  ;  and  his  Progress  towards  Truth, 
like  his  Progress  towards  Moral  Perfection,  can  never 
rightly  have  an  end.  Hence,  if  any  one  were  to 
argue  that  the  opinions  to  which  he  had  been  led 
must  be  blameless,  since  he  had  done  all  he  could  to 
arrive  at  truth  ;  we  should  reply,  that  a  man  has 
never  done  all  he  can  to  arrive  at  Truth  ;  that  every 
man  should  go  on  to  the  end  of  his  life,  constantly  en¬ 
deavouring  to  obtain  a  clearer  and  clearer  view  of  the 
Truths,  on  which  his  Duty  depends  ;  and  that  his  re¬ 
nouncing  this  task,  and  making  up  his  mind  that  he  has 
done  all  which  he  needs  to  do,  is  itself  a  Transgression 
VOL.  ii.  9 


RELIGION. 


130 


[book  IV. 


of  Duty,  which  prevents  his  Errour  and  Ignorance 
from  being  blameless. 

740.  The  Inquiry  after  the  Truths  which  are 
connected  with  Morality  and  Religion,  must  be  con¬ 
ducted  in  a  serious  and  earnest  disposition.  To  bring 
to  the  task  any  spirit  of  levity,  or  of  ready-made 
contempt  for  the  doctrines  whose  Truth  we  have  to 
examine,  is  to  trifle  with  or  pervert  our  Duty.  Such 
a  spirit  makes  our  inquiry  worthless ;  and  may 
make  us  both  mischievous  and  culpable  in  the  in¬ 
fluence  which  we  exert  upon  others.  Levity  or 
Ridicule,  which  has  any  tinge  of  impiety,  is  a  most 
grave  offence  ;  implying  the  absence  of  all  due 
appreciation  of  the  importance  of  religion  :  and  such 
behaviour  is  the  more  plainly  culpable,  inasmuch  as 
the  spirit  of  Levity  and  Ridicule  is  inconsistent  with 
calm  and  candid  Inquiry.  As  we  have  said  (247), 
Ridicule  implies  that  the  object  ridiculed  is  compared 
with  some  standard,  and  is  deemed  so  glaringly 
below  the  standard,  as  to  make  comparison  absurd. 
To  ridicule  Religious  Opinions,  is  to  take  for  granted 
that  they  are  unworthy  of  serious  examination.  To 
ridicule  Religious  Opinions,  does  not  prove,  but 
assumes  their  falsity.  Ridicule  is  no  test,  either  of 
truth,  or  falsehood,  in  the  opinion  ridiculed  ;  but  it  is 
a  test  of  assumption,  combined  with  levity,  in  the 
person  who  so  uses  it.  Yet  such  assumption  often 
carries  away  with  it  by  sympathy  the  weaker  kind 
of  intellects,  and  puts  them  out  of  the  frame  of  mind 
in  which  they  can  attend  to  serious  inquiry.  Ridicule 
often  influences  men  more  than  argument  ;  and  is 
more  difficult  to  reply  to  ;  because  the  replicant  has 
first  to  overcome  the  feeling  of  Contempt,  in  the 
expression  of  which  the  force  of  Ridicule  dwells. 
But  this  feeling  of  Contempt  is  not  really  any  advance 
towards  a  discernment  of  Truth.  It  majr  be  assumed 
on  the  side  of  Falsehood  as  well  as  of  Truth.  It  may 
be  communicated  by  sympathy,  by  the  play  of  fancy, 


CHAP.  XIV.]  CHRISTIAN  EDIFICATION. 


131 


the  ambiguities  of  language,  and  the  fallacies  of 
shallow  thinking  in  favour  of  what  is  false,  as  well-as 
of  what  is  true.  Hence,  even  those  Moralists  who 
allow  an  unlimited  Freedom  to  the  Inquiry  after 
speculative  Truth,  still  condemn  the  use  of  Ridicule 
with  regard  to  religious  Doctrines.  To  employ  Jests 
and  Grotesque  images,  Sarcasms  and  Sneers,  on 
such  subjects,  is  to  intoxicate  men,  while  we  are 
leading  them  among  the  most  difficult  and  dangerous 
paths. 

741.  As  implying  a  degree  of  Levity,  the  fa¬ 
miliar  mention  of  the  deeper  matters  which  belong 
to  Religion  is  not  without  evil.  For  the  deeper  mat¬ 
ters  of  Religion  cannot  be  properly  apprehended 
and  meditated  upon,  without  a  degree  of  reflection 
and  abstraction  which  is  inconsistent  with  familiar 
mention  of  them.  This  is  especially  the  case  with 
the  Idea  of  God.  The  thought  of  God,  the  Author 
of  Duty,  the  End  of  Hope,  the  ever-guiding  Intelli¬ 
gence  of  the  world,  the  ever-present  Witness  of  our 
Thoughts,  our  Holy  Lawgiver,  our  Righteous  Judge  ; 
cannot  fitly  be  called  up  in  our  minds,  without  be¬ 
ing  detained  a  moment,  as  the  object  of  Reverence. 
To  turn  our  thoughts  towards  God,  is  almost  to 
address  ourselves  to  him  ;  and  we  are  not  thought¬ 
lessly  to  use  words  which  may  make  this  demand 
upon  us. 

742.  Hence  a  good  man  will  employ  the  Name 
of  God  cautiously  and  sparingly  in  his  speech  ;  and 
will  never  introduce  it  on  any  slight  occasion,  or  in 
any  trifling  spirit.  Still  less  will  he  employ  it  as  an 
indication  of  some  confused  vehemence  or  reckless 
fierceness  in  his  thoughts  ;  as  is  done  in  common 
Profane  Swearing.  Such  are  the  dictates  of  Natural 
Piety.  They  are  confirmed  by  being  enjoined  by 
God  himself,  in  one  of  the  Ten  Commandments  given 
to  the  Israelites.  Thou  shall  not  take  the  Name  of  the 
Lord  ihy  God  in  vain,  for  the  Lord  will  not  hold  him 


132 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


guiltless  that  taketli  his  Name  in  vain.  And  this  is 
further  indicated  in  the  teaching  of  Christ  (Matth.  v., 
35).  For  the  Jews  had  apparently  applied  the  com¬ 
mandment  to  the  name  Jehovah  only  :  but  Christ 
extends  it  to  every  expression,  in  which  the  thought 
of  God  is  virtually  referred  to.  I  say  unto  you, 
Swear  not  at  all ;  neither  by  heaven,  for  it  is  God’s 
throne ;  nor  by  the  earth,  for  it  is  his  footstool ; 
neither  by  Jerusalem,  for  it  is  the  city  of  the  Great 
King. 

743.  All  the  Duties  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking  may  be  included  in  the  term  Christian 
Edification,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken.  But 
it  is  the  Christian’s  duty  to  edify  or  communicate 
religious  instruction  to  those  around  him,  in  a  larger 
sense.  The  body  of  Christians  who  are  in  the  world 
at  every  period,  have  it  for  their  business  to  diffuse, 
to  the  whole  world,  the  knowledge  and  the  spirit  of 
Christ ;  as  the  first  Disciples,  in  their  time,  had  this 
for  their  business.  The  true  Disciples  of  Christ  are 
always  a  Church,  an  Ecclesia,  a  Body  called  out  of 
the  great  body  of  the  world  ;  not  only  to  be  them¬ 
selves  brought  to  God,  but  to  bring  all  men  to  God. 
They  are  always  the  Salt  of  the  earth  ;  the  element 
by  which  it  is  to  be  preserved  from  corruption. 
Every  Christian  is  bound  to  labour  to  make  other 
men  truly  Christians,  as  far  as  his  influence  ex¬ 
tends  : — first,  as  we  have  said,  his  family  and  neigh¬ 
bours  ;  next,  his  nation  ;  and  then  the  whole  of  man¬ 
kind — the  whole  Human  Family  of  his  Brethren. 
Every  Christian,  and  every  Community  of  Chris¬ 
tians,  so  far  as  they  possess  this  Christian  spirit,  will 
be  led  to  look  upon  themselves  as  Christian  Mission¬ 
aries,  whose  business  it  is  to  inmart  to  all  men  Reli¬ 
gious  Truth. 


CHAP.  XV.] 


CHRISTIAN  ORDINANCES. 


133 


CHAPTER  XV. 

CHRISTIAN  ORDINANCES  IN  GENERAL. 

744.  We  have  already  (591)  spoken  of  Chris¬ 
tian  Ordinances  ;  namely,  certain  habitual  formal 
and  social  acts  by  which  members  of  the  Church 
acquire  and  express  their  Union  with  the  Church, 
the  Blessings  and  Privileges  which  this  union  pro¬ 
duces,  and  the  Emotions  and  Affections  to  which 
their  Christian  condition  gives  rise.  As  such  Ordi¬ 
nances,  we  have  mentioned  Baptism,  the  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per,  Prayer  and  Praise,  Profession  of  Faith  and 
Preaching.  These  Ordinances  involve  the  appoint¬ 
ment  of  sacred  times,  as  the  Lords  Day,  and  other 
Christian  Festivals,  and  of  sacred  Places  and  Forms. 
Besides  these  Ordinances,  which  belong  to  the  uni¬ 
versal  course  of  Christian  life,  Christian  doctrines 
give  to  Marriage,  and  to  Death,  a  religious  aspect 
which  is  expressed  by  Religious  Acts  accompanying 
each  event ;  and  thus  the  Religious  Solemnization  ol 
Marriages  and  Funerals  may  also  be  looked  upon  as 
Christian  Ordinances.  Oaths  are  necessarily,  as  we 
have  seen,  Religious  Acts ;  and  therefore,  in  a 
Christian  community,  are  a  Christian  Ordinance. 
Finally,  the  appointment  of  an  Order  of  men  for  the 
purposes  of  Religious  Ministration  and  Religious 
Teaching-,  and  the  mode  of  Admission  into  this  Order, 
are  also  Christian  Ordinances. 

745.  The  use  of  Christian  Ordinances  is  a  Du¬ 
ty  binding  upon  every  Christian  ;  for  they  are  the 
means  of  a  Christian’s  finding  in  Religion  that  sup¬ 
port  which  Morality  needs,  and  those  Blessings  and 
Privileges  which  Christianity  offers  to  Christians. 

740.  Hence  it  is  proper  to  show  separately, 
with  reg;ard  to  the  Ordinances  which  have  been 
mentioned,  that  they  are  Christian  Ordinances,  in  the 

VOL.  II.  M 


134 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


form  in  which  they  are  appointed  to  be  observed  in 
this  country.  It  belongs  to  the  Religious  Teacher  to 
insist,  in  a  more  especial  manner,  upon  the  Spiritual 
Efficacy  (592)  of  these  Ordinances.  We  consider 
them  as  a  portion  of  the  Rule  of  Christian  Duty,  in 
which  they  are  necessarily  included. 

747.  The  Supreme  Rule  of  Christian  Duty, 
with  regard  to  Ordinances,  is  the  same  as  with  re¬ 
gard  to  everything  else  : — the  Will  of  God.  This 
Will,  however  made  known  to  Christians,  is,  as  we 
have  said  (654),  the  Christian  Rule  of  Conscience. 
But  the  Rules  of  Christian  Duty,  with  regard  to  Or¬ 
dinances,  cannot  be  collected  from  Scripture  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  Precepts  of  Christian  Morality  : 
for  Rules  for  Christian  Ordinances,  as  to  their  Form, 
are  not  given  in  the  Scriptures.  Hence  we  must 
collect  the  Will  of  God  respecting  Ordinances  from 
other  sources. 

Of  such  sources,  there  are  four  principal  ones, 
which  we  shall  term  ;  Natural  Piety  ;  Early  Reve¬ 
lation  ;  Apostolic  Institution ;  and  Catholic  Tradi¬ 
tion . 

748.  We  have  seen  (674)  that  Public  Worship 
of  the  Deity  is  pointed  out  as  a  Duty  by  the  Dictates 
of  Natural  Piety  :  and  that  Public  Worship  involves 
the  establishment  of  Sacred  Times,  Sacred  Places, 
and  Religious  Ceremonies.  Hence  it  has  been,  bv 
some  Christian  writers,  reckoned  as  among  the  dic¬ 
tates  of  Natural  Piety,  that  God  should  be  worship¬ 
ped  in  a  special  and  marked  manner,  at  the  recur¬ 
rence  of  certain  fixed  intervals  of  time  ;  as,  every 
morning,  every  seventh  day,  every  tenth  day,  every 
month.  Certain  it  is,  that  such  an  usage  has  pre¬ 
vailed  very  extensively,  we  might  almost  say  uni¬ 
versally,  among  nations  in  all  ages.  So  has  also  the 
celebration  of  annual  festivals,  having  a  reference  to 
the  annual  phenomena  of  the  seasons,  or  to  some  his¬ 
torical  event.  With  regard  to  some  of  these  observ- 


CHAP.  XV.]  CHRISTIAN  ORDINANCES. 


135 


ances,  as  the  cycle  of  seven  days,  they  are  found  to 
be  so  widely  diffused  in  the  remotest  antiquity,  that 
some  persons  have  judged  them  to  be  traces  of  some 
Revelation  made  by  God  to  man,  in  the  early  period 
of  the  world’s  history  ;  and  before  that  dispersion  of 
the  human  race  by  which  they  were  separated  into 
nations. 

749.  But  of  Revelations  previous  to  the  com¬ 
ing  of  Christ,  we  have  no  authoritative  account  ex¬ 
cept  the  Old  Testament.  The  Law  of  Moses,  de¬ 
livered  in  the  Old  Testament,  contains  a  very  large 
and  detailed  body  of  Precepts,  concerning  Religious 
Observances  ;  concerning  Ceremonies  and  Sacrifices, 
Sacred  Places  and  Times.  These  were  delivered 
to  the  Jews  ;  and  were  observed  by  the  Jews,  with 
more  or  less  modification,  till  the  coming  of  Christ. 
It  is  proper  to  consider  how  far  these  Precepts  may 
be  regarded  as  guides  for  the  Christian  Church,  in 
the  regulation  of  its  ordinances. 

750.  The  Old  Testament  has  a  high  claim 
upon  the  reverence  of  Christians.  The  Revelation 
of  Christ  is  founded  upon,  and  is  the  sequel  to,  the 
Revelations  of  which  the  Books  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  contain  the  record.  Christ  and  his  Apostles, 
in  their  teaching,  recognize  and  confirm  the  author¬ 
ity  of  Moses  and  the  prophets ;  and  the  precepts  of 
Christian  morality  are  often  delivered  in  the  way  of 
a  commentary  upon  the  Law  of  Moses.  The  Jew¬ 
ish  prophets  predicted  the  coming  of  Christ,  the 
promised  Messiah  ;  and  by  their  predictions  pre¬ 
pared  men  for  the  reception  of  his  teaching.  The 
connexion  between  the  Jewish  Laws  and  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Doctrines  was  so  close,  that  at  first,  a  great 
number  of  the  Jewish  Christians  held  the  whole 
Law  of  Moses  to  be  binding  on  Christians,  even  as 
to  ceremonies  ;  for  instance,  circumcision,  meats, 
sabbath-days,  new  moons,  and  the  like.  This  opinion 
was  rejected  by  the  teachers  of  genuine  Christianity. 


136 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 

St.  Paul  argues  earnestly  against  it.  The  main 
tendency  of  his  Epistle  to  the  Galatians,  for  instance, 
is  to  prove  (Gal.  ii.,  16),  That  a  man  is  not  justified 
by  the  works  of  the  Law  of  Moses,  but  by  the  faith  of 
Jesus  Christ.  This  he  urges  especially  against  the 
necessity  of  circumcision.  But  he  applies  it  also  to 
ceremonies  in  general.  He  tells  the  Colossians  (ii., 
14),  that  Christ  blotted  out  the  handwriting  of  or¬ 
dinances  ;  and  in  connexion  with  this,  exhorts  them  : 
Let  no  man  therefore  judge  you  in  meat  or  in  drink, 
or  in  respect  of  a  holy-day,  or  of  the  new  moon,  or 
of  the  sabbath-days,  which  are  a  shadow  of  things  to 
come,  but  the  body  is  of  Christ.  Hence  it  is  plain 
that  even  the  Jews  who  became  Christians,  were  not 
bound  by  the  Mosaic  ordinances  :  other  nations  were 
never  bound  by  them,  either  before  or  after  the 
coming  of  Christ. 

751.  But  through  the  ordinances  of  Moses  be 
not  binding  on  us ;  yet,  inasmuch  as  they  were  part 
of  a  divine  revelation,  they  may  serve,  in  some  de¬ 
gree,  as  a  guide  to  Christians  ;  since  they  truly  ex¬ 
hibit  modes  in  which  God,  the  Giver  alike  of  the 
Mosaic  and  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  was  will¬ 
ing  to  be  worshipped.  And  this  is  especially  appli¬ 
cable,  in  cases  which  the  reason  for  the  ordinance 
applies  alike  to  Jews  and  Christians  ;  as  in  the  fixa¬ 
tion  of  times  and  places  of  religious  assemblies. 
To  .  which  we  may  add,  that  the  existence  of  the 
Jewish  Observances,  in  the  time  of  Christ  and  the 
Apostles,  exercised  an  influence  in  the  determina¬ 
tion  of  the  Christian  Ordinances,  as  we  see  in  the 
cases  of  the  Lord’s  day,  Easter,  and  Whitsuntide. 

752.  In  some  instances,  the  Jewish  ordinances 
were,  as  we  learn  from  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  in¬ 
tended  by  God  to  prefigure  the  events  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Revelation  ;  and  therefore  ceased,  by  the  rea¬ 
son  of  the  case,  when  those  events  had  occurred. 
This  is  implied  by  what  is  said  of  Jewish  ordinances 


CHAP.  XV.]  CHRISTIAN  ORDINANCES. 


137 


(Col.  ii.,  17),  that  they  are  a  shadow  of  things  to 
come  ;  hut  the  substance  is  of  Christ.  So  also  Heb. 
x.,  1.  In  this  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  we  are  taught 
that  Christ  was  prefigured,  both  by  the  Jewish  High 
priest,  and  by  the  sacrifices  which  the  High  priest 
offered  ;  and  especially,  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  Pas¬ 
chal  Lamb  (1  Cor.  v.,  7)  :  Christ  our  Passover  is 
sacrificed  for  us. 

753.  This  sacrifice,  in  the  person  of  Jesus 
Christ,  was  offered  at  the  time  of  the  Jewish  Pass- 
over  ;  and  hence,  the  annual  commemoration  of  the 
death  of  Christ  has  continued  the  Paschal  feast  from 
the  Jewish  to  the  Christian  Church  ;  and  it  has  from 
the  first  been  observed  by  Christians.  A  conse¬ 
quence  of  this  connexion  of  the  Christian  Easter 
with  the  Jewish  Pascha  is,  that  the  time  of  Easter 
is  made  to  depend  upon  the  time  of  full  moon,  as 
that  of  the  Jewish  festival  did  ;  instead  of  being 
kept  on  a  fixed  day  in  the  year,  like  other  festivals 
of  the  Christian  Church. 

754.  The  Pentecost,  another  of  the  three  great 
annual  festivals  of  the  Jews,  the  fiftieth  day  after 
the  Passover,  was  also  rendered  memorable  among 
Christians.  On  that  day  the  Holy  Ghost,  promised 
by  Jesus  Christ  to  his  disciples,  as  the  Comforter 
who  should  come  to  them  after  his  departure,  de¬ 
scended  in  an  especial  manner  upon  them,  when 
they  were  assembled  together ;  and  gave  them  the 
endowments  which  enabled  them  to  diffuse  the  belief 
in  Christ  throughout  the  world.  Hence  this  Jewish 
festival  also  is  adopted  into  the  Christian  church  ; 
it  bears  the  name  of  Whitsuntide. 

755.  The  relation  of  the  Lord's  Day  of  Chris¬ 
tians  to  the  sabbath  of  the  Jews  will  require  a  spe¬ 
cial  consideration.  Besides  the  Lord’s  day,  there 
are  other  Christian  Ordinances  which  prevail  among 
Christians,  and  of  which  we  shall  say  a  few  words ; 
namely,  the  Sacredness  of  Places,  Forms  of  Wor- 

M  2 


138 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


ship,  Baptism,  the  Lord’s  Supper,  Marriage,  Funeral 
Rites,  Oaths,  the  Character  and  Appointment  of 
Ministers  of  Religion. 

756.  As  the  State,  the  Jural  Community,  is 
the  proper  Authority  for  regulating  the  forms  of 
Civil  Institutions,  so  the  Church,  the  Religious  Com¬ 
munity,  is  the  proper  Authority  for  regulating  the 
forms  of  Religious  Ordinances.  As  we  must  find 
the  determination  of  what  is  right,  as  to  political  in¬ 
stitutions,  in  the  history  of  the  State,  we  must  find 
the  determination  of  what  is  right  as  to  Christian 
Ordinances,  in  the  history  of  the  Christian  Church. 
As,  in  the  State,  we  refer  to  a  certain  fundamental 
and  original  scheme  of  our  institutions,  the  Consti¬ 
tution,  on  which  we  look  with  reverence,  and  by 
whose  spirit  we  seek  to  be  guided  ;  so  in  the  Church, 
we  refer  to  a  certain  fundamental  and  original 
scheme  of  ordinances,  Apostolic  Institutions ;  to 
which  we  look  with  reverence,  and  by  which  we 
wish  to  be  guided,  so  far  as  the  spirit  of  the  times 
and  the  altered  forms  of  life  will  allow  us. 

The  Evidence  of  Apostolic  Institutions  must  be 
found  in  the  New  Testament;  and  this  Evidence, 
so  far  as  we  find  it,  is  a  most  important  guide  for 
the  forms  of  Christian  Ordinances. 

757.  But  there  is  a  very  remarkable  distinc¬ 
tion  to  be  noticed  between  Civil  Institutions  and 
Christian  Ordinances,  as  to  the  Authority  by  which 
their  form  is  determined.  States  are  many :  and 
each  State  has  its  separate  Authority,,  for  determin¬ 
ing  its  own  institutions  ;  but  the  Church,  in  some 
senses  at  least,  is  one  ;  it  is  a  single  body,  of  which 
Christ  is  the  Head.  There  is  a  Universal  or  Catho¬ 
lic  Church,  composed  of  the  true  Christians  of  all 
lands.  Their  separation  of  nationality  is  melted 
away  by  their  spiritual  union.  There  are  Ordin¬ 
ances  which  belong  to  them  in  common,  in  virtue  of 
this  union.  And  these  Ordinances,  in  spite  of  the 


CHAP.  XVI.] 


139 


THE  LORD’S  DAY. 

separate  channels  in  which  their  national  histories 
have  run,  have  been  derived  to  them  all,  from  the 
primitive  times  of  the  Christian  Church,  by  Catholic 
Tradition ,  or  Universal  Christian  Usage. 

What  Ordinances  can,  and  what  cannot,  be  shown 
to  be  derived  from  Apostolical  Institution  by  Catholic 
Tradition,  is  a  question  which  has  been  disputed 
among  Christians ;  but  all  have  agreed  that  those 
Ordinances  which  are  supported  by  Apostolical  In¬ 
stitution  and  Catholic  Tradition,  are  Ordinances  es¬ 
tablished  by  the  Authority  of  the  Christian  Church, 
and  therefore  Duties  for  all  Christian  men. 

758.  There  are,  in  every  community  of  Chris¬ 
tians,  forms  and  details  of  Ordinances  which  are  not 
regulated  by  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Usage,  but  by 
some  special  authority  belonging  to  the  community. 
Every  Christian  nation  has  such  an  authority  be¬ 
longing  to  it ;  and  this  Authority  is  the  National 
Church. 

We  must  now  consider  certain  Ordinances  spe¬ 
cially. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  LORD’S  DAY. 

759.  The  observation  of  the  First  Day  of  the 
Week,  as  a  day  especially  appropriated  to  worship 
and  religious  employments,  is  a  Christian  Ordinance 
which  is  supported  by  all  the  four  grounds  of  which 
we  have  spoken  ;  Natural  Piety,  Early  Revelation, 
Apostolic  Institution,  anu  Catholic  Usage.  As  we 
have  already  stated,  it  has  been  recognized  as  one  of 
the  dictates  of  Natural  Piety  that  there  should  be 
stated  times  for  the  public  worship  of  God,  and  this 


140 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


has  been  manifested  in  the  practice  of  all  nations. 
The  portion  of  time  set  apart  in  this  manner,  in  the 
revelation  of  God’s  will  made  to  the  Jews,  was  every 
seventh  day  ;  the  Seventh  Day  being  the  Sabbath ,  or 
day  of  rest.  In  this  case,  the  rule,  by  which  revela¬ 
tion  has  fixed,  what  natural  piety  leaves  undetermi¬ 
nate,  has  a  special  ground  of  authority  for  us,  in 
that  the  reason  given  for  the  hebdomadal  cycle  is 
valid  for  all  mankind,  as  well  as  for  the  Jews  :  name¬ 
ly,  that  God  created  the  world  in  six  days,  and  rest¬ 
ed  on  the  seventh  day.  The  first  Christians  were  in 
the  practice  of  assembling  for  religious  purposes,  on 
the  first  day  of  the  week,  the  day  of  Christ’s  resur¬ 
rection.  We  have  various  notices  of  assemblies  of 
the  disciples  on  that  day  ;  (John  xx.,  19.  Acts  ii.,  1  ; 
xx.,  7.  1  Cor.  xvi.,  2).  The  day  was  called  the 

Lord’s  Day  ;  thus  (Rev.  i.,  10),  I  was  in  the  Spirit 
on  the  Lord’s  day  (t*  rn  Kvpicucrj  bpepa  ).  The  Lord’s  Day 
gradually  succeeded  to  the  sacredness  which  the 
Jewish  Sabbath  had  before  possessed.  When  we 
pass  from  the  New  Testament  to  succeeding  Chris¬ 
tian  writers,  we  find  distinct  notices  of  this  universal 
Christian  usage.  Thus  Justin  Martyr,  in  the  Second 
Century  (Apol.  n.,  p.  98),  On  the  day  which  is  called 
Sunday  ( rrj  rov  r/^i'ov  Xeyoptvp  fj/i£/3u)  there  is  an  assembly 
of  those  who  abide  in  the  fields  or  in  the  city ,  and  the 
narratives  of  the  Apostles  are  read ,  and  the  writings 
of  the  prophets  ;  and  he  states,  as  the  reason  of  this 
observance,  that  they  thus  celebrate  the  day  on  which 
God  divided  the  light  from  the  darkness,  and  Christ 
rose  from  the  dead.  Tertullian  recommends  the  ob¬ 
servance  of  the  day  in  times  of  persecution,  after  the 
manner  of  the  Apostles,  who  were  protected  by  their 
faith.  From  this  period,  there  is  no  difficulty  in 
tracing  the  Observance  of  the  Lord’s  day,  as  a  Ca¬ 
tholic  usage  of  the  Christian  Church. 

760.  The  Jewish  Sabbath  was  an  ordinance 
of  Divine  Authority,  being  appointed  in  the  Fourth 


CHAP.  XVI.] 


THE  LORD  S  DAY. 


141 


of  the  Ten  Commandments.  Some  Christian  writers 
have  identified  the  Lord’s  Day  with  the  Jewish  Sab¬ 
bath  ;  and,  asserting  the  Fourth  Commandment  to  be 
binding  on  Christians,  have  claimed  Divine  authority 
for  the  Christian  Sabbath  ;  while  other  writers,  deny¬ 
ing  that  the  Sabbath  is  thus  commanded  to  Chris¬ 
tians,  have  pronounced  the  Lord’s  Day  a  mere  hu¬ 
man  law.  We  have  seen  that  the  Lord’s  Day  is  a 
Catholic  and  Apostolic  Ordinance ;  resting  in  part 
also  upon  the  Jewish  Revelation.  Such  an  Ordinance 
may  be  conceived  as  having  something  intermediate 
between  an  entirely  divine  and  a  merely  human  au¬ 
thority.  We  shall  therefore  make  a  few  remarks 
upon  the  two  extreme  opinions  just  stated. 

761.  We  have  already  said  that  Christ  and  his 
Apostles  taught,  clearly  and  emphatically,  that  the 
Jewish  ordinances  were  blotted  out  by  the  Christian 
revelation.  We  may  add  that  the  Sabbath-days  are 
expressly  mentioned  (Col.  ii.,  16),  in  the  enumera¬ 
tion  of  things  in  respect  of  which  the  Christians  were 
not  to  be  judged.  Christ  taught  (Matth.  xii.,  1. 
Mark  ii.,  23.  Luke  vi.,  1),  The  Sabbath  was  made 
for  man ,  and  not  man  for  the  Sabbath  ;  and  that  the 
Son  of  man  is  Lord  also  of  the  Sabbath.  So  (John 
v.,  17)  he  claimed  authority  over  the  Sabbath,  as 
being  the  Son  of  God.  Some  Christian  writers  think 
that  when  Christ  (John  v.)  not  only  cured  the 
sick  man  at  the  pool  of  Bethesda,  on  the  Sabbath- 
day,  but  bade  him  carry  his  bed  ;  and  when  (John 
ix.)  he  not  only  restored  the  blind  man  to  sight,  but 
made  clay  on  the  Sabbath-day  ;  he  purposely  vio¬ 
lated  the  traditional  rules  of  the  Jewish  Sabbath,  thus 
asserting  his  Divine  authority.  But  however  this  be, 
he  appears  to  have  especially  chosen  the  Sabbath,  as 
the  occasion  through  which  he  was  to  show  that  the 
Spirit  of  Ordinances  is  of  more  importance  than  the 
Letter  ;  and  that  he  had  the  power  to  abolish  mere 
Ordinances. 


142 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


762.  It  is  sometimes  urged,  that  the  Fourth  of 
the  Ten  Commandments  must  be  binding  upon  Chris¬ 
tians  because  the  other  Nine  are  so.  But  to  this  we  re¬ 
ply,  that  the  Ten  Commandments  are  not  binding  upon 
Christians  because  they  are  parts  of  the  Law  of 
Moses,  but  because  they  are  parts  of  the  Moral  Law. 
Thou  shalt  not  steal ;  thou  slialt  not  kill ;  thou  shall 
not  commit  adultery  ;  are  precepts  which  do  not  de¬ 
rive  their  authority  from  any  special  command,  but 
from  the  moral  nature  which  God  has  given  to  man. 
There  are  parts  of  the  Ten  Commandments,  which 
are  merely  arbitrary,  or  local,  or  temporary,  and  ap¬ 
ply  only  to  the  ancient  Jews.  Such  is  the  reason 
given  for  the  Fifth  Command  ;  that  thy  days  may  he 
long  in  the  land  which  the  Lord  thy  God  shall  give 
thee  ;  such  is  the  command  of  absolute  abstinence 
from  labour  on  the  Sabbath  ;  such  is  the  selection  of 
the  seventh  day  of  the  week  for  the  day  of  rest,  if 
that  selection  is  really  included  in  the  Command. 

763.  I  do  not  know  that  any  Christian  moral¬ 
ists  hold  that  the  Mosaical  Form  of  the  Sabbath  Or¬ 
dinance  is  binding  upon  Christians.  From  the  first, 
and  in  all  ages,  the  Lord’s  Day  of  the  Christian 
Church  has  been  observed  in  a  manner  quite  differ¬ 
ent  from  the  Sabbatical  Observances  of  the  Jews. 
The  sum  of  the  Mosaic  command  is  Rest  from  la¬ 
bour  ;  and  though  Reading  of  the  Scripture  and 
Public  Worship  grew  out  of  this,  these  are  no  part 
of  the  Law.  The  strictness  with  which  this  com¬ 
mand  of  Rest  was  intended  to  be  enforced,  appears 
from  the  narration  in  the  fifteenth  chapter  of  the 
book  of  Numbers ;  respecting  the  man  who,  while 
the  Israelites  were  in  the  wilderness,  was  put  to 
death  for  gathering  sticks  on  the  Sabbath-day.  In 
the  Christian  observance  of  the  Lord’s  Day,  on  the 
contrary,  Assemblies  for  the  purpose  of  Religious 
Instruction,  Worship,  Prayer,  and  Works  of  Bene¬ 
volence,  were,  from  the  first,  the  main  point.  It  is 


CHAP.  XVI.] 


THE  LORD’S  DAY. 


143 


very  improbable  that  the  first  Christians,  living  con¬ 
stantly  among  the  Jews,  abstained  from  working  and 
travelling  on  the  first  day  of  the  week.  We  find 
(Acts  xiii.,  42  ;  xvi.,  13  ;  xviii.,  4)  that  St.  Paul  was 
in  the  habit  of  preaching  on  the  seventh  day  of  the 
week  ;  thus  conforming  his  habits  of  religious  teach¬ 
ing  to  those  of  the  Jews. 

764.  But  if  the  Sabbath  be  not,  for  us,  an  or¬ 
dinance  resting  on  Divine  Command,  it  is  also  not 
properly  described  as  an  ordinance  peculiarly  in¬ 
tended  for  the  Jews.  It  is  not  only  a  Christian  Or¬ 
dinance  of  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Authority,  but  is 
also  recommended  to  the  Christian  Church  by  the 
manner  in  which  it  is  spoken  of  in  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment.  The  reason  given  for  the  religious  observ¬ 
ance  of  one  day  in  seven ;  that  God  created  the 
world  in  six  days,  and  rested  on  the  seventh  day  ; 
equally  concerns  all  nations.  The  institution  of 
the  Sabbath  by  Divine  Authority,  is  mentioned  in 
connexion  with  the  account  of  the  Creation  ;  and 
long  before  the  Jews  as  a  separate  people  are  spoken 
of.  (Gen.  ii.,  3),  And  God  blessed  the  seventh  day , 
and  sanctified  it ;  because  that  in  it  he  had  rested  from 
all  his  work  which  God  created  and  made.  This 
notice  must  strongly  recommend  the  religious  ob¬ 
servance  of  a  seventh  day  to  all,  who  receive  the 
Old  Testament  as  an  authoritative  account  of  God’s 
revealed  will.  And  this  remark  would  be  applica¬ 
ble,  even  if  we  were  to  allow,  as  Dr.  Paley  con¬ 
tends,  that  the  Sabbath  was  not  observed  by  the  Pa¬ 
triarchs  before  the  time  of  Moses,  and  was  instituted 
for  the*first  time  in  the  wilderness.  But  in  reality 
this  opinion  appears  to  be  untenable,  as  we  shall  en¬ 
deavour  to  show. 

765.  In  the  sixteenth  chapter  of  Exodus,  we 
have  the  account  referred  to  by  Paley,  which  ap¬ 
pears  to  him  to  contain  the  actual  institution  of  the 
Sabbath.  He  quotes  verse  23,  in  which  Moses  says 


144  RELIGION.  [BOOK  IV. 

f 

to  the  rulers  of  Israel,  who  came  and  told  him  that 
the  people  gathered  a  double  quantity  of  manna  on 
the  sixth  day,  This  is  that  which  the  Lord  hath  said , 
To-morrow  is  the  rest  of  the  holy  Sabbath  unto  the 
Lord.  Now  it  cannot  escape  notice,  that  this  is 
very  far  from  having  the  appearance  of  a  Command 
to  observe  a  new  Ordinance.  It  is  not  a  command, 
but  a  reason  for  what  had  happened,  given  by  refer¬ 
ring,  as  it  would  seem,  to  something  known.  Al¬ 
ready,  in  verse  5,  an  indication  had  been  given  of  a 
difference  established  between  the  seventh  day  and 
other  days.  The  Lord  said ,  It  shall  come  to  pass, 
that  on  the  sixth  day  they  shall  jwepare  that  which 
they  bring  in  ;  and  it  shall  be  twice  as  much  as  they 
gather  daily.  And  the  observation  of  this  difference, 
we  are  told,  verse  22,  began  with  the  common  peo¬ 
ple,  and  was  remarked  by  the  rulers.  It  came  to 
pass  that  on  the  sixth  day  they  gathered  twice  as  much 
bread.  .  .  And  the  rulers  of  the  congregation  came 
and  told  Moses. 

766.  In  the  Mosaic  narrative  itself,  therefore, 
we  seem  to  have  evidence  that  the  observance  of  the 
Sabbath  by  the  Israelites  in  the  wilderness,  immedi¬ 
ately  after  their  departure  from  Egypt,  was  not 
a  new  thing.  We  have  also,  from  other  quarters, 
evidence  strongly  confirmatory  of  the  opinion,  that 
the  observance  of  the  seventh  day  must  have  been 
known  to  the  Israelites  in  Egypt.  A  judicious  an¬ 
cient  writer,  Dio  Cassius,  in  his  History  (xxxvii.,  18), 
gives  an  account  of  the  origin  of  the  names  of  the 
days  of  the  week.  “  The  practice,5’  he  says,  “  of 
referring  the  days  of  the  week  to  the  seven  stars 
called  Planets,  arose  among  the  Egyptians,  and  has 
already  spread  through  every  people,  though  it  is 
not  long,  so  to  say,  since  it  began.”  He  then  pro¬ 
ceeds  to  explain  the  reasons  why  the  days  are  named 
respectively  after  the  Sun,  the  Moon,  Mars,  Mer¬ 
cury,  Jupiter,  Venus,  Saturn.  And  the  remark, 


CHAP.  XVI.] 


THE  LORD’S  DAY. 


145 


that  a  week  of  seven  days,  named  respectively  after 
the  Sun,  Moon,  and  Planets,  was  very  widely  dif¬ 
fused  in  ancient  times,  is  confirmed  by  what  we 
know  from  other  countries.  The  week  was  in  use, 
not  only  among  the  Arabians  and  Assyrians,  but 
also  in  India,  and  in  China.  The  Week  is,  say 
astronomers  (as  Bailly  and  Laplace),  the  most  an¬ 
cient  monument  of  astronomical  knowledge. 

767.  An  usage  thus  common  to  Egypt,  India, 
and  China,  may  have  been  derived  from  the  Patri¬ 
archs  of  the  Jewish  race ;  but,  at  any  rate,  it  must 
be  supposed  to  have  originated  before  the  historical 
periods  of  those  nations  ;  and  therefore,  must  have 
existed  in  Egypt  at  the  time  of  the  residence  of  the 
Israelites  in  that  country.  When  they  departed  out 
of  Egypt,  and  began  to  traverse  the  wilderness,  it  is 
possible  that  the  common  people,  as  a  matter  of 
habit,  reckoned  upon  a  rest  on  the  seventh  day,  and 
acted  accordingly.  If  a  conjecture  may  be  here 
allowed,  we  might  perhaps  say,  that  the  rulers  of 
the  congregation,  who  knew  that  their  nation  was 
under  a  general  obligation  to  reject  the  superstitions 
of  the  Egyptians,  conceived  that  this  was  one  of 
them,  knowing  the  day  of  rest  to  be  dedicated  to  one 
of  their  deities.  They  referred  the  matter  to  Moses, 
who  informed  them  that  the  true  God  had  appointed 
this  rest,  though  observed  also  among  idolators  ;  and 
his  injunctions,  to  retain  the  observance,  were  con¬ 
firmed  and  sanctioned  by  the  mode  in  which  the 
supply  of  the  food  from  heaven  was  dispensed  to  the 
people. 

The  rest  of  the  seventh  day,  then,  has  an  origin 
earlier  than  the  laws  delivered  to  the  Israelites 
through  Moses,  and  may,  with  some  probability,  be 
considered  a  remnant  of  an  earlier  Revelation. 

768.  The  religious  observance  of  the  Lord’s 
Day  is,  thus,  not  only  of  Catholic  and  Apostolic 
Authority,  but  is  also  recommended  to  us  by  its  ori- 

vol.  it.  10 


148 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


gin  in  an  earlier  Revelation.  For  the  Form  of  such 
observance,  the  proper  guide  is,  as  we  have  said,  the 
authority  and  usage  of  the  Christian  Church.  Chris¬ 
tians  are  bound  to  conform  to  Rules  established  by 
the  Church,  as  they  are  bound  to  conform  to  the 
Laws  of  the  State.  In  the  one  case,  as  in  the  other, 
the  positive  historical  Definition  of  the  general  duty 
is  binding  upon  the  Conscience. 

769.  Hence,  in  points  on  which  the  evidence 
of  Apostolic  and  Catholic  usage  is  complete,  a  Chris¬ 
tian,  or  a  body  of  Christians,  have  no  liberty  to  alter 
the  mode  of  observance.  As  an  example  of  this,  it 
appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  Christian  duty  for 
any  community  to  alter  the  day  of  special  religious 
observances,  from  the  first,  to  any  other  day  of  the 
week  ;  as  Calvin  is  said  to  have  suggested  to  the 
city  of  Geneva  to  do,  in  order  that  they  might  show 
their  Christian  liberty  with  regard  to  ordinances.  If 
to  do  this  were  within  the  limits  of  Christian  liberty, 
it  would  likewise  be  so,  to  alter  the  period  of  the 
recurrence  of  the  day,  and  to  observe  every  fifth 
day  ;  or  every  tenth,  as  was  appointed  in  France 
when  Christianity  was  publicly  rejected. 

770.  Christians  are  thus  bound  to  observe  the 
first  day  of  the  week  ;  and  by  the  universal  and 
original  usage  of  the  Church,  to  observe  it  as  a  day 
of  religious  assembly,  of  religious  instruction  by 
reading  and  meditation,  of  common  worship  and 
prayer,  and  of  works  of  benevolence.  It  does  not 
appear  that  the  usage  of  the  universal  Church  gives 
us  any  more  precise  directions  for  the  observance  of 
the  day. 

771.  But  the  Universal  Christian  Church  as¬ 
sumes  special  modifications  in  each  country  ;  and  the 
Regulations  and  Customs,  by  which  such  modifica¬ 
tions  are  established,  have  also  their  authority  within 
their  proper  circle,  although  this  authority  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  that  of  the  Universal  Church. 


CHAr.  XVI.] 


THE  LORD’S  DAY. 


147 


The  Gallican  church  may  regulate  the  ordinances 
which  its  own  members  are  required  to  observe  :  the 
Anglican  church  may  do  the  same. 

To  what  degree  of  detail  a  National  Church  may 
fitly  proceed  in  prescribing  observances  for  the  Sun¬ 
day,  we  shall  not  here  consider.  Our  business  at 
present  is  with  the  duties  of  individuals  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  such  observances. 

772.  A  duty  of  individuals  is,  to  practise  a 
ready  and  full  conformity  to  all  Rules  that  are  es¬ 
tablished  by  lawful  Authority.  This  applies  to  such 
observances  as  are  appointed  by  the  National  Church; 
even  when  they  cannot  be  shown  to  be  enjoined  by 
the  authority  of  the  Universal  Church,  but  are  esta¬ 
blished  by  the  National  Church  for  the  sake  of  order 
and  edification,  in  the  exercise  of  its  own  judgment. 
Such  are,  in  this  country,  the  customs  of  abstaining 
from  work,  closing  shops,  and  attending  public  wor¬ 
ship.  These  are  observances  directed  by  our  civil 
and  ecclesiastical  law,  and  therefore  they  are  Du¬ 
ties.  And  so  far  as  such  Observances  provide  for 
the  practices  which  have  always  prevailed  as  usages 
of  the  Universal  Church  (as  assemblies  for  religious 
instruction,  worship,  and  prayer,  with  a  more  spe¬ 
cial  direction  of  the  thoughts  to  religious  concerns), 
the  observances  are  Religious  Duties  ;  they  are  in¬ 
cluded  in  the  duty  of  conforming  to  Rules,  which 
have  more  than  a  mere  human  sanction. 

773.  But  the  whole  course  of  the  teaching  of 
Jesus  Christ,  with  respect  to  the  Sabbath,  shows  us 
that  we  are  not  to  look  upon  the  external  observances 
of  the  Sunday  as  the  essential  point.  We  learn  from 
him,  that  works  of  benevolence  were  no  violation  of 
the  Sabbath ;  still  less,  can  such  works  be  a  viola¬ 
tion  of  the  Lord’s  day ;  of  which,  as  we  have  said, 
rest  is  not  a  primary  rule.  And  though  at  a  period 
comparatively  early,  a  law  wras  made  directing 
Christians  to  abstain  from  work  on  a  Sunday  ;  it  was 


148 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


very  fitly  made  liable  to  exception  in  cases  of  neces¬ 
sity  ;  as,  for  instance,  when  harvest  work  needs  to 
be  done  without  loss  of  time. 

774.  Besides  the  observances  which  are  di¬ 
rected  by  law,  civil  or  ecclesiastical,  national  or 
catholic,  there  are,  in  every  country,  many  Sunday 
observances  governed  by  Usage  ;  such  as  in  this 
country,  the  abstinence  from  games  at  other  times 
not  forbidden  by  law,  and  the  abstinence  from  tra¬ 
velling,  except  in  cases  of  necessity.  These  usages 
have  grown  up  out  of  a  regard  for  the  religious  au¬ 
thority  of  the  day  ;  and  out  of  opinions  concerning 
the  best  means,  consistent  with  the  national  charac¬ 
ter  and  habits,  of  expressing  and  fostering  seriousness 
and  devotion.  To  conform  to  them,  will,  in  most 
cases,  confirm  seriousness  and  devotion  in  each  per¬ 
son,  by  the  sympathy  of  his  fellow-citizens  ;  and  to 
do  so  is  therefore  a  duty  of  religious  self-culture. 

775.  And  even  if  there  be  any  portion  of  those 
usages,  in  which  we  do  not  find  this  effect ;  it  will 
still  be  a  duty  to  conform  to  them,  in  such  a  manner 
as  not  to  disturb  their  edifying  influence  on  others. 
St.  Paul  has  urged  the  duty  of  conformity  very 
strongly,  both  by  his  example  and  by  his  precepts. 
After  explaining  the  Christian’s  freedom  from  Jew¬ 
ish  formalities,  he  adds  (1  Cor.  viii.,  9),  But  take 
heed  lest  by  any  means  this  liberty  of  yours  become  a 
stumblingblock  to  them  that  are  weak.  For  if  any 
man  see  thee  which  hast  knowledge  do  that  which  he 
deems  irreligious,  shall  not  the  conscience  of  him  that 
is  weak  be  emboldened  to  do  that  which  he  himself 
deems  irreligious  ?  And  through  thy  knowledge  of 
the  limited  value  of  ordinances,  shall  the  weak  bro¬ 
ther  perish,  for  whom  Christ  died  ?  By  no  means  let 
this  be.  It  is  a  sin  :  and  When  ye  sin  so  against  the 
brethren ,  and  wound  their  weak  consciences,  ye  sin 
against  Christ.  Wherefore,  he  concludes,  if  any 
neglect  of  ordinances  make  my  brother  to  offend,  I 


CHAP.  XVII.] 


CONSECRATED  PLACES. 


149 


will  obey  them  in  the  most  rigorous  manner,  lest  I 
make  my  brother  to  offend. 

776.  But  while  we  thus  avoid  offending  weak 
brethren,  it  is  no  part  of  our  duty  to  perpetuate  their 
weakness.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  our  duty  to  avoid 
any  share  in  proceedings  which  have  this  effect. 
Such  a  proceeding  it  would  be,  for  instance,  to  ex¬ 
aggerate  the  authority  of  Observances,  which  we 
know  to  depend  only  upon  our  national  usages,  or 
upon  the  appointment  of  our  National  Church  ; 
speaking  of  them  as  if  they  were  of  Catholic  and 
Apostolic,  or  even  of  Divine  authority.  And  this 
consideration  will  lead  us  to  abstain  from  censuring 
the  Sunday  customs  of  other  countries,  merely  be¬ 
cause  they  differ  from  our  own  ;  and  the  Sunday 
habits  of  our  neighbours,  merely  because  they  are  not 
directed  by  the  maxims  which  we  have  adopted  for 
ourselves.  This  appears  to  be  one  of  the  cases  in 
which  we  may  very  properly  apply  the  general  Pre¬ 
cept,  To  be  very  scrupulous  in  our  own  conduct, 
and  very  careful  not  to  judge  harshly  of  our  neigh¬ 
bours. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

CONSECRATED  PLACES. 

777.  Under  the  Jewish  dispensation,  after  the 
establishment  of  the  Jews  in  Palestine,  the  Temple 
at  Jerusalem  was,  in  an  especial  manner,  a  Holy 
Place.  Jesus  Christ  himself  recognized  the  sacred¬ 
ness  of  this  Temple,  by  driving  out  the  traffickers, 
and  quoting  the  Scripture,  My  house  shall  be  called 
the  house  of  'prayer.  But  we  have  in  this  case,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  Sabbath,  especial  authority  for  the 

N  2 


150 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


abolition  of  the  peculiar  privileges  possessed  under 
the  old  law.  Christ  says  to  the  woman  of  Samaria 
(John  iv.,  21) :  The  hour  cometli  when  ye  shall  neither 
in  this  mountain  nor  yet  at  Samaria  worship  the  Fa¬ 
ther  .  .  .  when  the  true  worshippers  shall  worship  the 
Father  in  spirit  and  in  truth  ;  for  the  Father  seeketh 
such  to  worship  him.  God  is  a  Spirit  ;  and  they  that 
worship  him ,  must  worship  him  in  spirit  and  in  truth  : 
not  in  a  belief  of  the  essential  importance  of  this  or 
that  place  of  worship.  Yet  a  degree  of  sacredness 
was  ascribed  by  the  Christians  to  their  places  of 
meeting,  even  in  the  Apostles’  time.  St.  Paul,  ex¬ 
postulating  with  the  Corinthians  on  certain  unseemly 
practices  which  took  place  at  their  meetings,  says  (1 
Cor.  xi.,  22),  Have  ye  not  houses  to  eat  and  to  drink 
in  ?  Or  despise  ye  the  Church  of  God  ?  The  Con¬ 
secration  of  Christian  Churches  is  historically  known 
to  have  prevailed  from  the  time  of  Constantine,  and 
is  supposed  to  have  been  practised  earlier.  Since 
this  practice  has  existed,  Churches,  and  other  Conse¬ 
crated  Places,  have  been  considered,  in  all  Christian 
countries,  as  peculiarly  fitted  for  worship  and  other 
religious  offices. 

778.  Thus  the  Consecration  of  places  rests,  in 
some  measure,  upon  the  same  grounds  as  the  conse¬ 
cration  of  times;  Natural  Piety,  the  Example  of  the 
Jewish  Revelation,  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Usage. 
Though  the  grounds  are  not  so  plain  and  strong,  in 
this  instance,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Lord’s  Day,  they 
are  sufficient  to  impress  a  reverence  for  sacred  places 
upon  all  Christians ;  especially,  when  these  grounds 
are  confirmed  by  the  special  views  and  rules  of  the 
particular  Christian  community  in  which  we  live. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  Duty,  to  give  to  consecrated  places 
such  reverence  as  Catholic  and  Apostolic  usage  as¬ 
signs  them  ;  and  to  conform  to  any  other  observances 
indicative  of  such  reverence,  which  the  National 
Church  enjoins.  It  is  our  duty  also  to  cherish,  in 


CHAP.  XVIII.] 


FORMS  OF  PRAYER. 


151 


ourselves  and  in  others,  that  seriousness  and  devo¬ 
tion  which  the  consecration  of  places  to  religious 
uses  is  fitted  to  foster.  It  is,  moreover,  a  duty  to 
abstain  from  doing  anything  which  may  unneces¬ 
sarily  offend  our  scrupulous  neighbours,  on  the  one 
hand :  and  on  the  other,  to  abstain  from  urging, 
upon  other  men,  any  rules  and  any  views  with 
regard  to  such  places,  which  have  not  Catholic  and 
Apostolic  authority.  And  finally,  on  such  sub¬ 
jects,  as  was  said  in  the  former  case,  we  ought  to 
be  careful,  both  to  avoid  all  irreverence  in  ourselves, 
and  to  abstain  from  hastily  ascribing  irreverence  to 
others ;  because  their  views  and  usages  differ  from 
our  own. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

FORMS  OF  PRAYER. 

779.  Prayers  to  God,  and  other  acts  of  de¬ 
votion,  proceeding  from  an  assembly,  have,  in  all 
ages  and  countries,  been,  in  a  considerable  degree, 
expressed  in  stated  Forms  of  words,  determined  by 
usage  and  authority.  To  a  certain  extent,  indeed, 
this  can  hardly  be  otherwise.  If  any  part  of  the 
devotional  service  be  in  verse,  or  accompanied  by 
music,  it  must  necessarily  be  previously  arranged 
and  prepared.  And  even  when  the  devotional  ex¬ 
pressions  are  not  so  fettered  in  their  rhythm,  if  they 
are  not  such  as  are  known  and  expected  by  the  con¬ 
gregation,  they  cannot  generally  carry  with  them 
that  joint  feeling  and  thought,  which  may  prevail  in 
religious  assemblies  when  forms  are  used  ;  and 
which  may  so  operate  as  greatly  to  animate  devo¬ 
tion. 


152 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


780.  In  our  worship,  which  ought  to  be  rea¬ 
sonable  as  well  as  devout,  we  are  led  to  use  a  fixed 
Form  of  prayers,  thanksgivings,  and  praises,  by  such 
considerations  as  the  following.  Such  a  fixed  Form 
prevents  absurd,  extravagant,  and  impious  addresses 
to  God,  which  the  folly  or  enthusiasm  of  ministers 
uttering  extemporaneous  expressions  might  produce. 
It  also  prevents  the  confusion  and  indecision  gene¬ 
rated  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer  during  extemporary 
prayer.  Prayer  in  which  all  can  join,  must  be  such 
as  is  foreseen,  so  that  the  mind  can  accompany  it ; 
not  such  as  the  mind  must  wait  for  till  it  is  uttered, 
before  it  can  judge  whether  its  sympathy  is  to  be 
given. 

781.  We  have  abundant  examples  of  set  forms 
of  devotion,  in  the  Old  Testament.  Thus  (Numb, 
vi.,  22),  we  have  a  form  of  blessing  the  people,  ap¬ 
pointed  by  God  himself.  The  Lord  spake  unto 
Moses ,  saying ,  Speak  unto  Aaron,  and  unto  his  sons, 
saying,  On  this  wise  ye  shall  bless  the  children  of  Is¬ 
rael,  saying  unto  them  ;  The  Lord  bless  thee  and  keep 
thee  :  The  Lord  make  his  face  to  shine  upon  thee,  and 
be  gracious  unto  thee  :  The  Lord  lift  up  his  counte¬ 
nance  upon  thee,  and  give  thee  peace.  And  Moses 
wrote  a  song  (Deut.  xxxi.,  22),  and  taught  it  the 
children  of  Israel.  This  song  is  given  in  the  thirty- 
second  chapter  of  Deuteronomy.  It  was  used  in 
the  Jewish  services,  and  is  said  to  be  found  also  in 
several  of  the  old  liturgies  of  the  Arabic  Chris¬ 
tians.*  The  Psalms  of  David  were  constantly  used 
in  the  devotional  exercises  of  the  Jews ;  and  these, 
along  with  set  forms  of  benedictions,  thanksgivings, 
and  supplications,  were  used  in  their  synagogues. 

782.  It  has  been  doubted  by  some,  whether  set 
forms  of  prayer  are  not  unsuited  to  the  worship  in 
spirit  and  in  truth  which  is  demanded  of  Christians. 


*  Hooker,  E.  P.  B.  v.,  ch.  2G.  Note  by  Keble. 


CHAP.  XVIII.] 


FORMS  OF  PRAYER. 


153 


But  the  practice  of  the  Church,  from  the  time  of 
Christ  himself,  assures  us  that  there  is  no  such  un¬ 
fitness.  When  Christ’s  disciples  asked  him  (Luke 
xi.,  1),  Teach  us  to  pray,  as  John  also  taught  his  dis¬ 
ciples  :  he  gave  them  a  brief  form  of  prayer,  which 
has  ever  since  been  in  constant  and  universal  use 
among  Christians  :  it  is  also  given  in  Matthew  (vi., 
9).  When  our  Saviour  had  eaten  the  passover  with 
his  disciples,  and  delivered  the  cup  to  them  (Matth. 
xxvi.,  30),  they  sung  a  hymn  ;  probably  the  hymn 
which  was  sung  by  the  Jews  on  such  occasions ; 
namely,  Psalm  cxii.,  and  what  follows.  And  in 
that  night  in  the  garden  of  Gethsemane,  he  prayed 
three  times,  saying  the  same  words  (Matth.  xxvi., 
44).  It  is  true,  that  Christ  gives  to  his  disciples  a 
precept  (Matth.  vi.,  7),  which  our  translators  have 
rendered,  use  not  vain  repetitions,  as  the  heathen  do. 
But  in  the  original  word  (/i»j  ParroXoyriarirE,)  there  is 
nothing  which  specially  implies  repetition.  The 
whole  passage  enjoins  inward  heartfelt  prayer,  in¬ 
stead  of  ostentatious  worship  of  outward  acts  and 
words.  Nor  can  it  be  doubted,  that  this  inward 
worship  is  a  Christian  duty,  both  in  private  and  in 
public  devotions.  To  the  same  purpose  is  the  pas¬ 
sage  in  St.  John  (iv.,  24)  God  is  a  Spirit :  and  they 
that  worship  him  must  worship  him  in  spirit  and  in 
truth.  Public,  as  well  as  private  prayer,  is  con¬ 
stantly  referred  to  in  the  history  of  the  Apostles. 
Thus  (Acts  xii.,  5),  Peter  was  kept  in  prison ;  but 
prayer  was  made  without  ceasing  of  the  church  unto 
God  for  him.  And  (Acts  xvi.,  16),  As  we  went  to 
prayer. .  .  a  certain  damsel  met  us.  (So  1  Cor.  vii., 
5 ;  2  Cor.  i.,  11,  and  ix.,  14;  Eph.  vi.,  18  ;  Phil, 
i.,  19,  and  iv.,  6  ;  James  v.,  15  ;  1  Pet.  iv.,  7).  In 
1  Tim.  ii.,  subjects  of  prayer  are  prescribed  by  the 
Apostle:  1  exhort  therefore,  that, first  of  all,  suppli¬ 
cations,  prayers,  intercessions,  and  giving  of  thanks , 
be  made  for  all  men  :  for  kings,  and  for  all  that  are 


154 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


in  authority ,  that  we  may  lead  a  quiet  and  peaceable 
life  in  all  godliness  and  honesty.  For  this  is  good 
and  acceptable  in  the  sight  of  God  our  Saviour  ...  I 
will  therefore  that  men  pray  everywhere,  lifting  up 
holy  hands,  ivitlxout  wrath  and  doubting ;  where  the 
last  words  seem  to  refer  to  some  disputes  which  had 
taken  place  on  the  subject.  Thanksgiving  is  en¬ 
joined  to  be  combined  with  prayer ;  thus  (Phil,  iv., 
6),  By  prayer  and  supplication  with  thanksgiving  let 
your  requests  be  made  known  unto  God.  (So  Col. 

11.,  7,  and  iv.,  2  ;  Eph.  v.,  20  ;  Heb.  xiii.,  15).  So 
also  praises  (Acts  xvi.,  25)  ;  Paul  and  Silas  in 
prison  prayed  and  sang  praises  unto  God.  (So  Phil. 

1.,  11  ;  Heb.  ii.,  12,  and  xiii.,  15  ;  1  Pet.  iv.,  11.) 

783.  Set  forms  of  worship,  or  Liturgies,  have 
been  in  use  in  the  Christian  Church  from  its  origin, 
and  have  been  transmitted,  with  various  modifica¬ 
tions,  to  the  present  times.  Many  of  the  expressions 
still  used,  were  employed  in  very  early  ages  of  the 
Church  ;  as  the  phrase,  Sursum  corda,  Lift  up  your 
hearts,  at  the  beginning  of  the  service  of  the  Com¬ 
munion  :  the  questions  asked  of  godfathers  in  the 
office  of  Baptism  ;  the  form  of  baptism,  in  the  Name 
of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost, 
enjoined  by  Christ  himself ;  the  Doxology,  borrowed 
from  this,  Glory  be  to  the  Father,  and  to  the  Son,  and 
to  the  Holy  Ghost ;  with  the  response  afterwards 
added,  As  it  was  in  the  beginning,  is  now,  and  ever 
shall  be,  world  without  end.  Amen.  The  Collects, 
Epistles,  and  Gospel,  for  the  various  festivals  of  the 
year,  have  been  in  use  in  England  from  the  Saxon 
times  ;  and  many  of  the  prayers  of  the  present  Eng¬ 
lish  Liturgy,  are  borrowed  from  the  ancient  ritual 
of  the  Church. 

784.  At  the  time  of  the  English  Reformation, 
changes  were  made  in  the  forms  of  public  worship. 
The  services  were  made  more  suitable  to  that  in¬ 
ward  prayer,  which  we  have  spoken  of  as  a  Chris- 


CHAP.  XIX.] 


BAPTISM. 


155 


tian  duty,  by  presenting  them  to  the  worshipper  in 
his  own  language,  instead  of  the  previous  Latin 
Liturgy.  All  that  was  conceived  to  imply  idolatry 
and  false  doctrine  was  removed.  The  Liturgy  was 
put  into  a  form  in  which  a  considerable  portion  of 
it  was  derived  from  the  worship  of  the  Catholic  and 
Apostolic  Church  ;  while  the  remainder  was  com¬ 
posed  with  a  careful  regard  to  scripture  precepts, 
and  to  the  condition  and  feelings  of  English  Chris¬ 
tians,  by  the  authority  of  the  National  Church. 

Thus  we  are  led  to  the  conviction,  that  the  use, 
both  of  a  Liturgy  in  general,  and  of  the  English 
Liturgy  in  particular,  is  conformable  to  the  con¬ 
dition  of  an  English  Christian.  We  see,  also,  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  every  Christian  not  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  mere  form  of  the  Liturgy ;  with  lip- 
worship  and  knee-worship ;  but  to  accompany  the 
prayers,  thanksgivings,  and  praises,  with  inward 
movements  of  his  heart. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

BAPTISM. 

785.  Baptism  is  not  only  a  Catholic  and  Apos¬ 
tolic  usage,  but  is  recommended  to  us  by  the  dictates 
of  natural  piety,  and  the  analogy  of  the  Jewish  Law. 
Not  only  Baptism,  but  Infant  Baptism  in  particular, 
is  agreeable  to  the  dictates  of  natural  piety  and  rea¬ 
son.  Men,  living  together  in  a  Religious  Society, 
into  which  they  have  been  initiated  by  an  especial 
and  solemn  Rite,  and  which  they  consider  as  the 
source  of  highly  precious  privileges,  cannot  but  wish 
that  their  children,  even  from  their  earliest  infancy, 
should  be  members  of  the  same  Religious  Society. 


156 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


They  are  naturally  led  to  admit  them  into  the  Reli¬ 
gious  Community,  even  before  their  religious  feelings 
and  convictions  are  unfolded  ;  trusting  that  their 
education,  under  the  influence  of  those  who  have 
thus  admitted  them,  will  bring  them  into  a  condition 
of  sympathy  with  the  community,  such  as  their  ini¬ 
tiation  presumes,  or  anticipates. 

786.  In  the  Jewish  Church,  children  were  ad¬ 
mitted  into  the  Covenant  of  God  with  the  Nation,  by 
Circumcision,  at  eight  days  old.  Circumcision  was 
abolished  by  the  coming  of  Christ ;  and  Baptism,  the 
Rite  of  initiation  into  the  New  Covenant,  superseded 
the  former  initiation.  Baptism,  that  is,  momentary 
immersion  in  water,  had  already  been  employed 
among  the  Jews,  as  a  rite  of  purification  :  and  hence, 
as  a  symbol  of  repentance  ;  as  it  was  employed  by 
John  the  Baptist.  But  the  Baptism  of  John  was  pro¬ 
fessedly  only  preparatory  to  that  of  Jesus  Christ 
(Matth.  iii.,  11.  Mark  i.,  8).  Jesus  Christ  baptised 
through  his  Apostles  (John  iv.,  2)  :  and  when  he 
finally  parted  with  his  disciples  (Matth.  xxviii.,  19), 
he  commanded  them  to  baptize  all  nations.  We  have 
abundant  instances,  in  the  history  of  the  Acts  of  the 
Apostles,  of  the  application  of  Baptism,  as  the  Rite 
of  initiation  into  the  Christian  Church.  (Acts  ii .,  41  ; 
viii.,  12  and  38 ;  ix.,  18 ;  x.,  48 ;  xviii.,  8  ;  xix.,  5  ;  and 
numerous  allusions  in  the  Epistles.  In  several  of 
these  cases,  we  read  of  whole  households  being  bap¬ 
tized  ;  as  that  of  Lydia  (Acts  xvi.,  15)  ;  of  the  jailer 
at  Philippi  (Acts  xvi.,  33)  ;  of  Stephanas  (1  Cor.  i., 
16).  In  these  cases,  probably  children  were  bap¬ 
tized  ;  and  we  cannot  doubt  that,  at  any  rate,  the 
subordinate  persons  in  the  household  were  baptized 
on  the  responsibility  of  the  principal  convert. 

787.  In  the  Early  Church,  after  the  time  of  the 
Apostles,  we  have  early  indications  of  Infant  Baptism 
having  been  practised,  though  it  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  universal.  Justin  Martyr,  who  lived 


CHAP.  XIX.] 


BAPTISM. 


157 


about  forty  years  after  the  death  of  St.  John,  dis¬ 
courses  “  of  Baptism  being  unto  us  instead  of  Cir¬ 
cumcision.”  Irenmus,  near  forty  years  later,  men¬ 
tions  infants  as  “  by  Christ  born  again  unto  God.” 
This  expression  “born  again,”  is  used  by  Christian 
writers  as  equivalent  to  “  baptized.”  Origen,  about 
fifty  years  later  still,  speaks,  in  several  places,  of 
Infant  Baptism,  as  a  known  and  undoubted  practice  : 
and  in  one  of  these  places,  as  having  been  according 
to  a  tradition  ordered  by  the  Apostles.*  Augustin 
very  frequently  speaks  of  Infant  Baptism  ;  and  says 
that  he  never  heard  of  any  Christian,  Catholic,  or 
Sectary,  who  taught  any  other  doctrine  than  that  in¬ 
fants  are  to  be  baptized  for  pardon  of  sin.  The  first 
Antipsedobaptist  who  formed  a  congregation  was  Pe¬ 
ter  Bruis,  about  a.  d.  1100.  Thus  the  main  stream 
of  Catholic  and  Apostolic  authority  is  strongly  in 
favour  of  the  baptism  of  infants,  as  the  token  of  their 
admission  into  the  Church  of  Christ.  Soon  after 
their  natural  birth,  they  are  admitted  to  a  new  birth, 
as  children  of  God  through  Christ,  and  heirs  of  eter¬ 
nal  life. 

788.  The  practice  of  Infant  Baptism  having 
thus  prevailed  in  the  Church,  from  the  earliest  times  ; 
we  are  further  to  take  into  account  the  strong  ex¬ 
pression  of  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  respecting  the 
necessity  of  baptism  as  the  first  step  to  the  benefits 
of  Christ’s  coming.  Christ’s  last  command  was 
(Matth.  xxviii.,  19),  Go  and  teach  all  nations,  baptiz¬ 
ing  them.  In  the  next  Evangelist,  the  assertion  is 
stronger  (Mark  xvi.,  16),  He  that  believeth  and  is 
baptized  shall  be  saved,  and  he  that  believeth  not  shall 
be  damned.  In  Ephes.  iv.,  5,  Baptism  is  mentioned 
as  one  of  the  leading  characters  of  the  Church. 
There  is  one  body  and  one  spirit... one  hope  of  your 
calling  ;  one  Lord,  one  faith,  one  baptism.  And  it  is: 

*  Wall,  Infant  Baptism ,  P.  i.,  chap  v.,  §  3. 

VOL.  II.  O 


158 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


constantly  referred  to,  as  the  necessary  mode  of  in¬ 
troduction  into  the  Christian  Church  (Acts  ii.,  28, 
&c.)  ;  and  as  a  symbol  and  means  of  a  death  to  sin 
and  a  new  life  to  God  (Rom.  vi.,  1).  This  introduc¬ 
tion  into  the  Christian  Church,  which  was  granted  to 
the  first  Christians,  in  pursuance  of  their  own  belief, 
was,  it  appears,  continued  to  their  families,  in  the 
trust  of  the  blessing  of  God  ;  which,  operating  through 
a  Christian  education,  was  to  prevent  their  becoming 
unfit  members  of  the  Church.  Parents  (Eph.  vi.,  4) 
are  commanded  to  bring  up  tlieir  children  in  the  nurture 
and  admonition  of  the  Lord ,  which  appears  as  if  the 
children  were,  from  the  first,  contemplated  as  belong¬ 
ing  to  the  Church.  So  Acts  ii.,  39,  The  promise  is 
unto  you ,  and  to  your  children. 

On  these  grounds  we  deem  it  a  Christian  Duty  to 
accept  Baptism  in  general,  and  Infant  Baptism  in 
particular,  as  a  Catholic  and  Apostolic  usage  ;  and 
to  promote  its  administration,  under  a  due  sense  of 
its  import,  in  all  appropriate  cases  with  which  we 
have  any  concern. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  LORD’S  SUPPER. 

789.  At  the  last  Supper  of  Jesus  Christ  with 
his  disciples,  he  instituted  an  ordinance,  which,  in  an 
especial  manner,  expresses  the  relation  of  Christians 
to  him.  He  delivered  to  them  Bread  and  Wine, 
saying,  Take ,  eat  ;  this  is  my  body  which  is  given  for 
you.  Drink  ye  all  of  this.  This  is  my  blood  of  the 
new  testament  which  is  shed  for  many  for  the  remis¬ 
sion  of  sins.  Do  this  in  remembrance  of  me  (Matth. 
xxvi.,  Mark  xiv.,  Luke  xxii.,  1  Cor.  xi).  And  we 


CIIAP.  XX.] 


THE  LORD'S  SUPPEK. 


159 


read  frequently  in  the  history  of  the  Apostles,  of  the 
celebration  of  this  ordinance  under  the  name  of 
breaking  of  bread  (Acts  ii.,  42  and  46  ;  xx.,  7).  • 

790.  This  ordinance  expresses  the  union  of 
Christians  with  Christ,  as  the  source  of  their  spiritual 
life.  St.  Paul  says  (1  Cor.  x.,  16),  The  cup  of  bless¬ 
ing  which  we  bless,  is  it  not  the  communion  of  the  blood 
of  Christ  ?  The  bread  which  we  break,  is  it  not  the 
communion  of  the  body  of  Christ  ?  [koivuvIu,  partici¬ 
pation).  Hence  this  Ordinance  is  also  called  the 
Communion ;  as  well  as  the  Lord's  Supper,  which 
name  is  given  it  1  Cor.  xi.,  20  (  KvpicLKov  tie^nvov).  Ill 
the  account  of  the  institution  of  the  Lord’s  Supper, 
and  in  many  of  the  references  to  it  just  quoted,  men¬ 
tion  is  made  of  giving  of  thanks  before  breaking  the 
bread  and  imparting  the  cup  :  and  hence,  the  ordi¬ 
nance  is  termed  the  Eucharist  ^xa9taTta),  or  thanks¬ 
giving. 

791.  The  Eucharist,  Lord’s  Supper,  or  Com¬ 
munion,  thus  instituted  by  Christ,  and  continued  by 
his  Apostles,  has  been  constantly  celebrated  in  the 
Church,  from  that  time  to  the  present  day.  From 
the  distinctness  and  solemnity  of  the  institution  of 
this  Ordinance,  and  from  the  habitual  celebration  of 
it  in  the  Apostolic  times,  as  well  as  ever  since,  it  is 
unnecessary  for  us  to  look  for  analogies  to  illustrate 
it  in  the  Old  Law.  The  circumstances  of  the  com¬ 
mand,  and  the  doctrines  combined  with  the  ordinance, 
make  it  the  duty  of  Christians  to  join  in  this  ordi- 
dance.  It  has  ever  been  held  by  all  Christians  the 
most  solemn  and  formal  Token  and  Act  of  their  Par¬ 
ticipation  in  the  Church  of  Christ. 


160 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

4.  * 

MARRIAGES  OF  CHRISTIANS. 

792.  Marriage  is  a  Civil  Contract ;  but  there 
are  strong  reasons  for  making  it  also  a  religious 
union.  It  is  in  its  complete  form  a  union  for  the 
whole  remaining  period  of  life ;  a  participation  of 
almost  all  interests,  large  and  small,  external  and 
internal.  The  engagement  includes,  not  only  con¬ 
stant  companionship,  but  steady  affection.  A  contract 
so  important  and  extensive,  may  naturally  be  con¬ 
firmed  by  a  religious  sanction ;  and  engagements 
which  concern  the  internal  feelings,  may  naturally 
be  supported  by  prayers  and  the  hopes  of  a  Divine 
blessing.  In  most  cases,  Marriage,  in  its  highest 
form,  has  been  accompanied  by  some  Religious 
Rites  ;  and  has  had  something  of  a  religious  charac¬ 
ter  given  it.  In  the  Roman  Law,  marriage  is  not 
only  consortium  omnis  vitce,  but  divini  ac  liumani  juris 
communicatio .  The  laws  of  Moses  concerning  Mar- 
riage  had  led  the  Jews,  in  some  cases,  to  treat  its  ob¬ 
ligations  lightly,  as  we  have  already  seen  (633). 
Christ  taught,  that  in  the  eyes  of  God,  it  is  a  union 
of  the  most  complete  and  essential  kind,  not  arbi¬ 
trarily  to  be  disturbed.  We  have  also  seen  that  the 
teaching  of  St.  Paul  gives  to  Marriage  a  religious 
significance  (632). 

793.  In  like  manner,  the  earliest  successors  of 
the  Apostles  also  ascribe  a  sacred  character  to  mar¬ 
riage  ;  speaking  of  the  consent  and  participation  of 
the  Christian  community  as  conditions  of  the  blessed¬ 
ness  of  Christian  Marriages.  St.  Ignatius  writing 
to  Polycarp  says  (n.,  5)  :  “  It  becomes  those  who 
marry,  and  those  that  are  given  in  marriage,  to  take 
this  yoke  upon  them,  with  the  consent  or  direction  of 
the  Bishop  ;  that  their  marriage  may  be  according 


CHAP.  XXI.]  MARRIAGES  OF  CHRISTIANS.  161 

to  the  will  of  God,  and  not  their  own  lusts;”  and 
Tertullian  exclaims  (ad  Ux.,  il,  8),  “  How  shall  I 
sufficiently  set  forth  the  happiness  of  the  marriage 
which  the  Church  brings  about  by  her  procurement ; 
which  the  Eucharist  confirms;  which  Angels  report 
when  done  ;  and  the  Father  ratifies  !”  At  that  time, 
marriage  by  the  law  of  the  land  was  a  Civil  Con¬ 
tract  ;  but  the  Christian  Teachers  spoke  of  it  as 
being,  under  due  conditions,  also  a  Divine  Ordi¬ 
nance.  At  a  later  period,  it  was  made  law,  through¬ 
out  the  Christian  world,  that  marriages  should  be 
celebrated  in  no  other  way  than  by  the  sacerdotal 
blessing  and  prayers.  This  continued  to  be  the  case 
in  England,  till  the  usurpation  of  Cromwell  ;  when 
Marriage  was  declared  to  be  merely  a  civil  contract. 
At  the  restoration  of  Charles  the  Second,  marriage 
was  again  regarded  as  a  religious  ordinance.  By  a 
recent  act  of  Parliament,  Marriages  contracted  with 
certain  civil  formalities,  are  valid.  But  the  Church 
of  England  retains  in  use  her  Form  of  Solemniza¬ 
tion  of  Matrimony  ;  and  in  this  she  declares  that 
“  so  many  as  are  coupled  together  otherwise  than 
God’s  word  doth  allow,  are  not  coupled  together 
by  God,  neither  is  their  matrimony  lawful.” 

794.  Taking  into  consideration  the  declara- 
tions  of  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  respecting  the  sa¬ 
credness  of  the  institution  of  Marriage,  it  appears 
conformable  to  the  duty  of  Christians  to  connect, 
with  the  contract,  a  religious  sanction,  and  prayers 
for  the  Divine  blessing.  When  the  man  and  woman 
belong  to  a  Church  which  has  made  matrimony 
a  religious  ordinance,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the 
duty  of  celebrating  the  union  in  the  ecclesiastical 
form.  To  do  otherwise,  would  be,  in  significance, 
to  deny  the  sacredness  of  Marriage  ;  and  to  reject 
the  prospect  of  the  Divine  aid  and  blessing  in  the 
married  condition.  Where  the  two  parties  do  not 
both  belong  to  the  same  church,  there  is  a  difficulty 
vol.it.  o2 


162 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV.  - 


in  determining  what  religious  form  of  solemnization 
of  the  union  ought  to  be  adopted.  To  employ  the 
forms  belonging  to  both  the  churches,  appears  to  be 
a  course  free  from  any  valid  objection  ;  for  it  cannot 
be  supposed  that  one  of  the  parties  shuns,  as  impious, 
the  religious  service  to  which  the  other  assents.  If 
the  incongruity  of  sentiment  on  religious  subjects  go 
so  far  as  this,  the  marriage  cannot  take  place  be¬ 
tween  religious  persons. 

795.  If  it  be  asked,  whether  the  Church  sanc¬ 
tions  the  marriages  of  her  children  with  aliens  from 
the  church,  we  may  reply,  that  when  they  are  once 
contracted  she  does  not  disallow  them.  St.  Paul,  as 
we  have  seen  (635),  gives  his  judgment  (1  Cor.  vii., 
12)  that  the  believing  husband  was  not  to  put  away 
the  unbelieving  wife  ;  the  believing  wife  not  to  se¬ 
parate  from  the  unbelieving  husband  ;  and  that  the 
children  were  not  “  unclean”  ( uxadapra ).  Thus,  the 
Early  Church  did  not  annul  or  disallow  mixed  mar¬ 
riages  ;  nor  did  she  solemnize  them  again,  when  the 
unbelieving  party  was  converted. 

796.  Whether  and  under  what  circumstances 
the  Church  would  give  her  sanction  to  the  celebration 
of  Mixed  Marriages,  is  another  question.  A  mar¬ 
riage  with  an  unbeliever  is  forbidden  by  Apostolic 
authority  (2  Cor.  vi.,  14),  Be  ye  not  unequally  yoked 
with  unbelievers  :  for  what  fellowship  hath  righteous¬ 
ness  with  unrighteousness  ?  and  what  communion  hath 
light  with  darkness  ?  and  what  concord  hath  Christ 
with  Belial  ?  or  what  part  hath  he  that  believeth  with 
an  infidel?  ...  Wherefore  come  out  from  among  them , 
and  be  ye  separate ,  saith  the  Lord.  And  again  (1 
Cor.  vii.,  23),  If  the  husband  be  dead ,  the  wife  is  at 
liberty  to  be  married  to  whom  she  will ;  only  in  the 
Lord. 


CHAP.  XXII.]  FUNERAL  RITES  OF  CHRISTIANS.  163 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

FUNERAL  RITES  OF  CHRISTIANS. 

797.  A  Funeral  is  necessarily  a  religious 
service  among  a  religious  people.  The  change  which 
takes  place  at  death,  is  a  transition  from  this  life  to  a 
future  life,  which  religion  discloses  to  us  ;  and  no 
occasion  can  be  so  appropriate,  or  so  impressive,  for 
the  utterance  of  religious  views  and  feelings,  re¬ 
specting  the  past,  the  present,  and  the  future ;  re¬ 
specting  man’s  life  in  general,  and  the  condition  of 
the  dead  man  in  particular.  Accordingly,  in  all 
times  and  places,  the  funeral  rites  have  been  of  a  re¬ 
ligious  kind,  the  corpse,  the  bier,  the  grave-clothes, 
the  grave,  have  been  looked  upon  with  awe. 

798.  The  Christian  religion  did  not  remove 
this  feeling  :  but  by  presenting  to  believers  the  re¬ 
surrection  of  the  dead,  as  a  sure  truth,  constantly 
insisted  upon,  it  removed  much  of  the  fear  which 
belonged  to  such  occasions.  Its  language  was,  O 
death ,  where  is  thy  sting  !  O  grave,  where  is  thy 
victory  /  It  spoke  of  dying,  as  falling  asleep ;  of 
the  dead,  as  those  who  sleep.  On  the  tombs  of  the 
early  Christians  were  represented,  as  symbols  of  their 
hopes,  a  Crown,  a  Phcenix,  a  Pelican,  a  Palm-tree,  a 
Ship  sailing  out  of  the  Harbour,  or  the  like.  It  was 
at  a  much  later  period  that.  Death  began  to  be  re¬ 
presented  as  a  skeleton,  or  a  meagre  spectre  ;  a 
usage  which  is  supposed  to  have  arisen  in  part  from 
the  familiarity  with  bones  which  the  use  of  Relics 
produced  ;  and  in  part  from  the  ascetic  spirit,  which 
sought  to  subdue  man’s  levity  and  love  of  enjoy¬ 
ment  ;  and  aimed,  not  at  evading,  but  at  overcoming, 
the  fear  of  death. 

799.  From  the  earliest  times  of  the  Church, 
the  funeral  of  a  Christian  was,  not  a  private,  but  a 


164 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


public  business  ;  the  concern  of  the  Christian  com¬ 
munity.  Psalms  and  Hymns  were  sung  containing 
such  passages  as  these:  (Ps.  cxvi.,  15),  Precious  in 
the  sight  of  the  Lord  is  the  death  of  his  saints :  (ver. 
7),  Return ,  O  my  soul ,  to  thy  rest ,  for  the  Lord  hath 
dealt  bountifully  with  thee.  (Prov.  x.,  7),  The  memory 
of  the  just  is  blessed.  (Wisd.  iii.,  1),  The  souls  of  the 
righteous  are  in  the  hand  of  God.  In  later  ages, 
other  hymns  were  used  ;  as,  for  example,  the  noted 
one  referring  to  the  day  of  Judgment,  which  begins 
Pies  Irce,  dies  ilia  Solvet  sceclum  in  favilla.  The 
greater  part  of  the  Burial  Service  of  the  English 
Church  was  in  use  in  this  country  (in  Latin),  long 
before  the  Reformation. 

800.  Both  the  Jewish  and  the  Roman  customs 
directed  that  burial-places  should  be  outside  the  city. 
(Luke  vii.  12.  John  xi.  30).  Cic.  de  Leg.  n.  23, 
quotes  the  law  of  the  Twelve  Tables  :  Hominem 
mortuum  in  urbe  ne  seyelito  neve  urito.  The  Chris¬ 
tians  gave  to  their  burial-grounds  the  name  of  sleep¬ 
ing  places,  Cemeteries  ( Koi^rnpia ) ;  implying  the 
hope  of  the  resurrection.  But  they  also  buried  their 
dead  in  the  Church-yards  ;  and  this  was  understood 
as  a  recognition  of  the  Communion  of  Saints  ;  a  com¬ 
munity  of  interest,  or  sympathy,  between  dead  and 
living  believers  ;  the  place  where  the  departed  were 
gathered  together  being  thus  brought  near  the 
place,  where  those  who  remained  in  life  assembled 
for  purposes  of  religion. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  purpose  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  funeral  solemnities  was,  in  early  times,  under¬ 
stood  to  be,  not  any  advantage  to  the  dead,  but  the 
edification  of  the  living. 

801.  The  due  religious  celebration  of  funeral 
solemnities  being  plainly  capable  of  being  made  to 
further  such  purposes  ;  and  being  supported  by  the 
constant  practice  of  Christian  communities  ;  cannot 
be  disregarded  by  a  Christian  in  any  instance  which 


CHAP.  XXIII.]  OATHS  OF  CHRISTIANS. 


165 


belongs  to  his  charge,  without  showing  irreverence 
and  levity  in  religious  matters  ;  besides  the  blame 
of  want  of  affection,  and  want  of  decency,  which  such 
a  neglect  naturally  and  deservedly  incurs  ;  even 
without  referring  to  religious  considerations. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

OATHS  OF  CHRISTIANS. 

802.  We  have  already  spoken  of  Oaths  in 
general,  as  a  custom  arising  from  the  dictates  of  na¬ 
tural  Piety  ;  we  have  now  to  speak  of  Christian 
Oaths  as  a  Christian  Ordinance.  The  Oaths  com¬ 
monly  used  in  this  country  contain  a  reference  to 
Christianity.  The  ancient  form  of  the  Oath  was 
that  the  Juror  touched  the  Gospels,  and  said,  Ita  me 
Deus  adjuvet  et  hcec  Sancta  Dei  Evangelia  ;  and  the 
present  form  is,  that  in  taking  the  Oath  he  holds  the 
Gospel  in  his  hand,  and  kisses  the  book  after  saying 
So  help  me  God. 

803.  Christian  Oaths  have  been  taken  in  vari¬ 
ous  forms.  As  to  its  general  character,  the  Ordi¬ 
nance  is  supported  by  all  the  four  grounds  of  Ordi¬ 
nances  which  we  have  enumerated  ;  Natural  Piety, 
Early  Revelation,  Apostolic  Practice,  and  Catholic 
Usage.  But  the  two  latter  reasons  have  not  given 
the  Ordinance  a  new  form  and  a  new  authority,  to 
the  same  extent  to  which  they  have  done  in  other 
Ordinances.  Natural  Piety  has  made  the  use  of 
Oaths  universal.  In  the  Jewish  Revelation  we  find 
them  abundantly  used,  and  approved  and  enjoined 
by  God.  Christ  and  his  Apostles  sanctioned  the  use 
of  Oaths  by  their  practice,  but  nowhere  clearly  en¬ 
joined  them.  There  are  even  some  passages  in  the 


166 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


New  Testament  which  have  been  understood  as  for¬ 
bidding  Oaths,  but  without  good  ground  for  such  an 
interpretation.  And  the  Universal  Usage  of  Chris¬ 
tian  Communities,  down  to  modern  times,  has  given 
its  authority  to  that  interpretation  of  the  Christian 
Precepts,  which  allows  the  use  of  Oaths  on  solemn 
occasions.  We  shall  further  illustrate  some  of  these 
assertions. 

804.  Among  the  Israelites,  the  custom  of 
swearing  on  solemn  occasions  existed,  and  is  con¬ 
stantly  taken  for  granted  in  the  Old  Testament. 
Oaths  are  there  commanded  as  a  part  of  the  usual 
judicial  procedure  :  Thus,  Exod.  xxii.,  11,  if  a  man 
deliver  unto  his  neighbour  an  ox,  &c.,  and  it  die,  or 
be  hurt,  or  driven  away,  no  man  seeing  it,  Then  shall 
an  oath  of  the  Lord  he  between  them  both.  And 
Psalm  xv.,  4,  it  is  mentioned  among  the  characters 
of  a  good  man,  that  he  sweareth  to  his  neighbour ,  and 
disappointeth  him  not,  though  it  be  to  his  own  hin¬ 
drance.  The  denunciation  of  God’s  anger  against 
false  swearing,  imply  a  sanction  of  swearing  when 
truly  employed  ;  and  we  cannot  suppose  God  to  dis¬ 
approve  of  the  practice,  when  he  is  repeatedly  repre¬ 
sented  as  himself  having  sworn  an  oath  to  Abraham 
(Gen.  xxii.,  16),  to  David  (Psalm  lxxxix.,  3),  and  to 
the  people  of  Israel  on  various  occasions  (Isai.  xlv., 
23.  Jerem.  xlix.,  13  ;  li.,  14.  Amosvi.,  8).  The 
command,  Thou  shall  not  take  the  Name  of  the  Lord 
thy  God  in  vain,  implies  that  the  name  might  be  used 
on  important  and  fit  occasions ;  and  the  command 
appears  fitted  to  keep  up  the  solemn  reverence  for 
the  thought  of  God,  which  an  Oath  implies. 

805.  When  Jesus  Christ  taught  the  true  im¬ 
port  of  the  law  of  Moses,  he  noticed,  among  other 
things,  the  Jewish  practice  of  Oaths.  His  injunc¬ 
tions,  on  this  subject,  were  to  the  same  effect  as  with 
regard  to  other  parts  of  the  Jewish  usages.  As  with 
regard  to  retaliation,  to  divorce,  to  honouring  of  pa- 


CI1A1*.  XXIII.] 


OATHS  OF  CHRISTIANS. 


107 


rents,  to  angry  expressions,  the  Jewish  teachers  had 
made  subtle  distinctions  as  to  what  was  and  was  not 
a  transgression  of  the  law,  while  they  had  neglected 
the  spirit  of  the  law  •  so  with  regard  to  swearing. 
The  trivial  and  thoughtless  use  of  forms  of  swearing 
had  become  common,  and  the  teachers  had  laid  down 
rules  as  to  which  of  these  forms  were  binding,  and 
which  were  not  so.  In  this,  as  in  the  other  cases, 
Christ  rejects  these  distinctions,  and  says  of  such 
cases  (Matth.  v.,  34),  I  say  unto  you ,  Swear  not  at  all. 
That  this  is  the  import  of  his  words,  is  plain  from  the 
course  of  teaching  in  this  place.  Christ  begins  by 
saying  (v.,  17),  Think  not  that  I  am  come  to  destroy 
the  law  and  the  prophets  ;  and  then  goes  on  to  vari¬ 
ous  points,  with  the  expressions,  Ye  have  heard  it 
hath  been  said  by  them  of  old  time.  .  .  But  I  say  unto 
you  (v.  21,  22,  27,  28,  31,  32,  38,  39).  And  the 
same  form  he  uses  here  :  Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath 
been  said  (v.  33),  Thou  shalt  not  forswear  thyself ,  but 
shalt  perform  unto  the  Lord  thine  oaths  :  but  I  say 
unto  you,  Swear  not  at  all.  If,  in  this  instance,  he 
had  forbidden  judicial  Oaths,  it  is  plain  that  he 
would  have  been  destroying  the  law  and  the  prophets. 
For  the  Law  enjoined  judicial  Oaths,  as  we  have 
seen  ;  and  if  a  hearer  of  Christ,  thinking  to  obey  him, 
had  refused  to  answer  upon  his  Oath  before  a  judge, 
he  would  have  been  violating  the  law  of  Moses,  and 
of  his  country,  as  we  have  seen.  We  do  not  find 
that  Christ  was  ever  accused  of  having  violated  the 
law  of  Moses  in  this  part  of  his  teaching.  And  when 
we  consider  how  different  the  Oaths  he  spoke  of  were 
in  form  from  the  judicial  Oaths  of  the  Jews,  it  seems 
impossible  to  suppose  that  his  hearers  would  under¬ 
stand  him  to  speak  of  these. 

806.  In  this  passage,  Christ  refers  to  what  had 
been  said,  namely,  Thou  shalt  perform  unto  the  Lord 
thine  oaths.  But  we  learn  from  another  passage  that 
this  had  been  said  with  various  distinctions.  In 


168 


KEL1GIOX. 


[BOOK  IV. 


Matth.  xxiii.,  16,  Christ  reproaches  the  Scribes  and 
Pharisees  on  this  subject  :  Woe  unto  you ,  ye  blind 
guides ,  which  say,  Whosoever  shall  swear  by  the  tem¬ 
ple,  it  is  nothing  ;  but  whosoever  shall  swear  by  the 
gold  of  the  temple,  he  is  a  debtor  !  .  .  And  whosoever 
shall  swear  by  the  altar,  it  is  nothing  ;  but  whosoever 
swear eth  by  the  gift  that  is  upon  the  altar,  he  is  guilty. 
And  he  then  explains,  that  all  these  distinctions, 
which  were  used  to  show  Oaths  to  be  no  Oaths,  were 
futile,  (v.  17,  19,  20,  21,  22),  The  temple  sanctif  eth 
the  gold.  .  .  the  altar  sanctif  eth  the  gift.  Whosoever 
shall  swear  by  the  altar,  sweareih  by  it,  and  by  all 
things  thereon.  Whoso  shall  swear  by  the  temple, 
sweareth  by  it,  and  him  that  divelleth  therein.  He  that 
shall  swear  by  heaven,  sweareth  by  the  throne  of  God, 
and  by  him  that  sitteth  thereon.  These  are  very  for¬ 
cible  considerations  against  the  light  or  familiar  use 
of  Oaths  ;  but  of  no  apparent  force  to  overthrow  the 
Jewish  law  which,  given  by  God  himself,  had  till 
then  permitted  and  enjoined  Oaths.  Indeed,  the  pre¬ 
cept  by  Christ,  Swear  not  at  all,  cannot  be  considered 
as  having  reference  to  judicial  Oaths.  The  forms 
mentioned  of  swearing,  by  heaven,  by  Jerusalem,  &c., 
were  not  judicial  forms,  and  the  precept  is  combined 
with  other  precepts  which  would  put  an  end  to  all 
judicial  contests  :  Resist  not  evil.  .  .  And  if  any  man 
will  sue  thee  at  law,  and  take  away  thy  coat,  let  him 
have  thy  cloak  also  (Matth.  v.,  40).  When  Christ 
says(ver.  37),  Let  your  communication  be,  Yea ,  yea  ; 
Nay,  nay  ;  for  whatsoever  is  more  than  these  cometh 
of  evil,  we  may  readily  apply  this  to  judicial  Oaths, 
for  these  come  as  lawsuits  come,  from  the  cupidity 
and  anger,  the  falsehood  and  levity  of  man.  Oaths 
come  of  evil  sources,  and  judicial  Oaths  among 
others;  but  there  is  in  the  precepts  now  referred  to, 
nothing  which  denies  them,  so  far  as  they  are  evils, 
to  be  necessary  evils,  as  all  judicial  proceedings  may 
be  said  to  be,  if  we  look  at  their  origin. 


CHAP.  XXIII.]  OATHS  OF  CHRISTIANS. 


169 


807.  Accordingly,  it  is  related  that  Christ 
(Matth.  xxvi.,  73)  held  his  peace  when  he  was  ac¬ 
cused  till  the  high  priest  said  unto  him ,  I  adjure  thee 
by  the  living  God,  that  thou  tell  me  whether  thou  be 
the  Christ,  the  Son  of  God.  He  then  answered,  Thou 
hast  said  ;  or,  as  St.  Mark  gives  the  answer  (xiv.,  62), 
1  am.  This  is  conceived  by  commentators  to  be  a 
submission  to  an  Oath  imposed  in  a  judicial  proce¬ 
dure.  An  Oath  for  judicial  purposes  is  mentioned 
with  apparent  approval  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews 
(vi.,  16),  An  oath  for  confirmation  is  the  end  of  all 
strife  ;  and  this  is  stated,  in  order  to  explain  God’s 
condescension,  in  accommodating  himself  to  the  cus¬ 
toms  of  men,  as  when  he  swore  to  Abraham  ;  thus 
adding  to  one  immutable  thing,  God’s  promise,  ano¬ 
ther  immutable  thing,  his  oath.  It  cannot  be  sup¬ 
posed  that  such  illustrations  and  expressions  would 
have  been  used  by  the  writer,  if  he  had  held  the 
oaths  of  men  to  be  sinful. 

808.  For  the  like  reasons,  we  cannot  understand 
the  precept  given  by  St.  James  as  applicable  to  Ju¬ 
dicial  Oaths.  It  is  almost  a  verbal  repetition  of  the 
words  of  Christ  (James  v.,  12),  But  above  all  things, 
my  brethren,  swear  not,  neither  by  heaven ,  neither  by 
the  earth,  neither  by  any  other  oath  ;  but  let  your  yea 
be  yea  ;  and  your  nay,  nay  ;  lest  ye  fall  into  condemna¬ 
tion.  This  precept  occurs  in  an  Epistle  in  which  the 
government  of  the  tongue  is  especially  dwelt  on  (ch. 
iii).  It  does  not  occur  along  with  precepts  for  the 
conduct  of  Christians  in  their  intercourse  with  the 
world ;  but  is  connected  with  injunctions  of  the  feel¬ 
ings  which  were  to  be  excited  by  the  approaching 
coming  of  the  Lord.  Thus  ch.  v.,  8,  Be  patient... 
for  the  coming  of  the  Lord  draweth  nigh;  ver.  9, 
Grudge  not  one  against  another... behold,  the  judge 
standeth  before  the  door.  ver.  10,  Take  the  prophets 
for  an  example  of  patience,  ver.  12,  Above  all  things , 
swear  not.  ver.  13,  Is  any  afflicted  ?  let  him  pray.  Is 

VOL.  II.  p 


170 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


any  merry  ?  let  him  sing  psalms.  It  is  plain  that  we 
have  here  a  train  of  injunctions  respecting  the  seri¬ 
ousness  of  thought  and  demeanour  which  were  suited 
to  the  near  coming  of  the  Lord ;  and  it  is  evident 
that  any  light  or  trivial  mention  of  sacred  things, 
such  as  familiar  swearing  involves,  was  grossly  at 
variance  with  this  seriousness :  but  we  have  here  no 
ground  for  concluding  anything  against  the  serious 
and  faithful  discharge  of  an  important  task,  like  that 
of  giving  to  our  solemn  declarations  a  religious  sanc¬ 
tion. 

809.  Besides  the  allowance  given  to  judicial 
Oaths  by  the  above  passages,  we  find  countenance 
given  to  religious  asseverations  in  other  cases  by  the 
example  of  St.  Paul  (Rom.  i.,  9),  God  is  my  witness 
...that  I  make  mention  of  you  always  in  my  prayers. 
(2  Cor.  i.,  23),  I  call  God  as  a  witness  on  my  own 
soul ,  that  to  spare  you  I  came  not  to  Corinth.  These 
expressions  so  far  assume  the  form  of  an  Oath  as  to 
show  us  that  in  that  form  there  was  nothing  repug¬ 
nant  to  the  religious  views  of  St.  Paul. 

810.  The  examples  of  swearing  which  are 
given  in  the  precepts  above  quoted  are  all  of  the 
same  form :  by  heaven ,  by  earth ,  by  the  altar ,  by  the 
temple.  The  forms  of  asseveration  used  by  St.  Paul 
are  different:  God  is  my  witness ;  I  call  God  as  a 
witness.  The  forms  used  in  other  cases  are  still  dif¬ 
ferent  :  God  do  so  to  me ,  and  more  also ,  if  ought  but 
death  part  thee  and  me  (Ruth  i.,  17).  As  I  shall  an¬ 
swer  to  God  at  the  day  of  judgment  (which  is  the  form 
of  Oath  in  Scotland) ;  So  help  me  God ,  which  is  the 
usual  form  in  England. 


GHAP.  XXIV.] 


CHRISTIAN  MINISTERS. 


171 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

CHRISTIAN  MINISTERS. 

811.  Not  only  Times  and  Places,  but  also 
Persons,  are  specially  appropriated  to  religious 
offices.  This  practice  has  been  so  universal  in  the 
world,  that  it  must  be  considered  a  consequence  of 
Natural  Piety.  In  the  case  of  our  religion,  the  rea¬ 
sons  for  such  a  practice,  on  grounds  of  mere  reason, 
are  evident.  To  give  religious  instruction  to  Chris¬ 
tians,  the  teacher  must  be  acquainted  with  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  of  the  Old  and  of  the  New  Testament ;  and  in 
order  to  understand  them,  he  must  have  an  acquaint¬ 
ance  with  the  history  and  manners  of  those  times. 
He  must  also  be  acquainted  with  the  history  of  the 
Christian  Church  ;  and  with  the  doctrines  which  have 
prevailed  in  it ;  especially  with  those  doctrines  which 
the  condition  of  his  own  National  Church  requires 
him  particularly  to  inculcate.  This  cannot  be  done, 
without  selecting  from  the  community  the  ministers 
of  religion;  making  them  a  Clergy  ;  educating  them 
for  their  profession  ;  combining  with  it  the  means  of 
their  being  supported  without  being  compelled  to  en¬ 
gage  in  other  labours  ;  and  thus  giving  them  both 
the  means,  and  the  obligation,  to  devote  all  their 
powers  to  their  ministry. 

812.  The  establishment  of  a  Clergy,  recom¬ 
mended  by  these  reasons,  is  in  agreement  with  the 
Jewish  polity ;  according  to  which  a  body  of  priests 
was  set  apart,  to  perform  the  religious  offices  ;  and 
the  tribe  of  Levi  in  general  was  appointed  to  assist 
these  priests  in  their  ministrations.  The  Priests  and 
Levites  had  an  ample  provision  made  for  them,  out 
of  the  tithes,  first-fruits,  and  offerings  of  the  people  ; 
and  had  also  forty-eight  cities  appointed  for  their  re¬ 
sidence  (Num.  xxxv.,  1).  They  were  trained,  by 


172 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


hereditary  instruction  and  tradition,  in  the  offices  of 
the  temple- worship,  and  in  the  knowledge  of  the  law 
and  the  prophets. 

813.  The  Apostles,  the  first  teachers  of  the 
revelation  of  Jesus  Christ,  were  selected  and  fitted 
for  their  office,  in  an  especial  and  supernatural  man¬ 
ner,  by  God  himself.  But  when  the  Apostles  made 
converts  on  an  extensive  scale  (Acts  xiv.,  23),  they 
ordained  them  certain  officers  in  every  church  whom 
they  called  presbyters  or  elders  (so  Tit.  i.,  5).  These 
Presbyters  are  joined  with  the  Apostles  in  office  (Acts 
xv.,  2,  4,  6,  22,  23;  xvi.,  4),  and  are  spoken  of  as 
the  usual  governors  of  the  church  (Acts  xx.,  17  ;  xxi., 
18).  They  prayed  with  the  sick  (James  v.,  14). 
They  are  thus  exhorted  by  St.  Peter  (1  Pet.  v.,  1), 
The  presbyters  among  you  I  exhort ,  who  am  also  a 
presbyter... Feed  the  flock  of  God  which  is  among  you , 
taking  the  oversight  thereof  ( imaKo-novvTii )  not  by  con¬ 
straint ,  but  willingly  ;  not  for  filthy  lucre ,  but  of  a 
ready  mind  :  neither  as  being  lords  over  God’s  herit¬ 
age ,  but  being  ensamples  to  the  flock.  It  is  evident, 
from  this  passage,  that  the  office  of  presbyter  was,  at 
this  time,  assimilated  to  that  of  a  pastor  or  shepherd  ; 
and  that  it  was  one  of  authority,  since  the  presbyters 
are  exhorted  not  to  exercise  their  authority  in  an  im¬ 
perious  manner  ( KaTaxvpuvovres ).  So  (Matth.  xx.,  25; 
Mark  x.,  42),  The  princes  of  the  Gentiles  exercise  do¬ 
minion  over  them,  where  the  same  verb  is  used. 

814.  The  warning,  not  to  make  gain  the  ob¬ 
ject,  implies  that  the  minister  commonly  received 
something  from  his  flock.  And  St.  Paul  asserts  the 
reasonableness  of  this  claim  (1  Cor.  ix.,  7) :  Who 
goeth  a  warfare  any  time  at  his  own  charges  ?  who 
plantet.h  a  vineyard,  and  eateth  not  of  the  fruit  thereof? 
who  feedeth  a  flock,  and  eateth  not  of  the  milk  of  the 
flock  ?  ...  If  we  have  sown  unto  you  spiritual  things, 
is  it  a  great  thing  if  ice  reap  your  carnal  things  ?  .  .  . 
Do  ye  not  know  that  they  ivhich  minister  about  holy 


CHAP.  XXIV.]  CHRISTIAN  MINISTERS. 


173 


things  live  of  the  things  of  the  temple  ?  and  they  which 
wait  at  the  altar  are  partakers  with  the  altar  ?  Even 
so  hath  the  Lord  ordained  that  they  which  preach  the 
gospel  should  live  of  the  gospel.  And  though  he  re¬ 
fused  to  avail  himself  of  this  reasonable  claim  in  the 
case  of  the  Corinthians  (2  Cor.  xi.,  9  ;  xii.,  13),  and 
of  the  Thessalonians  (1  Thess.  ii. ,  9  ;  2  Thess.  iii.,  8) ; 
still  he  asserts  it  (1  Cor.  ix.,  12),  If  others  he  parta¬ 
kers  of  this  power  over  you ,  are  not  we  rather  ?  Nev¬ 
ertheless  we  have  not  used  this  power.  And  (2  Thess. 
iii.,  9)  ;  Not  because  we  have  not  power,  hut  to  make 
ourselves  an  ensample  unto  you  to  follow  us. 

815.  The  establishment  of  an  ordained  minis¬ 
try  of  religion,  provided  by  their  condition  with 
means  of  support,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  recommended 
by  the  reason  of  the  case  and  the  analogy  of  the  Jewish 
polity  :  and  the  inference  in  its  favour  is,  in  the  above 
and  other  passages,  so  distinctly  drawn  and  confirm¬ 
ed  by  Apostolical  authority,  that  it  is  needless  to 
dwell  longer  upon  the  subject.  To  promote  or  up¬ 
hold  the  establishment  of  a  paid  ministry  of  religion  ; 
and  to  act  as  minister  of  such  an  establishment,  are 
plainly  proceedings  in  entire  conformity  with  Chris¬ 
tian  duty. 

8161  Besides  teachers,  religious  ministers  for 
other  offices  were  very  early  appointed  in  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Church.  The  Apostles  had,  at  first,  the  office 
of  distributing  to  the  poor  what  the  benevolence  of 
the  converts  provided  for  them  ;  but  they  soon  found 
it  convenient  to  appoint  a  special  body  of  persons  for 
this  ministration.  The  Apostles  said  (Acts  vi.,  1),  It 
is  not  reason  that  we  should  leave  the  word  of  God , 
and  serve  tables.  .  .  We  will  give  ourselves  continu¬ 
ally  to  prayer  and  to  the  ministry  of  the  word.  And 
the  Christians  accordingly  appointed  seven  Deacons 
or  ministers,  whom  the  Apostles  ordained  by  praying 
and  laying  their  hands  upon  them  (verse  6).  And 
this  office  continued  to  exist  in  the  Church  from  that 

p  2 


174 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


lime.  St.  Paul  in  his  directions  to  Timothy  says  (1 
Tim.  iii.,  8),  The  deacons  musL  be  grave ,  not  double- 
tongued ,  not  given  to  much  wine,  not  greedy  of  filthy 
lucre  :  holding  the  mystery  of  the  faith  in  pure  con¬ 
science.  And  let  these  first  be  proved  ;  then  being 
found  blameless,  let  them  use  the  office  of  a  deacon. 
And  the  office  has  come  down  uninterruptedly  to  our 
own  time,  as  the  first  stage  of  the  Christian  ministry  ; 
although  the  different  condition  of  the  Christian  com¬ 
munity  has  materially  altered  its  business  in  most 
places.  Such  an  alteration  has,  however,  taken 
place  gradually,  under  the  guidance  of  due  ecclesi¬ 
astical  authority. 

817.  We  also  find  in  the  New  Testament  Bishops 
mentioned,  as  the  governors  and  teachers  of  Chris¬ 
tian  churches.  They  are  joined  with  Deacons. 
(Phil,  i.,  1.),  Paul  and  Timotheus,  the  servants  of 
Jesus  Christ,  to  all  the  saints  in  Christ  Jesus  which 
are  at  Philippi,  with  the  bishops  and  deacons.  The 
term  means  Overseers  ;  and  in  Acts  xx.,  28,  is  so 
translated  :  where  St.  Paul  applies  it  to  the  Presby¬ 
ters  of  Miletus  :  Take  heed  therefore  unto  yourselves, 
and  to  all  the  fiock,  over  which  the  Holy  Ghost  hath 
made  you  overseers  (l*  ia  kottovs)  to  feed  the  Church  of 
God,  which  he  hath  purchased  with  his  own  blood. 
He  appears  also  to  apply  the  term  to  presbyters  in 
writing  to  Titus.  (Tit.  i.,  5),  I  left  thee  in  Crete,  that 
thou  sliouldest  set  in  order  the  things  that  are  wanting, 
and  ordain  presbyters  in  every  city,  as  I  had  appoint¬ 
ed  thee  :  if  any  be  blameless... For  a  bishop  must  be 
blameless.  Here  the  qualities  requisite  in  a  Bishop 
are  also  demanded  for  a  Presbyter.  Nearly  the 
same  requisites  for  a  Bishop  are  enumerated  1  Tim. 
iii.,  1  ;  where  it  is  also  said,  This  is  a  true  saying , 
If  a  man  desire  the  office  of  a  bishop,  he  desireth  a 
good  work.  But  in  a  short  time  this  name,  Bishop , 
became  a  fixed  title  of  those  who,  after  the  Apostles, 
exercised  the  chief  power  in  the  Church  ;  and  the 


CHAP.  XXIV.]  CHRISTIAN  MINISTERS.  175 

authority  of  each  Bishop  was  limited  to  a  special 
district  or  Diocese  napouda).  “  We  are  able 

to  number  up  them,”  says  Irenseus  (lib.  hi.,  c.  3), 
“  who  by  the  Apostles  were  made  bishops.”  James, 
“  the  brother  of  our  Lord,”  was  bishop  of  Jerusalem  ; 
Timothy,  of  Ephesus;  Titus,  of  Crete.  Irenseus 
says  that  the  Apostles  made  Linus  the  first  bishop  of 
Rome,  and  Polycarp  of  Smyrna.  Ignatius  testifies 
that  the  Apostles  made  Evodius  bishop  of  Antioch. 
“  Nulla  ecclesia  sine  Episcopo,  has  been,”  says 
Gibbon  (c.  xv.,  §  5,  note),  “  a  fact  as  well  as  a 
maxim,  since  the  time  of  Tertullian  and  Irenseus.” 
“  After  we  have  passed  the  difficulties  of  the  first 
century,”  he  adds,  “  we  find  the  Episcopal  govern¬ 
ment  universally  established  till  it  was  interrupted 
by  the  republican  genius  of  the  Swiss  and  German 
reformers.”  This  being  the  case,  it  appears  to  be 
not  too  much  to  assert  the  Authority  of  Bishops,  and 
the  necessity  of  the  office  in  the  Church,  to  be  a 
Catholic  and  Apostolic  Institution. 

818.  Since  we  thus  accept  Episcopal  Authority, 
as  necessary  by  Catholic  and  Apostolic  tradition,  we 
are  bound  to  the  Duty  of  establishing  and  upholding 
it  in  our  own  Church.  We  are  also  bound  to  the 
Duty  of  obeying  and  reverencing  the  persons  who  are 
invested  with  this  Dignity ;  and  of  spiritually 
profiting  by  their  ministrations,  according  to  their 
place  and  ours  in  the  Church. 

Ordination. 

819.  It  has  already  been  shown  that  the 
selection  of  a  special  body  of  persons,  for  the  ministry 
of  Christian  worship  and  instruction,  is  an  institution 
of  primitive  authority  and  uninterrupted  usage  in  the 
Church.  It  is  proper  to  make  some  remarks  on  the 
character  which  belonged  to  persons  thus  selected, 
and  the  Ordinances  bv  which  they  were  invested 
with  it. 


176 


RELIGION. 


[book  IV. 


I 

According  to  the  religious  views  of  many  nations, 
the  Priest  does  not  merely  pray  with ,  but  also  in  an 
especial  sense  for,  the  People.  He  not  merely 
directs  and  gives  form  and  utterance  to  the  devotional 
emotions  of  the  Laity,  but  he  is  an  intermediate 
person  between  them  and  the  Deity  whom  they 
address.  Through  him  prayers  find  a  more  ready 
access ;  and  by  him,  religious  ministrations  are 
performed,  which  the  laity  cannot  perform  without 
an  offence  against  religion.  This  was  the  case  also 
in  the  Jewish  Church.  The  Priests  and  Levites 
alone  were  allowed  to  perform  the  sacrifices  and 
other  rites  of  religion.  But  the  High  Priest  was  in 
a  more  especial  manner  the  intercessor  for  the 
People.  (Heb.  v.,  1),  The  High  Priest  is  ordained 
for  men  in  things  pertaining  to  God,  that  he  may  offer 
the  gifts  and  sacrifices  to  God... He  ought,  as  for  the 
people,  so  also  for  himself,  to  offer  for  sins.  And  no 
man  taketh  this  honour  to  himself,  except  he  that  is 
called  of  God,  as  was  Aaron. 

820.  But  from  this  same  Epistle  to  the  He¬ 
brews,  we  learn  that  the  Jewish  High  Priest  is,  in 
the  Christian  dispensation,  represented,  not  by  the 
Christian  Priest,  but  by  Jesus  Christ  himself — who 
(Heb.  x.,  14)  hy  one  offering  hath  perfected  for  ever 
them  that  are  sanctified.  The  Christian  minister  is 
never  called  Ispsis,  sacerdos,  the  proper  designation 
of  a  priest  who  offers  sacrifices  ;  but  npwPvTEpos,  preshy  - 
ter  (elder),  which  has  been,  in  the  progress  of 
modern  languages,  abbreviated.  The  Spanish  word 
is  preshitero,  the  Old  French  prestre,  the  German 
priester,  the  Anglo-Saxon  preost,  from  whence  the 
English  priest.  Christians  in  general,  indeed,  with¬ 
out  distinction  of  Laity  and  Clergy,  are  called  (1 
Pet.  ii.,  5  and  9),  a  holy  priesthood  ( Uparcvpa ),  to  offer  up 
spiritual  sacrifices  acceptable  to  God  by  Jesus  Christ ; 
and  a  royal  priesthood,  a  holy  nation,  a  peculiar 
people.  But  this  contradicts,  rather  than  confirms, 


CHAP.  XXIV.]  CHRISTIAN  MINISTERS. 


177 


the  notion  of  an  anology  between  the  Jewish  priest¬ 
hood  and  the  Christian  ministry.  The  Christian 
ministers  are,  by  learned  writers,  considered  as 
corresponding  rather  to  the  ministers  of  the  Jewish 
Synagogues,  than  to  the  Levitical  order. 

821.  Christian  ministers  derive  their  special 
character  and  authority  from  the  presumed  Com¬ 
mission  of  Christ  and  of  the  Church  which  he 
established.  He  himself  chose  of  his  disciples 
twelve,  called  them  Apostles,  and  gave  them  extra¬ 
ordinary  powers,  as  well  as  a  special  Mission  (Matth. 
x.,  1.  Mark  iii.,  13.  Luke  vi.,  12).  After  his 
Resurrection,  and  shortly  before  his  Ascension,  he 
repeated  his  Commission  to  them,  and  his  promises 
of  Divine  Assistance.  (Matth.  xxviii.,  16.  Mark 
xvi.,  15.  Luke  xxiv.,  44.  John  xx.,  22).  He 
breathed  on  them ,  and  said,  Receive  ye  the  Holy 
Ghost .  Whosesoever  sins  ye  remit,  they  are  remitted  : 
and  whosesoever  sins  ye  retain ,  they  are  retained. 
And  in  parting  with  them,  he  lifted  up  his  hands  and 
blessed  them.  But  in  the  time  of  the  Apostles,  others 
also  had  special  Divine  gifts.  The  persons  who  had 
special  religious  functions  in  the  early  Church  are 
described  by  St.  Paul  (1  Cor.  xii.,  28),  as,  first, 
Apostles  ;  second,  Prophets  ;  third,  Teachers  ;  fourth, 
Workers  of  Miracles  ;  fifth,  those  who  had  gifts  of 
healing ;  sixth,  those  who  spoke  with  tongues ; 
seventh,  those  who  interpret.  In  these  cases,  the 
Divine  gift  at  once  marked  the  appointment  of  the 
person,  and  his  special  office  :  but  these  cannot  be 
considered  as  examples  of  the  manner  in  which  it 
was  intended  that  Christian  ministers  should  be,  in 
all  ages  of  the  Church,  invested  with  the  ministry, 
and  directed  to  their  proper  business. 

822.  The  first  example  of  the  appointment,  or 
Ordination  of  persons  to  a  religious  office,  in  a 
manner  which  can  be  followed  by  succeeding  ages, 
is  the  selection  and  ordination  of  the  seven  Deacons 

12 


yol.  ir. 


178 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


described  Acts  vi.,  6  :  They  were  set  before  the 
Apostles  ;  and  when  they  had  prayed ,  they  laid  their 
hands  upon  them.  In  Acts  xiv.,  23,  it  is  said  of  Paul 
and  Barnabas  that  they  ordained  presbyters  in  every 
Church,  and  prayed  with  fasting ,  and  commended 
them  to  the  Lord,  on  whom  they  believed .  The  word 
here  and  elsewhere  translated  “  ordained,  ”  is 
%cipoTovnffavTes,  which  is  understood  to  imply  the  laying 
on  of  hands,  as  in  the  case  of  the  deacons.  The 
laying  on  of  hands  as  a  mark  of  blessing  was  a  very 
ancient  Jewish  custom.  Jacob  laid  his  hands  upon 
Ephraim  and  Manasseh,  when  he  blessed  them  (Gen. 
xlviii.,  14).  Which  custom  Jesus  Christ  followed, 
when  he  blessed  the  little  children  (Matth.  xix.,  15). 
It  was  also  the  action  used  when  the  Holy  Ghost  was 
communicated  to  persons  baptized  (Acts  viii.,  17,  and 
xix.  6).  Timothy  was  ordained  to  the  ministry  in 
an  especial  manner  by  St.  Paul  laying  his  hands 
upon  him  (2  Tim.  i.,  6)  :  Stir  up  the  gift  of  God 
which  is  in  thee  by  the  putting  on  of  my  hands  (<?«*  rijs 
IxiOsoews  tuv  xupuv  p°v').  But  the  presbyters  also  laid 
on  their  hands.  (1  Tim.  iv.,  14),  Neglect  not  the 
gift  that  is  in  thee,  which  was  given  thee  by  prophecy, 
with  the  laying  on  of  the  hands  of  the  presbytery 

(dtd  rrpoipriTEias  pera  cnideascjs  rtiv  xsiP^v  T°v  *pe<r/3vTepiov). 

Accordingly,  St.  Paul,  after  giving  directions  to 
Timothy  concerning  Elders,  adds  (1  Tim.  v.,  22), 
Lay  hands  suddenly  on  no  man.  To  Titus  he  gave 
commission  to  ordain  presbyters  in  every  city  ;  but 
here,  the  word  translated  ordain,  is  xaTaa'rrjarps,  appoint. 
The  practice  of  laying  on  hands,  in  the  Ordination 
of  Presbyters,  continued  in  the  early  Church.  Not 
only  the  Bishop,  who  was  the  principal  person  in  the 
performance  of  the  ordinance,  but  the  other  Presby¬ 
ters  who  were  present,  laid  their  hands  on  the  head 
of  the  person  to  be  ordained.  But  the  term  xstP0T 
was  applied  to  the  bishop  only  (Constit.  Apostol.  viii., 
28,  irpcoPvrepos  x£lP°^6TS^  ot>  XSlPOTOve^)• 


CHAP.  XXIV.]  CHRISTIAN  MINISTERS. 


179 


823.  From  the  early  times  of  the  Church  to  the 
time  of  the  Reformation,  Bishops  alone  had  a  right  to 
ordain  Priests.  In  England,  Sweden,  Denmark, 
Ordination  is  only  performed  by  Bishops.  And  even 
some  of  the  protestants,  who  have  rejected  episcopal 
government,  give  the  right  of  ordination  to  the  Super¬ 
intendent ,  and  commonly  only  to  the  General  Super¬ 
intendent,  or  higher  officers  of  their  Ecclesiastical 
Polity.  Those  protestants  who  are  specially  called 
the  Reformed  (the  followers  of  Calvin),  hold  that 
every  minister  may  ordain.  But  in  the  larger 
churches  of  this  kind,  in  Switzerland,  Holland,  and 
Scotland,  there  is  a  certain  Order  of  Ordination  by 
the  Seniors,  Class-leaders,  Synodal  Superintendents, 
or  the  like.  Only  the  Presbyterians,  Independents, 
and  other  Dissenters  in  England,  reject  the  imposition 
of  hands,  and  allow  every  minister  to  ordain  others.* 

824.  It  is  an  ancient  requirement  of  the  Church 
that  every  minister  must  be  ordained  to  a  special 
local  Ministry.  The  priest  was  ordained  as  the  Pas¬ 
tor  of  a  particular  Place.  The  appointment  to  the 
special  place  was  called  a  Title  : — and  the  Rule  was, 
Neminem  absolute  et  sine  titulo  esse  ordinandum. 

825.  The  appointment  of  a  minister  to  any 
particular  place  or  Parish,  was  often  in  the  hands  of 
the  principal  owner  of  the  land.  He  was  the  Patron 
of  the  Living.  His  was  the  Advowson  ( Advocaiio ). 
Of  course  the  Patron  could  not  appoint  to  the  living 
any  one  except  a  person  already  in  Holy  Orders. 
The  Right  of  Patronage  became  often  an  appendage 
of  private  property ;  and  was  bought  and  sold,  like 
other  appendages  of  property. 

826.  It  was  forbidden  in  the  Church  to  obtain 
any  spiritual  office  by  purchase,  gifts,  or  promises ; 
and  this  offence  was  called  Simonia,  Simony ,  from  its 
supposed  resemblance  to  the  offence  of  Simon  Magus  ; 

*  Augusti.  Christ.  Arch.,  B.  xi.,  c.  3. 


180 


RELIGION. 


[BOOK  IV. 


who  (Acts  viii.,  18)  offered  the  apostles  money ,  say¬ 
ing ,  Give  me  also  this  power ,  that  on  whomsoever  I  lay 
hands ,  he  may  receive  the  Holy  Ghost.  In  the  Apos¬ 
tolical  Canons,  which,  though  not  what  they  pretend 
to  be,  are  Christian  precepts  of  an  early  date,  it  is 
said  (Canon  Apost.  xxviii.),  “  If  any  Bishop  shall  ob¬ 
tain  this  dignity  by  means  of  money,  or  any  Priest  or 
Deacon,  let  both  him  and  the  person  who  ordained 
him  be  utterly  excommunicated,  as  Simon  Magus 
was  by  me  Peter.”  The  condemnation  of  Simony 
has  been  continued  to  modern  times,  and  adopted  in 
our  own  Laws  ;  and  it  is  plain  that  not  merely  the 
sacredness  of  spiritual  things,  but  justice  and  decency, 
are  violated  by  the  sale  of  spiritual  offices. 

827.  The  Sale  of  Advowsons,  of  which  we 
have  just  spoken,  may  appear  to  be  at  variance  with 
the  prohibition  of  the  Sale  of  Spiritual  Offices.  But 
this  is  not  so :  for  the  spiritual  office,  the  Order  of 
Priest  or  Deacon,  is  not  bought  or  sold.  The  Right 
of  Private  Patronage  implies  rather  a  sacred  aspect 
in  Property,  than  a  secular  aspect  in  the  Ministry. 
The  principal  Lord  of  the  land  had  originally  a 
religious,  as  well  as  a  civil  Duty,  to  his  tenants. 
And  when  the  Advowson  is  separated  from  the  local 
property,  it  still  implies  a  religious  Duty  in  those 
who  hold  it. 

Yet  the  Laws  against  Simony,  and  the  Right  of 
Private  Patronage,  sometimes  appear  to  be  in  conflict. 
Thus  a  clergyman  may,  as  well  as  any  other  person, 
purchase  the  Advowson  of  a  Living.  But  he  may 
not  purchase  it  so  as  to  secure  himself  the  next 
turn  only. 

828.  The  manner  in  which  Religious  Ministers, 
and  the  Property  by  which  they  are  supported,  are 
protected  and  regulated  by  the  State,  is  one  of  the 
most  important  features  in  the  different  Polity  of  dif¬ 
ferent  Nations.  It  is  their  Ecclesiastical  Polity.  Of 
this  subject  we  shall  have  to  treat  in  the  next  Book. 


BOOK  y, 


POLITY. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  RIGHTS  OF  THE  STATE. 

829.  We  have  already  (465 — 475)  spoken  of 
The  State,  as  a  Conception  applicable  to  every  Com¬ 
munity  of  Men,  among  whom  Rights  and  Obligations 
really  exist.  The  State  is  the  Origin  of  the  Law, 
and  of  the  powers  which  execute  the  Law ;  and 
hence,  is  the  Source  of  the  reality  of  Rights.  The 
State  is  Supreme,  or  Sovereign  over  all  persons  and 
authorities  within  it.  The  State  is  single  and  per¬ 
manent,  while  its  subjects  are  many  and  mutable. 
We  have  also  seen  that  the  State  so  conceived  is  a 
Moral  Agent :  it  has  Duties  ;  and  among  these  Du¬ 
ties,  we  have  been  led  to  notice  especially  the  Duty 
of  Educating  the  people  (474).  We  have  now  to 
consider  more  fully  the  Duties  of  the  State  in  gene¬ 
ral,  and  this  Duty  of  Education  in  particular. 

830.  In  the  case  of  individuals,  Duties  are  ex¬ 
tensions  of  Obligations,  and  Obligations  imply  Rights. 
The  same  is  true  of  States ;  and  therefore  we  have 

VOL.  II.  Q, 


POLITY. 


182 


[book  V. 


to  consider  in  the  first  place  the  Rights  and  Obliga¬ 
tions  of  States. 

We  have  already  spoken  of  the  rights  of  Govern¬ 
ment,  and  the  Obligation  of  Obedience  on  the  part  of 
the  governed  (206).  These  Rights  are  Rights  of  the 
State.  It  is  from  the  State,  that  all  persons  placed 
in  Magistracies  and  Offices  of  Command  derive  their 
Right  to  the  obedience  of  subordinate  persons.  It  is 
as  representing  or  possessing  the  Authority  of  the 
State,  that  they  are  Persons  in  Authority.  The 
Obedience  which  is  rendered  to  the  Magistrate,  is 
rendered  to  the  Law,  and  to  the  State,  which  is  the 
Source  of  the  Law.  The  State  is  the  origin  of 
Rights  in  general,  as  we  have  said ;  but  it  is  the 
origin  of  other  Rights,  by  having  the  Rights  of 
Government.  Other  Rights,  as  Rights  of  Property, 
it  assigns  to  its  subjects  ;  the  Rights  of  Government, 
it  asserts  to  itself. 

831.  The  relation  between  the  Rights  of  indi¬ 
viduals  and  the  Rights  of  the  State,  has  been  vari¬ 
ously  presented  by  different  Moralists.  Some,  as  we 
have  said  (469),  have  considered  the  Rights  of  the 
State  as  formed  by  the  addition  of  the  Rights  of  Indi¬ 
viduals.  According  to  this  doctrine,  individuals 
constitute  a  State,  by  uniting  themselves,  and  con¬ 
tributing  to  a  common  stock  the  rights  which  they 
naturally  possess  ;  sharing  this  stock  of  Rights 
among  themselves  by  common  consent,  and  esta¬ 
blishing  Officers  and  Laws  to  carry  their  agreement 
into  effect. 

We  have  already  (469)  pointed  out  the  untenable 
character  of  this  Doctrine.  Rights  cannot  exist 
without  the  State.  Individual  Rights  cannot  be  sup¬ 
posed  anterior  to  the  State ;  and  thus,  State  Rights 
cannot  be  hypothetically  constructed  out  of  Indivi¬ 
dual  Rights.  But  further:  there  are  some  State 
Rights  in  particular,  which  are  more  evidently,  from 
special  considerations,  not  aggregates  of  individual 


CHAr.  I.] 


RIGHTS  OF  TIIE  STATE. 


183 


Rights.  These  peculiar  State  Rights  we  shall  pro¬ 
ceed  to  describe. 

832.  The  State  has  a  Right  to  the  National 
Territory.  Individuals  derive  their  Rights  to  their 
special  Property  in  Land,  from  the  State,  according 
to  the  Law  of  the  Land  ;  but  they  could  not  derive 
those  Special  Rights  from  the  State,  except  the  State 
had  a  general  Right  to  the  whole.  An  Englishman 
has  a  Right  to  his  landed  Property  in  England,  be¬ 
cause  the  Law  of  England  gives  it  him.  A  French¬ 
man  has  a  Right  to  his  landed  Property  in  France, 
because  the  Law  of  France  gives  it  him.  But  this 
assumes  that  the  English  State,  which  speaks  its 
Will  in  the  English  Law,  has  a  Right  to  the  Soil  of 
England  ;  and  in  like  manner,  the  French  State  is 
assumed  to  have  a  Right  to  the  Soil  of  France.  An 
Englishman  may  possess  land  in  France  ;  but  this 
is,  still,  by  the  Law  of  France;  and  implies  the 
Right  of  the  French  State  to  the  French  Territory. 
There  can  be  no  property  in  Land,  except  what  is 
derived  from  the  State  in  which  the  Land  belongs. 

833.  We  may  illustrate  this  further.  Suppose 
any  County  of  England  were  conceived  as  detached 
from  the  State  ;  as  no  longer  owing  obedience  to  the 
English  State,  or  deriving  Rights  from  it.  What 
Right,  on  this  supposition,  have  the  inhabitants  of  the 
County  to  the  land  on  which  they  live  ?  It  may  be 
said,  that  they  have  the  Right  of  Possession.  But 
Present  Possession  can  confer  no  Right,  on  such  a 
supposition.  Present  Possession  is  a  fact,  which 
may  be  succeeded,  at  any  moment,  by  the  opposite 
fact  of  Dispossession  ;  and  then  the  Right  is  gone. 
Suppose  the  inhabitants  of  this  County  to  be  dispos¬ 
sessed  violently  by  a  body  of  new  settlers  from  any 
place,  at  home  or  abroad  ;  of  what  wrong  can  they 
complain  ?  When  dispossessed,  they  have  no  longer 
the  Right  of  present  Possession.  If  they  urge  the 
Right  of  past  Possession,  how  is  this  a  Right,  and  by 


184 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


what  laws  regulated,  when  the  Law  of  the  Land  is 
rejected  ?  How  have  they  themselves  acknowledged 
the  Right,  either  of  present  or  past  Possession  ? 
Their  ancestors,  Saxons,  Danes,  and  Normans, 
seized  the  Land  by  violence,  disregarding  both  pre¬ 
sent  or  past  Possession.  This  historical  event  is  a 
good  foundation  for  the  Right  of  Property,  if  we  as¬ 
sume  as  men,  in  thinking  of  Rights,  always  do  as¬ 
sume,  that  a  population,  organized  as  a  State,  have 
a  Right  to  the  territory  which  they  occupy  :  for  the 
imperfect  and  undecided  organization  of  the  English 
State,  which,  in  the  times  of  the  struggles  of  the 
Saxons,  Danes,  and  Normans,  might  leave  questions 
of  Right  doubtful,  has  long  since  passed  away.  But 
if  men  reject  this  foundation  of  Rights,  the  ancient 
Wrongs,  from  which  they  derive  their  claims,  will 
prevent  them  from  consistently  complaining  of 
Wrongs,  if,  in  modern  times,  acts  of  violence  be 
done  to  their  damage,  like  the  ancient  acts  of  vio¬ 
lence  of  which  they  now  enjoy  the  profit.  The  only 
good  ground  of  the  complaint  of  Wrong,  when  the 
Right  of  landed  Property  is  violated,  is  the  Right  of 
the  State  to  the  Soil  of  the  Country,  and  the  Will  of 
the  State  expressed  by  the  Law  of  the  Land. 

834.  The  Principle  just  referred  to  ;  that  a 
Community,  organized  as  a  State,  has  a  Right  to 
possess  their  Territory ;  and  the  Individuals  can¬ 
not  acquire  Property  in  Land,  except  by  derivation 
from  a  State,  is  often  carried  further  ;  thus  showing 
how  entirely  the  Principle  is  accepted.  It  is  main¬ 
tained,  for  instance,  that  a  Civilized  State,  on  dis¬ 
covering  a  country  of  Savages,  may  take  possession 
of  it ;  and  that  the  possession  of  the  Savages  must 
be  regulated  according  to  the  Laws  of  the  Civilized 
State.  But  these  are  questions  of  Internationa.1  Law, 
which  we  shall  not  here  discuss. 

835.  Another  Right  of  the  State  is  the  Right  of 
making  War  on  other  States.  This  Right  is  neces- 


CHAP.  I.]  RIGHTS  OF  THE  STATE.  185 

sary  to  the  existence  of  the  State,  as  a  distinct  and 
independent  agent,  which  is  sovereign  over  all  its 
subjects  within  it,  and  protects  them  against  all 
harm  from  without.  If  its  subjects  be  injured,  or  its 
independence  assailed,  by  a  foreign  State,  it  has  no 
resource  but  remonstrance,  which  may  inevitably 
lead  to  War;  since  States  have  no  common  tribunal 
before  which  injury  done  by  one  to  the  other  can  be 
inquired  into,  and  redress  given. 

836.  This  Right  of  making  War  is  not  a  Right 
arising  from  the  combination  of  the  Rights  of  in¬ 
dividuals.  England  has  a  right  to  make  war  on 
France,  on  due  grounds  ;-^but  no  one  or  more  Eng¬ 
lishmen  have  a  Right  to  make  war  on  any  selected 
number  of  Frenchmen.  In  the  case  of  a  National 
War,  individuals  commit  acts,  which  would  be  mur¬ 
der  and  robbery,  if  they  were  not  committed  under 
the  Authority  of  the  State.  It  is  true,  there  have 
been  rude  times  in  Europe  (and  there  may  still  exist 
such  in  other  countries),  when  the  Right  of  Private 
War  subsisted.  But  even  in  these  times,  this  Right 
did  not  exist  as  an  original  Right  of  individuals ; 
but  as  a  Right  given  by  the  Law,  and  limited  by  the 
Law  ;  and  if  anyone  used  violence  out  of  the  limits 
of  the  Law,  he  was  treated  as  a  malefactor.  The 
Right  of  Private  War  was  especially  subordinate 
to,  and  limited  by,  the  Right  of  National  War.  So 
far  as  sovereignty  had  its  power,  the  Sovereign, 
when  he  made  War  upon  another  Sovereign,  forbade 
Private  Wars  among  his  Subjects  and  forbade 
Private  Treaties  of  Peace  with  the  Subjects  of  the 
enemy.  Thus,  even  in  the  times  of  Private  War, 
the  Right  of  the  State  to  make  National  War  was 
the  Fundamental  and  Paramount  Right.  But  we 
must  further  add,  that  a  State,  which  recognizes 
Private  War,  is  very  imperfectly  organized.  Under 
such  a  State,  men  possess  in  a  very  incomplete  de¬ 
gree,  the  Rights,  of  Protection  from  Violence,  Se- 

q  2 


186 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


curity  in  their  Property,  and  the  like.  As  the  Nation 
more  entirely  assumes  the  genuine  attributes  of  a 
State,  the  right  of  Private  War  declines,  till  it  is  ex¬ 
tinct.  But  the  Right  of  National  War,  during  this 
progress  of  improvement,  undergoes  no  diminution. 
The  most  completely  organized  State  possesses  this 
Right  at  least  as  fully  as  the  Sovereign  of  a  body 
of  Feudal  Lords  ever  did.  And  thus,  this  Right 
belongs  to  the  State,  as  a  State  ;  and  not  in  virtue 
of  any  mode  of  composition,  by  which  the  State  may 
be  supposed  to  have  assumed  its  existence. 

837.  We  may  remark  further,  that  the  Right 
of  the  State  to  the  National  Territory,  of  which  we 
have  already  spoken,  necessarily  carries  with  it  the 
Right  of  making  War,  when  the  National  Territory 
is  infringed,  if  no  redress  or  defence  can  be  had  in 
any  other  Way.  The  Right  of  each  man  to  his 
Property,  is  realized  and  enforced  by  the  power  of 
the  State  ;  but  the  Right  of  each  State  to  its  Terri¬ 
tory,  if  contest  arise,  can  be  realized  and  enforced 
only  by  Treaty  ;  or  if  that  fail,  by  the  power  of  the 
Sword.  And  thus,  a  State  has,  as  one  of  its  charac¬ 
teristic  attributes,  the  Right  of  making  War  on  Other 
States,  on  due  occasions. 

838.  Another  Right  peculiarly  a  State  Right, 
not  derivable  from  any  supposable  Rights  of  indi¬ 
viduals,  is  the  Right  of  Bodily  Punishment,  and 
especially  the  Right  of  Capital  Punishment.  In  ex¬ 
ercising  the  Right  of  War,  the  State  necessarily  as¬ 
sumes  a  Right  to  put  in  peril,  and  to  expose  to  de¬ 
struction,  the  lives  of  its  subjects,  who  serve  it  as 
soldiers.  But  in  that  case,  it  is  not  that  the  State 
inflicts  the  blow,  but  that  it  cannot  avert  it,  under 
the  circumstances.  In  the  case  of  Capital  Punish¬ 
ment,  the  State  itself  takes  away  the  Life  of  its  sub¬ 
ject,  inflicting  a  sudden  and  violent  death.  The 
Right  of  doing  this  is  universally  assumed  in  States. 
And  it  is  assumed  necessarily.  Without  the  exer- 


CHAP.  I.] 


RIGHTS  OF  THE  STATE. 


187 


cise  of  this  Right,  the  State  could  not  discharge  its 
office.  Its  business  is,  to  give  reality  to  the  Rights 
of  men  in  Society.  But  Rights  cannot  have  reality, 
except  they  be  as  real  as  the  other  springs  of  human 
action.  In  order  that  Rights  may  be  real  for  me, 
the  Rights  of  another  man  must  be  as  real  in  my 
eyes  as  the  Objects  of  Desire.  To  each  man,  the 
Obligations  of  other  men  must  be  realities,  as  well 
as  his  own  Appetite,  Anger,  Avarice,  or  Ambition  ; 
the  former  must  influence  his  hopes  and  fears  in  the 
same  manner,  stimulate  and  restrain  him  in  the  same 
manner,  as  the  latter.  But  the  highest  and  most 
real  of  the  objects  of  men’s  hopes  and  fears  are 
Life  and  Death,  accompanied  with  Honour  and 
Shame.  A  violent  and  ignominious  Death  fills  the 
full  measure  of  the  object  of  man’s  fear.  The  force 
of  Desire,  Appetite,  Anger,  and  the  like,  is  fully  ex¬ 
pressed,  when  a  man  loves  objects  as  his  life,  and 
dreads  them  as  such  a  death  ;  but  it  is  not  fully  ex¬ 
pressed  by  anything  short  of  this.  Hence,  Rights 
and  Oligations  will  not  be  real  in  Society,  to  the 
same  extent  as  other  objects  of  action  are  real,  if 
they  be  not  sanctioned  by  the  prospect  of  Life  and 
Death,  as  depending  upon  the  observance  or  viola¬ 
tion  of  Obligations.  If  the  sanctions  of  Rights  stop 
short  of  this,  there  will  be  some  region  of  human 
action,  in  which  the  lawless  springs  of  action  are  not 
balanced  :  some  province  of  human  nature,  in  which 
the  extreme  forms  of  passion,  appetite,  anger,  and 
the  like,  are  not  governed  by  any  efficient  authority. 

839.  The  necessity  of  the  Right  of  Capital 
Punishment  being  vested  in  the  State,  will  also  ap¬ 
pear  from  the  following  considerations.  If  the  State 
do  not  possess  this  Right,  such  a  Right  may  be  as¬ 
sumed  by  another  body  of  persons,  who  by  that  very 
assumption  become  more  powerful  than  the  State, 
and  may  seize  all  the  powers  of  the  State.  If  there 
were  no  Capital  Punishment  for  Treason,  and  the 


188 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


like  crimes  ;  an  association  of  men  might  arm  them- 
selves,  and,  making  death  the  punishment  for  oppos¬ 
ing  them,  might  compel  the  citizens  to  obey  them, 
and  to  disobey  the  legal  authorities.  For  what 
would  other  inferior  punishments  avail,  to  avert  such 
a  result  ?  Who  will  be  found  ready,  unarmed,  to 
inflict  imprisonment  or  exile  on  a  body  of  armed 
and  resolute  men  ?  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that,  in 
extreme  cases  at  least,  Capital  Punishments  are  ne¬ 
cessary  to  the  existence  of  the  State  :  and  therefore, 
the  right  of  inflicting  such  Punishments  must  belong 
to  the  State. 

840.  The  Right  of  Capital  Punishment  is  a 
special  and  original  State  Right,  and  does  not  arise 
from  any  combination  of  individual  Rights.  This 
Right  cannot  be  conceived  to  be  a  Right  arising 
from  a  common  consent,  and  given  to  the  State  by 
an  understood  compact  between  it  and  individuals  ; 
each  person  conveying  to  the  State  a  Right  over  his 
own  life,  in  case  of  his  committing  a  capital  crime. 
For,  in  the  first  place,  the  assumption  that  man,  as 
an  individual,  has  such  a  Right,  is  contrary  to  com¬ 
mon  Morality.  If  a  man  have  a  Right  over  his  own 
life,  he  may  cast  off  life  when  he  pleases,  and  Sui¬ 
cide  is  no  sin.  And  even  if  it  were  allowed  that  a 
man  has  a  Right  over  his  own  life  ;  the  further  as¬ 
sumption,  that  he  has  transferred  this  Right  to  the 
State,  by  a  transaction  of  which  he  was  unconscious, 
and  in  which  he  had  no  choice,  is  so  extravagant, 
that  it  cannot  afford  a  satisfactory  basis  for  Rights. 
Thus,  we  reject  the  notion  of  this  Right  arising  from 
consent  or  compact,  and  consider  it  as  a  special  and 
original  State  Right. 

841.  Again,  there  is  another  Right  which  is 
exercised  by  all  States ;  the  Right  of  imposing 
Oaths  ;  for  instance,  Oaths  of  Testimony,  and  Oaths 
of  Office.  This  Right,  also,  is  necessarily  exer¬ 
cised  by  States.  Such  Oaths  identify  the  Citizen’s 


CHAP.  I.] 


RIGHTS  OF  THE  STATE. 


189 


Obligations  with  his  Duties.  As  a  Witness,  to 
give  true  testimony ;  as  a  Judge,  to  administer 
justice  ;  are  always  Duties.  By  means  of  Oaths, 
these  Duties  become  Obligations  imposed  by  a  dis¬ 
tinct  Contract,  and  accepted  by  a  solemn  Engage¬ 
ment.  And  if  there  be  not  this  identity  of  Duty 
and  Obligation  in  general,  the  State  cannot  subsist. 
For  the  State  consists  of  men,  who  are  moral  be¬ 
ings  ;  and  who  cannot,  without  an  intolerable  viola¬ 
tion  of  their  nature,  go  on  continually  discharging 
Obligations,  which  have  no  connexion  with  their 
Duties.  The  essential  part  of  the  business  of  the 
State  must  be  regarded  with  the  solemnity  which  be¬ 
longs  to  moral  acts ;  otherwise,  the  State  itself  can¬ 
not  be  a  permanent  reality,  in  the  minds  of  moral 
men.  And,  as  we  have  already  said  (677),  the 
natural  way  of  acknowledging  and  marking  this 
moral  solemnity,  among  religious  men,  is  by  acting, 
and  declaring  that  we  will  act,  as  in  the  presence 
of  God ;  that  is,  by  taking  an  Oath  to  act  rightly. 
The  thoughtlessness  of  men,  and  the  excuses  which, 
in  common  life,  they  make  for  falsehood,  deceit,  in¬ 
justice,  partiality,  inconsistency,  passion,  and  the 
like,  are  such,  that  it  is  requisite,  for  the  essential 
business  of  a  State,  to  demand  of  them  another 
frame  of  mind  than  that  which  is  usual  in  their  com¬ 
mon  intercourse.  If  the  Witness  were  to  give  his 
Evidence,  the  Jury,  their  Verdict,  the  Judge,  his 
Sentence,  with  the  carelessness  and  perversion  of 
truth  and  right,  which  men  often  allow  themselves 
in  common  conversation  ;  the  administration  of  jus¬ 
tice  would  be  impossible.  If  the  Witness  told  his 
tale,  and  the  Judge  gave  his  opinion,  with  the  levity 
which  prevails  at  a  convivial  meeting,  how  could  a 
moral  citizen  bear  a  part  in  a  court  of  Justice  ?  On 
such  occasions,  then,  men  must  be  grave,  must  be 
thoughtful,  and  must  engage  to  be  so.  The  occa¬ 
sion  and  the  acts  must  be  marked  as  solemn  ;  and 


190 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


this,  as  we  have  said,  is  necessarily  done,  among  re¬ 
ligious  men,  by  the  Witness  narrating,  and  the  Judge 
deciding,  as  in  the  presence  of  God.  And  the  occa¬ 
sion  is  marked  as  solemn,  by  each  person  declaring 
that  he  does  this;  that  is,  by  the  Oaths  of  the  Wit¬ 
ness,  and  of  the  Jurymen,  taken  at  the  time  of  the 
trial;  and  by  the  Oath  of  Office,  which  the  Judge 
has  previously  taken. 

842.  The  necessity  of  the  Right  of  adminis¬ 
tering  Oaths  being  vested  in  the  State,  will  also  ap¬ 
pear  from  the  following  considerations.  If  the  State 
do  not  exercise  this  Right,  a  body  of  the  Citizens, 
bound  together  by  their  common  belief  in  God  and 
in  his  Judgments,  may  administer,  to  each  other, 
Oaths  to  co-operate  in  their  common  purposes  ;  and 
may  thus,  when  their  purposes  become  inconsistent 
with,  or  hostile  to,  the  existing  Government,  over¬ 
throw  the  Government,  and  take  the  Authority  of  the 
State  into  their  own  hands.  For  a  State,  not  claim¬ 
ing  a  moral  reality  for  its  acts,  by  means  of  religious 
solemnities,  could  not  stand  against  a  great  body  of 
citizens  bound  together  by  religion.  If  such  citizens 
be  brought  before  the  tribunals  for  hostility  to  the 
government ;  the  witnesses,  the  jury,  the  judge,  may 
be  of  the  religious  party ;  and,  not  being  bound  to 
their  official  act  by  religion,  they  will  act  so  as  not 
to  be  the  effective  agents  of  laws  which  they  deem 
unjust  and  cruel.  And  if  the  laws  be  still  enforced, 
by  the  agency  of  citizens  acting  without  any  ac¬ 
knowledged  tie  of  religion,  the  laws  must  soon  cease 
to  be  regarded  as  just ;  for  morality  cannot  long 
subsist  in  men’s  minds  without  religion.  When  this 
has  taken  place,  and  the  laws  are  no  longer  support¬ 
ed  by  an  opinion  of  their  general  justice,  the  empire 
of  the  law  becomes  the  empire  of  mere  force,  which 
the  moral  nature  of  man  will  not. allow  to  continue 
long  among  men. 

Thus  the  ground  of  the  necessity  of  Oaths  in  a 


CHAP.  I.] 


RIGHTS  OF  THE  STATE. 


191 


State  is,  that  Morality  cannot  long  subsist  in  men’s 
minds  without  Religion  ;  that  for  the  efficacy  of  re¬ 
ligion,  a  recognition  of  it  by  the  State  is  requisite ; 
and  that  this  recognition  is  especially  requisite  on 
certain  solemn  occasions,  such  as  judicial  proceed¬ 
ings,  the  assumption  of  important  State  offices,  and 
the  like. 

843.  If  it  be  said  that  Religion  may  be  effica¬ 
cious  in  making  men  true  and  just  on  solemn  occa¬ 
sions,  without  being  publicly  recognized  and  refer¬ 
red  to  ;  we  reply,  that  though  this  may  be  so  with 
some  persons,  the  State  can  never  know  which  per¬ 
sons  are,  and  which  are  not,  of  this  number,  without 
the  use  of  some  Formula  referring  to  Religion  :  nor 
can  it  be  known,  without  the  use  of  some  such  For¬ 
mula,  whether  any  particular  person  considers  the 
occasion  a  solemn  one  or  not. 

844.  The  State,  therefore,  necessarily  has  the 
Right  of  administering  Oaths  of  Testimony,  of  Office, 
and  the  like.  And  this  State  Right,  like  the  others, 
is  a  special  and  original  Right  of  the  State,  not  de¬ 
rived  from  any  Combination  of  individual  Rights. 
For  though  men,  in  a  Contract  or  other  transaction, 
may  be  willing  to  accept  Oaths  from  one  another  ; 
no  one  man  can  be  conceived  as  having  any  Right  to 
impose  an  Oath  upon  another  man.  If  there  be  any 
difficulty  in  ascribing  to  the  State  a  Right  to  ques¬ 
tion  or  limit  a  man’s  actions  on  account  of  his  reli¬ 
gious  belief  or  religious  sentiments,  there  must  be  a 
much  greater  difficulty  in  ascribing  such  a  Right  to 
any  individual.  And  as  no  individual  could  have 
any  portion  of  such  a  Right,  no  collection  of  Indi¬ 
viduals  could  have  the  Right :  and  the  State  Right  to 
impose  Oaths  cannot  arise  from  the  combination  of 
the  Rights  of  the  Individuals,  of  whom  the  State 
consists. 

845.  It  may  perhaps  be  said,  that  an  assemblage 
of  religious  individuals,  associating  themselves  for 


192 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


their  mutual  advantage,  might  exclude  from  their 
body,  all  who  would  not,  upon  due  occasions,  make 
certain  religious  declarations.  And  this  might  be  so  ; 
but  we  cannot  conceive  this  as  the  origin  of  the 
Right  of  the  State  to  impose  Oaths.  For  to  imagine 
this,  would  be  to  suppose  the  State  to  be,  not  only  a 
voluntary  association  of  individuals  ;  but  of  individu¬ 
als  in  whose  minds  religious  belief  and  religious 
sentiments  were  already  established,  and  who  were 
drawn  together  by  their  religious  sympathies.  But 
this  is  an  impossible  supposition  :  for  we  cannot  con¬ 
ceive  Religion  without  Morality,  or  Morality  without 
Society  already  established.  We  know  that  the 
State  does  not  derive  its  religious  belief  from  the 
spontaneous  religious  sympathies  of  individuals  ;  but 
that  individuals  derive  their  religious  sentiments,  in  a 
great  measure,  from  the  Society  in  which  they  are 
born  and  live.  Men  bind  themselves  by  Oaths, 
under  the  direction  of  the  State,  not  as  if  it  were 
part  of  a  social  contract  that  they  should  do  so  ;  but 
looking  upon  the  State  as  a  Divine  appointment,  and 
a  channel  through  which  the  forms  of  the  most  so¬ 
lemn  engagements  must  necessarily  be  derived. 

846.  We  are  thus  led  to  reckon,  as  Rights  of 
States,  besides  the  general  Rights  of  Government, 
these  four  :  the  Right  to  the  National  Territory  ;  the 
Right  of  War  and  Peace  ;  the  Right  of  Capital 
Punishment  ;  and  the  Right  of  imposing  Oaths. 
These  Rights  are  all  necessary  to  the  continued  ex¬ 
istence  of  States  ;  and,  as  we  have  seen,  they  are 
not  derivative  or  cumulative  attributes,  but  original 
and  peculiar.  We  have  called  them  State  Rights, 
in  order  to  distinguish  them  from  Individual  Rights. 

To  Individual  Rights  correspond  Obligations  ;  and 
it  may  be  asked  whether  the  State  has  any  Obliga¬ 
tions  corresponding  to  its  Rights.  The  answer  to 
this  Question  will  occupy  the  next  Chapter. 


CHAP.  II. 1  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  STATE. 


193 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  STATE. 

847.  The  State  is,  as  we  have  said,  the  Sourt 
of  Law  and  of  Authority,  and  the  Realizer  of  indi¬ 
vidual  Rights.  The  State  Rights  exist,  in  order  that 
the  State  may  discharge  this  its  office.  And  hence, 
the  Obligation  corresponding  to  the  State  Rights  is, 
that  the  State  shall  be  the  State  ;  that  it  shall  deliver 
and  administer  Laws,  and  thus  realize  Rights.  And 
this  it  must  do,  not  for  a  short  time  merely  ;  not  for 
one  generation  only  ;  but  permanently,  and  with  a 
prospect  of  permanence.  Hence,  to  provide  for  this 
permanence  is  an  Obligation  of  the  State.  This  we 
may  describe  as  the  Obligation  of  Self-preservation. 

848.  We  more  frequently  hear  the  Duty  of 
Self-preservation  ascribed  to  the  State  :  but  we  shall, 
in  general,  use  the  term  Obligation  in  speaking  of 
this  subject :  not  only  because  Obligation  is  the  term 
corresponding  to  Right ;  but  also,  because  this  Obli¬ 
gation  is  enforced  by  a  real  Sanction,  as  individual 
obligations  are  :  for  if  the  State  do  not  fulfil  this  Ob- 
ligation  of  Self-preservation,  it  will  not  be  preserved, 
but  will  be  dissolved,  and  will  cease  to  be  a  State. 
If,  however,  we  wish  to  retain  the  term  Duty  in  this 
case,  we  may  speak  of  the  Duty  of  Self-preservation 
as  the  Lower  Duty  of  a  State,  in  comparison  with 
other  Duties,  such  as  the  Duty  of  rendering  its  sub¬ 
jects  moral  and  intelligent,  which  are  its  Higher 
Duties. 

849.  This  State  Obligation  of  Self-preserva¬ 
tion  divides  itself  into  several  branches  ;  related  in 
some  measure  to  the  different  State  Rights  of  which 
we  have  spoken.  Those  Rights  are  assigned  to  the 
StaTe  for  certain  purposes ;  and  the  State  is  under 
Obligations  to  employ  them  for  those  purposes, 

VOL.  II.  13  Q  2 


194 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


The  Right  of  making  War  is  a  necessary  appen¬ 
dage  to  the  Right  to  the  National  Territory  ;  and  is 
to  be  used,  when  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  de¬ 
fending  the  Nation  from  every  intrusion  of  an  enemy 
upon  its  soil  ;  and  also,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
the  citizens  from  all  other  violence  and  injustice,  in¬ 
flicted  by  strangers.  The  State  is  obliged  to  take 
measures  which  may  have  such  an  effect ;  and  this 
is  the  Obligation  of  National  Defence.  All  individual 
Rights  stand  within  the  fence  of  the  National  Right ; 
and  the  State  is  bound  to  keep  this  fence  entire  and 
substantial.  For  this  purpose,  the  State  is  bound  to 
provide  an  Army,  or  the  means  of  raising  an  Army, 
when  the  need  arises ;  and  to  provide  the  means  also 
of  supplying  its  Army  with  Officers,  and  with  Muni¬ 
tions  of  War.  The  State  is  bound,  also,  to  keep  a 
watchful  eye  upon  the  movements  of  other  States ; 
and  if  it  sees  them  preparing  any  evil  for  itself,  to 
avert  the  danger  by  timely  precautions.  For  this 
purpose,  Negotiations  with  other  States  may  be  re¬ 
quisite  ;  and  hence,  Embassies,  Treaties,  and  the 
like.  Such  negotiations,  in  the  discussions  to  which 
they  lead,  necessarily  assume  the  existence  of  Rights 
and  Obligations  between  Nations  ;  and  thus,  we  are 
referred  to  an  International  Jus ,  of  which  we  shall 
hereafter  have  to  speak.  The  Obligation  of  National 
Defence  is  the  first  Obligation  of  a  Nation,  for  it  is 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  a  Nation.  Without 
the  fulfilment  of  this  Obligation,  a  State  cannot  exist, 
even  in  the  most  imperfect  form.  A  State  which 
used  no  means  of  defending  itself,  would  soon  be 
blotted  out  of  the  Map,  by  the  pressure  of  surround¬ 
ing  States. 

850.  The  next  branch  of  the  State’s  Obligation 
of  Self-preservation  is  the  Obligation  of  upholding 
Law.  The  last-mentioned  obligation  regarded  foes 
without  the  nation ;  this  regards  citizens  within  it. 
In  the  former  case,  we  spoke  of  maintaining  the  ex- 


CHAP.  II.]  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  STATE.  105 

ternal  fence  which  protects  the  National  Existence ; 
we  now  speak  of  keeping  up  the  internal  barriers  of 
individual  Rights.  These  Rights  are  to  be  realized 
by  the  Law  ;  and  except  they  are  made  real  by  the 
enforcement  of  the  Law,  they  cease  to  exist,  and  the 
citizens  cease  to  be  citizens.  In  this  case,  the  State 
is  destroyed  by  the  dissolution  of  its  internal  organi¬ 
zation,  as  completely  as  if  it  were  obliterated  by  ex¬ 
ternal  violence. 

851.  There  are,  however,  various  degrees  of 
such  Disorganization,  according  as  the  Laws  are 
enforced  with  more  or  less  vigour  and  steadiness. 
Looking  merely  to  the  Self-preservation  of  the  State, 
if  the  Rights  of  the  more  Powerful  Class  of  the  Citi¬ 
zens  be  upheld  for  them,  the  State  may  long  subsist, 
although  there  are  other  Classes  whose  Rights  are 
neglected,  or  gradually  encroached  upon.  That  to 
do  this,  is  a  violation  of  the  Duty  of  a  State,  we  shall 
hereafter  see.  But  that  the  long-continued  existence 
of  a  State  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  continued  pre¬ 
valence  of  illegal  oppression  of  some  classes  of  the 
community,  the  history  of  many  nations  abundantly 
shows.  Still,  so  far  as  such  practices  prevail,  the 
organization  of  a  State  is  imperfect ;  its  functions  do 
not  proceed  in  a  healthy  manner.  The  imperfect  or 
unequal  administration  of  the  laws  may  not  be  the 
immediate  Death  of  the  State,  but  it  is  a  grievous 
Disease,  however  long  it  may  be  protracted.  A 
State,  in  order  to  preserve  its  full  vitality,  must  make 
the  laws  to  be  respected  ;  and  respected  alike  by  all 
classes,  high  and  low  ;  rich  and  poor.  So  far  as 
power  and  wealth  can  shield  their  possessors  from 
the  hand  of  the  law,  such  men  are  placed  above  the 
law ;  and  the  State  has  a  tendency  to  fall  to  pieces, 
and  to  cease  to  be  a  living  State. 

852.  Another  branch  of  the  Obligation  of  Self- 
preservation  belonging  to  States  is  the  Obligation  of 
repressing  Sedition.  By  Sedition,  is  meant  any 


296 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


course  of  action  separating  the  citizens  from  the 
State,  and  transferring  to  a  Rival  Body  the  obedience 
due  to  the  State.  When  this  Rival  Body  places  its 
strength  in  external  force,  it  is  an  Armed  Sedition  ; 
when  it  rests  its  pretensions  upon  defects  in  the  Right 
of  the  Governor,  it  is  a  Political  Sedition  ;  when  it 
draws  men  together  by  their  religious  sympathies, 
it  is  a  Religions  Sedition.  Of  whatever  kind  the 
Sedition  be,  it  tends,  so  far  as  it  attains  its  object,  to 
a  destruction  of  the  State.  The  establishment  of  a  Ri¬ 
val  Body,  whose  officers  and  laws  are  obeyed,  rather 
than  those  of  the  State,  necessarily  interferes  with 
and  disturbs,  and  in  its  natural  result,  puts  a  stop  to, 
the  functions  of  government.  In  this  case,  as  in  the 
others  just  mentioned,  the  Life  of  the  State,  the  body 
politic,  is  destroyed  ;  and  as  its  destruction,  from  de¬ 
fect  of  national  defence,  may  be  represented  as  death 
by  External  Violence,  and  its  destruction  from  de¬ 
fective  administration  of  the  laws,  as  death  by  Inter¬ 
nal  Disease ;  so  the  destruction  of  the  State  by 
sedition,  may  be  compared  to  the  fatal  effect  of  an 
Excrescence  which  grows  in  the  body,  and  draws  to 
itself  the  nutriment  which  should  supply  the  vital 
powers. 

853.  It  is  a  part  of  the  Obligation  of  Self-pre¬ 
servation  belonging  to  a  State,  to  suppress  Sedition, 
so  as  to  avert  this  tendency.  And  this  Obligation 
has  always  been  acknowledged  and  acted  on  by  all 
States.  The  highest  form  of  Sedition  is  Treason. 
This,  in  the  English  Monarchy,  is  defined  to  be  an 
offence  committed  against  the  security  of  the  king  or 
kingdom  ;  as  to  compass  the  death  of  the  king,  or  to 
levy  war  against  him,  or  to  adhere  to  his  enemies,  or 
give  them  aid,  within  the  realm  or  without.  In  all 
monarchies,  such  crimes  have  been  visited  with  the 
severest  punishments.  But  in  other  forms  of  govern¬ 
ment,  no  less  than  in  monarchies,  attempts  to  over¬ 
throw  the  existing  Government  have  universally 


CHAP.  II.]  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  STATE. 


197 


been  treated  as  Crimes  of  the  highest  order.  In  free 
States,  attempts  to  crush  the  Freedom  of  the  People, 
have  been  commonly  considered  as  no  less  atrocious 
crimes,  than  attacks  upon  the  Sovereign  Authorities  : 
and  where  the  usual  course  of  law  has  been  insuffi¬ 
cient  to  resist  and  punish  such  attempts,  extraordi¬ 
nary  acts,  on  the  part  of  some  members  of  the  State, 
have  been  often  and  generally  looked  upon  as  neces¬ 
sary  results  of  the  State’s  obligation  to  preserve  its 
free  condition  ;  such  acts  were  Tyrannicide ,  and  the 
putting  to  Death,  or  sending  into  Exile  ambitious 
men  in  ancient  times  ;  such  acts  have  been  the 
Impeachment  of  statesmen  in  England  for  attempting 
to  render  the  royal  power  absolute. 

854.  The  word  Treason  ( trahison ,  proditio ) 
implies  not  only  hostile  intentions,  but  fraud,  and 
breach  of  trust  and  generally,  treachery ,  a  word  of 
the  same  origin.  These  notions  are,  in  this  general 
manner,  combined  with  the  notion  of  hostility  to  the 
State,  or  the  Sovereign  ;  because  Fidelity  to  the 
State,  and  to  the  Sovereign,  are  reckoned  among  the 
duties  of  all  citizens.  A  man  who  joins  with  stran¬ 
gers,  in  harming  his  own  Country,  is  considered  as 
breaking  those  bands  of  national  duty  and  affection 
which,  in  their  hold  upon  good  men,  come  next  after  the 
ties  of  family  duty  and  affection  :  and  hence,  is  looked 
upon  with  the  same  kind  of  sentiments  with  which  we 
look  upon  a  man  who  joins  with  strangers  in  harming 
his  father  or  his  mother.  A  man  who  is  hostile  to  his 
country  may,  it  would  seem,  be  treated  as  a  public  ene¬ 
my  ;  he  deserves  not  to  receive  the  benefit  of  his  coun¬ 
try’s  laws,  or  to  be  protected  in  his  property  or  other 
rights.  And  hence,  the  existing  Government,  which, 
in  order  to  justify  and  protect  its  own  existence,  must 
identify  itself  with  the  Country,  treats  its  own  ene¬ 
mies  as  the  enemies  of  their  country,  and  punishes 
them  as  Traitors. 

This  view  shows  itself  in  the  distinction  made  be- 

r  2 


198 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


tween  domestic  and  foreign  enemies  ;  for  foreigners 
coming  into  the  country  in  a  hostile  manner  are  to 
be  dealt  with  as  an  enemy  ;  and  if  taken,  executed 
by  martial  law.  A  foreigner  cannot  be  executed  for 
Treason,  say  the  English  Lawyers,  for  he  owes  no 
allegiance  to  the  King. 

855.  Sedition  aims  at  its  objects  by  Conspiracy , 
the  mutual  understanding  established  as  to  the  Plot , 
or  Plan  of  proceeding  ;  and  by  Rebellion ,  the  open 
use  of  armed  force  against  the  Government.  If  a 
Government  do  not  put  down  Conspirators  and  Re¬ 
bels,  it  must  soon  cease  to  be  a  Government  ;  the 
State,  as  represented  by  the  Government,  must  perish. 
And  thus,  as  we  have  said,  the  repression  of  Armed 
Sedition  is  an  Obligation  incumbent  upon  the  Gov¬ 
ernment,  as  essential  to  its  Self-preservation. 

856.  The  repression  of  Political  Sedition  is,  in 
some  of  its  forms,  generally  acknowledged  as  a  part 
of  the  State’s  Obligation  of  Self-preservation.  For 
instance,  if  a  man  declare  and  maintain  that  the  king 
is  an  usurper,  and  has  no  title  to  the  crown,  such 
discourse  must  be  conceived  to  have  a  tendency  to 
incite  the  king’s  subjects  to  rebellion,  and  is  criminal. 
The  English  law  makes  it  a  grave  misdemeanour  to 
print  or  publish  Seditious  Libels  against  the  King  or 
his  Government.  But  the  genius  of  free  govern¬ 
ments,  which  tolerates  a  considerable  difference  of 
opinions  with  regard  to  the  justice  and  wisdom  of  the 
acts  of  the  Government,  will  not  allow  everything 
said  against  the  Government  and  its  acts  to  be  treated 
as  Seditious.  Accordingly,  the  English  Law  per¬ 
mits  a  man  to  discuss  the  measures  adopted  by  the 
King  and  his  Ministers ;  but  requires  this  discussion 
to  be  conducted  fairly,  temperately,  and  with  de¬ 
cency,  without  attributing  corrupt  motives. 

857.  The  repression  of  Religious  Sedition  is, 
under  some  of  its  forms,  evidently  necessary,  as  the 
only  means  of  Self-preservation  which  the  Govern- 


CHAP.  II. j 


OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  STATE. 


199 


ment  can  find ;  for  instance,  where  the  Seditious 
Party  teaches,  on  Religious  grounds,  obedience  to  a 
Supremacy,  the  rival  of  the  Sovereign  Power  in  the 
State  ;  or  where  the  Party  teaches,  on  religious 
grounds,  resistance  to  the  Laws.  The  rival  Supre¬ 
macy  may  be  claimed  for  a  religious  Body  or  Person 
residing  within  the  nation  ;  in  which  case  it  is  more 
plainly  of  a  seditious  character.  If,  within  the 
boundary  of  the  State,  there  be  claimed  for  a  foreign 
potentate,  or  other  person,  a  Supremacy  rivalling 
that  of  the  Sovereign,  the  offence  has  much  of  the 
character  of  Treason.  But  still,  since  the  obedience 
claimed  for  the  religious  Supremacy  will,  it  may  be 
supposed,  be  demanded  through  the  means  of  a 
religious  organization  existing  in  the  country  itself, 
a  Religious,  will  not  differ  much  from  a  Political 
Sedition  ;  except  that  the  opinions  by  which  the  Sedi¬ 
tious  are  bound  together,  will  exercise  their  influence 
upon  men’s  minds  in  a  different  way  in  the  one  case 
and  in  the  other.  The  amount  of  the  necessity  for 
repressing  a  Religious  Sedition  of  this  kind,  will 
depend  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  rival  Supremacy 
which  is  claimed.  If  what  is  asserted  by  the  Party 
be  merely  a  Supremacy  in  spiritual  matters,  Self- 
preservation  will  not  require  the  State  to  suppress 
the  Party  ;  provided  the  State  have  such  a  control 
over  the  organization  of  the  Party,  as  to  confine  the 
authority  of  the  religious  ministers  to  its  proper  spi¬ 
ritual  province.  This  stipulation  is  necessary  ;  for 
the  influence  of  religious  ministers  is,  in  the  course 
of  human  events,  almost  inevitably  extended  from 
spiritual  to  temporal  concerns.  And  if,  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  the  State  having  too  little  control  over  the 
religious  authorities  subordinate  to  the  rival  Supre¬ 
macy,  the  spiritual  Supremacy  which  is  asserted, 
interfere  with  and  overpower  the  temporal  Sove¬ 
reignty  ;  the  State  must  perish.  We  have  spoken 
of  a  Sedition  in  general,  as  an  Excrescence,  which 


200 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


diseases  the  body  politic  by  drawing  to  it  the  nutri¬ 
ment  which  should  support  the  bodily  life.  Retain¬ 
ing  the  same  image,  we  may  say  that  a  Seditious 
Religious  Party  in  the  Social  Body,  is  a  Spiritual 
Excrescence  ;  which,  though  not  immediately  visible 
in  a  material  form,  may  destroy  the  health  ;  as  a 
vehement  and  ungoverned  train  of  thoughts  may 
affect  the  texture  of  the  brain,  and  produce  the  most 
fatal  disease. 

858.  If  it  be  questioned  whether  the  State  have 
the  Right  to  take  measures  in  order  to  repress  a  dan¬ 
gerous  Religious  Party,  the  question  may  be  easily 
answered,  on  the  principles  already  laid  down.  The 
State  is  the  only  Authority  by  which  the  Rights  of 
citizens  are  realized  and  upheld.  It  may  make  this, 
its  support  of  the  Rights  of  its  subjects,  dependent 
upon  any  conditions  which  its  own  preservation 
requires.  If  there  be  a  rival  Spiritual  Authority,  the 
State  may  very  reasonably  demand  from  a  citizen  a 
renunciation  of  the  rival  Spiritual  Power’s  temporal 
Authority  within  the  national  territory.  If  the  citizen 
refuse  to  make  such  a  renunciation,  he  has  no  injus¬ 
tice  done  him,  if  he  be  not  allowed  either  the  Right 
of  property  in  land,  or  any  other  Right.  For  all 
these  Rights  exist  only  through  that  temporal  Sove¬ 
reignty  which  he  refuses  to  acknowledge.  If  he  will 
not  give  his  Allegiance,  he  cannot  justly  complain 
that  he  does  not  receive  Protection. 

There  is  therefore  no  valid  jural  objection  to  the 
repression  of  a  dangerous  Religious  Sedition.  Whe¬ 
ther  there  be,  in  any  case,  moral  objections  to  mea¬ 
sures  of  repression,  arising  from  the  harmlessness  of 
the  party ;  or  practical  difficulties  arising  from  the 
extent  to  which  the  Sedition  has  gone  ;  are  questions 
to  be  decided  by  the  circumstances  of  each  particu¬ 
lar  case. 

859.  If  the  Religious  Sedition  take  the  form  of 
teaching  Resistance  to  the  Laws  simply,  without  set- 


CHAP.  II.]  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  STATE.  201 

ting  up  any  definite  rival  authority,  its  repression  is 
included  in  the  common  administration  of  the  Law, 
and  in  the  punishment  of  those  who  resist  the  law. 
But  the  possibility  of  such  religious  teaching,  and 
the  examples  of  it  which  have  appeared,  make  it,  if 
not  an  Obligation,  at  least  a  Duty  of  that  State,  to 
give  to  its  citizens  a  religious  teaching  which  may 
tend  to  prevent  the  prevalence  of  an  opinion  of  the 
opposition  of  Religion  and  Law  ;  rather  than  to  de¬ 
pend  entirely  on  the  measures  which  may  be  employed 
to  repress  the  Seditions  arising  out  of  such  an  opinion. 
But  the  consideration  of  the  Duties  of  States,  and  of 
the  Duty  of  religious  Education  among  the  rest,  will 
come  under  our  notice  hereafter. 

860.  One  form  of  Error  respecting  Religion 
has  been  made  punishable  by  most  States,  on  the 
ground  of  its  being  an  opinion  dangerous  to  all  gov¬ 
ernment  :  namely,  Atheism  ;  the  Denial  of  the  truth 
of  all  Religion,  and  therefore  of  all  religious  Sanc¬ 
tions  of  Morality.  We  have  already  shown  (841) 
that  all  States  have  claimed,  and  must  claim,  the 
Right  of  exacting  from  men  declarations  in  the  most 
solemn  form  in  which  they  can  be  given ;  and  the 
form  employed  has  always  contained  a  reference  to 
the  existence  and  providence  of  God.  A  man  who 
denies,  and  teaches  men  to  deny,  the  existence  of 
God,  may  be  considered,  so  far  as  he  is  successful, 
as  setting  up  a  Sedition  which  makes  all  continued 
Government  impossible.  But  whether  this  Sedition 
is  so  dangerous  as  to  require  the  Laws  to  make  such 
opinions  criminal ;  or  whether  their  prevalence  and 
danger  may  not  better  be  prevented  by  Religious 
teaching,  of  which  we  have  spoken,  as  a  Duty  of  the 
State  ;  will  be  better  examined  hereafter. 


202 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  MORAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  STATE. 

861.  We  have  spoken  of  the  State,  as  having 
Obligations  ;  and  we  have  also  referred  to  its  Duties 
(473).  The  questions  naturally  occur;  since  the 
Actions  and  Thoughts  of  States  are  necessarily 
compounded  of  the  Actions  and  Thoughts  of  indi¬ 
vidual  Persons,  upon  what  Persons  these  Obligations 
and  Duties  fall,  and  in  what  manner  ?  We  may  make 
a  few  remarks  on  this  subject. 

862.  The  Governors  of  the  State  act  for  the 
State  ;  and  upon  them  the  Obligations  of  the  State 
fall ;  they  fall  upon  the  Sovereign  ultimately  ;  but, 
in  the  first  instance,  upon  the  Officers  and  Magis¬ 
trates  of  the  State,  who  receive  their  Authority  from 
the  Sovereign,  and  are  held  by  him  to  the  discharge 
of  their  Official  Duties.  The  Obligations  of  Na¬ 
tional  Defence,  of  upholding  the  Laws,  and  of  sup¬ 
pressing  Sedition,  all  belong,  in  a  general  form,  to 
the  Executive  Department  of  the  Government  (210). 
But  the  first  of  these  Obligations,  in  its  details,  is  de¬ 
volved  upon  the  Army  and  its  Commanders  ;  the 
second,  upon  the  Magistrates  and  Judges  ;  as  is  also 
the  third  ;  and  in  some  measure,  so  far  as  the  pre¬ 
vention  of  Religious  Sedition  is  concerned,  upon  the 
Religious  Teachers  of  the  Nation.  The  State  Obli¬ 
gations  fall  upon  the  persons,  who  occupy  these 
offices  respectively,  as  Obligations,  and  therefore,  as 
Duties.  It  is  the  Duty  of  the  Sovereign  to  provide 
for  the  defence  of  the  country  ;  it  is  the  Duty  of  his 
Ministers,  and  of  the  Estates  of  the  Realm,  to  advise 
and  aid  him  in  this  purpose.  It  is  the  Duty  of  the 
Commander  of  the  Forces  to  use,  for  this  purpose, 
with  his  best  ability,  all  the  means  which  are  placed 
in  his  hands :  it  is  the  Duty  of  every  military 


CHAP.  III.]  MORAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  STATE.  203 

Officer  and  Soldier,  according  to  his  condition,  to  ex¬ 
ert  zeal,  skill,  and  courage,  in  this  cause.  And  the 
like  may  be  said  of  the  other  departments  of  the 
State.  It  is  the  Duty  of  all  Persons  in  Judicial  po¬ 
sitions,  according  to  their  position,  to  join  in  admi¬ 
nistering  the  laws  ;  and  of  all  Magistrates  and  their 
Officers,  to  do  their  part  in  carrying  judicial  deci¬ 
sions  into  effect,  and  by  other  appropriate  means 
preserving  the  Order  of  the  Community.  We  have 
already  said  (278)  that  each  man  has  the  Duties  of 
his  Station ;  and  among  the  most  distinct  of  such 
Duties,  are  those  which  fall  upon  each  man,  as  h'is 
share  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  Obligations  of  the 
State. 

863.  The  State  has  Duties  as  well  as  Obligations 
(474).  Thus  all  States  have  Duties  of  Truthful¬ 
ness  and  Honesty :  they  ought  to  observe  their 
Treaties  and  pay  their  Debts.  They  have  Duties 
of  Justice  and  Humanity  :  they  ought  not  to  oppress 
or  enslave  the  unoffending  inhabitants  of  other 
countries'.  They  have  Duties  of  Self-culture  :  they 
ought  to  learn  and  to  adopt  true  Moral  and  Political 
Doctrines.  Some  of  these  Duties  will  be  acknow¬ 
ledged  by  all  Moralists  as  Duties  of  States  ;  and 
thus,  the  moral  character  of  the  State  as  an  agent 
capable  of  Duties,  cannot  be  denied.  States  may 
act  rightly  or  wrongly  ;  and  hence  their  actions  are 
subject  to  the  Supreme  Rule  of  Action,  the  distinc¬ 
tion  of  right  and  wrong. 

The  Question  then  occurs,  as  we  have  said,  Upon 
whom  do  the  Duties  of  the  State  fall,  and  in  what 
manner  1 

864.  It  is  evident  that  they  must  fall  upon  the 
Governors  and  Administrators  of  the  State,  for  these 
act  for  the  State.  They  fall  upon  these  persons  as 
Duties.  It  is  the  Duty  of  the  Governors  of  the  State 
to  be  truthful,  honest,  just,  humane,  rational,  on  the 
part  of  the  State.  But  it  must  be  observed,  that  this 


204 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


is  something  different  from  the  Duty  of  being  truth¬ 
ful,  honest,  just,  humane,  rational,  as  individuals. 
The  actions,  by  which  these  qualities  are  exerted,  on 
the  part  of  the  State,  must  be  the  acts  of  the  State, 
and  not  merely  of  the  individual.  The  Governor  of 
a  State,  in  order  that,  on  the  part  of  the  State,  he 
may  be  faithful  to  the  Treaties  which  the  State  has 
made,  must  be  able  to  direct  its  armies  and  navies,  to 
shape  its  commercial  and  fiscal  regulations,  as  the 
terms  of  the  Treaties  stipulate.  In  order  to  be 
honest  on  the  part  of  the  State,  he  must  be  able  to 
obtain,  from  the  citizens,  money  to  pay  the  State 
debts.  In  order  to  be  able  to  put  an  end  to  acts  of  vio¬ 
lence  or  oppression  on  the  part  of  the  State,  he  must 
be  able  to  persuade,  or  to  force  those  citizens  to  de¬ 
sist,  who  are  concerned  in  such  acts.  In  order  that 
he  may,  on  the  part  of  the  State,  learn  and  adopt 
true  Doctrines,  he  must  be  able  to  induce  the  other 
Members  of  the  Government,  or  other  Representa¬ 
tives  of  the  Will  and  Thought  of  the  State  (if  there 
be  such  Representatives),  to  join  with  him  in  the 
adoption  of  such  Doctrines.  The  individual  dispo¬ 
sition,  intentions,  and  convictions,  of  any  man  or  set 
of  men,  whatever  be  their  position  in  the  State,  are 
not  necessarily  those  of  the  State  itself.  There  is 
and  must  be  a  difference  between  what  Statesmen 
feel  and  think,  in  their  private  capacity,  and  their 
sentiments  and  opinions  as  Statesmen.  Their  designs, 
as  virtuous  Statesmen,  may  be  very  different  from 
their  wishes,  as  virtuous  individuals.  For  as  virtu¬ 
ous  Statesmen,  they  can  design  only  such  things  as 
the  State  can  perform  with  safety,  consistency,  and 
a  due  regard  to  the  claims  of  its  own  subjects.  A 
man  who  is  truthful,  honest,  just,  humane,  and  rea¬ 
sonable  as  an  individual,  will  endeavour,  if  he  be  a 
Statesman,  to  be  also  truthful,  honest,  just,  humane, 
and  reasonable  on  the  part  of  the  State.  But  he  will 
often  find  many  impediments,  which  will  prevent  his 


CHAP.  III.]  MORAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  STATE.  205 

directing  the  acts  of  the  State,  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  conform  to  the  Duties  of  Truth,  Justice,  and  Be¬ 
nevolence,  and  to  the  dictates  of  Reason.  He  has  to 
overcome  rooted  habits,  vested  interests,  ancient  pre¬ 
judices,  and  natural  diversities  of  opinion,  among 
those  whose  consent  is  necessary  to  action.  He  has 
to  guide  himself  by  a  due  regard  to  the  past  actions 
of  the  State,  and  the  nature  of  its  moral  agency,  as 
distinct  from  that  of  individuals.  These  are  diffi¬ 
culties,  not  arising  merely  from  accident,  or  from 
something  wrong,  but  necessarily  belonging  to  the 
nature  of  the  case.  For  instance,  if  the  humane 
Statesman  finds  that  the  citizens  of  his  State  hold  in 
cruel  captivity  a  population  of  predial  slaves  ;  he 
will  wish  and  endeavour  to  abolish  this  slavery.  But 
however  absolute  his  power,  he  cannot  do  this  by  a 
word  of  his  mouth,  or  a  stroke  of  his  pen  ;  by  a  com¬ 
mand,  or  a  law.  He  must  provide,  for  the  owners 
of  the  slaves,  compensation  for  the  loss  which  they 
suffer  by  their  emancipation.  He  must  prepare  the 
slaves  for  the  safe  exercise  of  their  liberty.  If  he  do 
not  do  this,  he  obeys  the  impulse  of  his  humanity  at 
the  expense  of  justice,  and  in  neglect  of  that  pru¬ 
dence  which  is  requisite  for  the  right  direction  of  his 
humanity.  For  to  emancipate  slaves,  on  grounds  of 
humanity,  by  a  law  which  should  throw  all  the  loss 
upon  the  owners,  would  be  unjust :  since  the  inhu¬ 
manity  of  the  previous  law,  which  protected  such 
property,  was  the  sin  of  the  State,  and  not  of  the 
owners.  Moreover,  slavery,  as  we  have  already 
seen  (520),  has  existed,  pure  or  modified,  in  many 
countries ;  and  the  perception  of  the  inhumanity  of 
the  practice  has  been  very  slowly  unfolded  in  men’s 
minds.  Where  slavery  exists,  it  is,  by  a  large  part 
of  the  community,  regarded  with  favour,  or  with  in¬ 
difference.  And  this  prejudice  the  Statesman  has  to 
overcome,  so  as  to  carry  with  him,  in  his  views,  the 
Representatives  of  the  State,  if  the  constitution  of 
VOL.  II.  s 


206 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


the  Country  require  that  he  should  have  their  co¬ 
operation  in  his  acts.  And  thus,  the  humanity  of  the 
Statesman,  acting  for  the  State,  may  often  take  a 
very  different  course,  and  especially,  must  often 
work  in  a  more  slow  and  gradual  manner,  than 
the  humanity  which  belongs  to  him  as  an  individual 
and  the  same  must  be  the  case  with  other  moral 
qualities. 

865.  And  this  is  the  case  with  those  acts  of  a 
State  which  indicate  a  Moral  Progress ;  so  is  it,  also, 
the  case  with  those  acts  which  mark  an  Intellectual 
Progress.  In  these  also,  though  the  Statesman 
thinks,  and  reasons,  and  discovers,  and  adopts  truths, 
for  the  State,  he  will  often  be  compelled  to  adopt 
truths,  on  the  part  of  the  State,  much  more  slowly, 
and  much  more  imperfectly,  than  he  himself  ac¬ 
quires  and  professes  them  in  his  own  mind.  He 
may,  in  his  own  thoughts,  see  the  truth  clearly,  and 
follow  it  rapidly ;  but  the  State,  although  in  a  great 
degree  represented  by  him,  will  seem  to  lag  behind 
him  in  the  intellectual  race  ;  and  cannot,  in  its  pub¬ 
lic  acts,  display  the  intellectual  clearness  and  quick¬ 
ness  which  may  be  shown  by  an  individual.  The 
State,  from  its  nature,  cannot  do  this ;  for  the  acts 
of  the  State  are  those  in  which  the  Members  of  the 
State,  according  to  their  respective  positions,  share, 
at  least,  by  assent  and  sympathy,  if  not  by  joint  ac¬ 
tion.  And  a  number  of  persons  can  rarely,  or  never, 
participate  in  the  clearness  of  mental  vision,  and 
agility  of  mental  action,  by  which  one  man  may 
pass  on  to  new  truths.  However  certain,  and  how¬ 
ever  demonstrable  may  be  the  new  truths,  they  must 
require  some  time  for  their  communication  to  the 
minds  of  many  men.  Repeated  explanation,  discus¬ 
sion,  proof,  may  convey  to  the  minds  of  many,  that 
conviction,  which  was  at  first  confined  to  one,  or  a 
few ;  but  it  can  only  be  by  degrees,  that  the  convic¬ 
tion  can  take  such  hold  of  the  members  of  the  com- 


CHAP.  III.]  MORAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  STATE.  207 

munity,  that  it  can  be  properly  expressed  by  any  act 
of  the  State,  as  its  conviction. 

866.  Thus  the  judgment  of  the  State  as  to 
what  Doctrines  are  true,  may  differ  very  widely 
from  the  judgment  of  those  who  are,  for  the  time,  its 
Governors  ;  and  yet  the  Governors  will  rightly  make 
their  convictions  of  truth  (so  far  as  it  concerns  mat¬ 
ters  of  State)  become  the  judgment  of  the  State,  as 
soon  as  they  can  make  it  take  this  form  by  constitu¬ 
tional  means.  A  Statesman,  who  has  obtained  a 
clear  view  of  new  and  important  truths,  deeply  af¬ 
fecting  the  morality  and  wisdom  of  public  acts,  can¬ 
not  fail  to  wish  to  make  these  truths  take  their  place, 
as  grounds  of  the  State’s  acts  ;  he  can  hardly  fail  to 
introduce,  into  the  acts  which  he  has  to  perform  on 
the  part  of  the  State,  an  assertion  of  or  reference  to 
these  truths ;  and,  if  he  acts  in  conjunction  with  col¬ 
leagues,  he  will  endeavour  to  convince  them  of  these 
truths.  But  he  knows  that  new  Truths  cannot,  in 
one  instant,  become  the  principles  of  action  of  a  Na¬ 
tion,  nor  even  of  a  Body  of  men ;  and  therefore,  he 
is  content  to  introduce  the  new  Truths  by  degrees, 
into  the  conduct  of  public  affairs.  He  is  content 
that  the  State  should  act,  in  a  great  degree,  upon 
principles  which  it  has  long  recognized  and  assumed. 
He  knows  that  the  existence  of  a  State  is  continuous  ; 
and  that  its  Moral  Character  is,  in  like  manner,  con¬ 
tinuous.  Its  acts  must  have  a  coherence.  Its  life 
is  its  History  ;  and  in  its  present  acts,  it  must  have 
a  regard  to  its  past  history  ;  so  as  not  to  interrupt 
the  vital  connexion  of  one  period  with  another.  The 
State  may  reform  its  conduct,  and  improve  its  views  ; 
and  it  may  do  this  rapidly,  and  even  suddenly ;  but 
it  must  preserve  some  identity  through  the  change ; 
else  the  State’s  moral  agency  vanishes  in  the  sup¬ 
posed  reformation.  If  each  person,  who  successively 
occupied  the  place  of  Governor,  might  at  once  pro¬ 
claim  his  own  views,  as  the  doctrines  of  the  State, 


208 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


the  act  would  be  of  little  or  no  value  ;  since  the  pro¬ 
clamation  of  to-day  might  be  superseded  by  a  con¬ 
trary  one  to-morrow. 

Thus  there  is,  for  States,  as  there  is  for  indivi¬ 
duals,  a  Duty  both  of  Moral  Progress  and  of  Intel¬ 
lectual  Progress :  and  these  Duties,  belonging  to  the 
State,  fall  upon  the  persons  who  administer  the 
Government,  as  Duties  belonging  to  them.  But  they 
do  not  fall  upon  them,  in  such  a  manner,  that  the 
Moral  Progress  and  the  Intellectual  Progress  of  the 
State  are  to  be  identified  with  those  of  the  individual. 
The  Governors  are  to  aim  at  a  Virtue  and  a  Wis¬ 
dom  on  the  part  of  the  State,  which  are  not  merely 
their  own  personal  Virtue  and  Wisdom  ;  which  are 
shown  in  the  Acts  and  Declarations  of  the  State ; 
which  belong  to  its  agency,  not  merely  to  theirs ; 
which  are  parts  of  a  national  life,  regulated  by 
Moral  Principles,  directed  to  Moral  Objects,  begun 
before  they  had  any  share  in  State  acts,  and  to  be 
continued,  on  the  same  Principles,  when  they  have 
ceased  to  live. 

867.  The  Moral  Character  of  the  State  has 
been  generally  recognized  by  Moralists,  and  has 
been  expressed  in  various  forms  of  language.  In 
one  of  these  forms,  the  State  is  described  as  having 
not  only  a  Moral  Character,  but  a  Conscience.*  On 
this  phrase  we  may  take  the  liberty  to  remark,  that 
it  is  not  at  all  necessary  in  order  to  express  any  moral 
Truths  belonging  to  Polity.  We  can  speak  intelli¬ 
gibly  and  fully  upon  all  the  Duties  of  the  State,  in¬ 
cluding  the  Duty  of  adopting  and  maintaining  moral 
and  religious  Truths,  without  speaking  of  the  Con¬ 
science  of  the  State.  And  this  expression  is,  in 
some  respects,  unsatisfactory ;  for  it  appears  to  im¬ 
ply  a  false  relation  between  the  Duties  of  the  State, 
and  those  of  the  individual  on  whom  they  fall.  The 


*  Vattel,  Law  of  JYations.  Prelim.,  §  21. 


CHAP.  III.]  MORAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  STATE.  209 

individual  takes  his  share  of  the  Duties  of  the  State, 
as  we  have  seen,  knowing  historically  what  the  State 
has  done ;  and  trying  to  make  the  State,  for  the  pre¬ 
sent,  act  morally,  so  far  as  the  coherency  of  its 
being  will  allow.  And  all  the  individuals  who  share 
in  the  acts  of  the  State,  have  to  act  thus,  with  his¬ 
torical  knowledge  and  moral  intention.  But  there 
is  nothing  in  this  process  which  can  with  propriety 
be  called  the  Conscience  of  the  State.  Statesmen 
are  not  conscious  of  the  past  history  of  their  coun¬ 
try,  however  they  may  be  cognisant  of  it.  The 
Statesmen  of  to-day  are  not  conscious  of  the  pur¬ 
poses  and  convictions  of  the  State  at  the  time  of  the 
Revolution.  Men,  contemporaries  and  successors  of 
each  other,  may  add  together  their  knowledge,  and 
may  correct  it  by  their  discussions ;  they  may  com¬ 
bine  their  intentions,  and  may  thus  carry  out  a  com¬ 
mon  plan :  but  they  cannot  properly  be  said  to  add 
together  their  Consciences,  and  thus  make  a  Common 
Conscience.  We  have  indeed  (368)  spoken  of  the 
Common  Conscience  of  mankind  ;  namely,  the  Su¬ 
preme  Law  of  Man’s  Being,  which  each  man  con¬ 
templates  in  his  own  Conscience  :  but  we  have  also 
said  (370),  that  we  may  more  properly  render  the 
moral  reasons  for  actions  by  referring  them  to  the 
moral  Ideas  of  Benevolence,  Justice,  Truth,  Purity, 
and  Order,  than  by  speaking  of  Conscience.  The 
Conscience  of  a  Nation,  if  it  be  spoken  of  at  all, 
must  be  conceived  to  be,  like  the  Conscience  of  an 
Individual,  the  stage  at  which  it  has  arrived  in  its 
advance  towards  a  full  possession  of  the  Fundamental 
Moral  Ideas.  But  the  stages  at  which  different  indi¬ 
viduals  have  arrived,  in  such  an  advance,  must  be 
very  various ;  and  it  does  not  appear  that  we  gain 
anything  by  calling  the  result  the  National  Con¬ 
science. 

But  in  whatever  way  we  express  it,  the  State 
undoubtedly  possesses  a  Moral  Character ;  and  has 

yol.  it.  14  s  2 


210 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 

Duties,  as  we  have  intimated,  of  the  same  description 
as  those  of  individuals : — Duties  of  Humanity,  J ustice, 
Truth,  Purity,  Order ;  the  Duties  of  Moral  and 
Intellectual  Progress.  These  latter  Duties,  in  the 
case  of  individuals,  include,  as  we  have  seen  (720), 
the  Duty  of  Religious  Belief.  We  shall  have  to 
consider,  hereafter,  whether  the  same  be  true  with 
regard  to  the  State.  But  we  must  first  consider  some 
of  the  other  Duties  of  the  State. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT. 

868.  We  have  spoken  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  Nature  of  the  State  imposes  Duties  upon  the 
Governors  ;  we  must  now  speak  of  the  manner  in 
which  it  imposes  Duties  upon  the  Governed.  Of 
some  of  the  Duties  of  the  Governed,  we  also  formerly 
spoke  (333)  ;  namely,  willing  obedience  to  the  Laws, 
an  affection  for  the  country,  a  love  of  its  institutions 
and  of  its  constitution  ;  a  loyalty  to  its  Sovereign. 
That  men  shall  possess  such  feelings  as  these  towards 
the  Government  of  their  country,  is  a  general  Moral 
Rule,  of  great  extent  and  great  importance.  But 
we  have  already  stated  (462),  that  in  the  course  of 
the  intellectual  progress  of  mankind,  Moral  Rules 
require  to  be  improved  by  a  fuller  development  and 
elucidation  of  the  import  of  the  terms  which  they 
contain.  We  have  already  endeavoured  (465,  486, 
513)  to  unfold,  for  this  reason,  the  conceptions  of  the 
State,  Justice  and  Humanity  :  we  must  now  do  the 
same  for  the  conception  of  Government  ;  and  for  this 
purpose,  must  explain  some  of  the  views  which  have 
been  successively  taken  by  writers,  of  the  Moral 


CHAr.  IV.] 


THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT. 


211 


Nature  of  Government,  and  the  grounds  of  men’s 
Duties  towards  it. 

The  view  which  we  have  already  given  of  the 
foundation  on  which  Government  rests  is  this 
(94)  :  that  Government  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
man’s  Moral  Nature  ;  for  Government  is  necessary 
to  the  existence  of  Rights ;  and  Rights  are  requisite 
to  the  existence  of  Duties  and  Virtues.  Or  as  we 
have  otherwise  expressed  it,  that  our  Idea  of  Moral 
Perfection  involves  an  Idea  of  Order  (269)  :  and  that 
this  Idea  of  Order  cannot  be  realized,  without  fixed 
permanent  external  Laws,  or  Rules  for  human 
Actions.  The  Rules  which  the  Idea  of  Order  thus 
implies,  are  Facts  external  to  the  human  Agent ;  but 
they  are  Facts  requisite  in  order  to  mould  his  acts 
into  a  definite  moral  form. 

869.  But  though  the  external  Facts  which 
embody  the  Idea  of  Order  are  thus  requisite,  in  order 
that  man’s  actions  may  have  a  moral  form  ;  there  is 
something  also  requisite,  in  order  that  they  may  be 
Moral  Actions  :  namely,  an  internal  Principle  of 
activity,  Freedom  to  act  (534).  Without  the  Com¬ 
bination  of  these  two  elements,  Order  and  Freedom, 
Moral  Action  cannot  take  place.  And  Government, 
which  has  it  for  its  office  to  supply  the  element, 
Order,  in  this  combination,  must  do  so  in  such  a 
manner  as  not  to  expel  or  destroy  the  element,  Free¬ 
dom.  The  external  fact  must  not  annihilate  the 
internal  act.  The  internal  act  must  modify  the 
external  fact.  Public  Order  and  Individual  Freedom 
must  subsist  together. 

Thus  Government,  in  order  to  be  what  it  essentially 
is,  a  necessary  Condition  of  man’s  moral  agency, 
must  include  a  Principle  of  Order,  and  also  a  Princi¬ 
ple  of  Freedom.  These  two  Principles  are  in  some 
respects  opposed  to  each  other,  and  have  been  so 
considered,  in  the  course  of  man’s  intellectual 
progress.  We  shall  first  observe  some  of  the  conse- 


POLITY. 


[book  v. 


212 

quences  of  this  opposition,  before  we  attempt  to  trace 
especially  the  development  of  the  Ideas  themselves. 

These  abstract  Ideas,  Order  and  Freedom,  have 
been  the  Objects  of  sentiments  in  men  which  are 
described  as  the  Love  of  Order  and  the  Love  of 
Freedom.  Under  the  influence  of  these  Sentiments, 
the  affairs  of  various  nations  have  been  variously 
conducted  ;  and  the  Conception  of  Government  itself 
has  been  presented  under  various  points  of  view.  We 
must  consider  how  these  are  related  to  each  other. 

870.  Since  Government,  as  we  have  seen, 
includes  an  external  Fact  independent  of  man’s  Will, 
and  an  internal  Will  modifying  the  external  Fact,  it 
may  be  regarded  mainly  in  the  one  or  the  other  of 
these  two  lights  :  and  thus  have  arisen  two  different, 
and  in  some  respect  opposite  views,  of  the  nature  of 
Government,  and  of  the  Duties  which  relate  to  it. 

One  view  represents  civil  Government  as  an 
External  Fact,  which  men  must  take  as  they  find  it, 
and  conform  their  actions  to  it,  without  having  any¬ 
thing  else  to  do  with  it.  We  are  under  a  Govern¬ 
ment  ;  we  are  to  obey  it ;  this  is  our  Duty,  and  this 
is  the  whole  of  our  business  as  subjects.  The  claims 
of  Government  upon  our  Obedience  are  universal 
and  irresistible. 

871 .  This  view  borrows  one  of  its  main  illustra¬ 
tions  from  a  kind  of  Government  which  is  undoubtedly 
an  External  Fact  independent  of  our  Will  :  which 
all  men  find,  and  must  take  as  they  find  it ;  which 
is  a  universal  condition  of  human  nature,  and  claims 
obedience  with  irresistible  power ;  namely,  the 
Paternal  Government.  The  child  is  placed  by  nature 
in  the  power  of  the  parent.  He  obeys  him,  and 
must  obey  him,  at  least  for  some  portion  of  life  ;  and 
no  one  questions  that  he  ought  to  obey  him.  The 
obedience,  thus  begun,  is  naturally  continued  through 
life,  and  extended  to  successive  generations,  as  we 
know  was  the  case  in  the  early  periods  of  society  ; 


CHAP.  IV.] 


THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT. 


213 


and  thus  was  produced  a  Patriarchal  Government. 
This,  the  natural  and  original  form  of  Government, 
presents  to  us  the  true  nature  of  Government :  and 
other  kinds  of  Government  are  to  be  explained  and 
justified  by  their  derivation  from  the  Patriarchal 
System. 

872.  This  view,  or  one  nearly  resembling  it,  is 
sometimes  expressed  in  a  different  manner.  Govern¬ 
ment,  being  an  External  Fact  which  we  find  univer¬ 
sally  annexed  to  our  condition,  by  no  agency  of  our 
own,  is  to  be  accepted  as  a  part  of  the  scheme  of 
Providence,  which  we  must  not  think  of  altering. 
It  is  a  portion  of  the  Divine  Order  of  things,  to  which 
men  must  conform.  Men’s  Duty  of  Obedience  to 
their  Civil  Governors  is  their  Duty  of  Obedience  to 
the  Will  of  God  ;  and  hence,  Governors  have  a 
Divine  Right. 

873.  The  opposite  view  to  this  looks  not  to  the 
External  Fact,  but  to  the  Internal  Fact ,  the  Will ; 
as  that  which  must  determine  man’s  condition.  His 
moral  position  must  depend  upon  himself.  He  makes 
Government  what  it  is  ;  and  obeys  it  because  he 
Wills  to  do  so. 

874.  This  view,  again,  borrows  one  of  its  main 
illustrations  from  a  class  of  transactions  in  which  a 
man  does  determine  the  circumstances  of  his 
condition  by  the  acts  of  his  Will ;  and  in  which  the 
External  Facts  which  regulate  his  actions,  do  so 
because  he  chooses,  and  as  far  as  he  chooses,  that 
they  should  do  so ;  namely,  Contracts.  A  man 
may,  by  a  Contract  with  other  men,  unite  with  them 
and  bind  himself  to  obey  certain  Rules  mutually 
agreed  upon  ;  and  so  long  as  the  Contract  stands,  the 
Rules  are  binding.  It  is  held,  that  Government  may 
be  likened  to  such  a  Contract,  and  that  the  Laws 
which  the  Government  upholds,  are  binding  in  virtue 
of  this  likeness.  Government  is  a  special  kind  of 
Contract,  the  Social  Contract ;  and  it  is  a  Duty  of 


*214 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


men  to  conform  to  the  Rules  of  this  Social  Contract, 
because  it  is  a  Duty  to  fulfil  the  Covenants  of  all 
Contracts. 

875.  This  view  looks  to  the  Rights  of  Man  as 
Man  ;  it  recognizes  the  Rights  of  Government,  not 
as  anything  Divine,  or  in  any  way  different  from 
any  other  Rights  ;  but  simply  as  a  necessary  con¬ 
dition  for  the  establishment  of  other  kinds  of  Rights. 

876.  The  adherents  of  these  opposite  views 
of  Government — the  Patriarchal  System,  and  the 
Social  Contract — have  attempted  to  apply  their  re¬ 
spective  Theories  to  existing  forms  of  Government. 
But  both  the  one  Theory  and  the  other  require  to  be 
much  modified,  before  they  can  be  made  to  agree 
with  the  circumstances  of  most  of  the  States  which 
history  exhibits  to  us. 

877.  In  scarcely  any  age  or  nation,  have  men 
accepted  their  Government  as  an  Existing  Fact,  with 
regard  to  which  they  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  obey. 
The  most  absolute  Governments  of  ancient  and 
modern  times,  have,  in  some  degree,  approximated 
to  such  a  condition  ;  but  even  in  these  cases,  there 
occur,  from  time  to  time,  attempts  to  improve  the 
Laws,  revolutions  which  overthrow  the  Governors, 
and  other  manifestations  that  men  cannot  be  pre¬ 
vented  from  exerting  their  own  judgment,  and  their 
own  will,  in  shaping  their  own  circumstances. 

878.  Indeed,  the  image,  which,  as  we  have 
said,  is  the  standard  illustration  of  this  view  of  the 
nature  of  Government,  itself  suggests  that  Obedience 
cannot  be  unlimited  and  interminable.  For  the 
child,  when  grown  to  manhood,  though  he  may  con¬ 
tinue  to  treat  with  deference  the  commands  of  his 
parent,  will  yet  have  a  will  of  his  own  ;  and  will 
claim  a  right  of  acting  for  himself,  in  a  large  por¬ 
tion  of  his  actions.  The  Patriarchal  view  itself 
leads  us  to  ask,  when  the  children  of  the  State  arrive 
at  the  independence  of  manhood. 


CHAP.  IV.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT. 


215 


879.  Again  :  if  we  attempt  to  derive  National 
Government  from  a  supposed  Original  Patriarchal 
Government,  we  fall  upon  other  questions,  which 
show  how  impossible  it  is  to  apply  this  Theory  in 
its  simple  form.  When  the  Patriarch  dies,  upon 
whom  does  his  power  devolve?  Upon  the  eldest 
son  ?  or  all  the  sons  alike  ?  or  sons  and  daughters  ?  or 
according  to  which  of  numerous  other  obvious  Rules  ? 
The  choice  among  these  Rules  cannot  be  determined 
by  the  Patriarchal  Theory,  in  its  simple  form. 
Obedience  to  an  elder  brother,  and  that,  continued 
through  life,  is  not  at  all  a  part  of  the  natural  and 
necessary  order  of  a  family,  as  obedience  to  a  pa¬ 
rent  is.  Nor  does  any  Rule,  on  this  subject,  natural¬ 
ly  and  necessarily  flow  from  the  Theory  itself. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  say  that  the  Rule  of  Suc¬ 
cession  is  determined  by  tacit  or  express  Agreement 
among  the  members  of  the  Society,  we  thus  admit, 
to  a  certain  extent,  the  opposite  Theory  of  the  Social 
Contract. 

880.  Again :  in  the  case  of  Usurpations  and 
Revolutions,  such  as  have  happened  in  every  coun¬ 
try,  when  the  family  line  of  the  Governors  is  broken 
through  ;  are  we  to  reject  all  the  subsequent  actual 
Government,  as  not  rightly  derived  from  the  Patri¬ 
archal  System,  and  therefore  wrongful  ?  Or  are  we 
to  allow  that  long  undisturbed  Possession  may  ob¬ 
literate  the  wrong  of  Usurpation  ?  If  we  take  the 
former  side  of  the  alternative,  the  Patriarchal  Theo¬ 
ry  is  not  applicable  to  any  existing  case  of  Govern¬ 
ment  :  for  in  all  countries  there  have  been  Usurpa¬ 
tions  and  Revolutions.  If  we  take  the  latter  side, 
we  acknowledge  a  new  element  in  the  Right  of  Gov¬ 
ernment,  namely,  long  Possession,  or  Prescription  ; 
and  we  shall  have  to  make  this,  in  almost  every 
case,  the  predominating  element. 

881.  Thus,  the  Patriarchal  Theory  cannot  be 
applied  to  actual  Governments,  without  such  modi- 


216 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


fixations  as  render  the  Patriarchal  Condition  by  no 
means  the  most  important  part  of  the  Theory.  And 
the  same  may  be  said  of  the  Doctrine  of  the  Divine 
Right  of  Government.  For  if  we  grant  that  the 
Rights  of  the  Governors  are  Divine,  as  resting  upon 
the  Will  of  God  ;  we  may  still  ask  what  Rights  are 
included  in  the  Rights  of  Governors,  and  in  what 
persons  these  Rights  reside.  These  questions  are 
in  no  degree  answered,  by  calling  these  Rights,  Di¬ 
vine  Rights.  To  which  we  may  add,  that  there  ap¬ 
pears  to  be  the  same  reason  for  calling  the  Rights 
of  the  Subjects,  as  those  of  the  Governors,  Divine. 

882.  But  the  opposite  Theory,  that  of  the  So¬ 
cial  Contract,  offers  no  less  difficulty,  when  we  at¬ 
tempt  to  apply  it  to  the  greater  part  of  actual  Gov¬ 
ernments.  For  it  is  not  true  that,  in  any  actual  so¬ 
cial  condition,  the  circumstances  of  men,  and  the 
Rules  which  they  obey,  are  those  which  have  been 
determined  by  their  own  Will.  In  some  of  the 
cases,  in  which  men  have  freely  combined  to  found 
a  new  and  independent  Colony,  some  approximation 
to  this  condition  may  have  occurred  ;  but  even  in 
those  cases,  the  relations  among  the  Colonists,  and 
the  Laws  br  which  they  are  bound,  are  determined, 
in  a  considerable  degree,  by  their  position  in  the 
States  of  which  they  were  previously  subjects  ;  and 
take  their  course  independently  of  the  Will  of  in¬ 
dividuals  in  the  Colony.  And  in  the  usual  conduct 
of  nations,  it  is  not  true  that  a  man,  by  his  own  acts, 
determines  all  the  circumstances  of  his  social  con¬ 
dition.  Man  is  really,  as  those  assert  who  borrow 
their  illustration  from  the  Family,  born,  fostered, 
taught,  and  governed,  with  little  or  no  regard  to  his 
own  will.  And  even  in  respect  to  Civil  Government, 
the  greater  part  of  the  circumstances  of  a  man’s 
condition  exist  before  him,  and  independently  of 
him  :  for  example,  the  institutions,  the  laws,  the  cus¬ 
toms,  the  character  of  the  nation,  in  which  he  must 


CHAP.  IV.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT.  217 

share,  and  by  which  his  own  habits  and  actions  are 
mainly  regulated.  And  his  Relation  to  the  Govern¬ 
ment  being  determined  by  these  External  Facts,  and 
not  by  himself,  it  seems  to  be  a  groundless  and  in¬ 
applicable  fiction,  to  speak  of  that  Relation  as 
founded  upon  a  Contract,  to  which  he  is  a  party. 

883.  The  Assertors  of  the  Theory  of  a  Social 
Contract  have  sometimes  replied  to  this  objection, 
by  a  further  assertion ;  that  a  man,  by  continuing  to 
live  under  a  Government,  after  he  arrives  at  man¬ 
hood,  gives  his  tacit  consent  to  the  Contract  by  which 
the  Government  is  established ;  and  is,  therefore, 
bound  by  its  Laws.  But  this  answer  leaves  abund¬ 
ant  room  for  other  questions ;  as  to  whether  such  a 
tacit  consent  may  reasonably  be  assumed  ;  and  if 
so,  at  what  period,  and  under  what  conditions  ;  and 
further  and  especially,  what  are  the  terms  of  the 
asserted  Contract?  And,  upon  the  answers  to  these 
questions,  will  depend  all  the  important  Doctrines 
which  concern  the  Rights  of  the  Governors,  and  of 
the  Governed  ;  and,  the  theory  of  the  Social  Con¬ 
tract,  if  it  be  retained  in  discussing  these  questions, 
is  little  more  than  a  form  of  expression  which  leads 
to  no  peculiar  results. 

884.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  other  forms 
of  expression,  which  are  used  to  convey  the  same 
views.  Thus  if  it  be  said  that  the  Rights  of  Gov¬ 
ernment  must  be  regulated  by  the  Natural  Rights 
of  Man ;  the  question  still  recurs,  What  are  the 
Natural  Rights  of  Man  ?  We  have  already  (508) 
stated,  that  all  which  have  been  called  Natural 
Rights  are  so  far  limited  and  modified  by  the  Laws 
of  State,  that  they  cannot  be  treated  as  universally 
Natural  Rights.  The  Rights  of  Man,  in  each  State, 
are  determined  by  the  Laws  of  the  State  ;  and  al¬ 
though,  as  we  have  also  attempted  to  show  (514), 
Humanity  requires,  that  States  and  men  should  con¬ 
stantly  endeavour  to  extend  to  all  men  the  Cardinal 

VOL.  II.  T 


218 


POLITY 


[BOOK  V. 


or  Primary  Rights  of  Man  :  this  Principle  will,  in  a 
very  small  degree,  aid  us  in  determining  the  Duties 
of  Subjects  towards  Governments. 

885.  Thus  the  Theory  of  the  Patriarchal  na¬ 
ture  of  Government  is,  both  by  the  analogy  of 
the  Family  itself,  and  by  the  universal  course  of 
human  action,  compelled  to  admit  a  Principle  of 
Freedom  ;  and  the  Theory  of  the  Social  Contract 
must  include  family  ties,  established  institutions, 
tradition,  and  assumed  consent,  as  Principles  of 
Order.  Each  of  these  Theories  is  drawn  towards 
the  other,  in  the  attempt  to  make  it  correspond  with 
the  actual  condition  of  nations. 

886.  But  though  the  doctrine  of  the  Social 
Contract  has  no  advantage  over  the  rival  Doctrine, 
as  a  Historical  Theory,  it  may  be  a  convenient  form 
for  the  expression  of  Moral  Truths.  And  this  it 
may  be,  if  we  can  answer  satisfactorily  the  questions, 
which  convey  the  objections  to  the  Theory;  namely, 
What  are  the  terms  of  the  Social  Contract  ?  under 
what  conditions  the  consent  of  men  to  this  Contract 
may  be  assumed  ?  and  the  like. 

887.  We  must,  however,  recollect,  that  though 
we  may  find  convenient  modes  of  stating  and  discuss¬ 
ing  Moral  Truths,  by  speaking  of  the  Social  Contract, 
as  the  ground  of  the  Rights  of  Government  ;  yet 
that,  in  fact,  Government  has  Rights  which  no  Con¬ 
tract  among  the  subjects  could  give.  We  have 
already  (846)  described  these  Rights  as  State  Rights  ; 
and  have  shown  that  they  cannot  be  bestowed  upon 
the  Government  by  any  agreement  among  the  indivi¬ 
duals  of  which  the  nation  consists  ;  namely,  the  Right 
to  the  National  Territory  ;  the  Right  of  Making 
War  ;  the  Right  of  Capital  Punishment  ;  the  Right 
of  Imposing  Oaths.  These  Rights  are  Articles  in 
the  Social  Contract  ;  but  they  are  Articles  such  as 
no  Contract  among  individuals  could  contain.  It  is 
not  because  it  is  A  Contract,  but  because  it  is  The 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  ETC.  219 

Social  Contract,  that  the  Foundation  Deed  of 
Human  Societies  contains  these  Covenants. 

We  may  now  proceed  to  consider  the  Questions 
above  stated  :  What  are  the  Terms  of  the  Social 
Contract  ?  and  the  like.  We  may  observe  that 
English  Writers  very  generally  speak  of  the  Social 
Compact  instead  of  Contract,  but  in  exactly  the  same 
sense. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  IS  THE  CONSTITUTION. 

888.  Before  we  attempt  to  determine  what  are 
the  terms  of  the  Social  Contract,  since  we  are  to  use 
the  expression  for  the  purpose  of  expressing  moral 
and  political  Doctrines,  let  us  consider  what  Doc¬ 
trines  it  has  commonly  served  to  express. 

The  most  noted  instance  in  which  this  Contract 
was  referred  to,  was  in  the  Vote  of  the  Houses  of 
Lords  and  Commons  of  England,  which  deposed 
James  the  Second,  declaring  that  he  had  “broken 
the  Original  Contract  between  king  and  people.” 
And  this  case  exemplifies  the  purpose  for  which  the 
phrase  has  generally  been  used  in  this  Country  ; 
namely,  to  express  that  there  are  cases  in  which  the 
subject’s  Duty  of  Obedience  is  annulled,  and  resist¬ 
ance  to  the  Governors  becomes  justifiable.  When 
this  is  alleged  to  have  happened  in  consequence  of 
some  violation  of  liberty  or  justice  by  the  Governor, 
he  is  said  to  have  “  broken  the  Original  Contract.” 
And  this  phrase  serves  well  to  express,  in  a  plain  and 
forcible  manner,  the  condemnation  of  the  transgres¬ 
sion,  and  the  steps  which  it  is  held  to  justify. 

889.  For  the  breach  of  a  Contract  is  an  offence 


220 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


on  which  all  men  look  with  hatred  and  anger  :  and 
when  a  Contract  is  broken,  in  a  fundamental  man¬ 
ner,  by  one  of  the  parties,  the  Obligation  of  the  other 
party  to  perform  his  share  of  it  ceases.  Those  who 
have  to  speak  for  the  People,  want  to  say,  that  the 
King’s  crimes  have  made  Obedience  cease  to  be  a 
Duty  of  the  People ;  and  they  cannot  say  this,  in 
any  more  intelligible  or  plausible  way,  than  by  say¬ 
ing,  that  the  King  has  broken  the  Original  Contract 
of  King  and  People. 

890.  But  this  language,  when  used  as  a  justi¬ 
fication  of  Resistance  to  the  Governors  by  their  sub¬ 
jects,  has  this  disadvantage;  that  while  it  refers  to 
general  Rules  of  Law,  it  makes  one  Party  the  Judge 
in  their  own  case,  which  is  against  all  Rules  of  Law. 
For  if  the  People  allege,  against  the  King,  a  Charge 
of  Breach  of  Contract,  they  ought  to  bring  the  case 
before  some  Tribunal  where  justice  may  be  done  to 
both  Parties.  And  if,  before  this  is  done,  they  resist 
the  King’s  authority,  he  may,  with  at  least  equal 
plausibility,  charge  the  offence  of  Breach  of  Contract 
upon  them.  They  may  charge  him  with  Tyranny, 
and  he  may  charge  them  with  Rebellion  ;  and  these 
charges  are  not  made  more  intelligible  by  calling 
them  Breaches  of  the  Original  Contract. 

891.  It  may  be  of  use  to  recollect  here  what 
was  formerly  said  (414)  of  Cases  of  Necessity  ;  of 
which  Rebellion,  justified  by  Tyranny,  is  one.  We 
cannot  lay  down  beforehand  any  exact  moral  Rules 
for  such  cases,  nor  is  it  desirable  to  do  so.  We  have 
already  said  (413),  that  we  cannot  define  the  cir¬ 
cumstances  of  Cases  of  Necessity,  because  they  must 
be  those  in  which  a  good  man  does  not  violate  the 
general  Rule  without  great  struggle  and  reluctance. 
For  (to  repeat  the  arguments  there  used),  if  we 
were  to  define  beforehand  the  conditions  under  which 
Resistance  to  Governors,  and  Rebellion,  are  proper, 
and  were  to  give  Rules  for  such  cases ;  those  who 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  ETC.  221 

accepted  our  Rules  would,  when  the  occasion  arrived, 
take  the  course  of  Resistance  and  Rebellion  without 
reluctance  or  compunction  ;  and  even  before  the  time 
came,  would  be  inquiring  whether  they  had  arrived 
at  a  point  where  they  might  cast  off  the  Duty  of 
Obedience  and  the  Affection  of  Loyalty.  And  fur¬ 
ther,  when  these  Cases  of  Necessity  arrive,  men  are 
not  calm  and  tranquil  enough  to  apply  Rules  of  ac¬ 
tion  ;  and  would,  in  practice,  pervert  any  Rules 
which  we  would  give.  We  cannot  pretend  to  give  a 
Formula  for  the  justification  of  Rebellion  ;  and  the 
phrase  of  the  King  having  broken  the  Original  Con¬ 
tract,  so  far  as  it  is  merely  a  Formula,  cannot  be  a 
justification  ;  although,  if  there  really  be  a  justify¬ 
ing  necessity,  this  phrase  may  serve  to  express  it. 

892.  Since  we  are  thus  compelled  to  abstain 
from  laying  down  Rules  for  Cases  of  Political  Ne¬ 
cessity  which  justify  Resistance,  it  may  be  allowable 
to  illustrate,  by  example,  the  manner  in  which  such 
cases  are  to  be  regarded.  I  will  take,  as  my  exam¬ 
ple,  the  writings  of  a  very  able  man  who  considered 
himself  compelled,  by  the  necessity  of  the  case,  to 
join  in  the  Resistance  to  Charles  the  First,  namely, 
Philip  Hunton.  He  wrote  a  Book  “  On  Monarchy 
in  General ;  and  the  Monarchy  of  England  in  par¬ 
ticular  and  in  this,  among  other  points,  he  treats 
of  the  question  of  Resistance  to  the  Monarch  ren¬ 
dered  necessary  by  his  transgressions.  He  does  not 
employ  the  phraseology  of  the  Original  Contract 
Theory,  which  at  that  time  had  not  become  familiar. 
But  he  discusses  the  Question,  which,  in  that  or  any 
other  form,  is  one  of  extreme  difficulty :  Who  is  to 
be  Judge  when  the  Contract  is  broken  ?  As  he 
states  the  question,  it  is,  “Who  shall- be  Judge  of 
the  excesses  of  the  Sovereign  Lord  in  Monarchies  of 
this  composure  ?”  that  is,  in  Mixed  and  Limited 
Monarchies.  In  reply,  he  says,  that  this  cannot  be 
the  Monarch  himself,  for  then  you  destroy  the  frame 


222 


POLITY. 


[book  y. 


of  the  State,  and  make  it  absolute  ;  since  to  bind  a 
Prince  to  a  Law,  and  to  make  him  the  Judge  of  his 
deviation  from  that  Law,  is  to  absolve  him  from  all 
Law.  Nor  can  the  Community  and  their  Deputies 
be  the  Judges  in  such  a  case  ;  for  then  we  put  the 
Supreme  Power  in  that  body,  and  destroy  the  essence 
of  the  Monarchy  :  for  the  Ruler  is  the  immediate 
Minister  of  that  Power  to  which  he  is  accountable  for 
his  actions.  “  So  that,”  he  says,  “  I  conceive  in  a 
limited  legal  Monarchy,  there  can  be  no  stated  Judge 
of  the  Monarch’s  actions,  if  there  grow  a  fundamental 
difference  between  him  and  the  community.  But 
you  will  say,”  he  adds,  “  it  is  all  one  way  to  abso¬ 
luteness  to  assign  him  no  Judge,  as  to  make  him  his 
own  Judge.”  Hunton  answers,  “  I  say  not  simply  in 
this  case  there  is  no  Judge  :  but  that  there  can  be 
no  Judge  legal  and  constituted  within  that  frame  of 
Government:  it  is  a  transcendent  case  beyond  the 
provision  of  the  Government,  and  must  have  an  ex¬ 
traordinary  Judge.” 

893.  He  then  proceeds  to  deliver  his  own  judg¬ 
ment  on  such  a  case ;  which  is  this  :  “  that  if  the 
transgression  of  the  Sovereign  be  of  lesser  moment, 
it  is  to  be  borne  by  public  patience,  rather  than 
endanger  the  being  of  the  State  by  a  contention  be¬ 
tween  the  Head  and  Body  politic.  But  if  it  be  mor¬ 
tal,  and  such  asi,  suffered,  dissolves  the  frame  and 
life  of  the  Government,  and  Public  Liberty ;  then 
the  illegality  and  destructive  nature  is  to  be  set  open, 
and  redress  sought  by  Petition ;  which  failing,  the 
auther  pronounces  that  “  prevention  by  Resistance 
ought  to  be.”  But  yet  he  once  more  repeats  his 
cautions  and  preliminaries :  “  First,  that  the  case  is 
such,  must  be  made  apparent :  and  if  it  be  apparent, 
and  an  appeal  be  made  ad  conscientiam  generis  hu- 
mani,  especially  of  those  of  that  community,  then  the 
fundamental  Laws  of  that  Monarchy  must  judge,  and 
pronounce  the  Sentence  in  every  man’s  Conscience  ; 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  ETC, 


223 


and  every  man,  as  far  as  concerns  him,  must  follow 
the  evidence  of  truth  in  his  own  soul,  to  oppose  or 
not  to  oppose.”  This  power  of  judging  in  such  a 
case,  he  adds,  implies  no  civil  superiority  in  those 
who  judge  ;  being,  not  authoritative  and  civil,  but 
moral  ;  belonging  to  us,  not  as  citizens,  but  as  rea¬ 
sonable  creatures. 

894.  I  have  made  these  quotations  from  Hun- 
ton,  because  it  is  desirable  to  show  how  far  the  strug¬ 
gles  of  mind  of  a  conscientious  man,  in  a  particular 
case  in  which  resistance  to  the  Government  seemed 
to  become  necessary,  are  removed  from  the  familiarity 
and  positiveness  with  which  Rules  of  such  cases,  in 
the  general  form,  are  sometimes  laid  down,  by 
writers  of  Morals.  Hunton’s  judgment,  that,  under 
the  English  Constitution,  resistance  to  the  Sovereign 
might  become  necessary,  has  the  more  weight,  be¬ 
cause  it  is  combined  with  a  strong  admiration  of 
the  “  Architecture  ”  of  the  English  Constitution  ; 

“  whereof,”  he  says,  “  I  must  declare  myself  to  be 
so  great  an  admirer,  that,  whatever  more  than  human 
wisdom  had  the  contriving  of  it,  whether  done  at 
once,  or  by  degrees  found  out  and  perfected,  I  con¬ 
ceive  it  unparalleled  for  exactness  of  true  policy  in 
the  world.”  His  grief  at  the  necessity  of  discussing 
such  questions  is  strongly  expressed.  “  O  let  no  Son 
of  this  State,”  he  says,  “  account  it  presumption  in 
me,  for  putting  in  my  judgment,  and  speaking  that 
which  I  conceive  might,  if  not  remove,  yet  mitigate 
this  fatal  distemperature  of  our  common  Mother  :  at 
another  time,  perhaps,  it  might  be  censurable,  but  in  - 
this  exigence,  laudable.” 

895.  We  conceive,  then,  that  Cases  of  Resist¬ 
ance  to  Government  are  Cases  of  Necessity  ;  and 
as  such,  Cases  for  which  no  Rule  can  be  given. 
The  use  of  the  phrase  “  Original  Contract  ”  does  not 
enable  us  to  give  any  special  Maxims  on  this  sub¬ 
ject.  Still,  as  we  have  seen  that  the  object  of  the 


224 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Social  Contract  was  to  secure  Order  and  Freedom, 
we  may  say  that  the  Resistance  may  be  used  when 
it  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  Order  and  the  Free¬ 
dom  which  are  guaranteed  by  the  Social  Contract. 

This  leads  us  again  to  inquire  what  the  terms  of 
the  Social  Contract  are :  but  before  we  answer  this 
question,  we  shall  consider  another  purpose  for  which 
this,  or  equivalent  phrases,  are  employed. 

896.  Such  phrases  have,  in  modern  times,  been 
used  in  the  Preambles  of  various  Codes  of  National 
Law  ;  and  especially  in  the  Prefaces  to  the  Consti¬ 
tutions  of  the  States  of  North  America.  Thus,  the 
Constitution  of  New  Jersey  begins  by  declaring  that 
“  All  the  Constitutional  Authority  ever  possessed  by 
the  kings  of  Great  Britain  over  their  dominions  was 

u 

by  Compact  derived  from  the  people,  and  held  of 
them  for  the  common  interest  of  the  whole  Society.” 
The  Constitution  of  Connecticut  declares  that  “  all 
men,  when  they  form  a  social  Compact,  are  equal  in 
Rights;”  and  the  Constitutions  of  some  of  the  other 
States  have  like  expressions.  Now  here  it  is  plain, 
that  the  word  “  Compact  ”  is  employed  in  order  to 
conciliate  to  the  Law  the  regard  of  men  fond  of  Free¬ 
dom.  The  Lovers  of  Liberty  can  readily  obey  a 
Law  which  is  a  Compact  among  themselves  ;  though 
they  would  resist  with  indignation  a  Law  imposed  by 
another.  And  accordingly,  the  Laws,  which  are  thus 
prefaced,  are  rigourously  enforced,  without  exciting 
any  discontent  among  the  freemen  of  North  America. 

897.  Now  if,  in  these  instances,  we  inquire 
what  are  the  terms  of  the  Compact  which  is  thus 
spoken  of,  the  answer  will  evidently  be,  that  the 
Compact  is  the  Constitution  itself,  of  which  we  have 
quoted  the  introductory  phrases.  The  written  Con¬ 
stitutions  of  the  respective  United  States,  which  thus 
begin  by  speaking  of  a  Compact,  by  which  Civil 
Society  is  held  together,  do  themselves  contain  the 
Articles  of  this  Compact.  In  these  Cases,  we  have 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  ETC. 


225 


the  Social  Contract  in  a  distinct,  manifest,  and  com¬ 
pendious  form. 

898.  Further;  it  is  plain,  that  in  these  cases 
the  Social  Contract  is  not  merely,  like  the  Original 
Contract  of  the  Act  which  deposed  James  the  Second, 
a  Contract  between  the  King  and  People.  Nor  is  it 
a  Contract  between  the  Governors  and  Governed  ; 
for  the  Governors,  in  such  Constitutions,  cannot  be 
looked  upon  as  a  separate  party.  The  Contract  is  a 
Compact  among  the  Citizens  in  general,  expressing 
the  political  relations  of  each  to  each.  It  is  a  Con¬ 
tract  between  every  man  and  all  others  within  its 
compass.  And  accordingly,  this  is  expressed  in  th.e 
Constitution  of  Massachusetts :  “  The  body  politic  is 
formed  by  a  voluntary  association  of  individuals.  It 
is  a  Social  Compact  by  which  the  whole  people  cove¬ 
nants  with  each  citizen,  and  each  citizen  with  the 
whole  people,  that  all  shall  be  governed  by  certain 
Laws  for  the  common  good.”  The  Social  Compact, 
that  is,  the  Constitution,  determines  the  Rights  and 
Obligations,  not  merely  of  the  Governors,  but  of 
all  persons  and  all  Classes  :  at  least  so  far  as  the 
Fundamental  Rules  and  Maxims  of  Rights  are  con¬ 
cerned. 

899.  But  since,  in  these  States,  the  Terms  of 
the  Social  Contract,  concerning  which  we  were 
inquiring,  are  to  be  found  in  the  Constitution,  we 
must,  for  the  like  reasons,  look  for  the  Terms  of  the 
Social  Contract  of  any  other  State  in  its  Constitution, 
that  is,  in  the  Collection  of  the  Fundamental  Rules 
and  Maxims  of  Rights,  and  especially  of  Political 
Rights  (210).  For  that  the  Constitution  of  any 
Country  has  not  been  authoritatively  promulgated  in 
a  compendious  written  form,  but  is  to  "be  gathered 
from  various  Sources,  in  various  forms,  does  not 
alter  the  nature  of  its  obligation.  If  the  Social  Com¬ 
pact  of  New  England  be  its  Constitution,  the  Social 
Compact  of  Old  England  must  be  Its  Constitution. 

vol.  ir.  15 


226 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


The  Constitution  is,  in  each  case,  the  Collection  of 
Fundamental  Rules  and  Maxims  of  Rights,  and 
especially  Political  Rights  :  in  each  case,  it  is  the 
Common  Understanding  by  which  the  Laws  of  Or¬ 
der  and  Freedom  are  bound  together. 

900.  Thus  the  Social  Contract,  being  the 
Constitution  of  the  Country,  is  different  in  different 
Countries,  and  in  all,  contains  a  great  number 
of  Articles  and  Clauses.  The  Social  Contract  is 
not  merely  some  one  or  two  Maxims,  respecting 
Protection,  or  Property,  or  Personal  Liberty,  or 
the  like.  It  is  a  wide  and  complex  collection  of  Ar¬ 
rangements  and  Provisions  for  defining  and  securing 
to  men  their  Rights.  The  security  of  the  Rights  is 
the  object  of  the  Contract ;  the  Contract  itself  is  the 
Collection  of  Arrangements  and  Provisions. 

901.  Moreover,  if  some  one  of  these  Articles 
or  Clauses  be  violated  by  any  party,  the  Contract  is 
not  thereby  annulled.  For  all  the  other  parties,  it 
is  not  even  disturbed  ;  and  the  party  who  is  guilty 
of  the  breach  of  Contract  is  not  necessarily  to  be 
punished  by  declaring  the  Contract  void  for  him  ; 
but  is  to  be  judged  by  the  rest  of  the  community ; 
and  visited  with  penalties  provided  by  the  Constitu¬ 
tion  itself ;  or  else,  with  inflictions  devised  for  the 
exigence  of  the  occasion. 

902.  And  this  is  the  manner  in  which  the  So¬ 
cial  Contract  has  been  understood  in  this  Country, 
even  when  it  has  been  referred  to  in  seasons  of  Re¬ 
sistance  and  Revolution.  In  the  deposition  of  James 
the  Second,  though  he  was  deposed  as  having  broken 
the  Original  Contract  of  King  and  People,  still  the 
Original  Contract,  which  gave  the  Houses  of  Parlia¬ 
ment,  and  the  Magistrates  of  the  Land,  their  Autho¬ 
rity,  was  looked  upon  as  undisturbed  ;  and  all  parties, 
except  the  King,  retained  and  exercised  the  powers 
of  their  Stations.  The  English  Constitution,  like 
that  of  Massachusetts,  of  which  we  have  quoted  the 


CHAP.  V.]  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  ETC.  227 

description  (898),  was  held  to  be  a  Compact  by  which 
each  citizen  covenants  with  the  whole  people,  and  the 
whole  people  with  each  citizen  ;  and  those  who  had 
adhered  to  their  Covenants  were  still  entitled  to  all 
the  benefit  of  the  Compact. 

903.  This  view  of  the  Constitution  of  each 
Country,  as  a  Compact  among  the  citizens,  by  no 
means  tends  to  diminish  the  reverence  and  affection 
towards  it,  which  we  have  stated  to  be  one  of  the 
Duties  of  a  citizen  (329).  Even  a  common  Con¬ 
tract  is,  to  a  moral  man,  an  object  of  most  careful 
fidelity  and  respect ;  and  to  a  religious  man,  an  ob¬ 
ject  of  religious  reverence  ;  it  is  sacred.  But  the 
Social  Contract  is  not  a  common  Contract.  It  is  a 
Fundamental  Contract,  by  which  all  the  Rights  of 
men  are  defined  and  secured,  all  the  most  important 
and  dearest  social  relations  protected.  It  is  a  Con¬ 
tract  with  the  whole  body  of  our  Community,  dic¬ 
tated  by  the  universal  voice,  devised  or  assented  to 
by  all  the  wisest  and  best  of  our  Countrymen. 
Whether  it  be  the  result  of  the  wisdom  of  man,  or 
of  the  wisdom  of  ages,  that  is,  of  the  good  guidance 
of  Providence,  it  has  made  our  Country,  and  all  that 
we  value  in  it,  what  they  are.  Whatever  were  its 
origin  therefore,  the  Constitution  of  our  Country  is  a 
worthy  object  of  our  fidelity,  reverence,  and 
affection. 

904.  This  also  is  recognized  in  the  States  of 
North  America.  Thus  the  Constitution  of  Rhode 
Island  says  :  “  In  the  words  of  the  Father  of  his 
Country  (Washington),  we  declare  that  the  basis  of 
our  political  Systems  is  the  Right  of  the  People  to 
make  and  alter  their  Constitutions  of  Government  : 
but  that  the  Constitution  which  at  any  time  exists,  till 
changed  by  an  explicit  and  authentic  act  of  the  whole 
People,  is  sacredly  obligatory  upon  all.”  And  in 
accordance  with  this  feeling,  the  Members  of  the 
General  Legislatures,  and  of  the  respective  State 


228 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Legislatures,  and  all  Executive  and  Judicial  Officers, 
swear  to  support  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  also  the  Constitution  of  their  respective 
States.  With  what  reverence  and  love  the  Consti¬ 
tution  of  England  has  been  looked  upon  by  English¬ 
men,  in  general,  it  is  not  necessary  to  say. 

905.  Thus,  the  description  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  Country  as  its  Social  Contract ,  serves  to  ex¬ 
press  the  Doctrine  that  all  Members  of  the  State  have 
mutual  obligations  which  they  may  incur  heavy  pe¬ 
nalties  by  violating.  It  expresses  this  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  conciliate  the  good-will  and  assent,  both 
of  the  Lovers  of  Order  and  of  the  Lovers  of  Free¬ 
dom  ;  and  without  any  tendency  to  diminish  the  re¬ 
verence  and  affection  with  which  the  Constitution  is 
regarded. 

Before  we  quit  this  subject,  it  may  be  proper  to 
notice  some  of  the  objections  which  are  sometimes 
urged  against  the  Doctrine  of  the  Social  Contract. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 

906.  It  is  proper  to  consider  the  arguments 
which  Paley  has  urged  against  the  Doctrine  of  the 
Social  Contract  in  his  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy, 
both  on  account  of  the  currency  and  authority  which 
that  work  possesses  ;  and  also,  in  order  that  we  may 
thereby  further  explain  the  effect  of  the  Doctrine  : 
and  may  compare  it  with  the  Doctrine  which  he  pro¬ 
pounds  as  fit  to  supersede  it,  namely,  the  Doctrine 
that  the  foundation  of  Government,  and  of  the  Duty 
of  Obedience  to  it,  is  Expediency. 

907.  Paley’s  principal  arguments  against  the 


CHAP.  VI. j  OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED.  N  229 

Doctrine  of  an  original  Compact  are  :  that  such  a 
Compact  is  not  a  Fact ;  and  that  if  not  a  Fact,  it  is 
nothing:  that  if  it  were  a  Fact,  yet  that  the  Com¬ 
pact,  as  it  affects  the  generations  after  the  origin,  can 
he  of  no  force,  because  the  subjects  of  States  in  our 
generation  are  not  conscious  of  such  a  Compact,  and 
have  had  no  liberty  of  assent  or  refusal  with  regard 
to  it. 

908.  To  the  first  objection,  we  reply,  that  even 
if  the  Original  Compact  of  Society  be  not  a  Fact,  it 
by  no  means  follows  that  the  conception  of  such  a 
Compact,  as  the  Result  of  Facts,  and  the  Source  of 
Duties,  is  of  no  value.  There  are  several  such  con¬ 
ceptions  which,  though  not  historical  facts,  are  ap¬ 
pealed  to  by  moral  and  political  writers,  as  valuable 
moral  realities.  When  we  say  that  the  Governors 
are  Trustees  for  the  benefit  of  the  Governed,  or  that 
all  Property  is  a  Trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  Com¬ 
munity,  it  might  in  like  manner  be  objected,  that  no 
Deed  of  Trust  was  ever  executed  in  such  cases,  and 
that  Kings  reigned,  and  Proprietors  held  their  posses¬ 
sions,  before  any  such  views  were  taken  of  their 
tenure.  But  still,  the  doctrine  that  Sovereignty  and 
Property  are  Trusts,  is  held  by  Moralists  to  be  highly 
important ;  and  is  the  source  of  Moral  Maxims 
which  cannot  be  so  distinctly  conceived,  or  so  clearly 
expressed,  in  any  other  way.  And  in  like  manner, 
the  Doctrine  that  men  are  held  together  in  Society  by 
a  Compact,  even  if  we  cannot  point  to  any  event,  re¬ 
corded  or  conjectural,  as  the  Original  Transaction 
by  which  the  Compact  was  made,  may  be  a  very 
important  and  necessary  moral  and  political  Reality. 
And  it  is  so ;  since  it  expresses,  in  one  phrase,  the 
mutual  relations  of  the  Governors  and  the  Governed, 
and  of  all  classes  one  with  another ;  the  reciprocal 
Character  of  their  Rights;  the  possibility  of  the  ob¬ 
ligations  of  one  party  ceasing,  in  consequence  of 
some  act  done  by  another  party  ;  the  Duty  of  fidelity 

VOL.  II. 


230 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


and  respect  to  the  Constitution ;  and  the  condemna¬ 
tion  of  those  who  violate  or  disregard  such  Duties. 

909.  But  we  reply  further  :  that  the  Original 
Compact  is  a  Fact,  if  we  accept,  as  the  terms  of  the 
Compact,  those  Principles  of  Polity,  those  funda¬ 
mental  Political  Laws  and  Maxims,  which  have  been 
generally  accepted  and  approved  in  all  ages  of  the 
history  of  the  Country  ;  and  which,  though  occa¬ 
sionally  forgotten  or  transgressed,  have  constantly 
resumed  their  authority,  when  the  influence  of  force 
or  party  interest  was  removed.  The  aggregate  of 
such  Laws  and  Maxims,  in  other  words,  the  Consti¬ 
tution  of  the  Country,  is  a  Fact;  and  has  always 
been  so  regarded  ;  not  by  theoretical  writers  only, 
but  by  men  accustomed  to  deal  with  Facts;  by 
lawyers,  statesmen,  and  Englishmen  of  all  classes. 
Whatever  doubts  may  exist,  with  regard  to  some  of 
the  Rules  and  Maxims  so  asserted,  it  is  plain  that 
such  a  set  of  Principles  have,  as  a  Fact,  existed  in 
the  Collective  Mind  of  the  Country  ;  as  appears  by 
the  Constitution  having  grown  out  of  them.  And  if 
it  be  urged,  as  an  objection,  that  the  Maxims  which 
make  up  the  Constitution  have  been  adopted  in  suc¬ 
cession,  as  the  result  of  struggles  between  conflicting 
parties,  and  different  Classes  in  the  State  ;  we  reply, 
that  this  is  so  far  from  showing  that  there  is  no  So¬ 
cial  Contract,  that  it  gives  to  the  result  still  more  the 
character  of  a  Contract ;  for  in  other  Contracts,  also, 
it  constantly  happens,  that  each  party  to  the  Contract 
recedes  from  its  original  claims;  and  the  conditions 
of  the  Contract  are  different  from  the  pretensions  put 
forward  on  either  side,  in  the  course  of  the  neeo- 
tiations. 

The  Social  Contract  therefore,  which  we  assert  as 
a  moral  Doctrine,  is  not  to  be  rejected  because  it  is 
not  a  Fact  in  the  sense  in  which  the  objector  requires 
it  to  be  so,  namely,  a  single  Historical  Fact ;  and  it 


CHAP.  VI.] 


OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 


‘231 


is  a  Fact,  so  far  as  is  requisite  for  the  purpose  of  its 
being  a  true  Moral  Doctrine. 

910.  But  it  is  further  objected  by  Paley,  that 
the  Doctrine  of  a  Contract  is  false  and  useless,  be¬ 
cause  men  in  general  have  not  actually  given  their 
consent  to  the  fundamental  Rules  of  the  Government 
under  which  they  live,  and  have  had  no  opportunity 
of  giving  or  refusing  such  consent. 

911.  In  order  to  determine  how  far  this  objec¬ 
tion  is  valid,  we  must  consider  what  the  analogy  of 
Contracts  in  general  teaches  us,  with  regard  to  con¬ 
sent  which  may  be  supposed  or  implied,  though  not 
actually  given.  Now  on  this  subject,  we  have  not 
the  smallest  need  to  follow  any  other  teaching  than 
that  of  Paley  himself,  in  order  to  assert  an  Original 
Contract.  In  speaking  of  the  Administration  of  Jus¬ 
tice,  he  says,  “  The  law  of  nature,  founded  in  the 
very  constitution  of  human  society,  which  is  formed 
to  endure  through  a  series  of  perishing  generations, 
requires  that  the  just  engagements  a  man  enters  into 
should  continue  in  force  beyond  his  own  life  ;  it  fol¬ 
lows  that  the  private  Rights  of  persons  frequently 
depend  upon  what  has  been  transacted  in  times  re¬ 
mote  from  the  present,  by  their  ancestors  or  prede¬ 
cessors,  or  by  those  under  whom  they  claim,  or  to 
whose  obligations  they  have  succeeded.”  But  this, 
which  he  here  asserts  of  private  Rights,  may,  with 
exactly  the  same  reason,  be  asserted  of  public  Rights. 
Public  Rights  and  Obligations,  no  less  than  private, 
may  depend  upon  what  was  done  by  our  predeces¬ 
sors,  and  upon  their  Rights  and  Obligations.  And 
the  examples  which  he  offers,  further  show  this. 
They  are  such  as  these  :  the  questions  which  arise 
between  Lords  of  the  Manor  and  their  Tenants  ;  be¬ 
tween  the  King  and  those  who  claim  Royal  Fran¬ 
chises  ;  questions  of  Tithes  ;  and  the  like  ;  which,  as 
he  says,  depend  upon  ancient  Grants  and  Agree¬ 
ments.  “  The  appeal,”  he  adds,  “  to  those  grants 


232 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


and  agreements  is  dictated  by  natural  equity,  as  well 
as  by  the  municipal  law.”  This  is  asserting,  in  the 
most  decided  and  extensive  manner,  that  the  present 
generation  are  bound  by  Contracts  to  which  they 
have  given  no  actual  consent.  But  further  :  he  as¬ 
serts  this,  even  of  mere  hypothetical  Contracts. 
“  Concerning  the  existence,”  he  says,  “  or  the  con¬ 
ditions  of  such  Old  Covenants,  doubts  will  perpetually 
occur,  which  give  employment  to  the  Courts  of  Law.”* 
But  having  taken  the  case  in  which  the  present  gen¬ 
eration  are  required  to  allow  themselves  bound  by 
ancient  Contracts,  of  which  the  existence  or  the 
meaning  are  doubtful,  does  he  declare  the  supposition 
of  such  Contracts  to  be  absurd  or  useless  ?  By  no 
means.  On  the  contrary,  he  assigns  this  as  a  rea¬ 
son  (among  others),  why  the  general  precepts  of 
Morality  are  not  sufficient  guides  for  the  business  of 
life,  without  our  having  Courts  of  Justice  besides. 
And  for  the  like  reasons,  and  in  the  same  manner, 
we  maintain  that  the  general  Principles  of  Political 
Morality,  whether  we  state  them  as  Order,  Liberty, 
and  Justice,  and  the  like,  or  with  Paley,  as  Expedi¬ 
ency,  are  insufficient  to  point  out  the  boundaries  and 
the  force  of  Political  Rights  and  Obligations,  with¬ 
out  referring  to  a  Court  of  Natural  Jurisprudence, 
which  deals  with  these  as  the  Conditions  of  an  An¬ 
cient  Covenant,  to  be  made  out  by  a  calm  estimate 
of  the  evidence  which  Law  and  History  offer  us. 

912.  W e  have  stated  it,  as  among  the  advan¬ 
tages  of  the  Doctrine  of  a  Social  Contract,  of  which 
the  terms  are  the  Articles  of  the  Constitution,  that 
this  Doctrine  harmonizes  well  with  the  love  and  re¬ 
verence  for  the  Constitution  which  are  among  our 
Duties.  And  accordingly  Paley,  while  he  is  reject¬ 
ing  the  Doctrine,  rejects  also  these  Duties.  He  says, 

*  Paley  is,  in  this  part  of  his  work,  speaking  of  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  Courts  of  Law.  Book  vi.,  chap.  8. 


CHAP.  VI.]  OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED.  233 

truly,  that  the  original -conditions  of  the  Social  Com¬ 
pact  are  understood  to  be  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
Constitution.  He  rejects  the  notion  of  such  funda¬ 
mental  laws,  as  having  any  peculiar  force ;  and 
speaks  with  slight  of  those  who  “  ascribe  a  kind  of 
transcendental  authority  or  mysterious  sanctity  to  the 
Constitution,  as  if  it  were  founded  on  some  higher 
original  than  that  which  gives  force  and  obligation 
to  the  ordinary  Statutes  of  the  realm,  or  were  invio¬ 
lable  on  any  other  account  than  its  intrinsic  utility.’’ 
Now  the  persons  who  have  ascribed  an  exalted 
authority  to  the  English  Constitution,  have  spoken 
of  it  with  reverence,  and  have  defended  it  as  inviola¬ 
ble,  are  all  the  greatest  statesmen,  lawyers,  and 
patriots,  who  have  adorned  this  country  ;  and  in  pro¬ 
portion  to  their  ability,  their  legal  knowledge,  and 
their  patriotism,  they  have  been  copious,  earnest,  and 
pointed,  in  appealing  to  the  principles  of  the  Consti¬ 
tution  as  something  of  paramount  authority  and  value. 
They  have  ascribed  to  the  Constitution,  not  so  pro¬ 
perly  a  “  mysterious  sanctity  ”  which  Paiey  speaks 
of,  as  a  moral  sacredness :  and  we  have  seen  the 
Americans,  in  the  midst  of  their  most  emphatic  as¬ 
sertions  of  their  liberty,  have  done  the  same  thing. 
When  a  writer  is  thus  led  by  his  doctrines  to  speak 
contemptuously  of  the  emotions  of  moral  reverence 
and  affection  which  have  thus  prevailed  for  genera¬ 
tions,  in  the  nation  and  the  race,  he  cannot  be,  to 
them,  a  moral  teacher ;  and  as  far  as  he  gains  their 
attention,  he  can  only  perplex  them.  If  we  are  to 
accept  a  doctrine  which  tells  us  that  no  special  re¬ 
verence  and  authority  belong  to  the  Constitution,  we 
must  suppose  all  our  public  Jurists,  from  Fortescue 
and  Coke  to  Blackstone  and  Burke,  to  have  had  con¬ 
fused  and  superstitious  notions  of  the  English  Go¬ 
vernment.  And  if  the  study  of  English  Law  and 
History  leaves  so  wide  a  space  for  practical  error  in 
its  most  diligent  students,  we  can  have  little  trust  in 

u  2 


POLITY . 


234 


[book  y. 


the  permanence  of  any  new  doctrine  on  such  sub¬ 
jects. 

913.  There  are  two  other  objections  urged  by 
Paley  against  the  Doctrine  of  an  Original  Compact ; 
— That  if  such  be  the  ground  of  Government,  des¬ 
potic  Governments  can  never  be  changed  or  miti¬ 
gated,  because  Despotism  is  in  the  Compact,  and  the 
Subject  is  bound  by  it ;  and  thus  in  this  Theory,  re¬ 
course  to  arms  for  the  sake  of  a  better  constitution 
cannot  be  justified  : — and  again,  That  since  every 
violation  of  the  Compact  destroys  it,  this  Theory 
offers  ready  arguments  for  reposing  obedience  to 
Government,  and  “  has  in  fact  always  supplied  the 
factious  with  a  topic  of  seditious  declamation.” 

914.  To  the  first  of  these  objections,  we  reply, 
that  the  laws  of  no  State  allow  the  citizens  to  have 
recourse  to  arms  for  the  sake  of  bettering  the  Consti¬ 
tution  ;  that  our  Morality  does  not  give  Precepts  for 
such  armed  attempts  at  improvements ;  and  that  a 
system  of  Morality  which  lays  down,  for  the  citizens 
of  States  in  general,  rules  contradicting  the  Laws, 
cannot  be  fit  for  the  general  guidance  of  mankind. 
If  an  English  Moralist  might  go  into  any  State  which 
he  deems  Despotic,  and  preach  to  the  citizens  the 
duty  of  bettering  the  Constitution  by  an  armed  insur¬ 
rection,  English  morality  would  be  rejected  by  the 
Moralists  of  all  other  countries,  as  inconsistent  with 
Order  and  Humanity.  Not  that  we  allow  that  des¬ 
potic  Governments  are  never  to  be  improved ;  but 
they  are  not,  as  a  general  Rule,  to  be  improved  by 
armed  insurrections,  but  by  improving  the  condition 
of  the  people  ;  by  promoting  the  moral  and  intellec¬ 
tual  culture  of  the  Governed  and  of  the  Governors  ; 
by  strengthening  all  the  elements  of  the  Constitution 
which  contains  a  germ  of  Liberty;  (for  almost  all 
Governments,  however  despotic,  have  such  elements). 
By  such  courses,  despotic  Governments,  and  all  Go¬ 
vernments,  may  be  improved,  without  any  contradic- 


CHAP.  VI.] 


OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 


235 


tion  of  the  Social  Compact.  For  the  Social  Compact, 
according  to  all  moderate  interpretations  of  it,  is  not 
an  unchangeable  Rule  ;  but  is  capable  of  modifica¬ 
tion  from  age  to  age,  by  constitutional  proceedings  ; 
changes  so  produced  being  understood  as  changes  in 
the  terms  of  the  Compact,  made  with  the  consent  of 
the  parties.  In  the  progress  of  improvement,  vio¬ 
lence  and  resistance  may  occur ;  yet  violence  and 
resistance  can  never  be  justified  as  results  of  general 
Moral  Rules,  but  only  as  the  resource  in  a  case  of 
necessity  which  forms  an  exception  to  general 
Rules. 

915.  As  to  the  objection  that  the  Doctrine  of  a 
Social  Contract  offers,  and  has  supplied,  ready  argu¬ 
ments  for  Sedition,  this  is  no  more  than  inevitably 
belongs  to  every  doctrine  which  recognizes  Civil 
Liberty  as  an  important  object.  If  every  obnoxious 
proceeding  of  the  Governors  of  a  State  may  be  re¬ 
presented  as  a  violation  of  the  Social  Contract,  it 
may  also  be  represented  as  a  violation  of  Natural 
Justice  ;  and  in  whatever  manner  the  consequences 
of  Natural  Justice  are  described,  the  description 
may  be  used  as  a  means  of  inflaming  seditious  dis¬ 
positions. 

916.  It  is  by  no  means  true,  that  the  Doctrine 
of  the  Social  Contract  has  been  especially  used  for 
purposes  of  sedition  or  rebellion.  When  it  was 
brought  into  prominence  at  the  Revolution  in  1688, 
it  was  used  to  justify  resistance  to  the  Sovereign  in 
a  case  of  necessity,  and  not  as  a  general  Rule. 
Those  who,  in  modern  times,  have  most  freely  urged 
the  Right  of  Resistance  to  the  Government,  though 
they  may  have  occasionally  spoken  of  a  Social  Con¬ 
tract,  have  not  really  applied  the  Doctrine.  They 
have  not  usually  dwelt  upon  any  special  transgres¬ 
sion  of  the  Governor,  as  a  violation  of  the  Compact 
dissolving  its  tie ;  but  have  commonly  denied  and 


POLITY. 


236 


[book  V. 


derided  the  Authority  of  those  ancient  Laws  and 
Maxims  in  which  we  read  the  Contract. 

917.  How  far  the  Doctrine  of  an  Original 
Contract  is  from  being  “  captious  and  unsafe/’  as 
Paley  calls  it,  may  be  seen  by  the  mode  in  which  its 
adherents  in  this  country  have  employed  it  since 
1688.  One  of  the  most  prominent  of  the  occasions 
on  which  this  was  done,  was  the  prosecution  of  Dr. 
Sacheverell  for  seditious  doctrines  in  1710,  the  pro¬ 
secution  being  managed  by  the  leaders  of  the  House 
of  Commons.  These  Managers  all  took  occasion  to 
speak  of  the  Foundations  of  Government  ;  and  they 
all  agreed  in  putting  forward,  in  the  most  distinct  and 
emphatic  manner,  the  doctrine  of  an  Original  Con¬ 
tract.  It  may  suffice  to  quote  one  of  them.  “  The 
nature  of  our  Constitution,”  said  Mr.  Lechmere, 
“  is  that  of  a  limited  Monarchy,  wherein  the  supreme 
power  is  communicated  and  divided  between  Queen, 
Lords,  and  Commons,  though  the  Executive  power 
and  administration  be  wholly  in  the  crown.  The 
terms  of  such  a  Constitution  do  not  only  suppose, 
but  express,  an  Original  Contract  between  the 
Crown  and  the  People  ;  by  which  that  supreme 
power  was,  by  mutual  consent,  and  not  by  accident, 
limited  and  lodged  in  more  hands  than  one.  And  the 
uniform  preservation  of  such  a  Constitution  for  so 
many  ages  without  any  fundamental  change,  demon¬ 
strates  the  continuance  of  the  same  Contract.  The 
consequences,”  it  is  added,  “  of  such  a  form  of  Go¬ 
vernment  are  obvious.  The  Laws  are  the  rule  for 
both  ;  the  common  measure  of  the  power  of  the 
Crown  and  the  obedience  of  the  Subject.”  It  was 
added,  that  “  if  the  executive  part  endeavours  the 
subversion  and  total  destruction  of  the  Government, 
the  Original  Compact  is  broken,  and  the  Right  of 
Allegiance  ceases :  that  part  of  the  Government 
thus  fundamentally  injured  hath  a  right  to  save  or 
recover  that  Constitution  in  which  it  had  an  original 


CHAP.  VI.] 


OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 


237 


interest.”  But  such  a  breach  of  Contract  is  not  con¬ 
templated  as  a  general  or  ordinary  case  ;  but  as  an 
extreme  case  ;  a  case  of  necessity  ;  a  case  about 
which  no  rules  can  be  laid  down,  and  which  can  never 
be  drawn  into  precedent,  except  in  a  case  of  the  like 
necessity.  The  doctrine  of  the  Original  Compact,  put 
forwards  in  this  case  by  Lord  Somers  and  all  the  most 
zealous  lovers  of  liberty  of  the  time,  showed  no  traces 
of  the  seditious  tendency  which  Paley  ascribes  to  it. 

918.  Burke  quoted  these  passages  at  a  later 
period,  in  his  “  Appeal  from  the  New  to  the  Old 
Whigs,”  in  order  to  show  that  the  loversof  freedom  in 
England  had  always  asserted  the  cause  of  freedom  in 
this  measured  and  balanced  manner,  and  thus  to 
justify  his  own  consistency  in  doing  the  same.  And 
he  himself,  also,  refers  to  the  Social  Contract  as  the 
Foundation  of  Government.  Thus  he  describes  the 
succession  of  the  crown  as  “  derived  from  an  autho¬ 
rity  emanating  from  the  Common  Agreement  and 
Original  Compact  of  the  State,  communi  sponsione 
reipublica  ;  and  as  such,  binding  on  the  king  and 
people  too,  so  long  as  the  terms  are  observed.” 

919.  The  absence  of  any  tendency  to  foment 
sedition  or  rebellion,  in  the  Doctrine  of  the  Social 
Contract,  will  further  appear  if  we  compare  it,  as 
Burke  did,  with  other  Doctrines  which  prevailed  at 
the  time  of  the  French  Revolution;  and  which  re¬ 
presented  the  People  as  the  source  of- Political  Power. 
To  this  representation,  Burke  replied,  that  if  by 
“  The  People  ”  be  understood  the  mere  assemblage 
of  individuals  without  any  social  organization,  laws, 
or  magistrates,  the  term  describes  something  so 
vague,  obscure,  and  arbitrary,  that  no  intelligible 
proposition  can  be  asserted  concerning  it.  “  The 
People,”  so  understood,  has  no  means  of  collecting 
or  delivering  its  convictions  and  intentions  :  it  has  no 
Rights,  not  even  a  Right  to  the  soil  on  which  the  in¬ 
dividuals  happens  to  be  living.  An  assumption  is 


238 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


commonly  made,  by  those  who  thus  put  forwards 
“  the  People,”  that  the  numerical  majority  of  the 
People  are  to  act  for  the  whole  :  but  the  assumption 
that  a  numerical  majority  of  an  assemblage  shall  de¬ 
cide  or  choose  anything,  is  altogether  arbitrary.  The 
Rule  of  a  majority  governing  a  minority,  is  a  crea¬ 
ture  of  civil  society,  not  the  origin  of  it.  The  Rule 
is  entirely  artificial  ;  is  learnt  only  by  early  train¬ 
ing  ;  and  when  applied,  is  applied  with  arbitrary 
limitations;  for  instance,  with  the  exclusion  of  wo¬ 
men  and  children.  A  far  more  natural  mode,  for  a 
rude  nation  to  act  and  decide,  is  to  follow  their  Natu¬ 
ral  Aristocracy  ; — those  whom  their  character,  and 
property,  and  history,  and  habits,  and  education, 
have  made  most  fit  to  lead,  and  have  disposed  others 
to  follow  them. 

920.  Thus  the  doctrine,  that  Political  Power  is 
bestowed  by  the  People,  cannot  be  realized  without 
assuming  some  organization  natural  or  arbitrary.  In 
order  to  bestow  power,  the  People  must  have  some 
mode  of  assembling,  debating,  and  voting  ;  and  this 
is,  to  have,  to  some  extent,  a  Government,  for  the 
form  of  which  we  still  have  to  find  reasons.  If  we 
resolve  the  nation  into  its  counties,  or  its  parishes,  we 
shall  still  have  to  give  reasons  for  the  boundaries 
which  we  thus  draw,  and  for  the  officers  whom  we 
assume  to  exist :  and  our  reasons  will  necessarily  be 
drawn  from  history  and  usage,  not  from  the  choice 
and  will  of  the  existing  individuals.  And  thus  we 
are  brought,  in  the  partial  elements  of  any  possible 
national  act,  to  conventions  which  must  govern  men, 
though  not  made  by  themselves,  but  transmitted  from 
previous  generations.  And  thus,  if  we  reject  a  Na¬ 
tional  Social  Contract,  such  as  we  have  spoken  of, 
namely,  an  historical  Contract  into  which  we  are  born ; 
we  are  driven  to  a  Provincial  or  Parochial  Contract  of 
the  same  description.  And  if  we  were  to  reject  these 
conceptions  as  artificial,  we  should  resolve  society 


CIIAr.  VI.] 


OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 


239 


into  Families,  in  which  men  unavoidably  exist  under 
relations  into  which  they  are  bora,  and  which  they 
have  not  selected  by  their  Will  ;  and  which  yet  im¬ 
ply  both  obligation  and  duty.  And  thus  the  Concep¬ 
tion  of  “  the  People  ”  as  the  Source  of  Government, 
in  order  that  it  may  be  in  any  degree  distinct  and 
applicable,  must  be  moulded  into  form  by  means  of 
the  two  Principles  which  we  have  stated  as  the 
grounds  of  Rights  and  Obligations ;  the  Relations 
arising  from  circumstances  of  Birth  ;  and  Relations 
which  are  of  the  nature  of  Contract. 

921.  Having  considered  the  objections  com¬ 
monly  urged  against  the  Doctrine  of  a  Social  Con¬ 
tract,  I  shall  make  a  few  Remarks  on  the  assertion 
that  the  sole  foundation  of  Government  is  Expedi¬ 
ency.  or  Utility  :  that  it  is  to  be  upheld  solely  on  the 
ground  of  the  Benefits  and  Advantages  which  it  pro¬ 
duces  to  men.  In  reference  to  the  latter  statement, 
we  may  assent  to  it,  with  this  explanation,  that  if  we 
are  to  support  Civil  Government  on  account  of  the 
Benefits  it  confers,  the  nature  of  our  support  must 
correspond  with  the  nature  of  the  Benefits :  as  the 
Benefits  are  moral  Benefits,  the  support  must  include 
moral  Affections.  The  Benefits  which  Civil  Govern¬ 
ment  confers  upon  men  (if  that  expression  is  to  be 
used)  are,  that  it  is  the  Source  of  Order,  Freedom, 
Justice  ;  the  necessary  condition  of  Rights,  and 
therefore  of  Duties  and  Virtues.  That  anything  is 
the  source  of  these  Benefits,  is  certainly  abundant 
reason  for  supporting  it ;  and  so  long  as  the  nature 
of  the  Benefits  which  Civil  Government  produces  is 
borne  in  mind,  we  may  be  content  to  say  that  it  de¬ 
pends  for  its  claims  upon  these.  We  have  endea¬ 
voured  to  show  that  it  produces  these  Benefits  by 
being  of  the  Nature  of  a  Contract  among  men  ;  but 
whether  this  be  assented  to  or  not,  it  may  suffice  for 
our  moral  reasoning,  if  Government  be  regarded  as 
the  necessary  Condition  of  all  Duty  and  all  Virtues. 


240 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


922.  In  this  sense,  we  might  also  allow  that 
the  foundation  of  Government  is  its  Expediency,  or 
its  Utility.  But  as  we  have  already  said  (555), 
when  men  rest  their  approval  of  any  general  rule  or 
principle  on  its  Expediency,  or  its  Utility,  they  com¬ 
monly  mean  to  put  out  of  sight  all  differences  in  the 
value  of  the  objects  for  which  things  are  expedient  or 
useful.  When  a  man  says  that  it  is  expedient  to 
speak  the  truth,  we  suppose  that  he  considers  truth 
and  lying  to  differ  only  in  being  more  or  less  expe¬ 
dient.  Now  this  mode  of  speech  cannot  satisfy  the 
purposes  of  Morality.  We  cannot  be  content  to  say 
that  we  support  Civil  Government  for  its  Expediency, 
when  we  mean  that  we  reverence  it  as  the  necessary 
condition  of  man’s  moral  being.  We  cannot  be  satis¬ 
fied  to  talk  of  the  Utility  which  results  from  the 
existence  of  Government,  when  we  must  include,  in 
our  notion  of  Utility,  Order,  Freedom  and  Justice. 

923.  The  unsatisfactory  effect  of  the  language 
applied  to  this  subject  by  Paley  is,  I  think,  generally 
felt.  For  instance,  when  he  discusses  the  question 
of  the  Right  of  Resistance  to  Government,  he  ex¬ 
presses  himself  in  a  mode  which  has  startled  most 
of  his  readers.  On  this  question,  his  sentence  is  : 
“  That  the  established  government  is  to  be  obeyed 
so  long  as  it  cannot  be  resisted  or  changed  without 
public  inconvenience,  and  no  longer.”  And  he  adds, 
that,  to  the  question,  “  Who  shall  judge  ?”  on  this 
subject,  “  The  answer  is,  Every  man  for  himself.” 

924.  This  decision  must  be  understood  to  re¬ 
ject,  as  mistaken  feeling,  all  affection  towards  the 
existing  Constitution  of  the  Country.  All  loyalty  to 
the  Sovereign,  and  affection  towards  the  other 
governing  bodies,  can  only  be  impediments  in  the 
way  of  forming  this  judgment,  which  every  one  is 
called  upon  to  form,  whether  the  Government  may 
not  be  resisted  or  changed  without  public  inconve¬ 
nience.  The  condemnation  with  which  both  law 


CHAP.  VI.]  OBJECTIONS  CONSIDERED. 


241 


and  common  opinion  regard  Faction,  Sedition,  and 
Treason,  can  have  no  place  in  the  bosom  of  a  con¬ 
sistent  Moralist  of  this  school.  Such  a  one  would 
rather  be  led  by  his  views  to  deny  that  there  was 
any  harm  in  Sedition  and  Treason ;  since  these 
might  be  necessary  means  of  attempting  improve¬ 
ments.  There  may  be  always  ground  to  hope  ad¬ 
vantage  from  change  ;  and  those  forms  of  attempting 
it,  which  the  law  calls  Sedition  and  Treason,  may 
be  natural  results  of  a  wish  to  promote  the  public 
convenience ;  and  therefore,  even  if  errors,  are  no 
proper  objects  of  indignation. 

925.  It  is  true,  that  Paley  and  his  followers  do 
not  really  draw,  from  their  doctrines,  such  conclu¬ 
sions  as  these.  They  assert  Expediency  as  the  sole 
basis  of  the  Rights  of  the  State,  and  of  the  Obliga¬ 
tions  of  the  Citizen  ;  but  then,  they  assume  Expe¬ 
diency  to  be  a  sufficient  ground  of  strong  love  for 
existing  expedient  things  :  and  of  strong  condemna¬ 
tion  of  those  who  attempt  to  change  them  for  things 
less  expedient.  Though  professedly  so  open  to  pro¬ 
posals  of  change,  they  really  cling  with  affection  to 
the  claims  of  usage.  And  though  deriding  the  value 
set  upon  the  Constitution  by  others,  Paley  is  often  led 
to  refer  to  it  himself  as  an  important  subject  of  con¬ 
sideration. 

926.  Thus,  he  says,  in  speaking  of  his  doctrine 
of  Resistance  to  Government,  “  Not  every  invasion 
of  the  Subject’s  rights  or  liberty,  or  of  the  constitu¬ 
tion  ;  not  every  breach  of  promise  or  of  oath  ;  not 
every  stretch  of  prerogative,  abuse  of  power,  or 
neglect  of  duty  by  the  chief  magistrate,  or  by  the 
whole,  or  any  branch  of  the  legislative  body,  justifies 
resistance,  unless  these  crimes  draw  afte'r  them  pub¬ 
lic  consequences  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  outweigh 
the  evils  of  civil  disturbance.”  And  again,  as  a 
reason  for  especially  resenting  and  punishing  viola- 

VOL.  ii.  16  v 


242 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  Y. 


lions  of  the  Constitution,  he  urges  that  “  a  well- 
known  and  settled  usage  of  governing  affords  the 
only  security  against  the  enormities  of  uncontrolled 
dominion.”  Here,  the  Constitution  is  become  a 
valuable  reality.  In  the  same  manner  Paley,  after 
he  has  said  that  “  an  act  of  parliament  can  never  be 
unconstitutional,  in  the  strict  and  proper  acceptation 
of  the  term,”  as  if  startled  by  the  hardihood  of  his 
own  assertion,  adds,  “  that  in  a  lower  sense  it  may  ; 
viz.,  when  it  militates  with  the  spirit,  contradicts  the 
analogy,  or  defeats  the  provisions  of  the  laws  made  to 
regulate  this  form  of  government.”  This  spirit  and 
this  analogy  form  a  large  part  of  what  has  always 
been  understood  by  the  Constitution, 

927.  The  same  thing  may  be  noticed  in  other 
passages.  Thus  Paley  asks,  “  Why  is  a  Frenchman 
bound,  both  in  law  and  in  conscience,  to  submit  to 
many  things  to  which  an  Englishman  is  not  obliged 
to  submit?”  He  replies,  “Because  the  same  act  is 
not  the  same  grievance,  where  it  is  agreeable  to  the 
constitution,  and  where  it  infringes  it.”  “  And  this,” 
he  adds,  “  is  sufficiently  intelligible  without  a  Social 
Compact.”  But  when  he  thus  explains  the  case  by 
reference  to  the  Constitution,  and  to  the  wrong  in¬ 
flicted  by  its  violation,  he  approaches  very  near  to  the 
meaning  and  the  language  of  those  who  hold  the 
Doctrine  of  a  Social  Compact  expressed  in  the  Con¬ 
stitution  of  the  Country. 

928.  Indeed,  we  may  remark  in  general,  that 
in  Paley’s  mode  of  treating  moral  questions,  although 
Expediency  is  proclaimed  as  the  basis  of  all  Duties, 
Obligations,  and  Rights,  yet  that  when  these  asserted 
results  of  Expediency  have  assumed  the  forms  of 
Duty,  Obligation,  and  Right,  they  are  forthwith 
represented  as  the  occasion  of  affections  and  senti¬ 
ments  which  it  would,  by  most  persons,  be  reckoned 
absurd  to  found  upon  Expediency  alone.  The  ear- 


CHAP.  VII.]  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  243 

nest  love  of  what  is  right,  and  indignation  at  what  is 
wrong,  are  professed  by  the  disciples  of  Paley,  as 
feelings  in  which  they,  no  less  than  any  other  men, 
have  a  share.  Yet  how  strange  does  the  description  of 
these  feelings  sound,  when  translated  into  the  proper 
phraseology  of  the  school  ; — when  they  are  called 
the  “  earnest  love  of  what  is  expedient,”  and  the 
“  indignation  at  what  is  inexpedient.’5  The  insuf¬ 
ficiency  of  the  notion  of  Expediency,  as  a  basis  for 
moral  affections  and  moral  sentiments,  proves  that  it 
is  not  the  true  basis  of  Morality.  And  this  further 
appears,  by  the  mode  in  which  it  is  employed  by  its 
assertors.  While  we  read  Paley’s  pages,  we  find, 
that  when  he  comes  to  particulars,  the  things  which 
he  treats  as  Realities,  and  by  reference  to  which  he 
discusses  special  cases,  are  the  things  which  he  has 
rejected  in  his  general  discussions  ; — Constitution, 
Supposed  Ancient  Covenants,  Established  Usage, 
National  Rights ;  while  the  Expediency,  which  is 
asserted  in  general  as  containing  the  essence  of  moral 
and  political  philosophy,  is  put  out  of  sight  as  an 
element  of  discussion,  and  becomes  merely  an  occa¬ 
sional  form  of  expression. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

NATURAL  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT. 

929.  Civil  Government  exists  as  the  necessary 
condition  of  man’s  moral  being.  It  combines  the  con¬ 
ditions  of  Order  and  Freedom  ;  and  corresponds  to 
its  Idea  the  more  completely,  in  proportion  as  it  more 
completely  realizes  those  conditions.  In  the  history 


244 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


of  different  nations,  we  may  discern  various  succes¬ 
sive  steps  towards  these  combined  conditions  of  Or¬ 
der  and  Freedom  ;  and  some  of  these  steps  it  will  be 
proper  here  to  notice. 

In  the  earlier  kinds  of  Government  which  pre¬ 
vailed  in  human  Society,  Order  was  the  leading 
character,  and  was  regarded  as  their  main  purpose. 
Man  had  to  learn  and  practise  Obedience  to  Rules, 
before  he  could  learn  to  use  his  Freedom.  The  first 
form  of  Obedience,  is  Obedience  to  parents:  the  first 
kind  of  Government,  is  the  Government  of  the  Fa¬ 
mily.  When,  by  the  growth  of  succeeding  genera¬ 
tions,  the  Government  of  the  original  Family  became 
the  Government  of  many  Families,  there  came  into 
existence  the  Patriarchal  State ,  in  which  the  Supreme 
Authority  resided  in  the  Patriarch,  the  Head  of  the 
Original  Family.  And  when  the  Original  Patriarch 
died,  the  habit  of  filial  obedience  was  retained,  and 
the  obedience  transferred  to  the  new  Head  of  the 
complex  family,  however  selected.  In  this  kind  of 
Government,  we  hardly  see  Freedom  as  a  distinct 
element ;  for  Freedom  of  thought  is  so  subdued  by 
Filial  Reverence,  that  it  hardly  appears  as  a  Prin¬ 
ciple  of  action  opposed  to  Rule.  Yet  under  the 
Patriarchal  Rule,  we  may  suppose  the  members  of 
the  Family  to  have  their  distinct  Rights  of  Personal 
Security,  Property,  Contract,  Marriage.  And  if  any 
wrong  were  done  by  one  member  to  another,  the 
Patriarch  would  be  the  natural  Judge  ;  he  would 
determine  who  was  the  wrong  doer,  and  pronounce 
the  sentence  of  redress  or  punishment,  according  to 
his  judgment  of  the  equity  of  the  case  ;  or  it  might 
be,  according  to  express  Rules,  which  he  had  pro¬ 
mulgated  among  his  children  for  their  guidance. 

930.  By  the  migrations  of  men  in  the  earliest 
times,  the  original  families  of  mankind  were  separat¬ 
ed,  and  settled  in  various  parts  of  the  earth’s  sur¬ 
face  ;  they  were  divided  into  races ;  the  races  were 


CHAP.  VII.]  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  245 

again  separated  into  nations,  tribes,  clans.  These 
nations  acquired  a  property  in  the  territory  which 
they  occupied  ;  it  may  be,  according  to  the  appoint¬ 
ment  of  the  Patriarchs  of  the  race,  dividing  the  land 
among  their  descendants  ;  or  it  may  be,  by  a  series 
of  mutual  agreement  between  the  heads  of  neighbour¬ 
ing  tribes,  like  what  is  recorded  of  Abraham  and 
Lot  (Gen.  xiii.,  9)  :  If  thou  wilt  take  the  left  hand , 
then  i  will  go  to  the  right ;  or  if  thou  depart  to  the 
right  hand ,  then  I  will  go  to  the  left.  The  heads  of 
tribes  and  clans,  and  other  persons  also,  might,  in 
such  a  state  of  things,  acquire  wealth  in  cattle,  and 
food,  and  raiment,  and  ornaments,  and  other  objects 
of  desire ;  and  might  have  many  followers  and  ser¬ 
vants,  obedient  to  them,  because  dependant  upon 
them  for  subsistence  or  enjoyment.  The  Natural 
Rulers  of  men,  in  such  a  state,  would  be  those 
in  whom  the  remnants  of  the  Patriarchal  authority 
were  supported  by  the  inheritance  of  a  large  portion 
of  the  Patriarchal  possessions.  An  Aristocracy  of 
Birth  and  Wealth  combined,  would  be  the  Govern¬ 
ment  of  Nations  in  such  a  Condition. 

931.  In  such  a  kind  of  Government,  however 
little  Freedom  poor  and  common  men  may  possess, 
the  Chiefs  have  considerable  Freedom  to  act,  and 
means  of  manifesting  the  difference  of  character  and 
purpose  which  prevail  among  men.  The  chief  of 
one  tribe  may  make  war  upon  the  chief  of  another  ; 
they  may  lead  their  followers  to  battle  ;  may  show 
courage,  skill,  energy,  sagacity,  perseverance  in 
war.  One  Chief  may  be  a  Conqueror  of  many 
others.  He  may,  by  his  actions,  excite  fear,  admi¬ 
ration,  and  enthusiasm.  He  may  be  regarded  as  a 
Hero  ;  and  the  empire  over  men’s  minds  which  he 
thus  acquires,  may  make  them  submit  to  him,  and 
obey  his  Commands.  In  this  case,  the  Government 
may  be  termed  Hero  Sway.  And  this  Sway  may 
be  acquired,  not  merely  by  success  in  war,  but  by 

v  2 


246 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


any  of  that  superiority  in  overcoming  great  difficul¬ 
ties  and  executing  great  designs  which  subjugates 
the  minds  of  other  men.  Those  who  are  subject  to 
such  Government  are  not  free ;  they  are,  as  it  were, 
fascinated,  and  their  obedience  is  a  kind  of  Worship. 

932.  Such  Government  therefore  cannot  un¬ 
fold  the  moral  nature  of  man.  For  this  purpose  the 
opposite  Principle  must  be  called  into  action.  In 
order  that  man  may  be  a  moral  agent,  he  must  not 
be  subjugated  and  fascinated,  but  freed  and  enlight¬ 
ened  :  he  must  be  governed  and  directed  by  some¬ 
thing,  not  because  he  does  not  understand  it,  but  be¬ 
cause  he  does.  He  must  be  directed  not  by  mere 
external  Will,  but  by  intelligible  Rule.  He  must 
obey,  not  a  creature  of  superhuman  power,  but  the 
dictates  of  our  common  Human  Reason.  The  Reve¬ 
rence  for  Ideas  must  take  the  place  of  the  Worship 
of  Heroes. 

933.  It  is  only  when  Government  assumes  this 
character,  that  it  becomes  fitted  for  man.  Man, 
when  his  moral  faculties  are  awakened,  requires  that 
his  Government  be  just;  and  submits  to  it  willingly, 
in  proportion  as  he  sees  embodied  in  it  this  Idea  of 
Justice.  He  is  not  satisfied  to  be  ruled  by  a  Hero, 
except  he  be  also  a  just  Judge.  He  must  have  not 
merely  Commands  which  all  obey,  but  Laws  which 
all  observe. 

934.  But  neither  is  men’s  Conception  of  Gov¬ 
ernment  satisfied  by  the  abstract  Idea  of  Justice,  ad¬ 
ministered  so  far  as  its  Rules  are  universal.  In  the 
actual  world,  we  never  can  have  the  Idea  liberated 
from  the  Fact.  The  History  of  man,  as  a  series  of 
Facts,  must  be  combined  with  this  conception  of  Jus¬ 
tice,  as  the  rule  of  his  moral  being.  There  will  still 
remain  the  traces  of  the  original  tribes  of  men,  and 
of  the  actions  of  the  Heroes  who  conquered  their 
lands,  or  founded  their  cities,  or  ordained  their  mode 
of  life.  Their  Languages  will  bear  the  marks  of  the 


CHAP.  VII.]  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  247 

distinctions  thus  introduced  among  them.  Men  are 
divided  into  Nations  ;  each  Nation  has  its  Speech, 
its  History,  its  Usages,  its  Laws,  its  National  Char¬ 
acter. 

935.  A  nation  requires  not  merely  to  have 
Justice  administered,  but  also  to  act  as  a  Nation.  It 
must  have  a  Governor  to  act  for  it ;  to  foresee,  de¬ 
sign,  execute,  on  the  part  of  all  ;  as  well  as  to  keep 
each  from  wronging  each.  If  it  be  governed  by 
Judges  only,  it  will  ask  for  a  King. 

The  King  represents  the  Nation,  both  as  to  Facts 
and  Ideas.  He  exercises  the  Will  and  Power  of  the 
Nation,  and  acts  its  part  in  History  ;  and  he  is  also 
the  Source  of  Justice,  the  Preserver  of  Order,  the 
Assertor  of  Rights,  the  Punisher  of  Wrongs. 

936.  But  within  the  nation  also  there  may  re¬ 
main  traces  of  ancient  actual  distinctions  ;  which  the 
national  union,  though  it  has  comprehended  and  su¬ 
perseded,  has  not  obliterated.  Ancient  conquerors 
and  heroes,  and  rich  and  historical  families  may  have 
their  successors  ;  who  continue  to  retain  a  portion  of 
the  ascendancy  over  men’s  minds  which  belonged  to 
Patriarchs  and  Heroes  at  earlier  periods  ;  and  may 
also  have  power  from  their  present  wealth.  These 
Nobles  form  a  Natural  Aristocracy  in  the  Nation. 
There  may  be  several  Ranks  and  Conditions  of  per¬ 
sons.  The  individuals  of  a  Nation  are  thus  distin¬ 
guished  as  Noblemen  and  Common  men,  Patricians 
and  Plebeians,  Rich  and  Poor,  High  and  Low.  But 
in  almost  every  Nation,  there  is  to  some  extent  or 
other  this  Difference  of  Conditions ,  or  Classes. 

937.  This  Difference  of  Conditions  will  enter 
into  the  consideration  of  questions  of  Right  between 
the  members  of  the  Nation.  For  the  Definitions  of 
Rights  of  all  the  Citizens  are  necessarily  historical 
facts  :  namely,  the  historical  facts  which  have  es¬ 
tablished  the  differences  of  which  we  have  just 
spoken.  The  same  series  of  facts  which  has  made 


248 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


one  field  belong  to  Caius  and  the  next  to  Titius,  has 
made  Caius  a  Patrician  and  Titius  a  Plebeian. 

938.  This  difference  of  Ranks  is  accompanied 
with  a  difference  of  Political  Rights.  The  history 
which  has  produced  Patricians  and  Nobles,  has  also, 
in  general  left  them  some  portion  of  the  power  of 
Aristocracy.  They  have  some  share  in  the  Gov¬ 
ernment.  The  Government  is  compounded,  vari¬ 
ously  in  various  countries,  of  Aristocracy  and  Mo¬ 
narchy. 

939.  Although  the  King  is,  as  we  have  said, 
conceived  as  the  representative  of  Justice  and  Order, 
and  the  assertor  of  Rights,  the  person  who  is  at  any 
time  King,  becomes  so  by  the  course  of  historical 
facts,  and  not  by  any  process  which  makes  him 
necessarily  conformable  to  the  Idea  of  a  King.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  he  may  be  unjust  in  his  judgments 
between  his  Subjects,  and  in  his  actions  towards  them. 
He  may  take  advantage  of  their  habit  of  obedience, 
for  his  own  personal  gratification.  Or  he  may  act, 
on  the  part  of  the  nation,  in  a  way  which  does  not  at 
all  represent  the  will  of  the  nation.  He  may  wish  to 
use  its  power  for  war,  when  all  his  subjects  wish  for 
peace  ;  or  may  neglect  the  defence  of  the  Country, 
or  the  administration  of  the  Laws,  or  any  other 
National  Obligation. 

940.  In  the  Cases  in  which  any  portion  of  the 
government  remains  in  the  hands  of  any  other  part 
of  the  nation,  as  the  Elders,  or  the  Nobles,  this  portion 
may  be  used  by  them,  on  the  part  of  the  Nation,  for 
the  purpose  of  preventing  that  neglect  of  the  National 
Obligations,  or  Violation  of  Personal  Duties,  which 
the  King  would  otherwise  have  committed.  If,  for 
instance,  there  be  a  Senate,  without  whose  consent 
the  King  cannot  make  war  or  peace  ;  or  by  which 
unjust  Judges  can  be  punished  ;  such  a  Senate  will 
be  a  Check  upon  the  power  of  the  King.  It  will 
balance ,  in  some  measure,  his  authority ;  and  may 


CHAP.  VII.]  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT.  249 

thus  prevent  the  results  of  unjust  intention  or  perverse 
will  in  him. 

941,  The  Senate  are  in  the  Condition,  both  of 
Governors,  and  Governed  :  they  are  Subjects  of  the 
King,  and  Rulers  of  the  People.  For  them,  the 
Government  combines  the  conditions  of  Order  and 
Freedom,  at  least  to  some  extent;  for  they  are,  in 
some  respects,  not  only  free  to  act  for  themselves, 
but  also  to  act  for  others,  and  to  exercise  a  share  of 
command  over  others.  They  are  not  irresistibly 
controlled  by  the  will  of  the  King,  for  they  have  the 
power  of  resisting  it,  and  even,  in  some  degree,  of 
controlling  it. 

942.  But  the  People,  who  are  thus  subject  to 
the  King  and  the  Senate  combined,  are  they  free 
agents,  such  as  their  moral  nature  requires  them  to 
be  ? — If  the  sway  possessed  by  the  King  and  the 
Senate  be  exercised  mildly  and  temperately,  the 
People  may  be,  for  a  long  time,  free,  so  far  as  almost 
all  the  purposes  of  Morality  require.  Under  the 
paternal  sway  of  good  and  kind  men,  acting  without 
check,  as  King  and  Senators,  the  subjects  have  the 
means  of  acting  as  good  children.  But  such  a  sway 
cannot  answer  all  the  purposes  of  Morality.  Men 
cannot  feel  themselves  free,  when  their  freedom 
depends  upon  the  arbitrary  will  of  others.  They 
are  not  free,  if  their  freedom  may  be  taken  from 
them  to-morrow,  without  their  having  any  power  of 
resistance.  They  are  not  free,  if  they  have  no 
security  for  their  freedom  ;  no  means  of  asserting  and 
defending  it,  should  it  be  assailed  or  infringed  ;  in 
short,  they  are  not  free,  if  they  have  not  some  Poli¬ 
tical  Rights  ;  some  Rights  in  relation  to  the  Govern¬ 
ment.  And  not  being  free,  their  moral  career  cannot 
be  complete.  They  cannot  carry  on  their  moral 
and  intellectual  culture,  in  the  hope  of  bringing  into 
intelligible  harmony  with  themselves  all  the  circum¬ 
stances  of  their  condition  ;  for  there  is  one  element 


250 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


of  their  condition,  the  Government,  on  which  they 
have  no  power  of  acting,  and  which  does  not  allow 
itself  to  be  scrutinized  and  understood.  They  cannot 
go  on  constantly  and  indefinitely  in  the  realization  of 
their  moral  ideas  ;  for  when  they  would  extend  this 
realization  from  private  to  public  life,  they  find 
themselves  stopped  by  the  impassable  barrier  which 
separates  them  from  the  ruling  classes. 

943.  Thus,  without  Political  Rights  securing 
the  Liberty  of  the  people  at  large,  Government 
incompletely  attains  that  Combination  of  Order  and 
Freedom  which  is  requisite  as  the  Condition  of  man’s 
moral  being.  For  this  purpose,  besides  the  Checks 
^nd  Balances  which  a  Senate  may  offer  to  the 
injustice  or  imprudence  of  a  King,  there  must  be 
some  security  of  Popular  Rights,  some  protection  of 
the  Liberty  of  the  Subject.  The  Monarchy  must  not 
only  be  balanced  by  an  Aristocracy,  but  must  also 
recognize  a  Democracy. 

944.  Thus  the  State,  in  order  to  answer  its 
purposes  completely,  must  contain  a  combination  of 
Monarchy,  Aristocracy,  and  Democracy.  The 
Aristocracy  stands  for  order,  and  the  Democracy  for 
Freedom  in  the  Combination:  the  Monarchy  gives 
unity  to  the  Combination.  The  Aristocracy  stands 
for  Order  ;  for  the  Sovereign  Power  cannot  subsist 
except  it  be  supported  by  the  natural  Aristocracy  of 
the  Community ;  if  not  by  the  Aristocracy  of  Birth 
and  Wealth,  by  the  Aristocracy  of  Prudence  and 
Force.  The  Aristocracy  represents  the  actual  Past ; 
the  events  which  have  taken  place  and  left  their 
effects  :  the  Democracy  represents  the  actual  Present ; 
the  events  which  the  powers  of  men,  acting  freely, 
are  bringing  into  being.  Monarchy  is  an  Ideal  Power 
which  binds  together  these  elements  ;  acts  for  the 
State  in  present  history,  and  is  the  source  of  the 
Order  and  Justice  which  the  State  must  realize. 

945.  Thus,  these  three  kinds  of  Government 


CHAP.  VII.]  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT. 


251 


must  be  combined  in  the  Idea  of  a  State ;  and  they 
have,  in  general,  been  mixed  together,  in  the  States 
which  have  best  answered  their  moral  purposes.  But 
yet,  from  various  circumstances,  one  or  another  of 
these  elements  may  become  so  obscure,  as  to  seem  to 
lose  its  nature  ;  and  still,  the  Government  may  have 
a  long  and  tranquil  existence.  If  a  State  be  estab¬ 
lished  by  actual  contract  among  a  number  of  men 
meeting  as  equals,  it  has  no  past,  and  need  have  no 
Aristocracy.  For  the  moment,  the  Aristocracy  and 
the  Democracy  are  identified.  Every  man  is  at  the 
same  time  Governor  and  Subject,  bound  to  Order,  and 
possessed  of  Freedom.  And  if  the  Constitution  be 
wisely  framed,  such  a  condition  of  things  may  long 
continue.  The  natural  tendency  of  the  progress  of 
time  is  to  generate  an  Aristocracy  ;  but  this  tendency 
may  be  counteracted  by  the  activity  of  the  Democracy. 
Again,  the  Democratic  element  may  be  so  feeble 
that  the  nation  may  be  entirely  governed  by  the 
past ; — by  an  ancient  Aristocracy,  or  an  ancient  line 
of  Monarchs.  Where  Freedom  is  thus  extinguished, 
the  State  as  we  have  already  said,  answers  its  moral 
ends  imperfectly.  Again  ;  the  Monarchical  element 
may  be  enfeebled  in  various  ways  :  as  by  dividing 
the  executive  from  the  judicial  character;  by  pre¬ 
senting  the  State  itself,  not  the  King,  as  the  source 
of  Justice,  and  by  distributing  the  Sovereign  Execu¬ 
tive  Power.  The  Executive  Power  may  be  held  but 
for  a  short  time,  as  by  Consuls  or  Presidents  for  a 
year,  or  a  few  years.  By  such  means,  Democracy 
may  be  established,  with  very  small  evident  mixture, 
either  of  Monarchy  or  Aristocracy. 

946.  In  nations  which  have  subsisted  for  many 
centuries,  the  Aristocratic  element  is  generally  conspi¬ 
cuous  and  powerful,  having  on  its  side  accumulated 
property,  the  habit  of  command,  superiority  of  culture ; 
and  in  its  favour  on  the  other  side,  the  habit  of 
respect  for  historical  families,  and  of  obedience  to 


252 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


existing  authority.  But  on  the  other  hand,  where 
there  is  a  germ  of  freedom  to  begin  with,  there  are 
strong  influences  on  the  Democratic  side.  For  the 
influence  of  the  past  becomes  constantly  weaker  by 
the  lapse  of  lime  ;  and  the  balance,  which  at  first 
was  kept  steady  by  the  weight  of  old  families,  is 
disturbed  by  the  rise  of  new  men,  who  grow  in 
wealth,  or  in  some  other  form  of  power.  And  as 
the  love  of  power  on  the  one  side,  so  the  love  of  free¬ 
dom  on  the  other,  may  become  a  craving  for  more. 
Thus  there  are  tendencies  which  may  produce  a 
struggle  between  Aristocracy  and  Democracy  ;  such 
a  struggle  has  taken  place  in  most  old  countries,  and 
has  occupied  many  centuries. 

947.  In  the  contest  between  Aristocracy  and 
Democracy,  the  Aristocracy  represents  the  Principle 
of  Order ;  for  the  authority  of  the  existing  laws  is 
the  inheritance  of  the  past,  and  belongs  to  the  heirs 
of  the  past.  But  the  Principle  of  Order  may  also  be 
embodied  in  a  line  of  Kings,  as  well  as  in  families 
of  Nobles ;  or  in  the  two  conjointly.  In  this  case, 
the  Monarchy  derives  its  force  from  the  actual  past, 
as  well  as  from  the  Idea  of  a  National  Will  and  a 
National  Justice.  On  the  other  hand,  where  the 
people  have  already  acquired  Political  Rights,  the 
Democracy  represents,  not  only  the  Principle  of 
Liberty,  but  the  Principle  of  Order  also ;  for  they 
assert  their  Rights,  as  fixed  by  existing  Laws. 
Hence  we  do  not  find  in  the  History  of  Nations,  the 
Cause  of  mere  Order  and  of  mere  Liberty  opposed  to 
each  other.  The  Democratical  party  assert  the  ne¬ 
cessity  both  of  Order  and  of  Liberty :  the  opposite 
party,  whether  Monarchical  or  Aristocratical,  respect 
Liberty,  so  far  as  it  is  established  by  Law.  Yet  still 
there  is  an  opposition ;  the  one  party  make  a  stand 
for  Order  combined  with  Liberty,  as  it  is  by  Law 
established  ;  the  other  party  contend  for  an  extension 
of  Liberty,  which  they  hold  to  be  reconcileable  with 


CHAP.  VII.]  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT. 


253 


Order.  The  one  is  the  Cause  of  Authority,  the  other 
of  Relaxation.  The  one  Party  are  a  Conservative 
Party,  who  contend  for  the  position  of  equilibrium  of 
Order  and  Liberty,  which  already  exists  :  the  other 
are  a  Movement  Party,  who  seek  a  new  position,  in 
which  a  larger  share  of  Liberty  enters. 

948.  The  forms  which  such  struggles  take,  and 
the  means  which  are  employed  in  them,  are  very  va¬ 
rious.  Popular  Rights  are  embodied  and  protected 
by  Laws,  which  give  to  the  people  security  of  person 
and  of  property  ;  by  a  share  in  the  election  of  Magis¬ 
trates  ;  by  Magistrates  who  are  the  special  defenders 
of  such  Rights  (as  the  Roman  Tribunes  of  the  Ple¬ 
beians)  ;  by  men  of  the  People  holding  Magistracies ; 
by  the  People  having  a  share  in  making  the  Laws ; 
and  the  like.  The  Assemblies,  whether  Senates  or 
General  Assemblies,  in  which  such  questions  are  dis¬ 
cussed  and  decided  ; — in  which  Laws  are  passed, 
Magistrates  elected,  the  National  Acts  determined 
upon ; — are  the  especial  scenes  of  the  struggles  of 
Parties  :  either  of  the  Conservative  and  the  Movement 
party,  which  universally  exist  in  such  cases ;  or  of 
Parties,  which,  without  being  guided  by  any  funda¬ 
mental  Principle,  have  for  their  object  Power ;  name¬ 
ly,  the  Power  of  directing  the  national  acts.  If  such 
Assemblies  be  moderately  numerous,  and  if  the  citi¬ 
zens  who  take  part  in  them,  really  aim  at  Order, 
Liberty  and  Justice,  the  balance  of  the  Constitution 
may  long  subsist.  And  if,  on  the  increase  of  wealth 
and  intelligence  in  the  People,  a  large  share  of  Popu¬ 
lar  Rights  is  pressed  for,  the  Conservative  Party  may, 
by  yielding  slowly  and  yet  holding  steadily,  find  the 
new  position  pf  equilibrium  which  is  suited  to  the  new 
condition  of  the  community. 

VOL.  II.  w 


254 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  REPRESENTATIVE  SYSTEM  OF  GOVERNMENT. 

949.  When  a  nation  becomes  very  large,  such 
a  balanced  Constitution,  as  we  have  just  spoken  of, 
in  its  simple  form,  becomes  difficult  or  impracticable. 
The  General  Assemblies  of  the  citizens  become  too 
numerous  and  too  mixed,  to  deliberate  and  act  with 
order,  freedom,  and  virtue.  When  freedom  has  ex¬ 
isted  in  large  nations,  it  has  existed  under  more  com¬ 
plex  Constitutions;  and  the  struggle  between  Estab¬ 
lished  Authority  and  the  demands  for  Enlarged 
Liberty  have  assumed  corresponding  forms.  Some¬ 
times  the  struggle  has  been  between  the  King  and 
the  Nobles,  the  Nobles  contending  for  Liberty  for 
themselves ;  while  the  question  of  Liberty  between 
their  dependents  and  them  is  left  to  be  settled  after¬ 
wards.  Thus  the  Barons  of  England,  as  the  assert- 
ors  of  English  Liberty,  obtained  Magna  Charta.  Or 
the  struggle  may  be  between  the  King,  and  certain 
Classes  of  the  Community,  collected  (they  or  the 
principal  persons  of  them)  in  Assemblies,  Class  by 
Class.  Such  Assemblies  are  the  Estates  of  the 
Realm :  thus  in  England  the  three  Estates  were  an¬ 
ciently,  the  Spiritual  Body,  the  Temporal  Lords,  and 
the  Commons.  The  Members  of  the  Estate  of  the 
Commons,  the  Third  Estate,  may  be  appointed  by 
the  People  in  various  ways ;  but  in  all  its  modifica¬ 
tions,  this  Estate  is  a  Representative  Assembly.  And 
in  nations  where  Classes  of  Society  with  broad  his¬ 
torical  distinctions  have  never  existed,  or  where  the 
distinctions  have  been  abolished,  the  whole  body  of 
the  people  may  be  divided  into  Electoral  Districts ; 
and  the  Representatives  of  these  Districts  may  form 
assemblies  by  which  free  government  may  be  exer¬ 
cised  for  a  territory,  perhaps,  of  unlimited  extent. 


CHAP.  VIII.]  THE  REPRESENTATIVE  SYSTEM.  255 

950.  The  Principle  of  Representation  in  Go¬ 
vernment  is  entirely  of  modern  origin.  In  the  ancient 
world  we  nowhere  find  it  brought  into  play.  As  we 
have  just  said,  it  is  a  necessary  condition  of  the  free¬ 
dom  of  a  great  nation  ;  for  the  whole  body  of  the 
citizens  could  not,  in  any  other  way  have  their  share 
in  the  Government.  But  the  conduct  of  national 
business  by  Representative  Assemblies,  has  advan¬ 
tages  much  beyond  its  making  freedom  merely  pos¬ 
sible  for  an  extensive  and  populous  country.  It 
prevents  the  tumultuous  meetings  and  rash  proceed¬ 
ings  of  large  popular  assemblies.  It  also,  by  re¬ 
ducing  the  number  of  the  deliberative  assembly, 
increases  the  calmness  and  reasonableness  of  their 
discussions  and  decisions.  The  members  of  the 
assembly,  not  having  found  their  place  into  it  by 
chance,  but  being  chosen  for  their  real  or  supposed 
merits,  act  with  a  greater  sense  of  responsibility ; 
and  will  be,  really,  a  wiser  and  more  trustworthy 
set  of  men,  than  the  citizens  taken  at  hazard.  Their 
being  few  in  number,  selected  for  merit,  the  object  of 
public  notice,  makes  them  more  likely  to  act  for  right 
ends,  and  less  likely  to  be  seduced  by  the  prospect 
of  personal  advantage  to  oblique  and  selfish  courses. 
The  Members  of  such  an  assembly  also  attend  to 
their  public  business  more  regularly  and  carefully 
than  the  people  at  large  would  do  or  could  do.  The 
Members  of  the  Assembly  become  statesmen  by  pro¬ 
fession,  and  attend  to  their  work  with  a  professional 
care  and  skill.  They  guard  both  order  and  liberty, 
the  Rights  of  the  State  and  of  all  citizens,  more 
watchfully  and  better  than  the  citizens  would  guard 
their  own  Plights. 

951.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Representative 
System,  the  people  at  large  are  liberated  from  the 
task  of  managing  the  Government,  which  they  could 
not  execute  well ;  and  are  charged  only  with  a  busi¬ 
ness  to  which  they  are  fully  competent,  that  of  elect- 


256 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


ing  those  who  are  to  govern.  The  citizens  who 
would  be  wholly  unfit  to  be  trusted  with  the  decision 
of  a  question  of  foreign  polity,  or  domestic  economy, 
or  jurisprudence,  may  be  qualified  to  choose  a  person 
as  their  Representative.  In  this  manner,  the  whole 
people  have  a  share  in  the  government :  both  the 
masses  of  population  in  the  towns,  too  numerous  and 
too  ignorant  to  rule  directly ;  and  the  people  of  the 
country,  too  scattered  otherwise  to  act  at  all  in  public 
business.  For  these  two  may  be  brought  together 
without  difficulty  on  such  occasions  as  the  choice  of 
a  Representative. 

952.  We  see,  then,  that  this  Modern  Step  in 
Polity,  the  introduction  of  the  Representative  Sys¬ 
tem,  makes  a  combination  of  Liberty  and  Order  pos¬ 
sible  upon  any  scale  however  large,  and  brings  with 
it  other  vast  advantages.  But  for  this  purpose,  the 
Representative  must  not  be  merely  a  Delegate,  who 
reports  to  the  Central  Assembly  what  his  constitu¬ 
ents  have  directed  him  to  say  ;  nor  must  be  a  Sena¬ 
tor  for  life,  who,  once  elected,  is  no  further  responsi¬ 
ble  to  the  electors ;  nor  must  be  a  Patron,  who  has 
the  people  whom  he  represents,  not  for  his  Electors, 
but  for  his  Clients  ;  and  finally,  he  must  be  a  Repre¬ 
sentative  in  an  Assembly  which  acts  for  the  Nation  ; 
for  it  is  of  national  Government  that  we  are  speak¬ 
ing.  Hence  it  has  been  rightly  stated*  as  essential 
to  Representation,  that  in  electing  him  the  power 
of  the  People  must  be  parted  with,  and  given  over, 
for  a  limited  time,  to  Deputies  chosen  by  the  People  ; 
the  Deputies  fully  and  freely  exercising  Power  in¬ 
stead  of  the  People. 

953.  After  the  Representative  System  is  fully 
established,  the  Struggles  of  Parties,  and  especially 
the  Struggles  of  the  Conservative  and  the  Movement 
Party  in  each  Country,  are  mainly  carried  on  by 

*  Lord  Brougham,  Polit.  Phil.  Part,  m.,  33. 


CIIAP.  VIII.]  THE  REPRESENTATIVE  SYSTEM. 


257 


means  of  Debates  in  the  Representative  Body.  The 
leading  Ideas  of  these  two  opposite  Parties  are,  as 
we  have  seen,  Order  and  Freedom.  In  the  histori¬ 
cal  course  of  the  struggle,  these  Ideas  are  exempli¬ 
fied  and  embodied  in  special  forms ;  in  Coercive 
Laws  on  the  one  side,  and  Popular  Rights  on  the 
other  and  the  Struggle  is  carried  on  with  reference 
to  a  series  of  special  and  subordinate  objects  of  this 
kind. 

954.  When  men  begin  to  direct  their  thoughts 
and  actions,  not  towards  a  Practical  Order  and  a 
Practical  Freedom,  to  be  attained  by  the  removal  of 
Special  Disorders  and  Special  Grievances,  but  to¬ 
wards  a  general  Notional  Order  and  Notional  Free¬ 
dom  ;  these  Notions  are  too  vague  to  direct  their  ac¬ 
tions  safely,  while  the  very  largeness  of  the  Notions 
makes  them  disturb  the  tranquil  progress  of  men’s 
thoughts.  And  thus,  the  enthusiasts  of  both  sides 
strain  after  a  Visionary  Polity,  in  which  they  think 
they  could  realize  their  Notional  Order  or  their  No¬ 
tional  Freedom  ;  but  without  making  any  real  pro¬ 
gress  towards  the  Object.  In  Polity,  as  in  the  In¬ 
ductive  Sciences,  every  large  ascent  towards  Truth 
consists  of  a  number  of  small  ascents  ;  and  is  to  be 
forwarded  only  by  struggling  with  the  difficulty  at 
which  we  have  arrived  ;  not  by  tracing  in  our  minds 
a  visionary  scheme  of  the  Science,  which  conducts 
us  to  some  complete  body  of  knowledge.  Bacon  has 
remarked  that  though  the  human  Intellect  naturally 
tries  to  reach  the  ultimate  Truth  at  a  single  flight, 
yet  that  the  only  way  in  which  Truth  can  really  be 
attained  is  by  a  gradual  progress  through  many  inter¬ 
mediate  steps.*  The  same  is  the  case,  for  the  most 
part,  in  the  historical  progress  of  nations  towards  a 
realization  of  the  combined  Ideas  of  Order  and 
Freedom.  > 

*  Nov.  Org.  i.  Ax.  xix.,  xx. 

VOL.  TT.  17  W  2 


258 


rOLITY. 


[book  V. 


955.  By  means  of  the  Representative  System, 
Freedom  has  been  established  in  some  of  the  Monar¬ 
chies  of  Europe,  in  the  Democracy  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  some  of  the  British  Colonies.  In  all 
these  cases,  however,  there  has  been,  in  addition  to 
the  Assembly  directly  representing  the  People, 
another  Assembly,  a  Senate,  or  a  House  of  Peers, 
consisting  of  persons,  either  not  at  all,  or  not  so  di¬ 
rectly,  elected  by  the  people.  The  joint  assent  of 
this  Upper  House  and  of  the  Lower  Assembly  has 
been  made  requisite  for  the  validity  of  the  measures 
of  the  State.  And  there  appears  to  be  strong  rea¬ 
son  to  believe,  that  without  such  an  Upper  House, 
the  balance  between  Order  and  Liberty  in  a  State 
could  not  long  be  preserved.  For  an  Assembly, 
chosen  by  the  People,  and  brought  directly  into  con¬ 
flict  with  the  Established  Authority  in  its  highest 
form  ;  if  it  be  strong  enough  to  struggle  at  all,  will 
be  inflamed  by  the  struggle,  and  will  act  hastily,  an¬ 
grily,  and  immoderately.  The  assent  of  another 
Assembly  in  its  proceedings,  if  required  for  their  va¬ 
lidity,  secures  a  deliberate  and  calm  survey  of  the 
question,  by  men  not  heated  and  blinded  by  the  same 
contagious  passions  and  interests.  With  three  bodies 
in  the  State  ;  the  Sovereign,  the  Senate,  and  the  Re¬ 
presentative  Body,  it  is  probable  that  two  will  be 
against  the  one  which  would  disturb  the  balance  of 
the  Constitution. 

956.  Yet  the  balance  is  sometimes  disturbed  in 
most  States.  It  is  only  by  a  rare  felicity,  that  the 
struggle  between  the  Conservative  and  the  Movement 
party  is  carried  on  from  age  to  age  without  produc¬ 
ing  such  oscillations  as  overturn  the  balance.  To 
yield  slowly  and  firmly,  to  advance  steadily  and  mo¬ 
derately,  are  rare  virtues  in  Political  Parties.  More¬ 
over,  as  we  have  said,  besides  the  struggles  of  Parties 
from  Principle,  there  are  struggles  of  Parties  for 
Power.  It  may  happen  that  the  Established  Autho- 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION. 


259 


rity  uses  its  Power  to  crush  Established  Liberty  ;  and 
that  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  fail  in  providing 
adequate  means  of  resistance.  It  may  happen  that 
Established  Authority  refuses  all  concessions,  till  the 
sense  of  practical  grievances  becomes  intolerable, 
and  leads  to  popular  violence.  It  may  happen  that 
when  the  popular  Party  is  strong,  men’s  minds  are 
inflamed  with  a  Love  of  Notional  Liberty,  which  no 
practical  concessions  can  satiate  ;  and  then,  the  po¬ 
pular  Party  itself  violates  the  Constitution.  In  these 
and  many  other  cases,  we  may  have  Revolutions ,  or 
violent  and  anomalous  Changes  in  the  Constitution. 
They  are,  as  we  have  said,  cases  of  necessity  ;  to 
be  justified  only  by  their  necessity. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

ACTUAL  PROGRESS  OF  GOVERNMENT  IN  ANCIENT 
ROME  AND  IN  ENGLAND. 

957.  The  history  of  ancient  Rome  is  an  ex¬ 
ample  of  a  long-continued  struggle  between  an  aris¬ 
tocracy  and  a  democracy.  According  to  the  views 
of  the  most  philosophical  historians,  the  Patricians 
alone  had  a  place  in  the  original  constitution  of  the 
Roman  State.  The  Senate  was  the  Administrative 
Council,  with  the  King,  and  afterwards,  with  the 
Consuls,  at  its  head  ;  the  Senate  and  the  People 
( Senalus  Populusque  Romanus )  had  the  Legislative 
Authority,  exercised  in  the  Comitia  Curiata,  the  As¬ 
semblies  of  the  Curies  or  Wards  of  the  Patrician 
Houses  ( Gentes ).  The  Plebs  was  a  populace  occu¬ 
pying  a  portion  of  the  city,  but  not  admitted  to  any 
place  in  the  Senate,  the  Magistracy,  or  the  Comitia, 
although  forming  a  considerable  portion  of  the  army. 


260 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Servius  Tullius,  the  sixth  King,  gave  a  legal  organi¬ 
zation  to  the  Plebs,  by  dividing  it  into  thirty  Tribes ; 
and  gave  it  a  place  in  the  Constitution,  by  the  institu¬ 
tion  of  Classes  divided  into  Centuries ,  including,  as 
the  army  included,  Patricians  and  Plebeians  together  ; 
and  by  the  introduction  of  an  Assembly  of  these, 
Comitia  Centuriata,  with  authority  for  certain  pur¬ 
poses.  But  it  was  long  before  the  Plebeians  obtain¬ 
ed  the  advantages  which  such  a  Constitution  seemed 
to  promise  them.  They  were  still  oppressed  and 
kept  under  by  the  Patricians.  They  were  excluded 
from  the  Consulship,  the  Senate,  and  most  Magistra¬ 
cies,  and  from  intermarriage  with  Patricians.  The 
Patricians  had  the  profitable  occupancy  of  the  land 
(ager  publicus),  which  nominally  belonged  to  the 
State  ;  and  in  many  cases,  lending  money  to  the  im¬ 
poverished  Plebeians,  acquired  personal  power  over 
them,  in  virtue  of  the  severe  Roman  Laws  respect¬ 
ing  Debtors. 

958.  This  inequality  of  Rights  and  Advan¬ 
tages  led  to  a  Sedition,  in  which  the  Plebeians  be¬ 
gan,  in  a  body,  to  separate  themselves  from  the 
Roman  State.  They  were  brought  back  by  conces¬ 
sions,  that  the  debts  of  insolvents  should  be  cancelled, 
and  that  they  should  have  two  magistrates  appointed 
as  their  protectors  ;  Tribunes  of  the  Plebeians  ;  whose 
persons  should  be  inviolable,  and  who  should  have 
the  power  of  interposing,  so  as  to  arrest  any  legal 
proceeding.  From  this  time,  the  Plebeians,  by 
struggles  of  various  kinds,  obtained  many  of  the 
Rights  from  which  they  had  at  first  been  excluded. 
The  practice  of  voting  according  to  Tribes,  in  the 
Comitia  Tributa,  was  employed  :  and  by  this  means 
the  power  of  the  Plebeians  was  very  greatly  in¬ 
creased.  Connubium,  the  intermarriage  of  Patri¬ 
cians  and  Plebeians  was  allowed ;  the  Senate  was 
thrown  open  to  the  Plebeians ;  afterwards  it  was  or¬ 
dained  that  of  the  two  Consuls,  always  one  should 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION. 


261 


be  a  Plebeian.  They  succeeded  in  their  attempts  to 
carry  Agrarian  Laws,  for  an  equal  division  of  the  pub¬ 
lic  land.  At  length  the  remaining  Magistracies  were 
thrown  open  to  Plebeians ;  the  decrees  of  their  as¬ 
semblies  (Plebiscita)  were  invested  with  the  force  of 
Laws ;  and  the  distinction  of  Patricians  and  Plebei¬ 
ans  ceased  to  have  any  political  value.  The  Polity 
of  Rome  had  been  changed  by  these  struggles,  from 
a  rigorous  Aristocracy,  to  a  combination  of  Aristo¬ 
cracy  and  Democracy.  This  may  be  looked  upon 
as  the  golden  period  of  the  Roman  Constitution.  It 
is  at  this  period  that  it  obtained  the  admiration  of 
Polybius :  who  describes  the  Constitution  as  exhibit¬ 
ing,  in  the  combined  institutions  of  Consuls,  Senate, 
and  Commons,  a  happy  mixture  of  Regal  Power, 
Aristocracy,  and  Democracy. 

959.  When  Rome  had  become  Mistress  of  the 
whole  of  Italy,  new  struggles  arose,  in  consequence 
of  the  demands  of  the  Italians  claiming  to  be  admitted 
into  the  privileges  of  the  Roman  Constitution.  If 
the  practice  of  modern  times  had  been  introduced, 
according  to  which  the  Citizens  of  Free  States  act 
their  political  part  by  their  Representatives,  it  is  pos¬ 
sible  that  Italy  might  have  long  flourished  under  the 
mixt  Roman  Constitution.  But  the  attempt  to  make 
all  Italy  one  City,  in  a  political  sense,  soon  led  to 
confusion.  The  Democratic  portion  of  the  State  was 
too  numerous  for  orderly  action  ;  and  mobs  of  armed 
men,  and  armies,  soon  took  its  place.  The  evils  of 
this  state  of  things  were  so  intolerable,  that  after  a 
few  transient  changes,  the  Romans,  in  order  to  obtain 
tranquillity  and  security,  were  willing  to  resign  their 
Liberty.  They  acquiesced  in  the  sway  of  the  suc¬ 
cessful  General,  bestowed  upon  him  all  their  Consti¬ 
tutional  Magistracies,  and  acknowledged  him  as  their 
Emperor  ( Imperator .) 

960.  The  Jmperium  from  which  this  designa¬ 
tion  was  especially  borrowed,  was  the  military  power 


262 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


which  the  Commander  of  the  Army  has  assigned  to 
him  over  his  troops  in  the  field.  It  was  of  the  most 
absolute  kind,  and  was  made  obligatory  upon  each 
person  by  an  oath  ( Sacramentum  militare ),  that  he 
would  be  faithful  and  obedient  to  his  General,  saving 
the  fidelity  he  owed  to  the  Roman  Senate  and  Peo¬ 
ple.  On  the  destruction  of  Public  Liberty,  this  Oath 
was  taken  to  the  Emperor,  as  Commander-in-Chief; 
but  the  Clause  in  favour  of  the  Senate  and  People 
was  omitted.  Instead  of  being  limited  to  the  Sol¬ 
diers,  the  oath  was  extended  to  all  magistrates  and 
citizens,  and  ultimately  to  the  provincials.  And 
thus,  the  Roman  Emperors  had  unlimited  power, 
both  by  the  accumulation  of  all  civil  authority  in 
their  persons,  and  by  the  military  authority  thus  de¬ 
clared. 

961.  Accordingly,  the  Emperor  had  legislative 
as  well  as  executive  power.  The  Roman  Jurists 
say,*  “  Quod  Principi  placuit  legis  habet  vigorem, 
utpote  quum  Lege  Regia  quce  de  Imperio  ejus  lata 
est,  Populus  ei  et  in  eum  omne  suum  imperium  et 
potestatem  conferat.”  Religious  as  well  as  Civil 
authority  was  given  to  the  Emperor ;  a  sacredness 
and  a  kind  of  divinity  were  ascribed  to  him.  After 
Christianity  became  the  Religion  of  the  Roman 
State,  high  religious  dignity  was  still  attributed  to 
the  imperial  condition.  In  imitation  of  the  Jewish 
kings,  he  was  anointed  with  oil,  and  consecrated  by 
a  priest ;  he  was  declared  to  hold  his  crown  by  the 
Grace  of  God,  and  was  spoken  of  as  the  Yicar  of 
Christ  over  Christian  people.  And  thus,  the  mon¬ 
archical  office  was  elevated  to  a  transcendent  supre¬ 
macy  and  ideal  perfection  ;  it  was  the  Source  of 
Order,  Justice,  and  Right;  and  absorbed  and  super- 

*  Dig.  i.,  4.  Inst,  i.,  2,  §  6.  Gains,  i.,  §  7.  The  Com¬ 
mand  of  the  Emperor  has  the  force  of  Law  ;  for  by  the  Royal 
Law  respecting  his  authority,  the  People  gives  to  him  and  con¬ 
fers  upon  him  all  its  authority  and  power. 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION. 


263 


seded  all  other  powers  and  Rights  which  had  existed 
in  the  Constitution. 

962.  Very  different  from  this  view  of  the  chief 
ruler  of  the  State,  was  that  which  prevailed  among 
the  northern  nations  who  gradually  took  possession 
of  the  provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire.  In  the  most 
considerable  of  the  Germanic  tribes,  the  form  of 
Government  was  republican.  Some  of  these  had  a 
Chief,  to  whom  the  Romans  gave  the  name  of  King ; 
but  his  authority  was  very  limited.  The  Supreme 
Authority  of  the  nation  resided  in  the  Freemen  of 
whom  it  was  composed.  When  a  national  war  was 
undertaken,  one  of  the  Chiefs  was  selected  to  com¬ 
mand  the  army,  but  his  authority  expired  with  the 
return  of  peace.  But  when  these  tribes  settled  as 
conquerors  in  the  Roman  provinces,  they  adopted,  in 
many  respects,  the  customs  and  the  legal  language 
of  those  whom  they  subjugated.  The  superiority  of 
the  Romans  over  the  Barbarians  in  intellectual  and 
literary  culture,  the  advantages  attendant  upon  fixed 
laws,  and  laws  already  fixed,  strongly  promoted  this 
result.  And  after  a  time,  the  servility  of  men’s 
language  infected  their  thoughts  ;  and  the  subjects 
of  the  kingdoms  which  arose  out  of  the  empire  not 
only  spoke,  but  in  some  measure  thought  of  their 
King,  as  the  Romans  had  been  accustomed  to  do  of 
their  Emperor. 

963.  But  there  was  another  especially  Ger¬ 
manic  element,  which  modified  the  feelings  of  men 
towards  their  Chief.  Every  German  Chief  had  a 
band  of  Followers,  who  had  voluntarily  attached 
themselves  to  him.  From  him  they  had  received 
their  recognized  place  as  warriors  ;  at  his  table  they 
feasted  ;  to  his  service  they  were  devoted.  In  war, 
he  fought  for  victory,  they  for  their  chief.  From  an 
ancient  Teutonic  word  signifying  their  trustiness  to 
him,  they  were  called  Antrustiones .  They  were 
also  called  the  Chief’s  Vassi,  his  young  men,  or  his 


264 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


men :  as  the  act  of  a  person  declaring  himself  a 
superior’s  man  was  afterwards  called  homage ,  by  a 
derivative  from  the  Latin.  This  connexion  was  re¬ 
garded  as  the  most  sacred  which  could  subsist  be¬ 
tween  one  man  and  another.  The  usage  of  this 
connexion  the  Germans  carried  with  them  into  the 
countries  which  they  subdued,  and  it  became  one  of 
the  chief  bonds  of  political  union  in  the  governments 
which  they  established.  It  was  commonly  confirmed 
by  an  oath,  promising  fidelity,  fealty  or  allegiance ,  on 
the  part  of  the  inferior,  and  sometimes,  by  an  oath 
promising  protection  and  justice  on  the  part  of  the 
superior.  The  feelings  connected  with  this  ancient 
relation  of  superior  and  inferior  have  given  a  pecu¬ 
liar  character  to  loyalty  towards  a  Sovereign,  as  con¬ 
ceived  in  modern  times. 

964.  The  Feudal  System,  which  was  estab¬ 
lished  in  Europe  after  the  separation  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  borrowed  much  of  its  language  from  this 
relation  of  the  Chief  and  his  men:  it  became  that 
of  the  Seignior  and  his  Vassals:  But  the  Feudal 
System  borrowed  its'  more  substantial  element,  the 
tenure  of  land  by  military  service,  from  the  Roman 
Empire.  Even  while  the  empire  was  only  com¬ 
mencing,  Sylla  and  Augustus  assigned  lands  to  their 
Veterans  ;  and  a  little  later,  lands  were  granted  to 
the  Limitanean  or  Ripuarian  Soldiery,  on  condition 
of  defending  the  boundaries  of  the  empire.  These 
were  commanded  by  the  Dukes  and  Counts  of  the 
Provinces.  Under  Constantine,  the  Count  of  the 
Saxon  Shore  ruled  from  Norfolk  to  Sussex,  while  the 
Duke  of  Britain  governed  the  remainder  of  Britain. 
These  military  Counts  and  Dukes  were  the  Magis¬ 
trates,  as  well  as  the  Commanders  of  the  Soldiery. 
The  Military,  so  organized,  constituted  a  distinct 
and  ruling  Class,  both  in  consequence  of  their  privi¬ 
leges,  and  of  the  right  which  they  exercised  of  elect¬ 
ing  an  Emperor  upon  some  occasions.  They  were, 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ROMAN  CONSTITUTION. 


265 


in  short,  a  Military  Aristocracy.  The  lands  thus 
possessed  by  military  service  were  termed  Benefices 
(beneficia) ;  and  afterwards  Fiefs  ( feuda ),  by  the 
Barbarians,  who  received  land  from  the  Roman 
rulers  on  the  like  conditions.  Afterwards  the  Seig¬ 
niors  or  Lords  held  their  Fiefs  as  the  grants  of  the 
Kings  of  the  separate  kingdoms.  In  turn,  they  them¬ 
selves  granted  portions  of  them  to  inferior,  Vassals, 
on  the  like  condition  of  military  Service  ;  and  this 
Subinfeudation  of  Vassals  and  Arriere  of  Vassals 
was  continued  through  several  degrees.  The  sub¬ 
ordinate  holders  of  feudal  benefices  possessed  some 
of  the  privileges  of  feudal  Lords.  In  the  course  of 
time,  Fiefs  became  hereditary. 

965.  Thus  the  Feudal  System  was  established  ; 
and  gave  to  the  relation  between  the  Governors  and 
the  Governed  a  new  form.  Instead  of  the  single 
transcendental  authority  of  the  Roman  Empire,  be¬ 
fore  which  all  Liberty  was  annihilated,  there  was, 
along  with  Monarchy,  a  Military  Aristocracy,  in 
which  the  Superiors  and  Inferiors,  from  the  Sovereign 
downwards,  had  mutual  Rights  and  Obligations,  of 
Protection  and  Service ;  and  in  which  there  were, 
therefore,  for  them,  Elements  both  of  Order  and  of 
Liberty. 

966.  It  is  true  that  this  Order  and  this  Liber¬ 
ty  were  very  imperfect,  being  only  such  as  are 
maintained  in  a  state  of  peace  which  is  looked  upon 
as  subordinate  to  a  state  of  war.  The  lowest  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  Feudal  System  were  liable  to  great  op¬ 
pression.  Moreover,  the  peaceable  part  of  the  com¬ 
munity,  the  inhabitants  of  towns,  and  generally, 
those  who  had  no  place  in  the  army,  were  not  pro¬ 
vided  for  in  this  System.  So  far  as  they  were  con¬ 
cerned,  there  was  no  Security  and  no  Liberty. 
Hence,  from  this  time,  the  struggle  between  Mon¬ 
archy,  Aristocracy,  and  Democracy,  takes  a  new 
form.  We  have  the  Feudal  Aristocracy  in  conflict 

VOL.  n.  x 


266 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


with  the  Imperial  Doctrine  of  absolute  Regal  Power; 
and  we  have  the  Burgher  Democracy  in  conflict 
with  the  Feudal  Aristocracy  and  the  Monarchy. 

967.  Our  own  country  exhibits  to  us  an  ex¬ 
emplification  of  these  conflicts.  The  Feudal  Sys¬ 
tem  was  fully  established  in  England  by  the  Nor¬ 
man  Conquest ;  but  the  Conqueror  gave  to  it  a  more 
monarchical  character  than  it  elsewhere  had,  by 
requiring,  not  only  those  who  held  in  chief  of  the 
crown,  but  also  their  tenants,  to  swear  personal 
fealty  to  the  King.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ex¬ 
orbitance  of  the  royal  authority  was  resisted,  not 
only  by  the  rights  of  feudal  tenancy,  but  also  by  a 
spirit  of  Freedom  which  the  Anglo-Saxons  had  de¬ 
rived  from  their  German  ancestors,  and  by  the  An¬ 
glo-Saxon  Laws  and  Institutions,  which  embodied 
this  Freedom.  The  Anglo-Saxon  Kings  were  guided, 
in  the  main  acts  of  their  government,  by  the  great 
Council  of  the  nation,  which  bore  the  title  of  Wit- 
tenagemote,  or  the  assembly  of  wise  men.  All  the 
Laws  expressed  the  assent  of  this  Council.  It  was 
composed  of  Prelates  and  Abbots,  of  the  Aldermen 
of  the  Shires,  and,  as  it  is  expressed  in  the  Laws 
themselves,  of  the  Noble  and  Wise  of  the  kingdom. 

968.  After  the  Norman  Conquest,  when  the 
Anglo-Saxons  were  for  a  time,  not  only  subjected  to 
rigorous  feudal  servitudes,  but  reduced  to  the  con¬ 
dition  of  a  subjugated  race,  they  looked  back  with 
an  affectionate  regret  to  the  Laws  of  Edward  the 
Confessor.  William  the  Conqueror  was  induced  to 
relax  the  rigour  of  his  rule,  so  far  as  to  grant  his 
subjects  a  charter,  in  which  he  professed  to  restore 
the  Laws  of  the  Confessor,  and  to  relieve,  or  at  least 
to  limit,  the  feudal  burthens.  Similar  Charters 
were  obtained  by  the  subjects  from  succeeding 
kings;  and  after  various  struggles,  there  was  won, 
from  the  crown,  the  Great  Charter  of  King  John, 
which  determines  the  character  of  the  English  Con- 


CHAF.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION.  267 

stitution.  This  Charter,  from  the  time  of  its  being 
granted,  was  always  considered  as  a  primary  and 
fundamental  law  of  the  nation.  Mr.  Hallam  says,* 
“  This  is  still  the  key-stone  of  English  Liberty.  All 
that  has  since  been  obtained  is  little  more  than  as 
confirmation  or  commentary  :  and  if  every  subse¬ 
quent  Law  were  to  be  swept  away,  there  would  still 
remain  the  bold  features  which  distinguish  a  free 
from  a  despotic  monarchy.”  Like  preceding  Char¬ 
ters,  this  redresses  the  worst  grievances  of  the  mili¬ 
tary  tenants  ;  but  its  more  important  clauses  are 
those  which  protect  the  personal  security  and  Rights 
of  Property  of  all  freemen.  “  No  freeman  shall  be 
taken,  or  imprisoned,  or  disseized  of  his  freehold,  or 
liberties,  or  freecustoms  ;  or  be  outlawed,  or  exiled, 
or  any  otherwise  destroyed.  Nor  will  we  pass  upon 
him  but  by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers  and  the 
Law  of  the  land.  We  will  sell  to  no  man  justice 
and  right ;  we  will  not  deny  or  delay  them  to  any 
man.”  Other  clauses  restrain  excessive  and  arbi¬ 
trary  demands  of  those  pecuniary  aids  which  the 
Feudal  System  authorized  the  Lord  to  claim  of  his 
vassals. 

969.  But  the  great  Council  of  the  Nation,  as 
well  as  the  Charters  of  the  Kings,  became  a  bul¬ 
wark  of  Liberty.  In  the  Saxon  and  in  the  Norman 
period,  the  King  legislated  with  the  advice  of  his 
Great  Council  or  Parliament.  It  was  a  principle 
of  the  Feudal  System  that  within  the  limits  of  his 
fief,  a  Vassal  could  not  be  bound  by  a  law  made 
without  his  consent.*)*  New*  taxes,  like  other  new 
laws,  required  the  sanction  of  this  Assembly  ;  but 
the  King  had  many  old  established  claims  upon  his 
vassals,  as  Escuage,  a  commutation  for  the  personal 
military  service  of  his  tenants ;  Tallage ,  a  tax  on 

*  Middle  Ages,  m.,  447. 

f  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  i.,  247 


268 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


his  demesne  lands  and  royal  towns;  Customs ,  on 
certain  imports  and  exports.  The  Great  Charter  re¬ 
strained  escuage  imposed  without  consent  of  Parlia¬ 
ment  ;  and  the  successors  of  John  never  pretended 
to  a  general  right  of  taxation  without  this  consent. 
This  part  of  the  Constitution  attained  a  more  defi¬ 
nite  form  under  Edward  the  First.  His  Conjirmatio 
Chartarum  not  only  gave  to  previous  Charters  most 
solemn  sanctions,  and  universal  circulation ;  but 
gave  to  private  property  that  security  against  the 
aggressions  of  the  crown,  which  Magna  Charta  had 
given  to  personal  liberty.  By  this  Statute  the  “aids, 
tasks,  and  prizes,’5  previously  taken,  are  removed 
as  precedents  ;  and  the  King  grants  to  his  Clergy, 
Peers,  and  to  all  the  Commonalty  of  the  land,  “that 
for  no  business  from  henceforth  we  shall  take  such 
manner  of  aids,  tasks,  or  prizes,  but  by  the  common 
assent  of  the  realm,  and  for  the  common  profit 
thereof.” 

970.  But  here  the  progress  of  the  Constitution 
towards  a  balance  is  further  marked  by  the  appear¬ 
ance  of  the  Commonalty  as  well  as  the  Nobles  in 
Parliament.  There  is  a  House  of  Commons  as  well 
as  a  House  of  Peers. 

The  earliest  known  writs  of  summons  to  cities  and 
boroughs  to  send  members  to  Parliament,  are  those 
issued  by  Simon  de  Montfort,  Earl  of  Leicester,  act¬ 
ing  as  Sovereign  of  the  kingdom ;  after  he,  at  the 
head  of  a  confederation  of  Barons,  had  defeated 
Henry  the  Third  at  the  battle  of  Lewes.  The 
deputies  of  such  places  were  finally  and  permanently 
engrafted  upon  Parliament  by  Edward  the  First. 
These  formed  a  Council,  in  addition  to  that  of  the 
Barons  and  higher  Peers ;  and  Knights,  sent  by  the 
Shires,  were  associated  with  the  Burgesses,  at  least 
from  the  time  of  Edward  the  Second.  In  the  course 
of  that  and  the  following  reign,  the  efforts  of  Parlia¬ 
ment  established  upon  a  firmer  footing  three  essen- 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION.  269 

tial  principles  of  the  Constitution  :  the  illegality  of 
raising  money  without  consent  of  Parliament ;  the 
necessity  that  the  two  Houses  should  concur  for  any 
alterations  of  the  Law  ;  and  the  Right  of  the  Com¬ 
mons  to  inquire  into  public  abuses,  and  to  impeach 
the  King’s  Counsellors. 

971.  From  this  time,  the  importance  of  Parlia¬ 
ment  was  shown  by  its  becoming  the  battle-field  of 
conflicting  Parties  in  the  State.  In  the  reign  of 
Edward  the  Second,  it  was  not  Parliament,  but  the 
Ba  rons,  who  had  the  principal  share  in  opposing  the 
Government.  But  in  the  end  of  Edward  the  Third’s 
reign,  an  opposition,  headed  by  the  Prince  of  Wales, 
urged  their  grievances  by  means  of  the  Petitions  and 
proceedings  of  Parliament.  And  Richard  the 
Second,  the  son  of  this  Prince  of  Wales,  after  a 
reign  of  contests  with  his  Parliaments,  in  which  he 
repeatedly  promised  redress  of  grievances  in  return 
for  Subsidies  which  they  voted  him,  was  compelled 
to  abdicate  the  throne,  and  Henry  the  Fourth  was 
acknowledged  King  in  1399. 

972.  In  the  reigns  of  the  three  kings  of  the 
House  of  Lancaster  (Henry  IV.,  V.,  and  VI.)  the 
powers  of  the  Parliament  to  protect  the  Liberty  of 
the  Nation  were  more  fully  unfolded.  The  exclu¬ 
sive  Right  of  taxation  by  Parliament  was  maintained, 
and  their  Right  also  to  direct  and  check  the  public 
expenditure.  They  exercised  the  Right  of  making 
their  supplies  depend  upon  the  redress  of  grievances  ; 
they  secured  the  people  against  illegal  ordinances 
and  interpolations  of  Statutes  ;  they  controlled  the 
royal  administration  in  matters  of  peace  and  war; 
they  punished  bad  ministers  ;  and  finally,  they  esta¬ 
blished  immunity  of  person,  and  liberty  of  speech, 
for  themselves  in  their  parliamentary  capacity. 
Some  of  the  most  eminent  maxims  of  parliamentary 
law  were  established  in  this  period :  for  instance, 
that  the  Commons  possess  the  exclusive  Right  of 

x  2 


270 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


originating  Money  Bills ;  and  that  the  King  ought 
not  to  take  notice  of  matters  pending  in  Parliament. 

973.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  election 
of  Members  of  Parliament  became  a  very  important 
Duty  and  Privilege  of  Englishmen.  It  was  in  the 
eighth  year  of  Henry  YI.  that  the  Elective  Franchise 
of  Voters  for  Counties  was  determined  to  belong  to 
freeholders  of  lands  or  tenements  of  the  value  of 
forty  shillings.  The  proper  Constituents  of  the 
Citizens  and  Burgesses  sent  to  Parliament  appear  to 
have  been  Chartered  Boroughs,  and  Towns  belong¬ 
ing  to  the  demesne  of  the  Crown,  and  all  places  of 
eminent  wealth  and  importance,  even  though  not 
incorporated.  But  probably  no  Parliament  ever  per¬ 
fectly  corresponded  with  this  Rule. 

974.  Thus,  many  centuries  ago,  a  Constitution 
was  established  in  England,  in  which  Monarchy, 
Aristocracy,  and  Democracy,  balanced  and  controll¬ 
ed  each  other.  There  were  many  Institutions,  Laws, 
and  Customs,  which  were  a  security  against  arbitrary 
power  ;  protecting  both  the  rights  of  the  Commons 
and  of  the  Nobility  ;  while  yet  the  Government,  in 
its  whole  tone  and  character,  was  Monarchical.  In 
the  language  of  the  Law,  all  seems  to  grow  out  of 
the  King,  and  is  referred  to  his  advantage  and  benefit. 
The  voice  of  the  Commons  towards  the  Crown  was, 
in  its  form,  humble  and  deferential.  The  royal  pre¬ 
rogative  was  always  named  in  large  and  pompous 
expressions.  This  monarchical  tone  still  more  per¬ 
vades  our  law-books.  Hence,  perhaps,  it  is,  that 
some  writers,  as  Hume,  have  fallen  into  the  mistake 
of  believing  that  the  limitations  of  royal  power  in 
this  country,  during  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  cen¬ 
turies,  were  unsettled,  both  in  law  and  in  public 
opinion.  But  the  gradual  development  of  the  con¬ 
stitutional  practices  of  parliament,  in  the  way  we 
have  described,  shows  that  there  was  nothing  unset- 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION.  271 

tied  or  ambiguous  in  their  general  character,  as  real 
securities  of  the  National  Liberty. 

975.  Accordingly,  the  English  Constitution  'is 
described  as  free,  and  is  put  in  contrast  to  despotic 
governments,  by  intelligent  writers  of  those  times. 
Sir  John  Fortescue,  who  was  Chief  Justice  of  the 
King’s  Bench  under  Henry  VI.,  and  afterwards 
Governor  to  the  young  Prince  of  Wales,  wrote  a 
Treatise,  entitled  “  Of  the  Difference  between  Abso¬ 
lute  and  Limited  Monarchy,”  in  which  the  English 
Government  is  his  example  of  a  Limited  Monarchy. 
He  also  wrote  a  Treatise,  “De  Laudibus  Legum 
Angliae,”  in  which  he  inculcates  this  doctrine  upon 
his  royal  pupil :  “  A  King  of  England  cannot  at  his 
pleasure  make  any  alteration  in  the  Laws  of  the 
Land  :  for  the  nature  of  his  government  is  not  regal, 
but  political  [or,  in  more  modern  phrase,  not  abso¬ 
lute,  but  constitutional].  Had  it  been  merely  regal, 
he  would  have  had  a  power  to  make  what  innovations 
and  alterations  he  pleased  in  the  laws  of  the  King¬ 
dom,  impose  tallages  and  other  hardships  upon  the 
people,'  whether  they  would  or  no,  without  their  con¬ 
sent  ;  which  sort  of  Government  the  Civil  Laws  point 
out,  when  they  declare  Quod  principi  placuit  legis 
habet  vigorem.  But  it  is  otherwise  with  a  king  whose 
government  is  constitutional ;  because  he  can  neither 
make  any  alteration  or  change  in  the  laws  of  the 
realm  without  the  consent  of  the  subjects  ;  nor  bur¬ 
then  them  against  their  will  with  strange  impositions  ; 
so  that  a  people  governed  by  such  Laws  as  are  made 
by  their  own  consent  and  approbation  enjoy  their 
properties  securely,  and  without  the  hazard  of  being 
deprived  of  them,  either  by  the  king  or  any  other.” 

976.  To  the  same  effect  speaks  Philip  de  Co¬ 
mines*  in  the  reign  of  Edward  the  Fourth.  “  The 
King  of  England  is  not  able  to  undertake  things  of 


*  B.  iv.,  c.  1. 


272 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


great  importance  without  calling  his  Parliament, 
which  is  in  the  nature  of  our  Three  Estates ;  and 
consisting  for  the  most  part  of  sober  and  pious  men, 
is  very  serviceable,  and  a  great  strengthening  to  the 
King.  At  the  meeting  of  this  Parliament,  the  King 
declares  his  intention,  and  desires  aid  of  his  subjects, 
and  they  supply  him  very  liberally.”  And  else¬ 
where*  he  says,  “In  my  opinion,  of  all  the  countries 
of  Europe  where  I  was  ever  acquainted,  the  Govern¬ 
ment  is  nowhere  so  well  managed  ;  the  people  no¬ 
where  less  obnoxious  to  violence  and  oppression, 
nor  their  houses  liable  to  the  desolations  of  war,  than 
in  England  ;  for  there  those  calamities  fall  only  on 
their  authors.” 

977.  The  expressions  exalting  the  King’s 
authority  to  absolute  power,  though  borrowed,  as  we 
have  seen,  from  the  Law  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and 
inconsistent  with  English  history,  yet  being  retained 
by  lawyers  and  others,  perhaps  stimulated  the  Kings 
of  England  to  arbitrary  conduct  and  imperious  lan¬ 
guage,  such  as  often  proceeded  from  the  Tudor 
princes.  In  opposition  to  this,  the  House  of  Com¬ 
mons  did  not  fail  from  time  to  time  to  make  declara¬ 
tions,  and  to  take  measures,  in  favour  of  the  liberty 
and  laws  of  the  land  :  and  though  often  overborne  by 
power,  they  never  surrendered  the  Cause  of  constitu¬ 
tional  government.  Even  in  the  Act  passed  in  the 
28th  of  Henry  VIII.,  which  gave  to  the  King’s  pro¬ 
clamations  the  force  of  law,  this  was  limited,  “  So 
that  they  should  not  be  prejudicial  to  anyone’s  inhe¬ 
ritance,  offices,  liberties,  goods  and  chattels,  or  in¬ 
fringe  the  established  laws  and  the  very  passing 
the  Act,  implied  the  recognition  of  Parliament  as  the 
legislative  Authority.  Even  in  this  reign,  in  1532, 
the  Commons  refused  to  pass  a  bill  recommended  by 
the  Crown. j*  In  the  following  reigns  of  Edward  VI. 


*  B.  v.,  c.  18. 


f  Hallam,  Eng.  Const.,  i.,  59. 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION. 


273 


and  Mary,  the  House  of  Commons  recovered  its  in¬ 
dependent  powers :  and  the  course  which  the  Court 
took,  in  order  to  strengthen  itself,  was,  to  conciliate 
the  assembly.  Queen  Elizabeth  frequently  spoke  to 
her  Parliaments  in  an  imperious  manner  ;  but  they, 
too,  had  members  who  spoke  boldly  on  the  other  side  ; 
and  though  she  exercised  a  large  power  in  some  in¬ 
stances,  she  yielded  in  others.  The  voice  of  English 
freedom  was  never  silenced  in  the  Houses  of  Parlia¬ 
ment,  nor  the  voice  of  English  law  in  the  Courts  of 
Justice.  In  this  period,  the  House  of  Commons  esta¬ 
blished  some  of  their  most  important  privileges  ;  the 
exemption  of  their  members  from  arrest  during  their 
Session  ;  the  right  of  determining  contested  elections 
of  their  own  members  :  the  right  of  punishing  offences 
against  themselves  by  imprisonment  of  the  offenders. 
The  Government  of  England  was  still,  as  it  had  long 
been,  recognized  as  a  Monarchy  limited  by  law. 

978.  In  opposition  to  Hume,  who,  to  show  the 
despotic  character  of  the  English  Government,  has 
quoted  from  Raleigh  a  passage  of  servile  flattery 
addressed  to  the  Queen,  Mr.  Plallam  quotes  Aylmer, 
who  wrote  a  Reply  to  John  Knox’s  “  Blast  of  the 
Trumpet  against  the  monstrous  Regiment  of  Wo¬ 
men.”  In  this  work  (in  1559),  it  is  stated,  as  an 
undoubted  doctrine,  that  “  the  regiment  of  England, 
is  not  a  mere  monarchy,  as  some  for  lack  of  consid¬ 
eration  think,  nor  a  mere  oligarchy  nor  democracy ; 
but  a  rule  mixed  of  all  these,  wherein  each  one  of 
them  hath  or  should  have  like  authority.  The 
image  whereof,  and  not  the  image,  but  the  thing  in¬ 
deed,  is  to  be  seen  in  the  Parliament  house,  wherein 
you  find  these  three  Estates :  the  King  or  Queen, 
which  represent  the  monarchy  ;  the  noblemen,  which 
be  the  aristocracy  ;  and  the  burgesses  and  knights, 
the  democracy.  If  the  parliament  use  their  privi¬ 
leges,  the  King  can  ordain  nothing  without  them  :  if 
he  do,  it  is  his  fault,  and  their  fault  in  permitting  it.” 

VOL.  II.  18 


274 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


979.  There  were,  no  doubt,  persons  who  held 
that  the  Sovereign  of  England  possessed,  in  a  sense 
more  or  less  strict,  Absolute  Power  ;  and  the  oppo¬ 
sition  between  these  persons,  and  the  asserters  of 
constitutional  government,  became  more  and  more 
marked  under  the  Stuarts.  James  I.  had  dissensions 
with  his  parliaments,  which  lasted  during  his  reign  : 
and  these  led  to  the  famous  Protestation  of  the  Com¬ 
mons  of  December  10th,  1621,  which  is  to  the  follow¬ 
ing  effect ;  its  various  clauses  referring  to  controver¬ 
sies  with  the  crown  which  had  occurred  at  various 
times:  “That  the  liberties,  franchises,  privileges, 
and  jurisdictions  of  parliament,  are  the  undoubted 
birthright  and  inheritance  of  the  subjects  of  Eng¬ 
land  — (this  was  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  as¬ 
serted  by  the  King,  that  they  proceeded  from  the 
royal  grace  :)  “  That  the  arduous  and  urgent  affairs 
concerning  the  King,  State,  and  defence  of  the 
realm,  and  of  the  Church  of  England ;  the  making 
and  maintenance  of  laws,  and  redress  of  mischief 
and  grievances,  are  proper  subjects  and  matters  of 
counsel  and  debate  in  parliament :  That  in  the  hand¬ 
ling  and  proceeding  of  those  businesses,  every  member 
of  the  house  hath,  and  of  right  ought  to  have,  free¬ 
dom  of  speech,  to  propound,  treat,  reason,  and  bring 
to  conclusion,  the  same  with  other  clauses  of  the 
like  nature.* 

980.  Charles  I.  was  in  conflict  with  his  parlia¬ 
ment  from  the  beginning  of  his  reign  ;  but  in  1628, 
he  gave  his  assent  to  the  Petition  of  Right,  which 
embodies  many  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the 
Constitution.  This  Statute  recites  the  various  laws 
which  had  established  certain  essential  privileges  of 
the  Subject,  and  enumerates  violations  of  them  which 
had  recently  occurred  in  the  points  of  illegal  exac¬ 
tions,  arbitrary  commitments,  quartering  of  soldiers 


*Hallam,  Eng.  Const.,  i.,  501. 


CHAP.  IX. 


THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION. 


275 


or  sailors,  and  infliction  of  punishment  by  martial 
law  •  and  then  prays  the  King,  “  That  no  man  here¬ 
after  be  compelled  to  make  or  yield  any  gift,  loan, 
benevolence,  tax,  or  such  like  charge,  without  com¬ 
mon  consent  by  Act  of  Parliament ;  and  that  no  free¬ 
man  in  such  manner  as  is  before-mentioned  be  im¬ 
prisoned  or  detained  ;  and  that  your  majesty  would 
be  pleased  to  remove  the  said  soldiers  and  marines  ; 
and  that  your  people  may  not  be  so  burthened  in 
time  to  come ;  and  that  the  aforesaid  Commissions 
for  proceeding  by  martial  law  may  be  revoked  and 
annulled  ;  and  that  hereafter  no  Commission  of  the 
like  nature  may  issue  forth  to  any  person  or  persons 
to  be  executed  as  aforesaid,  lest  by  colour  of  them 
any  of  your  majesty’s  subjects  be  destroyed  or  put  to 
death  contrary  to  the  laws  and  franchises  of  the 
land.”  Proceedings  inconsistent  with  this  law  were 
resisted  ;  as  in  the  Case  of  Ship-money,  in  which 
Hampden  refused  payment  of  the  illegal  exaction. 
And  though  the  decision  of  the  majority  of  the  judges 
was  against  him,  this  judgment  was  annulled  by  the 
Parliament  as  soon  as  it  was  allowed  to  meet. 

981.  But  the  Parliament,  which  had  so  long 
been  the  defender,  now  became  the  assailant  of  the 
Constitution ;  and  from  this  time,  through  the  dis¬ 
eased  and  troubled  period  of  the  Civil  War  and  the 
Usurpation  of  Cromwell,  the  public  acts,  both  of 
Government  and  of  Parliament,  no  longer  express 
the  national  judgment  of  what  was  just,  right,  and 
constitutional  ;  and  have  been  repudiated  by  subse¬ 
quent  acts  of  the  nation.  Yet  even  in  this  time  of 
conflict,  we  see  the  reverence  with  which  the  forms 
of  the  Constitution  were  retained.  The  parliament 
employed  the  name  of  the  King ,  even  in  acting 
against  him  ;  and  the  King  assembled  a  Parliament 
at  Oxford,  denying  the  name  to  that  which  sat  at 
Westminster.  Even  when  Cromwell  had,  by  the 
aid  of  the  army,  usurped  the  power  of  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  he  retained  the  general  forms  of  the  constitu-. 


276 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


tion  ;  a  Parliament  elected  by  and  representing  the 
nation  ;  and  a  House  of  Lords.  And  he  was  con- 
stantly  told  by  the  lawyers, — that  his  authority  could 
never  be  truly  valid  till  he  assumed  the  Title  of 
King ;  which  was,  to  use  their  words,  a  wheel  on 
which  the  whole  body  of  the  law  was  carried  ;  which 
stood  not  on  the  top,  but  ran  through  the  whole  veins 
and  life  of  the  law: — That  the  nation  had  ever  been 
a  lover  of  monarchy,  and  of  monarchy  under  the  ti¬ 
tle  of  a  King  : — That,  in  short,  this  title  of  King 
was  the  title  of  the  supreme  magistrate  which  the 
law  could  take  notice  of,  and  no  other. 

982.  The  restoration  of  the  Stuart  line  in 
Charles  II.,  introduced  no  change  in  the  principles 
of  the  Constitution  :  for  Charles  assumed  the  throne 
as  King  of  England  by  law  ;  and  therefore,  as  bound 
by  all  the  laws  which  preceding  Parliaments  had 
made,  till  they  were  repealed.  The  Convention  Par¬ 
liament  which  restored  him,  not  having  been  called 
together  by  royal  authority,  the  validity  of  its  acts 
was  doubtful,  till  they  were  confirmed  by  the  suc¬ 
ceeding  parliament ;  but  from  this  time,  the  mo¬ 
narchy  resumed  its  ancient  course.  The  frequent 
session  of  parliament,  and  its  high  estimate  of  its 
own  privileges,  furnished  a  security  against  illegal 
taxation  ;  and  from  this  time  we  have  no  more  of 
that  grievance,  hitherto  so  common.  The  power  of 
the  Commons  to  impeach  a  minister,  even  for  acts 
performed  by  the  King’s  command,  was  established 
in  the  case  of  the  Treasurer  Danby  ;  and  this  led 
to  the  decision  of  several  important  points,  respecting 
the  effect  of  such  impeachment.  In  this  reign,  also, 
the  ancient  Right  to  a  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus ,  by 
which  Englishmen  are  protected  from  illegal  or  ar¬ 
bitrary  imprisonment,  was  invested  with  new  securi¬ 
ties  and  facilities.  The  encroachments  on  the  legis¬ 
lative  supremacy  of  parliament,  and  on  the  personal 
right  of  the  subject,  by  means  of  Proclamations 
issued  from  the  Privy  Council,  which  had  been  fre- 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION. 


277 


quent  under  former  princes  both  of  the  Tudor  and  of 
the  Stuart  families,  fell  with  the  odious  tribunal,  the 
Star  Chamber,  by  which  they  had  been  enforced. 

983.  It  is  true,  that  some  persons  still  held  that 
the  Royal  Power  was  absolute,  and  could  not  be 
limited  by  opposite  acts  or  length  of  usage.  But 
these  doctrines  were  not  those  of  the  Parliament ; 
the  attempts  to  exclude  James  II.  from  the  throne, 
showed  how  large  a  portion  of  the  sovereign  power 
was  held  to  reside  in  other  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment.  And  the  Revolution,  which  placed  William 
the  Third  on  the  throne,  involved  a  complete  repudi¬ 
ation,  on  the  part  of  the  nation,  of  the  doctrines  of 
the  Absolute  Power,  and  the  indefeasible  and  impre¬ 
scriptible  Rights,  of  the  King  of  England.  Yet  the 
asserters  of  the  liberty  of  England,  even  in  this 
extreme  case,  attempted  to  divest  their  act,  as  much 
as  possible,  of  the  aspect  of  violence.  The  great 
vote  of  Jan.  28,  1689,  was  to  the  effect  that  King  James 
II.  had  “  abdicated  the  government,  and  that  the 
throne  was  vacant.”  In  this,  it  was  not  pretended  that 
the  word  abdicated  ”  was  used  in  its  ordinary  sense, 
to  denote  a  voluntary  resignation  of  the  crown.  It 
was  a  somewhat  gentler  term  than  “  forfeited,”  which 
was  the  notion  really  intended.  But  the  national  act, 
in  this  case,  went  beyond  even  the  meaning  of 
forfeiture  ;  for  it  disregarded  the  rights  of  James’s 
Heirs,  and  appointed  another  Sovereign.  The  modern 
constitutional  writer  whom  we  have  mainly  followed 
in  our  historical  survey,  says,  on  this  occasion,*  “  It 
was  only  by  recurring  to  a  kind  of  paramount,  and 
what  I  may  call  hyper-constitutional  law  ;  a  mixture 
of  force,  and  regard  to  the  national  good,  which  is 
the  best  sanction  of  what  is  done  in  revolutions  ;  that 
the  vote  of  the  Commons  could  be  defended.  They 
proceeded,  not  by  the  stated  rules  of  the  English 

*  Hallam,  Eng.  Const.,  in.,  134. 
y 


VOL.  II. 


278 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Government,  but  the  general  rights  of  mankind. 
They  looked  not  so  much  to  Magna  Charta,  as  the 
original  compact  of  society,  and  rejected  Coke  and 
Hall  for  Hooker  and  Grotius.”  As  we  have  said 
(895),  Revolutions  cannot  be  justified  by  stated 
Rules  of  Government,  but  must  be  defended  as 
Cases  of  Necessity.  The  defence  of  the  Revolution 
of  1688  was,  that  the  constitutional  liberty  and 
rational  independence  in  matters  of  religion,  which 
by  the  historical  education  of  Englishmen  were 
become  necessary  to  their  moral  agency  and  moral 
progress,  could  not  subsist  under  princes  whose  views 
of  the  national  constitution  and  national  religion  were 
those  of  the  Stuarts  :  and  the  proof  of  this  incompati¬ 
bility,  which  had  been  gaining  strength  ever  since 
the  accession  of  James  I.,  was  completed  by  the  last 
acts  of  James  II.  A  Revolution  of  which  this  is  the 
true  defence,  conducted  calmly,  resolutely,  and 
peaceably  to  its  object,  may  very  fitly  be  called 
Glorious. 

984.  This  great  occasion  of  the  assertion  of  the 
liberty  of  England  was  signalized  by  the  Declaration 
of  Rights,  which  gave  judgment  on  the  past,  and 
maxims  for  the  future  acts  of  the  crown.  It  contains 
a  recital  of  the  arbitrary  acts  which  James  had 
committed,  and  a  condemnation  of  them  as  illegal. 
In  this  important  act,  it  is  declared  :  “  That  the  pre¬ 
tended  power  of  suspending  laws,  and  the  execution 
of  laws,  by  royal  authority  without  consent  of  parlia¬ 
ment,  is  illegal  :  That  the  pretended  power  of 
dispensing  with  laws  by  royal  authority,  without 
consent  of  parliament  is  illegal :  That  the  Commission 
for  creating  the  late  Court  of  Commissioners  for 
ecclesiastical  causes,  and  all  other  commissions  and 
courts  of  the  like  kind,  are  illegal  and  pernicious : 
That  levying  of  money  for  or  to  the  use  of  the  crown 
by  pretence  of  prerogative  without  grant  of  parliament, 
or  for  longer  time,  or  in  other  manner  than  the  same 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION. 


279 


is  granted,  is  illegal  :  That  it  is  the  right  of  the 
Subjects  to  petition  the  King,  and  that  all  commit¬ 
ments  or  persecutions  for  such  petitions  are  illegal  : 
That  the  raising  or  keeping  a  standing  army  within 
the  kingdom  in  time  of  peace,  unless  it  be  with 
consent  of  parliament,  is  illegal  :  That  the  subjects 
which  are  protestants,  may  have  arms  for  their 
defence  suitable  to  their  condition,  and  as  allowed  by 
law  :  That  elections  of  members  of  parliament  ought 
to  be  free  :  That  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  debates 
in  parliament,  ought  not  to  be  impeached,  orquestioned 
in  any  court  out  of  parliament  :  That  excessive  bail 
ought  not  to  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed, 
nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishments  inflicted  :  That 
juries  ought  to  be  duly  empanneled  and  returned, 
and  that  jurors  which  pass  upon  men  in  trials  of  high 
treason  ought  to  be  freeholders  :  and  That  for  the 
redress  of  all  grievances,  and  for  the  amending, 
strengthening,  and  preserving  the  laws,  parliaments 
ought  to  be  held  frequently.”  This  Declaration  was 
by  the  Bill  of  Rights. 

985.  After  the  Revolution,  the  Constitutional 
Liberty  of  England  seemed  to  be  sufficiently  secured  ; 
and  was  so  :  yet  the  care  of  parliament  was  still 
employed  in  devising  and  enacting  further  Securities. 
The  appropriation  of  the  revenue  by  Parliament  was 
carried  into  further  detail,  by  the  separation  of  the 
Civil  List,  and  of  the  Navy,  Army,  and  Ordnance 
Department,  from  each  other.  li  This  measure  has 
given  the  House  of  Commons  so  effectual  a  control 
over  the  executive  power,  or  more  truly  speaking, 
has  rendered  it  so  much  a  participator  in  that  power, 
that  no  administration  can  possibly  subsist  without  its 
concurrence  ;  nor  can  the  session  of  parliament  be 
intermitted  for  an  entire  year,  without  leaving  both 
the  naval  and  military  force  of  the  kingdom  unpro¬ 
vided  for.”*  The  Mutiny  Bill  also,  by  which  alone 
*  Hallam,  Eng.  Const.,  hi.,  159. 


280 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


martial  law  can  be  administered  in  the  army,  was 
from  this  time  passed  only  from  year  to  year. 

986.  The  Act  of  Settlement,  by  which  the 
Electress  Sophia,  after  the  death  of  Queen  Anne,  was 
declared  to  be  the  stock  of  the  Royal  line,  contained 
further  provisions,  intended  to  secure  the  nation 
against  arbitrary  acts  of  the  Court :  especially  the 
exclusion  of  pensioners,  and  many  of  the  officers 
of  the  Crown,  from  parliament ;  and  the  protection  of 
the  independence  of  the  Judges,  by  making  their 
commissions  continue  quamdiu  se  bene  gesserint, 
during  life  or  good  behaviour,  instead  of  durante  bene 
jplacito ,  as  long  as  the  crown  chose,  which  had  been 
the  practice. 

987.  Thus,  so  far  as  Parliament  was  the 
guardian  of  the  National  Liberty,  the  cause  of 
liberty  was  fully  vindicated  ;  and  the  doubt  might 
occur,  whether,  according  to  the  Constitution  so 
modified,  Parliament  might  not  sometimes  be  led,  by 
some  special  object,  to  interpose  its  power  so  as  to 
obstruct  the  acts  of  the  crown,  and  to  make  govern¬ 
ment  impossible.  Order  seemed  to  have  been  sacrifi¬ 
ced  to  Liberty.  But  this  was  not  the  case.  The 
balance  between  Order  and  Liberty  was  preserved 
by  the  struggle  which  took  place  within  the  boundary 
of  Parliament  itself.  The  Influence  of  the  Crown 
and  of  the  Aristocracy  was  in  that  field  exerted 
in  favour  of  Order  ;  and  with  more  steadiness  and 
care,  than  can  be  expected,  on  that  side,  from  the 
Democracy.  The  efforts  of  the  Democracy  soon 
began  to  be  directed  to  diminish  or  extinguish  this 
Influence.  One  of  the  points,  which  thus  came  into 
conflict,  was  the  mode  of  electing  the  Members  of  the 
House  of  Commons.  By  the  theory  of  the  Constitu¬ 
tion,  as  it  had  been  commonly  stated,  these  Members 
were  the  Representatives  of  the  Common  People  ; 
but  the  Advocates  of  popular  Rights  asserted  that  in 
fact,  they  were  not  so ;  and  that  the  House  of 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION. 


281 


Commons  ought  to  be  reformed ,  so  as  to  bring  the 
fact  into  nearer  accordance  with  the  theory  of 
Representation. 

988.  By  the  ancient  Constitution,  the  House  of 
Commons  was  supposed  to  contain  representatives  of 
all  the  parts  of  the  Empire  which  were  subject  to  Eng¬ 
lish  laws  and  parliamentary  burthens.  Henry  VIII. 
extended  the  right  of  election  to  the  whole  of  Wales, 
the  counties  of  Chester  and  Monmouth,  and  even  the 
towns  of  Berwick  and  Calais  ;  and  thus  added  thirty- 
three  members  to  the  Commons.*  Edward  VI.  cre¬ 
ated  fourteen  boroughs,  and  restored  ten,  that  had 
disused  their  privilege.  Mary  added  twenty-one, 
Elizabeth  sixty,  and  James  twenty-seven  members. 
But  the  design  of  the  great  influx  of  new  members 
from  petty  boroughs,  in  these  latter  reigns,  seems  to 
have  been  to  secure  the  authority  of  government, 
which  such  members  were  likely  to  support,  rather 
than  to  follow  out  a  democratic  principle  of  the  Con¬ 
stitution. 

989.  Four  different  kind  of  Electors  of  the  Re¬ 
presentatives  of  Boroughs  appear  in  our  Constitu¬ 
tional  History.  (1)  Members  of  Corporations  :  the 
municipal  magistracy  or  governing  body  of  the  in¬ 
corporated  place  ;  (2)  Freemen  of  Corporations,  to 
whom  the  elective  franchise  was  given  by  charters 
of  incorporation  ;  (3)  Electors  by  Burgage  Tenure  ; 
where  the  right  was  annexed  to  certain  freehold  lands 
or  burgages,  and  did  not  belong  to  any  persons  but 
such  tenants ;  (4)  The  inhabitant  householders  pay¬ 
ing  scot  and  lot ,  which  include  local  and  general 
taxes.  This  was  the  original  form  of  the  right  as 
enjoyed  by  Boroughs  in  the  time  of  Edward  I.,  and 
was  applied  to  all  of  a  later  date,  where  a  franchise 
of  a  different  nature  was  not  expressed  in  the 
charter. 

*  Ilallam,  Eng.  Const.,  in.,  50. 
y  2 


282 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


990.  These  varieties  in  the  elective  franchise, 
the  various  growth  and  decay  of  ancient  Boroughs, 
and  in  some  cases  the  rise  of  insignificant  hamlets  into 
great  and  wealthy  towns,  have  at  all  periods  produc¬ 
ed  great  deviations  from  regularity  and  consistency, 
in  the  representative  structure  of  the  House  of  Com¬ 
mons.  So  long  as  the  struggle  of  the  House  with 
the  Crown  was  an  external  war,  these  irregularities 
were  not  considered  as  very  prejudicial  to  the  cause 
of  Liberty.  Taking  the  House  altogether,  the  vari¬ 
ous  classes  of  the  Community  were  virtually,  if  not 
actually,  represented,  as  to  their  interests,  arguments, 
and  purposes.  But  when  the  battle  between  Autho¬ 
rity  and  the  claims  of  a  larger  Liberty  was  to  be 
fought  within  the  body  of  the  Commons,  the  mode  of 
electing  the  individual  members  became  a  matter  of 
great  moment  in  the  struggle.  Those  who  wished  to 
enlarge  the  Liberty  of  the  People  demanded  a  Re¬ 
form  of  the  Parliament.,  a  correction  of  the  Anoma¬ 
lies  of  its  composition,  and  a  more  faithful  applica¬ 
tion  of  the  Principle  of  Representation.  Such  re¬ 
forms  in  special  cases  would  have  been  consistent 
with  previous  history ;  but  the  establishment  of  a 
new  Rule  for  all  cases,  was  giving  a  new  basis  to  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  was  resisted  as  a  perilous 
experiment,  by  the  adherents  of  the  ancient  forms  of 
Authority.  The  act  for  such  a  new  basis  of  the 
House  of  Commons  was,  however,  carried  in  1831. 
In  the  preamble  it  is  stated  to  have  for  its  objects 
“  to  deprive  many  inconsiderable  places  of  the  right 
of  returning  members,  to  grant  such  privilege  to 
large,  populous,  and  wealthy  towns,  to  extend  the 
elective  franchise  to  many  of  His  Majesty’s  subjects 
who  have  not  heretofore  enjoyed  the  same.”  By  this 
Act,  the  voters  for  Knights  of  the  Shire  were  to  be, 
in  addition  to  the  old  electors,  the  forty-shilling  free¬ 
holders,  copyholders  to  the  extent  of  ten  pounds  a 
year,  and  other  tenants  to  the  extent  of  fifty  pounds. 


CHAP.  IX.]  THE  ENGLISH  CONSTITUTION. 


283 


The  voters  for  Boroughs  were  to  be  persons  occupy¬ 
ing  a  house  in  the  borough  of  the  value  of  ten  pounds 
a  year.  A  number  of  boroughs  (sixty)  were  disfran¬ 
chised  as  inconsiderable  places  ;  the  criterion  adopt¬ 
ed  being,  that  the  population  was  less  than  2000.  A 
number  of  other  boroughs  were  allowed  only  one 
member,  the  population  being  less  than  4000.  In¬ 
stead  of  two  members  to  each  county,  there  were  as¬ 
signed  to  some  of  the  more  populous  counties  three, 
to  some,  four,  according  to  their  importance.  To 
towns  containing  more  than  10,000  inhabitants,  one 
representative  was  given  ;  and  two  to  places  which 
had  20,000  inhabitants  or  more. 

991.  This  is  now  the  condition  of  the  electoral 
franchise.  The  passing  of  the  Act  by  which  it  was 
established  is  perhaps  the  largest  attempt  ever  made 
at  once  to  bring  the  Constitution  nearer  to  a  theore¬ 
tical  symmetry ;  but  it  is  to  be  recollected,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  the  deviations  of  the  composition  of 
the  representative  body  from  the  representative  prin¬ 
ciple  had  become  enormous.  One  caution,  however, 
is  suggested  to  the  admirer  of  the  English  Constitu¬ 
tion  by  this  circumstance  ;  In  proportion  to  the  large¬ 
ness  of  the  step  made  in  the  Reform  Bill,  should  be 
the  length  of  time  which  is  allowed  to  elapse  before 
any  new  Movement  of  an  extensive  nature  is  at¬ 
tempted.  The  New  Part  of  the  Constitution  must 
have  time  to  incorporate  itself  with  the  Old,  before 
the  body  politic  can  bear  with  safety  any  new  expe¬ 
riments.  It  may  be  that  the  Constitution  has  in  this 
case  drawn  in  a  new  life  by  a  deep  draught  of  the 
cup  of  liberty  ;  but  it  is  requisite  for  the  health  of 
the  nation  that  this  strong  potion  be  allowed  time  to 
assimilate  with  the  system,  before  the  draught  be 
repeated. 


284 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


CHAPTER  X. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE  IN  GENERAL. 

992.  We  have  stated  (473)  that  the  State  is  a 
moral  Agent:  it  has  Duties:  as  Duties  of  Justice, 
Truth,  Humanity,  and  the  like.  It  has  also  a  more 
general  Duty  ;  the  Duty  of  the  Moral  Education  of 
its  citizens.  We  must  now  consider  further  these 
Duties,  and  the  means  of  performing  them. 

Some  persons  may  be  disposed  to  say,  that  the  only 
Duties  of  the  State  are  the  Duty  of  protecting  the 
Persons,  the  Property,  and  the  other  material  inte¬ 
rests  of  its  citizens.  And  it  is  true,  that  all  these 
Duties  are  Duties  in  a  more  vigorous  sense  than  the 
Duties  of  Humanity,  and  the  like;  they  are  Obliga¬ 
tions  of  the  State,  and  are  included  in  the  Obligation 
of  upholding  the  Laws  (850).  But  the  practice  of 
States,  in  all  tranquil  and  cultured  times,  has  point¬ 
ed  out  other  Duties  of  another  kind,  as  belonging  to 
them.  If  the  protection  of  Person  and  Property  be 
the  stricter,  they  are  also  the  lower  Duties  of  States  : 
and  States  in  general  have  recognized  higher  Duties, 
in  addition  to  these.  They  have  recognized  the  Duty 
of  paying  their  debts,  a  Duty  of  Justice:  they  have 
recognized  the  Duty  of  keeping  their  Treaties,  a 
Duty  of  Truth:  they  have  recognized  the  Duty  of 
preventing  Cruelty  and  Oppression,  as  in  the  prohi¬ 
bition  of  the  Slave-trade,  a  Duty  of  Humanity  :  they 
have  recognized  the  Duty  of  prohibiting  obscene  and 
indecent  acts  and  publications,  a  Duty  of  Purity: 
they  have  recognized  the  Duty  of  assisting  and  re¬ 
warding  the  progress  of  science  and  literature,  as 
for  instance,  by  means  of  Universities,  Observatories, 
Voyages,  and  the  like,  a  Duty  of  Intellectual  Cul¬ 
ture  :  finally,  they  have  very  generally  recognized  the 
Duty  of  morally  Educating  the  young,  of  punish- 


CHAP.  X.]  STATE  DUTIES  IN  GENERAL.  285 

ing  and  suppressing  immoral  books,  and  of  uniting 
the  citizens  in  general  by  the  ties  which  common 
moral  instruction  produces  ;  and  this  is  a  Duty  of 
Moral  Culture.  I  purposely  abstain  now  from  speak¬ 
ing  of  Religious  Culture. 

993.  If  any  one  were  to  assert  the  protection 
of  Person  and  Property  to  be  the  sole  duties  of 
States,  we  should  ask,  whether  he  asserts  the  States 
to  have  done  wrong,  which  have  recognized  the  Du¬ 
ties  above  enumerated.  Perhaps  some  would  answer 
that  some  of  the  above  Duties,  as  paying  National 
Debts  and  keeping  National  Treaties,  are  necessary 
to  a  good  understanding  with  other  Nations,  and 
therefore,  necessary  to  the  Duty  of  national  Self- 
defence,  which  is  a  duty  of  the  State  in  the  strictest 
sense.  To  this  we  must  reply,  that  to  pay  debts  and 
observe  contracts,  without  any  love  for  Justice  and 
Truth,  and  merely  for  the  purpose  of  being  trusted, 
is  to  have  a  lower  standard  of  Morality  than  can 
satisfy  most  men,  even  when  applied  to  the  State. 
But  we  add,  that  the  answer  does  not  apply  at  all 
to  the  instance  of  Duties  of  Humanity  performed  by 
States,  as  in  the  prohibition  of  the  Slave-trade  ;  nor 
to  the  other  Duties  mentioned.  If  the  only  Duties 
of  the  States  are  the  protection  of  the  Persons  and 
Property  of  the  Citizens ;  then  the  suppression  of 
cruelty  towards  defenceless  foreigners,  the  suppres¬ 
sion  of  profligacy  and  mere  vice  at  home,  the  en¬ 
couragement  of  art,  science,  and  literature,  in  all 
their  higher  forms,  the  education  of  children,  and 
of  all,  except  so  far  as  teaching  them  the  Law, 
must  be  proceedings  with  which  the  State  has  nothing 
to  do ;  and  those  States  which  have  employed  them¬ 
selves  in  aiming  at  such  objects  by  Laws,  or  by  the 
expenditure  of  the  national  wealth,  have  been  alto¬ 
gether  in  error. 

994.  The  necessity  of  the  State  undertaking 
such  duties,  in  addition  to  the  Obligations  of  pro- 


280 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


tecting  person  and  property,  may  be  further  illus¬ 
trated.  If  we  suppose  a  State  which  undertakes  to 
protect  the  persons  and  property  of  its  members,  but 
disclaims  all  higher  Duties  of  Humanity,  Purity, 
and  the  like  ;  the  members,  when  they  have  attained 
to  a  moderate  degree  of  moral  culture,  will  not  be 
satisfied  with  the  range  of  action  of  the  State  ;  and 
will  not  acquiespe  in  the  State,  as  the  highest  repre¬ 
sentative  of  their  common  action.  They  will  form 
themselves  into  Associations  for  purposes  of  Justice, 
Humanity,  and  other  similar  objects.  These  Asso¬ 
ciations  may  become  so  numerous  and  united,  as  to 
elect  the  magistrates,  control  the  national  acts, 
change  the  laws,  or  defeat  their  execution,  and  the 
like  ;  and  thus,  may  be  something  exercising  higher 
powers  than  the  State,  and  reducing  that  which  is 
formally  the  State,  to  a  mere  mode  of  action  of 
these  Associations.  Moreover  it  is  probable  that 
Associations  thus  bound  together  voluntarily  by  a 
sympathy  in  Justice  and  Humanity,  will  become  so 
powerful  as  to  control  or  direct  the  acts  of  the  State, 
if  their  Standard  of  Morality  is  much  higher  than 
that  by  which  the  State  acts  ;  and  if  they,  conse¬ 
quently,  look  upon  the  formal  course  of  action  of 
the  State  with  no  approval  or  sympathy.  For  in¬ 
stance,  the  State  may  give  its  members  property  in 
slaves;  but  if  the  general  body  of  individuals  have 
arrived  at  a  point  of  Moral  Culture  in  which  they 
look  upon  Slavery  as  unjust  and  inhuman  ;  when  a 
man  seeks  to  obtain  possession  of  a  slave  by  course 
of  law,  witnesses,  judge,  and  jury  (or  some  of  these), 
will  probably  act  so  as  to  evade,  or  even  to  contra¬ 
dict  the  law  ;  or  the  law  will  soon  be  altered.  Per¬ 
haps  even  the  Association  may  be  powerful  enough 
to  compel  the  nation  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  slaves 
of  other  countries  ;  and  thus,  in  such  a  case,  the 
voluntary  Association,  and  not  the  Body  which  is 
formally  the  State,  acts  as  the  Nation.  And  in  the 


CHAP.  X.]  STATE  DUTIES  IN  GENERAL.  287 

same  manner,  if  the  State  do  not  attempt  to  give  to 
the  young  a  moral  education,  there  may  be  Associa¬ 
tions  which  undertake  to  do  this  ;  and  such  Associa¬ 
tions,  as  part  of  their  teaching,  may  inculcate  the 
injustice  or  inhumanity  of  the  existing  laws.  Thus, 
so  far  as  their  teaching  is  effective,  these  Associa¬ 
tions  may  produce  fundamental  changes  in  the  laws, 
and  may  direct  the  National  Action  in  some  of  the 
most  important  points.  But  further  :  Moral  Educa¬ 
tion  must  necessarily  depend  upon  Religion,  and 
will  always  take  the  form  of  Religious  Education. 
Men  cannot  think  much  of  their  Duties,  and  their 
Destination,  without  being  led  to  think  of,  and  to 
adopt  Religion.  Religion  binds  them  into  Associa¬ 
tions,  in  which  they  have  common  convictions,  and 
common  privileges,  which  they  earnestly  wish  to 
transmit  to  their  children,  and  to  others  whom  they 
love.  If  Classes  and  Bodies,  charged  with  such  ob¬ 
jects,  be  not  involved  in  the  composition  of  the  State 
itself,  Societies  will  be  formed,  as  an  addition  to  the 
State  ;  and  these  will  exercise  such  power,  that  the 
State  will  be  subordinate  to  them,  or  will  be  de¬ 
stroyed  by  them.  In  the  history  of  States  we  have 
many  instances  of  a  Religion,  independent  of  the 
State,  displacing  the  Religion  previously  adopted  by 
the  State  ;  though  the  latter  has  exerted  the  formal 
powers  of  the  State  in  its  defence.  In  several  such 
cases,  the  struggle  between  the  old  and  the  new  Re¬ 
ligion  has  been  long  and  obstinate.  But  then,  the 
main  strength  of  the  defence  of  the  old  Religion  lay 
in  its  being  a  Religion,  satisfying  in  some  degree 
men’s  religious  needs,  and  binding  them  to  its  cause 
by  religious  ties.  If  the  struggle  were  between  a 
new  Religion  and  no  Religion  in  the  State,  the  suc¬ 
cess  of  the  Religious  Association  in  obtaining  its 
ascendancy  over  the  State  would  be,  we  cannot  but 
suppose,  much  more  rapid.  It  may,  indeed,  happen, 
that  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of  several  rival 


288 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 

Religious  Associations  in  the  State,  no  one  of  them 
obtains  a  complete  Ascendancy  over  it.  In  this 
case,  the  power,  which  the  Religious  Associations 
in  every  State  possess,  is  not  extinguished,  but  di¬ 
vided  and  balanced.  But  even  in  this  case,  States¬ 
men  will  find  it  necessary  to  recognize,  on  the  part 
of  the  State,  those  Duties,  which  all  the  kinds  of 
Religion  agree  in  enjoining.  And  thus,  the  State 
cannot  omit  to  recognize  its  higher  Duties,  without 
putting  in  the  hands  of  those  who  do  recognize  such 
Duties,  the  means  of  combining  men  into  Associations 
more  powerful  than  the  State  ;  the  means  of  convert¬ 
ing  the  State  organization  into  their  instrument ;  the 
means  of  acting  for  the  Nation  in  spite  of  the  State. 

995.  The  necessity  of  a  State  recognizing  its 
higher  Duties,  and  especially  the  Duty  of  impart¬ 
ing  or  confirming  the  religious  instruction  of  its 
members,  appears  also  by  considering  the  Right  of 
imposing  Oaths,  which,  as  we  have  said,  is  exercised 
by  all  States  (841).  By  the  imposition  of  Oaths, 
the  citizen’s  Obligations  are  identified  with  his  re¬ 
ligious  Duties ;  and  the  State  relies  upon  this  iden¬ 
tity,  as  necessary  to  give  it  a  real  hold  upon  men, 
and  to  make  them  do  its  business  in  a  sincere,  seri¬ 
ous,  and  solemn  spirit.  If  the  State  cannot  obtain 
this  result,  it  will  necessarily  tend  to  dissolution. 
But  religious  Duties  can  have  no  force  for  men  who 
have  no  Religion.  The  State  therefore,  in  order  to 
provide  for  its  own  preservation,  must  maintain  the 
Religion  of  the  citizens  in  such  modes  as  it  can  ; 
for  instance,  by  the  religious  education  of  the  young, 
and  by  arrangements  for  keeping  up  the  religious 
convictions  and  religious  sympathies  of  all.  If  the 
State  do  not,  by  such  means,  or  by  some  means, 
keep  alive  the  religious  convictions  to  which  it  ap¬ 
peals  in  the  Oaths  which  it  imposes,  the  Oaths  will 
be  rejected,  or  regarded  as  unmeaning.  In  such  a 
Case,  men,  thinking  lightly  of  Oaths,  will  think 


CHAP.  X.] 


STATE  DUTIES  IN  GENERAL. 


289 


tightly  also  of  Duties  and  Obligations ;  and  the 
State  will  be  dissolved  by  the  destruction  of  all  the 
ties  which  bind  its  members  to  it.  Or  else,  such 
Oaths  will  be  looked  upon  as  a  sinful  profanation  of 
true  Religion  ;  religious  men  will  refuse  to  take 
them,  and  will  give  all  their  efforts  to  the  support 
of  their  own  Religious  Association,  which  is  opposed 
to  the  Religion  of  the  State;  and  thus  the  actions 
of  such  men  will  tend  to  destroy  the  Religion  of  the 
State,  and  perhaps  the  State  itself.  It  may,  indeed, 
happen,  as  we  have  just  said,  that  there  are  several 
rival  Religions  in  the  State;  and  in  this  case,  there 
are  especial  difficulties  in  employing  Oaths  for  the 
purposes  of  the  State,  and  in  keeping  up  the  religi¬ 
ous  convictions  which  give  Oaths  their  force.  In 
this  case,  if  all  the  Religions  allow  that  obedience 
to  the  Civil  Authorities  is  a  religious  Duty,  Oaths 
may  still  be  employed,  to  promote  the  lower  aim  of 
the  State,  its  own  preservation ;  but  the  higher  aim 
of  the  State,  the  moral  and  intellectual  culture  of 
its  members,  will  necessarily  be  pursued  under  great 
disadvantages;  for  the  moral  and  intellectual  cul¬ 
ture  of  men  cannot  be  prosecuted  without  employ¬ 
ing  Religion  ;  and  Religion  can  be  employed  for 
such  purposes,  only  by  accepting  it  as  true.  The 
State  therefore  cannot  employ,  for  its  higher  pur¬ 
poses,  Religions  which  contradict  each  other ;  and 
in  such  a  case  as  we  have  spoken  of,  the  State  may 
be  prevented  from  pursuing  its  higher  purposes  at 
all ;  or  may  be  much  impeded  in  doing  so.  But 
even  in  such  cases,  the  State  has  those  Duties  which 
all  the  rival  Religions  agree  in  recognizing  ;  and 
has,  besides,  the  Duty  of  promoting  moral  and  intel¬ 
lectual  culture,  in  conjunction  with  the  true  Re¬ 
ligion,  as  far  as  circumstances  permit. 

996.  Thus,  in  all  cases,  States  have  Duties. 
The  Duties  of  States  may  be  arranged  under  the 
same  heads  which  we  have  already  had  before  us. 

VOL.  it  19 


290 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


Besides  the  Duties  of  Order,  by  which,  especially, 
the  State  is  the  State,  there  are  Duties  of  Justice, 
Truth,  Humanity,  Purity ;  and  there  is  also  the 
higher  and  more  comprehensive  Duty  of  moral  and 
intellectual  Self-culture.  The  State  obtains  moral 
and  intellectual  Culture  for  itself,  by  obtaining  it  for 
its  members.  And  thus,  the  highest  and  most  com¬ 
prehensive  Duty  of  the  State  is  the  moral  and  intel¬ 
lectual  Education  of  its  members.  This  Duty,  as 
belonging  to  the  State,  modifies,  in  an  especial  man¬ 
ner,  its  other  Duties ;  and  must  be  considered  in  con¬ 
junction  with  all  of  them,  as  we  shall  have  occasion 
to  see. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE— JUSTICE  AND  TRUTH. 

997.  The  Duties  of  Justice  and  Truth,  as  be¬ 
longing  to  States,  point  out  the  same  course  of 
action  which  they  point  out  for  individuals :  they 
direct  the  State  to  abstain  from  infringing  the  Pro¬ 
perty  or  Rights  of  other  States ;  to  pay  its  Debts ;  to 
observe  its  Treaties;  and  the  like.  In  these  instan¬ 
ces,  the  Duties  have  analogy  with  the  Legal  Obliga¬ 
tions,  rather  than  with  the  Moral  Duties  of  individu¬ 
als  ;  and  accordingly,  these  Duties  are  the  subject  of 
an  especial  branch  of  Law  or  Jus  ;  which  we  may 
term  International  Law,  or  International  Jus,  and 
which  we  shall  treat  of  afterwards. 

998.  But  the  Duties  of  Justice  and  Truth,  as 
belonging  to  the  State,  have  also  their  Sphere  of 
Action  within  the  State ;  they  require,  for  instance, 
that  both  the  Laws,  and  the  Administration  of  the 
Laws,  be  conformable  to  Justice  and  Truth.  We 
have  already  stated  (393)  a  general  Maxim  of 


CIIAP.  XI.] 


JUSTICE  AND  TRUTH. 


291 


Justice ,  which  applies  especially  to  Legislation  : 
namely,  that  Justice  requires  us  to  aim  con¬ 
stantly  to  remedy  the  inequalities  which  History 
produces.  And  this  maxim  applies  to  all  the  matters 
with  which  Law  deals  ;  to  personal  Rights,  to  Pro¬ 
perty,  to  Education.  In  these  matters,  Justice  does 
not  require  Equality.  Any  Attempt  to  establish 
Equality  would  tend  to  destroy  all  Property,  all 
Law,  and  all  Right ;  for  if  Rights  be  permanent, 
their  permanent  subsistence  will  produce  Inequality. 
But  Justice  aims  constantly  to  remedy  Inequality. 
Hence  Laws  should  aim  continually  to  enrich  the 
poor,  to  strengthen  the  weak,  to  elevate  the  low,  to 
instruct  the  ignorant.  But  they  should  do  this,  in 
such  a  manner,  as  not  to  shake  at  all  the  permanence 
of  Rights.  They  should  enable  the  poor  to  enrich 
themselves,  the  low  to  rise,  the  ignorant  to  learn,  by 
the  use  of  their  own  Rights,  and  without  trespassing 
upon  the  Rights  of  any  other  Class.  Just  Laws  will 
not  transfer  Property  from  one  Class  to  another, 
merely  in  order  to  restore  equality.  Just  laws  will 
not  direct  the  poorest  to  be  educated  in  the  same  de¬ 
gree  as  the  richest.  But  Just  Laws  will  not  allow 
a  condition  of  the  community,  in  which  any  Class  is 
condemned  to  a  degradation,  or  poverty,  or  ignorance, 
from  which  they  cannot  escape.  Just  Laws  will 
provide  openings  for  the  rise  of  the  lower  ranks  into 
the  place  of  the  higher,  as  soon  as  they  become  fit 
for  such  a  rise  ;  and  will  assist  such  an  event,  by 
promoting,  among  the  higher  ranks  also,  such  views 
as  will  make  them  regard  this  event,  not  as  an  evil, 
but  as  a  good. 

999.  The  regard  of  the  State  for  the  Duty  of 
Truth  will  be  shown  both  by  the  simplicity  and  sin¬ 
cerity  of  its  own  proceedings,  and  by  its  encouraging 
and  promoting  this  Duty  in  individuals.  For  in¬ 
stances  of  the  former  kind,  we  may  take  the  abolition 
•  of  legal  fictions  and  the  removal  of  forced  construe- 


292 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


tions  of  old  laws  by  means  of  improved  laws.  Such 
steps  make  the  language  spoken  by  the  State  more 
true.  Yet  in  the  case  of  States,  much  more  than  in 
the  case  of  individuals,  we  must  take  account  of  the 
Conventions  (394)  by  which  words,  phrases,  and  pro¬ 
cesses,  acquire  a  meaning  different  from  their  obvi¬ 
ous  meaning.  This  is  more  necessary  in  the  case  of 
States,  because  it  is  impossible  for  States  to  accommo¬ 
date  their  language  to  each  case,  as  individuals  may 
do.  States  must  act  by  stated  forms  of  procedure 
and  language,  in  which  forms  a  complex  multitude 
of  interests  are  implied  ;  and  any  alteration  of  the 
forms,  since  it  will  require  a  consideration  of  all  these 
interests,  and  an  agreement  upon  the  alteration  by 
the  legislating  bodies,  cannot  take  place  frequently 
and  lightly,  nor  ought  it  to  do  so.  Legal  fictions, 
and  forced  constructions  of  the  language  of  old  laws, 
cannot  be  altogether  avoided.  They  have  existed 
in  all  countries  in  which  laws  have  long  subsisted  ; 
and  to  attempt  to  avoid  them  entirely,  would  be  to 
make  the  legislator  instantly  conform  to  all  changes, 
however  capricious,  of  language  and  practice.  Law 
Language,  and  Law  Forms,  must  have  an  antiquated 
cast,  for  this  reason  ;  that  they  must  have  in  them  a 
principle  of  steadiness  and  permanence  beyond  our 
daily  speech  and  common  manners. 

1000.  The  State  promotes  and  inculcates  the 
Duty  of  Truth  in  individuals,  by  requiring  from  them 
a  punctual  and  faithful  performance  of  Contracts  and 
other  engagements.  Yet  here  also,  the  considera¬ 
tion  of  other  Duties  comes  in  ;  and  limits,  in  some  de¬ 
gree,  the  extent  to  which  the  State  insists  upon  the 
performance  of  Engagements.  We  have  seen  that 
the  Roman  Law  did  not  compel  the  performance  of  a 
nudum  pactum,  a  mere  promise  made  for  no  reason¬ 
able  consideration ;  and  that  the  English  Law  takes 
the  same  course.  The  Law  will  not,  for  instance, 
sanction  or  enforce  an  engagement  to  win  and  lose 

o  o 


CHAr.  XII.]  JUSTICE  AND  TRUTH. 


293 


money  according  to  the  events  of  a  game  of  chance. 
To  insist  upon  the  performance  of  such  engagements, 
would  be  to  encourage  a  reckless  spirit,  which  loves 
to  depend  upon  casual  superiority,  or  upon  mere  ac¬ 
cident,  rather  than  on  rational  foresight  and  self¬ 
guidance.  The  State,  in  such  cases,  teaches  its  citi¬ 
zens  that  Property  is  a  Trust  of  more  value  than 
the  Veracity  of  such  rash  and  reckless  promisers. 
The  State,  in  doing  this,  does  not  slight  the  Duty  of 
Truth  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  sometimes  condemns  the 
whole  proceeding,  by  making  such  Gambling  a 
crime.  Besides ;  such  engagements  are  so  fre¬ 
quently  and  so  naturally  connected  with  Fraud,  as 
well  as  Folly,  that  Honesty,  as  well  as  the  rational 
use  of  Property,  would  be  damaged  by  the  legal  re¬ 
cognition  of  such  Engagements. 

1001.  In  another  kind  of  Engagements,  Pro¬ 
mises  of  Marriage,  the  Law  teaches  the  Duty  of 
Truth,  by  punishing  the  violation  of  the  Promise; 
and  sometimes,  even  when  it  has  not  been  made  in 
express  words,  but  only  implied  in  the  general  course 
of  the  language  used  between  the  parties.  And 
though,  here  also,  there  may  be  room  for  Mistake  or 
Delusion  ;  to  punish  the  Levity  or  Duplicity  which 
can  trifle  with  so  serious  a  matter,  is  a  moral  lesson 
which  it  becomes  the  State  to  give. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE— HUMANITY. 

1002.  The  Duty  of  Justice  on  the  part  of  the 
State  is  universally  allowed  :  that  the  State  has  a 
Duty  of  Humanity,  is  perhaps  not  so  generally  under¬ 
stood.  But  we  have  seen  (508  and  514),  in  speak- 

z  2 


294 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


ing  of  Justice  and  of  Humanity  in  general,  how  near 
the  Duties  belonging  to  the  two  approach  each  other, 
and  how  difficult  it  is  to  draw  the  boundary  line.  It 
is  a  Principle  of  Humanity,  and,  in  an  extended 
sense  of  Justice,  a  Principle  of  Justice  also,  that  all 
men  should  possess  the  Natural  Rights  of  man  ; 
namely  (514),  the  Rights  of  Personal  Security  from 
violence ;  of  Sustenance  and  Property  so  far  as  is 
requisite  for  moral  agency;  and  of  Marriage.  Such 
Rights,  in  every  State,  are  actually  possessed  by  the 
citizens  only  so  far  as  the  Law  allows  them  ;  but  the 
question  now  before  us  is,  what  the  Laws  ought  to 
to  ;  what  Civil  Rights  it  is  the  State’s  Duty  to  give 
to  its  citizens. 

1003.  We  have  already  seen  (522)  that  the  ex¬ 
istence  of  Slavery  is  contrary  to  Morality.  Such  a 
condition  of  the  community  is  a  violation  of  the  Duty 
of  Humanity  which  belongs  to  the  State  ;  and  wher¬ 
ever  it  exists,  Humanity  requires  that  the  State 
should  take  steps  towards  its  abolition.  But  we  have 
also  said  (530)  that  the  abolition  ought  to  proceed  by 
legal  and  constitutional  means ;  and  must  often  be 
attained  only  by  many  steps,  and  by  slow  degrees. 
Still,  it  must  be  again  repeated :  delay  in  this  course 
can  be  tolerated  by  the  Moralist,  only  so  far  as  it  is 
inevitable.  Every  State  which  acquiesces  in  the 
existence  of  Slavery  among  its  members,  as  a  per¬ 
manent  and  stable  condition  of  things,  neglects 
the  great  Duty  of  Humanity,  which  is  incumbent 
upon  States  as  upon  individuals.  A  State  cannot 
neglect  such  Duties,  without  divesting  itself,  to  an 
extent  shocking  to  all  good  men,  of  its  moral  charac¬ 
ter,  and  renouncing  its  hope  of  that  moral  progress 
which  is  its  highest  purpose. 

1004.  Slavery  involves  the  denial  of  all  Rights 
to  the  man,  and  especially  of  the  Right  of  security 
from  arbitrary  personal  violence,  and  the  Right  of 
Property.  But  even  in  States  where  these  Rights 


CHAP.  XII.] 


HUMANITY 


295 


are  allowed  by  the  Law  to  all,  it  often  happens  that 
there  are  Classes  of  persons  who  do  not  practically 
enjoy  them.  With  regard  to  the.  Right  of  Sus¬ 
tenance,  and  such  Property  as  is  requisite  to  make 
the  man  a  moral  agent,  there  are  large  bodies  of  the 
people,  even  in  States  conspicuous  for  their  general 
freedom,  who  hold  these  necessary  means  of  moral 
being  very  precariously,  and  occasionally  lose  them 
altogether.  Men  perish  of  hunger  in  opulent  cities. 
Many  are  mendicants,  who  are  supposed  to  have  no¬ 
thing  of  their  own,  and  depend  for  sustenance  upon 
the  casual  bounty  of  their  fellow-citizens.  Many, 
belonging  to  the  industrious  classes,  are  frequently 
destitute  ;  though  willing  to  work,  they  can  find  no 
one  to  hire  them,  and  they  have  expended  all  their 
previous  earnings.  Does  the  Duty  of  Humanity 
in  the  State  admit  of  its  tolerating  the  existence  of 
such  things  ?  To  pass  by  the  Right  to  sustenance, 
in  cases  of  extremity,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Humanity  of  the  old  law  of  England  allowed,  is  it 
possible  for  the  State  to  put  an  end  to  Mendicancy 
and  Destitution  ?  and  if  this  be  possible,  is  this  the 
Duty  of  the  State  ? 

1005.  We  find,  in  this  case  also,  other  Duties  of 
the  State  which  may  interfere  with  the  Duty  of  Hu¬ 
manity,  and  may  limit  or  prevent  its  operation.  It 
is  the  Duty  of  the  State  to  leave  room  for  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  the  Humanity  of  individuals;  for  this  is  an 
important  part  of  their  Moral  Culture.  If  the  Beg¬ 
gar  obtains  alms  on  which  he  can  live ;  if  the  poor 
Labourer  be  supported  through  his  seasons  of  desti¬ 
tution  by  the  benevolence  of  his  richer  neighbours ; 
the  men  so  provided  for  are  not  degraded  from  the 
rank  of  moral  beings ;  and  the  givers  are  probably 
morally  improved  by  what  they  do.  Such  depend¬ 
ence  of  the  poor  upon  the  rich,  has  existed  in  all 
communities  ;  and  it  is  not  necessarily  contrary  to 
the  Duty  of  the  State  to  tolerate  such  a  condition  of 


298 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


things,  which  includes  the  means  of  a  valuable  Moral 
Culture  of  Benevolence.  Moreover,  it  is  the  Duty 
of  the  State  to  teach  Foresight  and  Thrift  to  the 
poor,  as  well  as  Benevolence  to  the  rich.  Beggary, 
destitution,  and  want  of  work,  may  arise  from  impro¬ 
vidence,  carelessness,  prodigality,  idleness,  and  per¬ 
verseness.  By  letting  the  consequences  of  these  bad 
habits  fall  upon  those  who  are  guilty  of  them,  the 
State  teaches  useful  lessons.  If  the  State  were  to 
maintain  in  comfort  all  who  chose  to  beg,  or  all  la¬ 
bourers  who  remained  unhired,  the  produce  of  the 
labour  of  the  industrious  and  provident  would  be 
given  to  the  idle  and  improvident ;  and  this  might 
proceed  to  such  an  extent,  as  to  destroy  the  rewards 
of  labour  and  the  value  of  property. 

1006.  But  if  it  appear  that  the  destitute  are 
not  provided  for  sufficiently  by  the  benevolence  of 
individuals,  what  then  is  the  Duty  of  the  State  ?  If, 
when  room  is  thus  left  for  the  Humanity  of  the  rich 
to  act,  it  appears  that  there  is  still  a  large  class  of 
starving  poor,  what  is  the  course  to  be  taken  ?  If 
benevolent  individuals  do  much,  but  still  not  enough 
to  prevent  the  existence  of  extreme  distress  among 
numbers  of  men,  is  it  the  Duty  of  the  State  to  do 
the  rest  ?  And  if  so,  how  is  this  Duty  to  be  limited, 
so  as  not  to  interfere  fatally  with  the  other  Duties  of 
the  State  which  we  have  mentioned  ?  Ought  there 
to  be  a  State  Provision  for  the  poor  ?  and  if  so,  upon 
what  Principles  ? 

1007.  To  the  first  of  these  questions  the  Mo¬ 
ralists  must  needs  reply,  that  taking  the  case  as  here 
supposed,  the  spontaneous  bounty  of  the  rich  being 
insufficient  to  keep  the  poor  from  starvation,  it  is  the 
Duty  of  the  State  to  interpose,  and  to  make,  by  taxa¬ 
tion,  or  in  some  other  way,  a  provision  which  shall 
save  them  from  the  extreme  of  want.  This  is  a 
Duty  of  Humanity  on  the  part  of  the  State  in  any 
case.  If  the  deficiency  of  private  bounty  arises 


CHAP.  XII.] 


HUMANITY. 


297 


from  the  want  of  benevolence  towards  their  poor 
neighbours  on  the  part  of  the  rich,  it  is  the  business 
of  the  State  to  be  humane  for  the  rich,  both  in  order 
to  discharge  its  own  Duty,  and  to  teach  them  theirs. 
If  the  prevalence  of  distress  arise,  not  so  much  from 
men’s  wanting  the  benevolence  to  relieve  the  distress 
which  is  brought  before  them,  as  from  the  multitude, 
density,  and  variety  of  the  population,  which  con¬ 
ceals  large  classes  of  sufferers  from  the  eyes  of  their 
fellow-citizens  ;  it  is  then  proper  that  the  State  should 
be  humane  for  all  and  towards  all,  in  order  to  supply, 
for  the  benevolent  citizens,  that  which  they  cannot  do 
for  themselves  :  for  the  State  has  the  means  of  reach¬ 
ing  all  classes;  and  can  diffuse  relief  more  widely 
than  private  givers  can. 

1008.  With  regard  to  the  Principles  on  which 
such  public  Relief  is  to  be  given,  we  may  remark  ; 
First,  that  the  Relief  ought  always  to  be  contemplat¬ 
ed  as  temporary.  For  the  object  of  humanity  is, 
that  the  man  be  preserved  as  a  moral  agent ;  but 
man,  in  a  state  of  unlimited  and  hopeless  destitution, 
is  not  capable  of  moral  agency.  He  has  not  the 
means  of  self-guidance  and  advancement,  which  are 
requisite  to  his  moral  being.  If  a  man,  by  accept¬ 
ing  public  relief,  is  placed  in  a  condition  in  which 
there  is  a  permanent  bar  to  his  becoming  again  an 
independent  and  thriving  labourer,  the  object  of  hu¬ 
manity  is  defeated,  and  the  man  is  reduced  to  a  kind 
of  servitude.  Hence,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  re¬ 
quire  a  man  to  sell  or  part  with  the  tools  of  his  trade, 
or  the  furniture  of  his  house,  before  he  receives  pub- 
lie  relief :  for  the  want  of  these  things  will  be  a  most 
serious  obstacle  to  his  resuming  his  character  as  an 
independent  workman.  On  the  other  hand,  in  order 
that  the  State  may  not  teach  lessons  of  improvidence 
and  idleness,  it  is  necessary  that  the  public  relief  be 
given  on  harder  terms  than  the  wages  of  independ¬ 
ent  labour.  For  the  poor  must  be  taught  to  earn 


298 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


their  subsistence  independently,  as  long  as  it  is  pos¬ 
sible  ;  and  to  recur  to  public  charity,  only  in  cases 
of  necessity.  These  conditions  appear  to  be  satisfied 
if  we  make  public  relief  come  to  the  labourer,  in  the 
shape  of  wages  for  labour  at  some  public  work  ;  the 
wages  being  smaller  than  those  of  the  independent 
labourer,  and  yet  sufficient  for  subsistence.  In  such 
a  system,  it  may  be  supposed  that  men  would  claim 
public  relief,  only  so  long  as  it  was  necessary  ;  and 
would  gladly  return  to  independent  labour,  as  soon 
as  it  was  possible ;  while  at  the  same  time,  relief  to 
the  extent  of  necessary  subsistence,  would  always 
be  within  their  power. 

1009.  There  can  hardly  be  much  difficulty  in 
devising  works  which  might  be  so  conducted  ;  espe¬ 
cially  if  it  be  recollected  that  the  question  is  not, 
whether  such  works  will  pay  for  the  labour,  but 
whether  they  will  pay  better  than  supporting  the  la¬ 
bourers  in  idleness.  As  instances  of  such  works,  we 
may  mention  making  and  repairing  roads,  harbours, 
canals,  leveling  obstacles,  reclaiming  wild  land, 
draining  morasses,  building  public  edifices,  ships,  and 
the  like. 

1010.  It  may  be  a  question  whether  the  relief 
of  Paupers  (as  poor  persons  relieved  by  the  State 
may  be  termed,  for  the  sake  of  distinction)  should  be 
administered  by  the  general  Government :  or  whe¬ 
ther  the  paupers  belonging  to  districts,  as  Parishes, 
should  have  relief  administered  each  by  his  own  Pa¬ 
rish.  The  latter  scheme  appears,  at  first  sight, 
better  suited  to  make  the  relief — both  a  lesson  of 
humanity  to  the  givers,  since  it  is  bestowed  on  their 
neighbours.,  whose  distress  they  know — and  a  lesson 
of  industry  and  economy  to  the  receivers,  since,  if 
they  are  idle  and  improvident,  their  neighbours,  who 
know  their  conduct,  will  be  disposed  to  show  them 
less  favour,  in  the  public  relief  which  they  give 
them.  If  indeed  there  be  a  Poor  Lam,  which  gives 


CHAP.  Xil.] 


HUMANITY. 


299 


the  unhired  labourer  a  Right  to  a  sufficient  relief, 
whatever  be  the  judgment  which  the  Parish  Officers 
form  of  his  willingness  to  work,  the  relief  may  be 
considered  by  the  givers  as  an  unmerited  boon,  and 
by  the  receivers  as  an  undeniable  right ;  and  thus, 
may  produce  unkindly  feelings  on  both  sides,  while 
it  encourages  improvidence  and  idleness  as  much  as 
the  most  ineffective  benevolence  would  do.  On  the 
other  hand,  humanity  rejects  the  notion  that  the  des¬ 
titute  should  have  no  right  to  a  subsistence.  A  mode 
of  avoiding  these  opposite  inconveniences,  retaining 
the  administration  by  Districts,  appears  to  be  that 
already  mentioned  ;  the  employment  of  the  unhired 
labourers  upon  a  public  work,  at  wages  below  those 
of  the  independent  labourer,  and  yet  sufficient  for 
subsistence.  But  here  an  inconvenience  of  another 
kind  may  come  in.  If  the  administrators  of  the  poor- 
laws  be  also  the  employers  of  labour,  they  may  agree 
to  employ  the  unhired  labourers  upon  their  private 
work,  instead  of  public  work  ;  and  may,  thus,  bring 
them  into  competition  with  the  independent  labourer  ; 
they  may  thus  lower  the  wages  of  all,  while  they  pay  a 
part  of  the  wages  of  their  private  work  out  of  public 
funds.  This  might  be  remedied,  if  there  were  in  each 
parish,  or  in  each  district,  a  work  really  public,  and  if 
the  independent  labourer  were  always  at  liberty  to  seek 
work  there.  For  then  the  employers  of  labour  would 
always  be  compelled  to  give  to  labour  the  wages 
which  it  deserved. 

1011.  But  this  plan  is  applicable,  only  when 
the  number  of  persons  to  be  provided  for  out  of  pub¬ 
lic  charity  is  small,  compared  with  the  whole  num¬ 
ber  of  labourers.  If  a  large  portion  of  the  labouring 
population  were  to  ask  for  public  relief,  the  condition 
of  the  community  must  be  considered  diseased  :  for 
by  our  supposition,  public  relief  supplies  only  a  bare 
subsistence  :  and,  while  it  lasts,  takes  away  a  man’s 
free  agency,  and  suspends  his  moral  advancement ; 


300 


rOLITY. 


[book  V. 


besides  which,  it  might  be  difficult  to  find  in  every 
district  an  unlimited  supply  of  public  work.  In  such 
a  case,  when  great  numbers  of  the  poor  are  unem¬ 
ployed,  what  is  the  State  to  do  ? 

1012.  We  may  remark,  that  there  appears,  at 
least  at  first  sight,  to  be  a  tendency  to  such  a  state  of 
things,  in  consequence  of  the  improvements  constant¬ 
ly  going  on  in  the  productive  powers  of  labour,  and 
especially  of  agricultural  labour.  Our  rural  dis¬ 
tricts  employed  more  labourers  in  ancient  time,  when 
a  rude  husbandry  raised  a  scanty  produce,  than  they 
do  now.  The  produce  of  the  land  is  much  greater, 
but  the  portion  of  it  assigned  as  wages  to  the  agri¬ 
cultural  labourer  is  smaller.  The  surplus  goes  to 
the  Farmer  as  Profit,  and  to  the  Landlord  as  Rent. 
And  this  arises,  generally,  not  from  any  want  of  hu¬ 
manity  in  the  Landlord  or  in  the  Farmer,  but  from 
the  progress  of  agricultural  improvement.  If  the 
Landlord  diminish  his  Rent,  the  Farmer  puts  the  al¬ 
lowance  in  his  pocket.  If  one  Farmer  pay  his  la¬ 
bourers  higher  wages,  or  employ  a  greater  number, 
the  Relief  to  the  general  body  is  small  :  for  the  ge¬ 
neral  rate  of  wages  will  be  determined,  not  by  con¬ 
siderations  of  Humanity,  but  by  the  operation  of  the 
Demand  and  the  Supply  of  Labour.  We  cannot 
expect  a  universal  agreement  among  the  Employers 
of  Labour  to  increase  the  amount  paid  in  Wages. 
A  great  number  of  them  could  not  do  this,  without 
annihilating  their  profits,  and  subjecting  themselves 
to  positive  expense  ;  and  if  partially  done,  it  would 
produce  little  effect  beyond  a  rush  of  labour  from 
one  employment  to  another.  Hence,  the  State  can¬ 
not  require  that  men  should  show  their  Humanity  by 
lowering  their  Rents,  or  their  Profits,  or  increasing 
the  Wages  which  they  pay.  It  may  be  well  that 
individuals  should  do  this  ;  both  as  an  exercise  of 
humanity,  and  of  moderation  with  regard  to  wealth. 
But  the  nature  of  such  self-discipline  requires  that  it 


CIIAP.  XII.] 


HUMANITY. 


301 


should  be  spontaneous,  and  enforced  by  external  con¬ 
trol.  The  State  must  leave  Rents,  Profits,  and 
Wages,  to  be  regulated  by  their  appropriate  influ¬ 
ences. 

1013.  What,  then,  is  to  be  done  with  regard  to 
the  numbers  who  may  be  expected  to  be  thrown  out 
of  agricultural  employment  by  the  improvements  in 
agriculture  ?  If  we  consider  what  form  of  society 
would  be  ideally  the  best  under  such  circumstances, 
the  system  which  we  should  picture  to  ourselves 
would  seem  to  be  something  of  this  kind.  We  should 
conceive  that,  while  the  poor  portion  of  mere  labour¬ 
ers,  actually  required,  was  constantly  diminishing, 
the  structure  of  society,  both  with  respect  to  the  con¬ 
duct  of  the  powers  of  labour,  and  the  habits  of  do¬ 
mestic  life,  should  change,  so  as  to  provide  many 
new  ranks  and  stages  in  the  community,  on  which 
men  might  stand  ;  and  many  new  employments,  by 
means  of  which  they  might  obtain  their  share  in  the 
increased  sustenance  and  comfort  produced  by  the 
improvements  in  labour.  Instead  of  merely  the 
Landlord  cultivating  his  own  acres,  with  his  Hinds 
and  Labourers  under  him,  in  home-made  clothing 
amid  home-made  tools  and  instruments ;  we  may 
have  many  classes  arising  between  these  two,  each 
living  in  some  degree  of  comfort,  and  even  ease.  The 
Farmer  steps  in  between  the  Landlord  and  the  La¬ 
bourer.  He  employs  the  Wheelwright  and  other 
makers  of  agricultural  implements  ;  the  Corn-dealer  ; 
the  Carrier.  His  attire  is  furnished  by  Growers, 
Spinners,  Weavers,  Clothiers  of  various  kinds.  His 
house  is  furnished  with  implements  of  wood,  iron, 
brass,  silver,  gold,  glass,  porcelain.  The  manufac¬ 
turer  or  tradesman,  who  supplies  each  article,  has 
many  men  working  under  him,  and  is  himself  sur¬ 
rounded  by  the  like  luxuries.  There  are  many  gra¬ 
dations  of  tradesmen  of  each  kind  ;  many  manufac¬ 
turers  subordinate  to  each  tradesman,  many  trades- 

VOL.  II.  AA 


302 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


men  to  each  manufacturer.  Classes  so  complex 
require  many  persons  to  facilitate  and  regulate  their 
intercourse:  Brokers;  Factors;  Notaries;  Men  of 
Law  ;  Commercial  Travellers;  and  all  these  classes, 
thus  introduced,  are,  in  gains  and  habits,  much  above 
the  mere  labourer.  And  thus,  so  far  as  the  growth 
of  these  employments  goes,  there  is  a  constant  open¬ 
ing  for  those  who  are  no  longer  needed  as  labourers. 
When  the  proportion  of  mere  labourers  in  a  commu¬ 
nity  diminishes,  in  consequence  of  improvements  in 
the  art  of  labour,  it  is  not  that  any  are  extinguished 
or  extruded  ;  a  portion,  who,  if  the  state  of  the  com¬ 
munity  had  continued  unchanged,  would  have  been 
labourers,  are  elevated  into  something  more.  There 
is  a  constant  current  upwards,  in  a  thriving  society  ; 
and  the  multiplication  of  intermediate  classes  pro¬ 
vides  for  the  increasing  distance  between  the  highest 
and  the  lowest.  The  agricultural  classes  produce 
food  for  an  increased  number  of  persons  in  addition 
to  themselves  ;  and  the  multiplied  occupations  bring 
forward  persons  who  receive  their  share  with  advan¬ 
tage  to  all. 

1014.  We  have  evidence  that  in  England  the 
advance  of  which  we  hear  speak  has  gone  very  far, 
in  comparison  with  most  countries.  In  all  other 
countries,  the  agricultural  classes  are  the  largest 
share  of  the  population.  In  France,  for  instance, 
they  are  two-thirds  of  the  whole.  Two  agriculturists 
support  one  non-agriculturist,  besides  themselves. 
But  in  England,  the  non-agricultural  is  twice  the 
agricultural  population.  Two  agriculturists  support 
four  non-agriculturists.*  And  these  four  receive 
their  support,  as  members  of  some  or  other  of  the 
various  trades  and  occupations  which  have  gradually 
grown  up,  amid  the  increased  activity  and  multiplied 
bearings  of  our  industry. 


*  Jones,  On  Rent,  p.  230. 


CHAr.  XII.] 


HUMANITY. 


303 


1015.  I  have  spoken  of  the  increase  of  the 
productive  powers  in  agricultural  labour,  because 
that  labour  belongs  to  the  earliest  condition  of  man¬ 
kind,  and  is  always  the  most  indispensable.  But 
improvements  may  be  made  in  other  kinds  of  labour 
also,  by  which  its  powers  may  be  increased,  and  at 
least  for  a  time,  a  number  of  persons  may  be  thrown 
out  of  work.  And  this  is  more  likely  to  happen  in 
manufactures  than  in  agriculture  ;  because  improve¬ 
ments  are  always  slowly  and  gradually  introduced 
in  agriculture,  but  in  manufactures  often  suddenly 
and  rapidly.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  desire  for 
manufactured  goods  may  be  extended  much  further 
than  the  desire  for  food,  which  is  confined  within 
moderate  limits ;  and  therefore,  it  may  often  happen, 
that  when  a  body  of  labourers  have  been  at  first 
thrown  out  of  work,  by  some  improvement  in  manu¬ 
factures,  which  dispensed  with  their  labour,  they 
may  have  been  again  absorbed  by  the  manufactories, 
in  order  to  provide  for  the  increased  sale  of  manufac¬ 
tures  to  which  the  diminished  prices  had  given 
occasion. 

1016.  But  we  can  hardly  venture  to  assert 
that  the  multiplication  of  trades,  and  the  extended 
use  of  manufactures  taken  together,  will  always  pro¬ 
vide  an  adequate  employment  and  subsistence  for 
the  numbers  thrown  out  of  work  by  the  improvements 
in  agriculture  and  manufactures.  And  even  if  agri¬ 
culture  be  unprogressive,  and  manufactures  of  small 
amount,  the  numbers  of  the  people  may  multiply  so 
that  it  is  difficult  for  them  to  procure  subsistence. 
If  this  happen,  under  a  Government  in  which  the 
sense  of  Duty  is  not  unfolded,  or  in  one  in  which  it 
is  rejected,  the  people  will  be  left  to  struggle  with 
their  needs  for  themselves ;  and  the  hard  discipline 
of  want  or  famine  will  limit  their  increase,  or  dispose 
of  the  superfluous  numbers. 

1017.  It  has  been  sometimes  said,  that  when 


304 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


the  number  of  the  labouring  population  are  too  great, 
it  is  the  consequence  of  their  own  improvidence  ; 
that  they  ought  not  to  marry  and  produce  children 
except  they  have  a  reasonable  prospect  of  being  able 
to  support  them ;  that  they  have  the  remedy  in  their 
own  hands ;  since,  by  abstinence  from  marriage, 
they  may  limit  their  numbers,  and  reduce  them  to 
that  amount  for  which  the  condition  of  society  has 
need,  and  which  it  will  willingly  support. 

1018.  But  this,  though  sometimes  said  by  very 
humane  persons,  appears  to  be  contrary  to  all  con¬ 
sistent  humanity.  To  expect  that  the  labouring 
classes  shall,  by  general  consent,  take  the  course 
thus  recommended,  is  to  expect  that  they,  the  most 
ignorant  and  helpless  class,  shall  act  for  the  State  ; 
and  shall  act  with  more  foresight,  combination,  and 
self-denial,  than  any  State  has  even  yet  acted.  And 
if  it  be  merely  meant  that  each  poor  man  should,  for 
himself,  act  thus ;  it  may  be  true,  that  such  Forecast 
is  a  Duty  ;  but  to  this  may  be  opposed,  in  many  or 
most  cases,  other  Duties;  the  Duty  of  Chastity,  and 
the  Duty  of  promoting  the  happiness  of  those  we 
love.  For  it  can  hardly  be  meant  that  a  poor  man 
shall  never  love.  We  may  add,  too,  that  when  a 
man  looks  to  little  more  than  a  subsistence  for  him¬ 
self  and  his  family,  he  may,  under  the  influence  of 
love  and  hope,  frequently  reckon  upon  so  much  when 
he  does  not  find  it ;  and  often  his  destitution  may 
come  by  some  change  which  no  forecast  could  have 
divined.  But  supposing  there  be  a  great  number  of 
unemployed  poor  who  are  there  because  they  have 
neglected  such  duties  as  these  ;  still  the  question  re¬ 
curs,  What  is  the  State  to  do  respecting  them  ?  To 
say  that  they  have  neglected  their  Duty,  besides 
being  of  no  use  in  pointing  out  the  remedy  for  the 
evil,  has  the  fault  of  being  a  one-sided  censure.  For 
it  is  equally  probable  that  their  richer  neighbours 
also  have  neglected  their  Duty;  in  not  employing 


HUMANITY. 


305 


CHAP.  XII.] 

them  for  humanity’s  sake,  as  well  as  for  the  sake  of 
gain  ;  in  not  warning  and  superintending  the  poor  ; 
in  not  helping  them  at  an  earlier  period  ;  and  the 
like.  And  both  parties  being  thus  to  blame,  there 
appears  a  kind  of  cruelty  in  applying  the  censure  to 
the  party  who  are  already  suffering  the  consequences 
of  their  fault,  in  the  bitterness  of  want  and  destitu¬ 
tion,  and  with  no  power  of  deriving  present  relief 
from  the  course  suggested  to  them. 

1019.  To  the  question,  What  is  the  State  to  do 
in  such  a  case  ?  we  reply,  that  if  the  number  of  the 
destitute  be  so  great  that  they  cannot  be  employed 
upon  public  works  at  home,  as  we  have  suggested,  it 
appears  to  be  well  worth  consideration  whether  a 
number  of  them  might  not  be  encouraged  to  emigrate 
to  some  foreign  country,  uninhabited  or  slightly  cul¬ 
tivated,  in  which  their  labour  might  procure  them  an 
abundant  subsistence.  Such  Colonies  have,  in  all 
ages,  been  frequently  established  as  a  vent  for  the 
overflowing  population  of  a  State  ;  and  in  most  in¬ 
stances,  with  mutual  benefits  to  the  Mother  Country 
and  to  the  Colony.  Such  lands  are  easily  found,  and 
may  be  occupied  for  such  purposes,  with  a  just  re¬ 
gard  to  the  claims  and  interests  of  the  original  in¬ 
habitants. 

1020.  But  though  the  Emigration  of  labourers 
may  thus  be  a  highly  beneficial  resource,  if  there  be 
a  temporary  superabundance  of  that  class,  and  no 
vacant  occupation  for  them  at  home  ;  it  appears  very 
doubtful  whether  the  State  ought  to  reckon  upon 
Emigration  as  an  habitual  resource  against  the  evils 
of  a  too  rapidly  growing  population.  So  far,  indeed, 
as  Emigration  is  the  spontaneous  act  of  individuals, 
it  belongs  to  the  habits  of  the  people  and  is  taken 
into  account  by  families,  and  heads  of  families,  in 
forming  their  scheme  of  life.  But  an  Emigration  on 
a  large  scale,  conducted  by  the  State,  and  composed 
mainly  of  destitute  persons,  makes  too  abrupt  a 

VOL.  II.  20  AA  2 


306 


POLITY . 


[BOOK  V. 


change  in  the  community  to  be  entirely  wholesome, 
and  must  needs  be  an  expensive  mode  of  providing 
for  the  emigrants.  For  they  must  be  supported,  not 
only  on  the  voyage,  but  till  they  can  support  them¬ 
selves  in  the  Colony.  A  policy  more  generally  wise, 
appears  to  be,  to  facilitate  as  much  as  possible  that 
rise  of  men  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  classes  of 
society  by  which  the  lowest  are  prevented  from  being 
too  numerous;  and  to  encourage  that  increased  use 
of  manufactures  of  all  kinds,  which,  as  we  have  said, 
is  the  most  general  resource  against  the  temporary 
inconveniences  arising  from  increased  manufacturing 

o  o 

power. 

1021.  I  have  discussed  the  question  of  poor- 
laws  so  far,  with  reference  to  able-bodied  labourers, 
because  if  it  be  allowed  to  be  the  Duty  of  the  State 
to  make  provision  for  them,  it  will  hardly  be  denied 
with  regard  to  the  aged  and  infirm.  Yet  even  with 
regard  to  these,  there  are  not  wanting  important  con¬ 
siderations  which  may  modify  this  Duty.  It  is  desi¬ 
rable,  as  an  exercise  of  prudence  and  forethought, 
that  labourers,  as  well  as  others,  should  save  in  the 
season  of  health  and  manhood  something  on  which 
they  may  subsist  in  sickness  and  in  age.  It  is  desi¬ 
rable,  as  an  exercise  of  family  Affection,  that  aged 
and  infirm  persons  should  be  supported  and  nursed 
by  their  children  and  near  relatives.  If  the  State  be 
too  ready  to  take  upon  itself  the  burthen  of  aged  and 
infirm  persons,  children  may  feel  less  responsible  for 
the  comfort  of  their  aged  parents ;  parents,  for  that 
of  their  sick  children  ;  and  other  members  of  fami¬ 
lies,  in  like  manner,  with  respect  to  each  other :  and 
thus,  the  family  affections  may  be  chilled,  and  family 
claims  disregarded.  And  this  danger  is  so  far  worth 
attention,  that  if  a  parent,  or  child,  or  wife,  or  hus¬ 
band,  of  persons  who  have  enough  and  to  spare,  apply 
for  public  charity,  the  officers  may  properly  reject 
the  claim,  and  cast  the  applicant  upon  the  care  of  his 


CHAP.  XII.] 


HUMANITY. 


307 


relatives ;  not  relieving  him  except  when  his  neces¬ 
sities  have  stamped  his  relatives  with  the  disgrace  of 
want  of  natural  affection.  And  the  lesson  of  the 
Duty  of  natural  affection,  and  love  of  independence 
for  our  relatives  as  well  as  ourselves,  which  the 
State  thus  teaches,  is  to  be  extended  as  far  as  may 
be,  even  among  the  poorer  classes.  If,  however,  at 
last  there  remain  aged  and  infirm  persons  not  duly 
cared  for  by  their  relatives,  they  are  proper  objects 
of  the  care  of  the  State. 

1022.  We  have  been  proceeding,  all  through 
the  argument,  upon  the  supposition  that  voluntary 
charity  is  insufficient  to  relieve  the  distress  which 
exists  :  but  in  every  community,  the  question  may  be 
asked,  Is  this  so  ?  Is  legal  provision  for  the  poor 
necessary,  because  voluntary  charity  is  insufficient  ? 
And  it  has  been  urged  that  the  connexion  may  hap¬ 
pen  to  be  in  the  reverse  order ;  that  voluntary  char¬ 
ity  may  be  insufficient,  because  legal  provision  is 
established.  For  men,  it  is  said,  if  they  are  com¬ 
pelled  by  law  to  contribute  to  the  support  of  the  poor, 
think  their  Duty  towards  them  quite  fulfilled  ;  and 
will  not  exercise  voluntary,  as  well  as  involuntary 
bounty ;  but  if  they  be  left  to  the  workings  of  their 
own  hearts,  and  to  the  influence  of  the  distress  which 
they  witness  among,  their  neighbours,  they  will  give 
kindly,  the  poor  will  receive  gratefully,  and  the 
effects  will  be  better  than  any  which  a  compulsory 
provision,  a  Poor-law,  could  produce.  And  this  real 
charity  to  neighbours,  which  is  exercised  in  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  a  Poor-law,  will  not  be  confined  to  the  rich  ; 
even  the  poor  will  give  to  those  who  are  still  poorei 
than  themselves,  and  all  ranks  will  be  bound  together 
by  ties  of  kindness. 

1023.  Whether  the  State  provision  for  the  poor 
shall  or  shall  not  freeze  the  spontaneous  charity  of 
individuals,  as  here  asserted,  will  depend  much  upon 
whether  those  who  are  taxed,  on  this  account,  look 


308 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


upon  the  State  as  acting  towards  the  poor  for  them, 
or  for  the  poor  against  them.  If  the  former  be  the 
case,  which  is  what  we  have  supposed  ;  if  the  State 
be  looked  upon  as  executing  the  benevolent  inten¬ 
tions  of  the  citizens,  and  thus,  as  supplying  the  inevi¬ 
table  deficiencies  which  must  occur  in  the  practical 
working  of  the  charity  of  private  persons,  however 
benevolent  and  however  vigilant,  there  appears  to  be 
no  reason  to  fear  that  the  public  stream  will  stop  the 
private  sources.  We  do  not  find  that  the  State’s 
taking  into  its  hand  the  enforcement  of  Ownership  or 
of  Contracts  weakens  men’s  habits  of  Justice  and 
Truth;  except  that  in  cases  where  the  Government 
is  hated,  men  are  willing  to  defeat  the  administration 
of  the  Law.  Where  men  look  upon  the  Laws  as 
conformable  to  Justice,  they  readily  help  to  enforce 
them  ;  and  in  cases  which  the  Law  does  not  reach, 
they  are  the  more  likely  to  act  justly,  on  account  of 
their  having  promoted  the  administration  of  justice 
by  the  Law.  In  like  manner,  if  men  look  upon  a 
poor-law  as  humane,  and  approve  it  on  that  account ; 
they  are  likely  both  to  make  the  law  effective  for  the 
purposes  of  humanity  ;  and  when  the  law  falls  short 
of  the  measure  of  their  humanity,  to  supply  its  defects 
by  their  own  voluntary  acts.  They  are  the  Nation ; 
the  law  is  their  law ;  it  is  one  part  of  their  dealings 
towards  their  poorer  friends  and  fellow-citizens,  but 
necessarily  one  part  only. 

1024.  The  example  of  England  appears  to 
show  that  a  legal  provision  for  the  poor  does  not  ex¬ 
tinguish  the  disposition  to  spontaneous  charity.  In 
this  country,  all  lands  and  houses  are  taxed  for  the 
relief  of  the  poor  ;  and  this  tax  may  be  considered  as 
a  condition  of  the  tenure  of  property.  And  yet  there 
is,  perhaps,  no  country  in  which  there  is  more  spon¬ 
taneous  charity  ;  especially  if  we  include,  in  this  ex¬ 
pression,  the  relief  of  the  poor  in  the  various  forms 
in  which  it  is  undertaken  by  Charitable  Societies. 


CHAP.  XII.] 


HUMANITY. 


309 


These  Associations  are  something  intermediate,  in 
their  nature,  between  the  State  and  an  individual ; 
and  they  show,  that  the  humanity  of  Englishmen 
does,  as  we  have  intimated,  look  upon  the  relief 
given  to  the  poor  by  the  State,  as  insufficient ;  and 
seeks  to  supply  the  deficiency,  by  supplementary 
bodies.  These  Associations,  again,  do  not  supersede 
the  Duty  and  the  necessity  of  individual  Charity. 
The  Charity  of  each  person  to  his  immediate  neigh¬ 
bours  is  especially  a  Duty  ;  for  of  their  distresses,  he 
sees  something,  and  gives  to  them  because  he  feels 
for  them.  Not  only  no  act  of  the  State,  but  no  par¬ 
ticipation  in  associations,  can  supersede  this  Duty,  as 
a  necessary  part  of  our  Moral  Culture.  We  may 
add  also,  that  it  does  not  seem  likely  that  individual 
charity,  in  addition  to  the  operation  of  Societies,  will 
ever  cease  to  be  needed,  or  will  ever  be  less  needed, 
in  order  to  relieve  the  distress  which  prevails  in  va¬ 
rious  forms.  The  forms  of  misery  multiply  so  fast, 
and  the  number  of  the  distressed  is  so  great,  that 
charity  is  never  entirely  victorious  in  her  struggle 
with  them.  Or  rather,  all  the  exertions  which  we 
make  are  quite  insufficient  to  bring  the  distressed 
part  of  the  people  into  a  condition  which  our  huma¬ 
nity  can  contemplate  with  any  satisfaction.  All 
that  we  do,  serves  to  show  us,  among  other  things, 
this;  that  both  the  State  and  individuals  must  culti¬ 
vate  the  Principle  of  Humanity  within  them  to  a  far 
higher  degree  than  they  have  yet  done,  in  order  that 
their  moral  condition  may  correspond  to  the  actual 
condition  of  things,  and  in  order  that  the  continued 
moral  and  intellectual  progress  of  the  nation  may  be 
possible. 

1025.  If  we  can  see,  even  by  the  light  of 
rational  morality  alone,  the  necessity  of  thus  culti¬ 
vating  our  Humanity  by  acts  of  Kindness  and  bounty 
to  the  poor,  this  is  still  more  strongly  brought  to  our 
Conviction  when  we  take  into  our  account  Christian 


310 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Morality.  The  teaching  of  Christ  and  his  Apostles 
accepts  all  the  precepts  of  this  kind  which  prevailed 
among  the  Jews,  and  carries  them  farther.  Yet  in 
the  Jewish  law,  bounty  to  the  poor  was  largely 
enjoined.  The  Jews  were  forbidden  to  glean  their 
vineyards,  and  commanded  to  leave  something  for 
the  poor  and  the  stranger  (Lev.  xix.,  10).  They  were 
directed  to  lend  to  their  poorer  neighbours,  even  when 
likely  to  lose  what  they  lent  (Deut.  xv.,  9).  And 
almsgiving  was  among  them  one  of  the  most  necessary 
practices  of  a  good  man.  Christ  exhorted  his  disciples 
to  carry  this  practice  still  further  (Matth.  v.,  42)  : 
Give  to  him  that  asketh  thee.  He  himself  was  in  the 
habit  of  giving  money  to  the  poor  (Joh.  xiii.,  29). 
The  early  Christian  congregations  made  frequent 
contributions  for  the  poor  (Rom.  xv.,  26.  Gal.  ii.,  10, 
&c).  And  this  was  often  urged  as  a  duty  in 
Apostolic  injunctions.  The  Christians  were  recom¬ 
mended  to  lay  aside  something  for  this  purpose  on 
the  first  day  of  the  week,  according  as  God  had 
prospered  them  (1  Cor.  xvi.,  2).  And  such  a  collec¬ 
tion  on  the  Lord’s  day  has  continued  to  be  a  very 
general  practice  of  Christian  congregations,  up  to  our 
own  time.  In  England,  indeed,  it  has  been  discon¬ 
tinued  ;  perhaps  in  a  great  measure  in  consequence 
of  the  absolute  right  to  relief  which  the  laws  gave  to 
the  poor.  But  there  appears  to  be  no  reason  why  the 
Humanity  of  the  State  should  supersede  the  Christian 
Charity  of  the  Congregation.  There  is,  as  we  have 
said,  abundant  room  for  the  exercise  of  botln  We 
have  already  seen  (602,  614)  how  strongly  benevo¬ 
lence  to  the  poor  is  urged  upon  us  as  a  part  of 
Christian  Morality. 

1026.  There  is  another  way  in  which  the  Laws 
of  some  States,  and  of  England  among  the  number, 
express  the  humanity  of  the  humane  citizens,  and 
teach  a  lesson  of  that  virtue  to  those  that  need  it : 
namely,  by  forbidding  cruelty  to  animals,  and  making 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


PURITY. 


311 


it  penal.  This  is  a  remarkable  kind  of  Law,  as 
being  a  very  distinct  instance  of  Laws  dealing  with 
manners,  as  evidence  of  vicious  dispositions,  where 
no  Rights  are  violated.  For  animals  can  have  no 
Rights.  And  if  it  be  said  that  humane  men  have  a 
Right  not  to  be  shocked  by  the  sight  of  wanton 
cruelty,  it  may  be  said  on  the  same  ground  that 
truth-loving  men  have  a  Right  not  to  be  shocked  by 
wanton  lying  ;  and  the  like  ;  which  probably  no  one 
would  assert  as  a  ground  of  legislation. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE— PURITY. 

1027.  The  Duties  of  the  State  connected  with 
Purity  are  principally  those  which  concern  the 
Institution  of  Marriage,  which  is  the  foundation  of 
the  notion  of  Purity,  so  far  as  regards  the  Intercourse 
of  the  Sexes.  The  State  takes  the  course  which  the 
Duty  of  Purity  prescribes  for  it,  when  it  establishes 
and  sanctions  the  Marriage  Union,  punishes  Offences 
against  it,  makes  it  a  source  of  Rights  to  the  married 
Persons  and  to  their  children.  But  a  regard  for 
Purity  imposes  still  other  Duties  on  the  State  with 
respect  to  this  Institution.  It  is  the  business  of  the 
State,  aiming  at  moral  purposes,  not  only  to  sanction 
Marriages  such  as  belong  to  the  manners  of  any 
stage  of  society,  but  also  to  purify  and  elevate  the 
conception  of  the  Marriage  Union  itself.  Marriage 
must  be,  for  instance,  a  union  of  the  married  persons 
upon  equal  terms,  so  far  as  the  conditions  of  the  two 
sexes  allow  ;  with  an  identification  of  their  interests, 
and  an  engagement  of  permanent  and  obligatory 
community  of  life.  The  Law  teaches  this,  by  pro- 


312 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


hibiting  Polygamy  ;  and  by  denying  the  Rights  of 
children  to  the  offspring  of  mere  Concubines. 

1028.  The  closeness  of  the  jural  and  moral 
union  between  two  married  persons  may  still  further 
be  taught  by  the  Law,  in  its  provisions  concerning 
Divorce,  the  release  of  married  persons  from  the 
marriage  tie.  The  entire  union  of  interests,  affec¬ 
tions,  and  life,  which  forms  the  highest  conception  of 
marriage,  is  expressed  in  Law,  by  making  marriages 
indissoluble,  and  prohibiting  Divorce  altogether.  It 
may  perhaps  be  said,  that  this  is  legislating  upon  a 
standard  of  Morality  too  high  for  any  existing  state 
of  society.  It  may  be  said,  that  the  man  and  the 
woman  may,  after  marriage,  find  themselves  mistaken 
with  regard  to  the  union  of  hearts,  and  harmony  of 
dispositions,  which  they  supposed.  They  may  come 
to  hate  each  other,  as  much  as  they  ought  to  love. 
Can  it  answer  the  purposes  of  Marriage  to  prohibit 
such  persons  from  separating. 

1029.  It  may  perhaps  be  further  urged,  that  to 
shape  Laws  by  this  scheme  of  teaching  a  pure 
morality,  is  visionary  and  mischievous :  visionary, 
because  it  will  not  succeed  ;  mischievous,  because  the 
law  deprives  some  persons  of  Rights,  or  makes  them 
miserable,  in  its  attempts  to  teach  others.  It  may 
be  added,  that  the  true  way  to  legislate  concerning 
Marriage,  is  to  treat  it  as  a  Contract,  which  it  is  ;  to 
make  such  provisions  as  shall  most  promote  the 
benefit  of  the  Contracting  Parties  :  and  among  others, 
what  more  obvious  than  this  :  than  when  both  the 
Contracting  Parties,  who  must  know  best,  find  the 
engagement  a  source  of  unhappiness,  they  shall  be 
at  liberty  to  dissolve  it  ? 

1030.  To  this  we  reply,  that  if  we  take  this 
Principle  simply,  that  the  union  of  the  Sexes  is  a 
matter  of  Contract,  and  that  the  Contract  may  at  any 
time  be  dissolved  by  the  joint  agreement  of  the 
parties,  we  must  abolish  the  Laws  against  Polygamy, 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


PURITY. 


313 


and  place  illegitimate  and  legitimate  children  upon 
the  same  footing.  For  this  Principle  leaves  no 
distinction  possible  between  Marriage  and  Concubi¬ 
nage.  If  any  voluntary  engagement  of  cohabitation, 
for  any  time,  be  Marriage,  there  is  no  need  for  any 
Law  respecting  Marriage.  The  Law,  which  requires 
an  engagement  of  permanency,  in  order  that  the 
Marriage  may  have  legal  consequences,  limits  the 
freedom  of  such  Contracts  ;  and  does  so,  in  order 
that  the  Marriage  Contract  may  be  more  nearly 
what  it  ought  to  be.  Concubinage  and  Marriage  are 
distinguished,  in  order  that  an  entire  union  of  two 
persons,  for  social  and  moral,  and  not  merely  sensual 
purposes,  may  be  honoured  and  practised.  No  union 
is  acknowledged  as  Marriage,  which  does  not  profess 
to  be  for  life.  It  has  been  said,  that  if  men  and 
women  were  left  free  to  settle  the  terms  of  the  Mar¬ 
riage  Contract,  they  would,  in  most  cases,  be  led  to 
make  it  a  Contract  for  life.  The  number  of  cases  of 
Concubinage  show  that  this  is  true  only  in  a  very 
limited  sense.  But  even  if  this  were  true,  why  does 
the  Legislator  reject  the  cases  in  which  the  parties  do 
not  wish  this  ?  If  persons  wish  to  make  such  a 
Contract  for  a  limited  time,  why  does  he  not  sanction 
and  enforce  it?  Why  does  he,  on  the  contrary, 
make  rules  which  stamp  it  with  a  character  of 
degradation  and  disgrace  ?  Manifestly,  because  he 
wishes  to  impress  upon  the  citizens  the  great  social 
and  moral  dignity  of  a  complete  union  for  life,  and 
its  superiority  over  a  temporary  or  capricious  cohabi¬ 
tation.  Every  Law,  then,  which  establishes  Marriage, 
must  have  for  its  object  to  teach  what  Marriage 
ought  to  be. 

1031.  But  Marriage  ought  to  be,  not  only  an 
engagement  of  mutual  affection  for  life,  but  also  a 
provision  for  rearing  a  family  of  children  ;  and  this 
is  a  further  reason  against  allowing  a  Marriage,  once 
made,  to  be  dissolved.  While  the  children  are 

VOL.  ii.  BB 


314 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


young,  the  continued  union  of  the  parents  is  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  support,  protection,  and  education  of  the 
woman  and  the  children.  And  the  necessary  offices 
of  mutual  service  among  the  members  of  the  Family, 
cannot  be  effectually  performed,  except  they  arise, 
not  from  the  terms  of  a  Contract,  but  from  the  family 
affections :  and  such  affections  must  want  the  very 
nature  of  love,  if  they  can  look  forward  to  the  time 
when  they  can  terminate.  The  ties  of  Family  and 
Society  are  not  commonly  looked  upon  as  the  Obli¬ 
gations  of  a  Contract,  which  may  be  dissolved  at  the 
Will  of  the  parties.  The  Law  of  Marriage  would 
be  at  variance  with  the  general  feeling  of  mankind, 
if  it  so  treated  them.  Men  do  not  think  those  excu¬ 
sable  who  desert  their  children,  or  their  parents,  in 
their  need,  even  if  it  had  been  previously  agreed  be¬ 
tween  the  parties  that  they  should  be  nothing  to  each 
other.  And  further  :  as  we  consider  it  a  Duty  and 
even  an  Obligation  of  the  parents  to  support  and 
educate  the  children,  it  is  also  a  Duty  to  give  them 
that  Family  Education  which  the  permanent  union 
of  the  parents  alone  can  give. 

1032.  In  order  to  show  that  the  divorce  of  the 
parents  would  not  deprive  the  children  of  necessary 
support,  care,  and  connexion,  it  has  been  urged  that 
marriages  are  constantly  dissolved  by  the  death  of 
the  parties,  at  all  ages  of  the  children  ;  and  that  this 
event  does  not  prevent  the  proper  education  of  the 
children.  And  undoubtedly,  if  the  parents  be  sepa¬ 
rated,  by  whatever  event,  the  children  may  still  be 
brought  up,  and  even  excellently  brought  up.  But 
among  the  beneficial  influences  which  operate  to  form 
their  hearts  and  moral  principles,  their  regard  towards 
their  parents  must  have  an  important  place.  And  it 
must  make  a  very  material  difference  in  this  regard, 
whether  they  have  to  look  upon  their  parents  as  united 
by  an  affection  which  lasted  through  life,  though  one 
be  now  taken  away  ;  or  as  separated  by  a  voluntary 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


PURITY. 


315 


act,  and  perhaps  living  in  wedlock  with  new  spouses. 
If  the  Law  lend  its  aid  to  the  distribution  of  the  chil- 
dren  in  such  cases,  as  readily  and  as  approvingly  as 
to  the  arrangements  of  an  unbroken  family  :  it  pre¬ 
sents  to  us  a  Conception  of  Marriage  much  lower  and 
less  pure  than  that  to  which  a  moderate  moral  cul¬ 
ture  directs  us. 

1033.  It  is  said  that  an  engagement  to  retain 
our  affection  through  life  is  absurd,  since  we  cannot 
command  our  affections  ;  and  that  to  bind  two  per¬ 
sons  together,  who  have  come  to  hate,  instead  of  love 
each  other,  is  to  inflict  upon  them  an  useless  tor¬ 
ment.  But  though  we  cannot  command  our  affec¬ 
tions,  we  can  examine  our  hearts  before  we  make  the 
engagement :  when  this  is  faithfully  done,  married 
life  itself,  well-conducted,  tends  to  give  permanency 
to  affection  ;  and  nothing  can  more  impress  upon  us 
the  necessity  of  being  faithful  to  our  hearts  in  the 
choice  we  make,  than  the  knowledge  that  the  step, 
once  taken,  is  taken  for  life.  Again,  this  same  know¬ 
ledge,,  that  the  union  cannot  be  dissolved,  tends  to 
control  the  impulses  of  caprice,  ill-temper,  and  wea¬ 
riness,  in  married  life ;  and  to  keep  two  people  toge¬ 
ther,  and  on  the  whole,  very  tolerably  happy,  who 
might  have  separated  on  some  transient  provocation, 
if  Divorce  had  been  easily  attainable.  And  thus, 
the  exclusion  of  Divorce  tends  both  ways  to  the  pro¬ 
motion  of  conjugal  love  and  conjugal  happiness. 

1034.  All  that  we  have  hitherto  said,  tends  to 
this  :  not  that,  in  any  given  state  of  society,  Divorce 
should  be  absolutely  prohibited  ;  but  that  the  highest 
Conception  of  Marriage  is  expressed  by  making 
Marriage  indissoluble  ;  that  the  Duty  of  the  State, 
which  is,  among  other  Duties,  to  establish  such  Laws 
as  may  maintain  and  elevate  the  Moral  Culture  of 
the  citizens,  requires  the  Lawgiver  constantly  to  tend 
towards  this  Conception  of  Marriage,  and  this  con¬ 
dition.  Whether,  at  the  existing  point  of  the  moral 


316 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


progress  of  this  Country,  the  moral  teaching  of  the 
Law  is  made  most  effectual  by  prohibiting  Divorce 
in  general  (allowing  it  only  as  the  consequence  of 
adultery  on  one  side,  and  then  with  great  difficulty), 
I  shall  not  attempt  to  decide. 

1035.  So  far,  we  have  considered  the  subject 
in  the  light  in  which  it  is  presented  to  us  by  Rational 
Morality.  If  we  now  take  into  account  Christian 
Morality,  we  find  that  in  it  the  highest  view  which 
we  can  form  of  the  entireness  and  permanence  of 
the  marriage  union  is  confirmed.  We  have  already 
noticed  (633)  the  condemnation  delivered  by  Jesus 
Christ  against  the  practice  of  Divorce,  as  it  then  ex¬ 
isted  among  the  Jews.  It  has  been  most  commonly 
understood,  that  these  expressions  contain  a  condem¬ 
nation  of  Divorce  under  all  circumstances,  except  in 
the  case  of  adultery.  But  there  have  not  been 
wanting  those  who  have  explained  these  passages 
otherwise.  They  say  that  when  it  said,  Those  whom 
God  hath  joined  together ,  let  not  man  put  asunder ,  wq 
are  to  recollect  that  God  has  not  joined  together  those 
between  whom  there  is  a  settled  unfitness  for  the 
marriage  union,  though  man  may  have  done  so. 
When  it  is  said  that  Moses  allowed  Divorce  to  the 
Jews  for  the  hardness  of  their  heart,  it  cannot  be 
meant  that  he  allowed  a  sin  which,  according  to  that 
interpretation,  is  equivalent  to  adultery.  Divorce 
was  allowed  for  the  hardness  of  men’s  hearts,  as  all 
law  exists  in  consequence  of  the  hardness  of  men’s 
hearts,  that  is,  in  consequence  of  their  tendency  to  do 
wrong.  Divorce  was  given  especially  for  the  hard¬ 
ness  of  heart  of  those  who  abused  the  privilege  at  the 
time  of  our  Saviour,  for  it  was  the  means  of  their 
showing  the  hardness  of  their  hearts.  And  when  it 
is  said,  Whosoever  shall  put  aioay  his  wife,  and 
marry  another,  it  is  to  be  understood  that  these  acts 
were  part  of  the  same  design  :  such  a  design  is  adul¬ 
terous.  Such  are  the  arguments  for  the  less  strict 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


PURITY. 


317 


interpretation  of  this  passage.  But  even  with  this 
interpretation,  the  leading  point  of  Christ’s  teaching 
is  plain ;  that  the  Christian  was  not  to  be  content 
with  such  an  imperfect  view  of  the  marriage  union 
as  was  placed  before  the  Jew,  but  was  to  aim  at  that 
higher  view  which  was  shown,  when  in  the  beginning 
God  made  them  male  and  female. 

1036.  It  may  be  said,  the  view  we  have  been 
taking,  that  marriage  is  an  entire  and  interminable 
union  of  the  pair,  would  lead  us  to  reject  all  second 
marriages ;  and  that  the  law,  in  order  to  express  the 
highest  Conception  of  Marriage,  ought  to  prohibit 
these.  And  undoubtedly,  a  very  high  view  of  the 
sacredness  and  entireness  of  the  marriage  union 
may  easily  lead  to  a  disapprobation  of  second  mar¬ 
riages  ;  and  among  Christians,  in  every  age,  there 
have  been  those  who  have  condemned  them.  But 
yet,  when  the  life  of  one  of  the  parties  is  prolonged 
beyond  that  of  the  other,  and  when  after  the  sorrow 
of  the  separation  has  subsided  into  calm,  the  sur¬ 
vivor  sees  before  him  or  her,  perhaps  at  an  early 
age,  and  after  a  brief  married  life,  an  indefinite  re¬ 
mainder  of  life  ;  the  same  causes  which  impel  per¬ 
sons  to  marriage  at  first,  must  often  operate  again 
with  equal  power,  and  supply  the  same  reasons  why 
there  should  be  marriage.  And  the  law,  in  sanc¬ 
tioning  such  marriages,  divests  the  union  of  none  of 
its  entireness  and  permanence  ;  for  the  engagement 
is  still  for  life  on  both  sides.  When  the  act  of  God 
has  dissolved  the  first  engagement,  the  law  does  not 
make  that  which  is  past  and  gone,  a  fetter  upon  the 
present  and  future  ;  but  allows  a  new  origin  of  con¬ 
jugal  life,  making  what  remains  of  the  person’s  life, 
as  if  it  were  the  whole ;  which,  as  to  all  engage¬ 
ments,  it  is. 

1037.  Most  States  have,  in  some  way  or  other, 
punished  Adultery,  at  least  on  the  part  of  the  wife. 
Yet  the  Law  of  England,  placing  Rights  as  much 

BB  2 


318 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


as  possible  on  the  basis  of  property,  gives  the  in¬ 
jured  husband  pecuniary  damages  from  the  adul¬ 
terer;  and  leaves  the  public  crime  to  the  cognizance 
of  the  spiritual  courts.' 

1038.  There  is  another  subject,  on  which  it  is 
necessary  to  say  a  few  words  ;  namely,  the  degrees 
of  relationship  within  which  Marriage  is  to  be  per¬ 
mitted  by  Law.  In  framing  a  system  of  Morality, 
the  Moralist  is  often  compelled  to  dwell  upon  sub¬ 
jects  from  which,  on  other  accounts,  he  would  wish 
always  to  turn  the  thoughts  of  men  away :  Incest  is 
one  of  these  subjects.  But  it  will  suffice  us  to  treat 
it  in  a  very  brief  and  general  manner. 

1039.  Without  attempting  to  exhibit,  in  a  more 
definite  shape,  the  reasons  and  feelings  which  have 
made  men  look  with  horror  upon  any  connexion  of 
a  conjugal  nature,  between  the  nearest  family  rela¬ 
tives  ;  it  may  suffice  to  say,  that  all  such  relations 
make  the  man  the  natural  Guardian  of  the  woman’s 
purity.  This  feeling  of  Guardianship  on  this  sub¬ 
ject,  commonly  infused  into  the  affections,  from 
their  earliest  origin,  extinguishes  the  very  seeds  of  de¬ 
sire,  and  leaves  only  Fraternal  Love .  On  the  other 
hand,  when  no  such  relation  exists,  desiring  love 
may  grow  up ;  and  in  societies  where  men  are  free 
to  choose  their  partners,  there  is  a  constant  and  uni¬ 
versal  feeling  of  courtship  between  the  sexes,  which 
tinges  their  manners  towards  each  other.  This 
feeling  of  courtship,  in  however  many  folds  it  may 
involve  the  spark  of  desire,  is  yet  inconsistent  with 
the  chaste  guardianship  of  Fraternal  Love.  Lienee, 
the  necessity  of  separating  the  cases  in  which  per¬ 
sons  may  not  marry,  because  they  are  relatives, 
from  those  in  which  they  may  marry. 

1040.  Where  the  separation  line  is  to  be 
drawn,  in  any  given  state  of  Society,  is  a  question 
difficult  of  solution,  and  necessarily  in  some  degree 
arbitrary.  The  Rule  may  be  different  in  different 


CHAP.  XIII.] 


PURITY. 


319 


states  of  Society  ;  for  it  must  depend,  in  a  great  mea¬ 
sure,  upon  the  Structure  of  Families,  and  the  kind  of 
the  early  intercourse  of  their  members  with  each  other, 
and  with  other  Families.  Hence,  although  the  primary 
family  relations  must  always  have  the  same  conse¬ 
quences,  more  remote  relationships  may  be  subjected 
to  different  Rules  of  intermarriage  in  different  coun¬ 
tries  ;  and  one  Country  or  Age  is  no  absolute  Rule 
for  another :  except  only,  that  the  long-continued 
past  existence  of  a  Rule,  on  this  subject,  is  a  very 
strong  reason  for  retaining  and  observing  the  Rule ; 
since  the  separation  of  the  two  classes  of  cases,  so 
necessary  to  the  purity  of  families,  produces  its 
effect  by  being  familiar  to  men’s  minds. 

1041.  Some  persons  have  sought  a  ground  for 
the  prohibition  of  marriages  between  near  relatives 
in  physiological  reasons,  and  in  the  supposed  de¬ 
generacy  of  the  offspring  when  such  a  practice  is 
continued.  But  if  this  result  were  far  more  certain 
than  it  is,  we  could  not  consistently  make  it  a  ground 
of  legislation,  except  we  were  also  prepared  to  pro¬ 
hibit  unions  which  are  far  more  certainly  the  cause 
of  physiological  evil  ;  as  for  instance,  when  there 
is  a  great  disparity  of  years  ;  or  hereditary  disease, 
or  insanity,  on  either  side. 

1042.  A  question  of  prohibited  degrees  of 
kindred,  which  has  been  much  discussed,  is  this : 
Whether  a  man  may  marry  his  deceased  wife’s  sis¬ 
ter.  On  this  we  may  observe,  that  though  much 
argument  on  the  subject  has  been  drawn  from  the 
law  of  Moses,  such  argument  is  of  no  direct  force; 
since,  as  we  have  said,  one  Nation  is  no  Rule  for 
another  ;  and  the  habits  of  society,  and  the  relations 
of  families,  on  which  the  Rule  ought  to  depend, 
were  very  different  among  the  ancient  Jews,  and  in 
our  own  country  at  present.  So  far  as  the  Jewish 
law  has  been  the  basis  of  the  Rule  hitherto  received, 
it  has  weight;  since,  as  we  have  also  said,  an  ex- 


320 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


isting  Rule  is  entitled  to  great  respect.  As  to  the 
grounds  of  decision  belonging  to  our  own  state  of 
Society,  we  have  mainly  to  consider,  whether,  by 
marrying  one  sister,  men  in  general  are  placed  upon 
the  footing  of  Fraternal  Love  with  the  other  sisters ; 
and  whether  it  is  requisite  to  the  purity  of  this  Fra¬ 
ternal  Love  (on  both  sides)  that  there  should  be  no 
possibility  of  its  being  succeeded  by  the  love  which 
courtship  implies.  On  these  two  questions,  different 
opinions  will  be  entertained  by  different  persons. 
To  the  first,  the  manners  generally  prevalent  in  this 
country  seem  to  direct  us  to  return  an  affirmative 
answer.  Whether  Fraternal,  may,  in  the  course  of 
a  life,  alternate  with  Conjugal,  Love,  it  is  more  dif¬ 
ficult  to  say.  In  one  order,  at  least,  this  appears  not 
to  be  unusual ;  since  it  often  happens  that  a  person 
courts  first  one  sister  and  then  another :  but  this  is 
before  the  conjugal  relation  is  established  :  and  per¬ 
haps  tends  rather  to  show  that  the  fraternal  condition 
ought  to  supersede  all  other  affections. 

1043.  On  both  sides  of  this  question,  argu¬ 
ments  may  be  drawn  from  the  probable  conse¬ 
quences.  On  the  one  hand,  if  the  brother-in-law  is 
never  allowed  to  become  the  husband,  the  sister  of 
the  deceased  wife  may,  without  incurring  reproach, 
live  with  him  as  a  brother,  and  may  thus  give  to  the 
children  a  mother’s  care.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
brother-in-law  may  become  the  husband,  both  he 
and  the  children  may  often  find,  in  such  a  union, 
a  valuable  consolation  and  resource,  after  the  loss 
of  the  mother.  But  the  purity  which  is  the  object 
of  such  Rules,  is  in  danger  of  some  tarnish  from 
the  contemplation  of  consequences  ;  and  we  shall 
not  attempt  to  decide  the  question. 


CHAP.  XIV.] 


PUNISHMENTS. 


321 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  STATE— ORDER. 

Of  Punishments. 

1044.  All  Legislation  in  a  State  may  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  resulting  from  the  Duty  of  Order  ;  for 
all  Laws  are  means  of  Order.  We  have  considered 
Laws,  according  to  their  purpose,  as  directed  by 
Humanity,  Justice,  and  the  like  ;  and  we  shall  not 
attempt  here  to  make  a  separate  class  of  those 
which  have  Order  more  especially  for  their  object. 
But  we  may  consider,  as  particularly  resulting  from 
the  Duty  of  Order,  the  Office  of  the  State  in  giving 
reality  to  the  Laws  by  Sanctions,  that  is,  by  Punish¬ 
ments  (501).  If  transgressions  of  the  Laws  are 
not  punished,  the  Laws  are  merely  nominal  ;  and, 
if  such  a  course  be  continued,  will  soon  be  as  if 
they  did  not  exist.  There  must,  then,  be  Punish¬ 
ments  provided,  to  meet  transgressions  of  the  Laws  ; 
and  we  have  to  consider  by  what  Principles  this  part 
of  the  business  of  the  State  is  to  be  regulated. 

1045.  An  object  of  Punishment  is  to  prevent 
the  classes  of  acts  to  which  it  is  affixed  ;  but  this 
does  not  fully  express  the  object;  the  object  is  to 
prevent  such  acts,  as  being  wrong  (558).  And  the 
Laws  which  affix  Punishments  to  Crimes,  prevent 
them  (so  far  as  they  do  prevent  them)  by  making 
men  look  upon  them  as  wrong ;  or  at  least  by  mak¬ 
ing  each  man  regard  them  as  something  which  the 
community  deems  wrong,  and  will  punish  because 
it  so  deems.  And  thus,  Punishments,  while  they 
have  it  for  their  object  to  prevent  certain  kinds  of 
acts,  aim  to  obtain  this  object  by  making  men  look 
upon  these  acts  as  wrong.  The  Object  of  Punish¬ 
ment,  even  when  it  threatens  most  roughly,  is  not 

VOL.  IT.  21 


322 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


merely  to  deter  men,  but  to  teach  them  ;  not  merely 
to  tell  them  that  transgression  of  the  Law  is  dan¬ 
gerous,  but  also  that  it  is  immoral.  Punishment  is, 
as  we  have  already  said  (502),  a  means  of  the 
Moral  Education  of  the  Citizens.  We  will  trace 
some  of  the  applications  of  this  view. 

1046.  In  Laws  respecting  Wrongs,  we  see 
very  evident  traces  of  the  moral  teaching  which  the 
Lawgiver,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  has  had  in 
view.  Thus,  with  regard  to  Wrongs  against  the 
Person,  one  of  the  most  ancient  and  general  Rules 
is  the  lex  tallonis,  retaliation  ;  a  degree  of  suffering 
and  harm  inflicted  upon  the  wrong-doer,  equal  to 
that  which  he  had  himself  occasioned.  Such  was 
the  Mosaic  Rule  (Exod.  xxi.),  Strife  for  strife,  wound, 
for  wound,  burning  for  burning ,  foot  for  foot,  hand 
for  hand,  tooth  for  tooth,  eye  for  eye ,  life  for  life  : 
and  still  earlier  (Gen.  ix.,  6),  Whoso  sheddeth  man’s 
blood ,  by  man  shall  his  blood  be  shed.  Such  an  Or¬ 
dinance,  by  making  man  feel  that  which  he  inflicts, 
plainly  tends  to  teach  him  that  all  men  are  bound 
together  as  partakers  of  a  common  nature,  and  are 
required  to  act  with  a  recollection  of  this  commu¬ 
nity.  Such  is  the  mode  in  which  children  are  still 
often  taught,  so  as  to  have  unfolded  in  them  the 
feeling  of  humanity,  both  towards  other  children, 
and  towards  animals.  And  thus,  in  the  earliest 
measure  of  punishment,  we  see  a  disposition  to  pro¬ 
portion  it  to  the  degree  of  guilt,  as  measured  by  the 
violence  done  to  the  common  nature  of  all  men. 

1047.  But  it  may  be  said,  that  the  maxims  of 
punishment  admitted  in  later  times  deviate  from  this 
view,  and  are  regulated  by  the  principle  that  the 
object  of  punishment  is  simply  the  prevention  of 
crime,  and  not  the  moral  education  of  the  people. 
And  as  examples  of  such  maxims,  may  be  adduced 
such  as  these  :  that  Crimes  are  to  be  punished  with 
greater  severity  in  proportion  to  the  difficulty  and 


CHAP.  XIV.] 


PUNISHMENTS. 


323 


necessity  of  preventing  them;  or  the  facility  of  per¬ 
petrating  them ;  or  their  being  committed  by  com¬ 
binations  of  men.  These  circumstances,  it  is  said, 
do  not  increase  the  guilt;  and  yet,  in  the  common 
judgment  of  Legislators,  they  have  been  made  to 
increase  the  Punishment. 

1048.  But  there  is,  in  this  judgment  of  Legis- 
tors,  nothing  at  variance  with  the  doctrine,  that  the 
purpose  of  Punishment  is  the  Moral  Education  of 
the  people  ;  and  that  it  ought  to  be  regulated  by  this 
purpose.  For  such  circumstances  as  we  have  men¬ 
tioned,  if  they  do  not  increase  the  guilt  of  the  trans¬ 
gression,  at  least  augment  the  need  which  men  have 
of  the  lesson  which  the  Law  gives,  and  interpose  dif¬ 
ficulties  in  the  way  of  making  the  lesson  impressive. 
If  stealing  privately  in  a  shop,  or  stealing  from  a 
bleaching-ground,  or  any  other  offence,  can  be  com¬ 
mitted  with  special  facility  ;  those  who  are  placed 
in  temptation  require  to  be  taught  the  criminal  cha¬ 
racter  of  the  act  with  special  emphasis ;  which  the 
Law  can  do  only  by  annexing  to  it  a  severer  punish¬ 
ment.  And  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  crime,  though 
one  of  great  moral  depravity,  be  one  which  is  easily 
provided  against,  the  Law  may  express  its  condemna¬ 
tion  by  a  lighter  penalty  than  would  otherwise  be 
necessary.  Thus  a  Breach  of  Confidence,  though  it 
must  be  looked  upon  as  more  guilty  than  a  Fraud 
where  no  trust  has  been  reposed,  is  visited  with  a 
smaller  punishment.  And  this  is  quite  consistent 
with  the  character  of  the  Law  as  a  moral  teacher. 
The  forbearance  of  the  Law  in  punishing  Breach  of 
Trust,  is  a  significant  lesson  to  the  Trustor ;  incul¬ 
cating  the  circumspection,  care,  and  precaution,  with 
which  he  ought  to  select  and  control  the  depositary 
of  his  confidence.  And  accordingly,  when  the  trust 
is  unavoidable,  the  punishment  is  not  limited  by  this 
double  bearing  of  the  lesson  ;  as  in  the  case  of  a  theft 
committed  by  a  servant  in  the  shop  or  dwelling-house 


324 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


of  his  master  ;*  for  there  it  is  in  vain  to  preach  to 
the  Master  a  vigilance  which  could  not  be  effectually 
exercised. 

1049.  In  like  manner  with  regard  to  crimes 
committed  by  Combinations  of  men,  there  are  strong 
reasons  why  the  Law  should  teach  the  criminality 
of  such  acts  with  a  more  emphatic  voice,  that  is,  by 
a  heavier  punishment.  For  this  lesson  has  to  con¬ 
tend  against  strong  influences  on  the  other  side  ;  the 
countenance  and  encouragement,  perhaps  it  may  be, 
the  confidence  and  enthusiasm,  which  men  engaged 
in  a  criminal  act  derive  from  their  combination.  A 
solitary  criminal  must  feel  as  if  he  had  all  the  world 
against  him  ;  but  a  band  of  conspirators  are  a  public 
to  one  another ;  and  the  voice  of  this  public,  over¬ 
bearing  or  misleading  that  of  the  conscience,  re¬ 
quires  to  be  itself  overpowered  by  the  voice  of  the 
Law,  teaching  with  the  authority  of  the  whole  com¬ 
munity.  Hence,  conspiracies  and  combinations  to 
do  illegal  acts,  are  very  properly  punished  with 
greater  severity  than  the  like  acts  done  by  in¬ 
dividuals. 

1050.  In  order  that  the  Moral  Teaching  of 
the  Law  may  be  effectual,  it  must  be  in  a  great 
measure  in  harmony  with  the  general  opinion  of  the 
members  of  the  community.  An  attempt  to  throw 
the  strong  condemnation  of  the  community  upon  an 
act  by  an  extreme  punishment,  when  the  community 
do  not  sympathize  with  the  severity,  will  make  the 
criminals  objects  of  pity,  and  alienate  men’s  minds 
from  the  Law.  But  this  is  not  to  be  understood,  as 
if  the  Law  could  produce  no  effect,  in  exciting,  or 
keeping  up  a  greater  horror  of  certain  crimes,  than 
would  prevail  if  the  law  were  relaxed.  If  the  law 
be  not  very  strongly  at  variance  with  the  moral 
judgments  of  individuals,  there  are  many  citizens 


*  Paley,  vi.,  9.  Crimes  and  Punishments , 


CHAP.  XIV.] 


PUNISHMENTS. 


325 


who,  looking  upon  the  law  as  being,  in  general,  the 
support  and  expression  of  morality,  will  have  their 
sentiments,  with  regard  to  special  crimes,  drawn  to¬ 
wards  an  agreement  with  the  law  ;  and  will  look 
upon  such  crimes  with  especial  abhorrence,  so  long 
as  they  are  the  objects  of  extreme  punishment.  In 
such  cases,  the  relaxation  of  the  punishment  may 
diminish  the  prevalent  abhorrence  of  the  act.  Thus, 
it  is  possible  that  the  removal  of  the  punishment  of 
death  from  the  crime  of  incendiarism  may  make  the 
common  people  look  upon  such  acts  as  less  atrocious 
than  heretofore.  The  recklessness  and  malignity 
of  the  crime  made  men  continue  to  sympathize  with 
the  extreme  of  punishment  in  this  case,  so  long  as 
the  law  awarded  it  ;  but  the  mitigation  of  the  punish¬ 
ment  may  possibly  weaken  the  feeling. 

1051.  The  law  of  retaliation,  which  we  have 
mentioned  as  the  oldest  measure  of  punishment,  is 
one  to  which  men’s  feelings  still  very  generally  as¬ 
sent.  That  punishment  of  Death  should  be  inflicted 
upon  murderers,  shocks  few  persons,  compared  with 
those  who  are  shocked  at  the  infliction  of  death  in 
most  other  cases.  Yet  Capital  Punishment  has  often 
been  assigned  to  crimes  of  mere  fraud,  as  forging 
bank-notes,  coining  money,  and  the  like.  It  may  be 
asked,  whether  this  is  consistent  with  the  Principles 
we  have  laid  down.  Without  pretending  to  justify 
any  particular  law,  we  may  reply,  that  laws  of  this 
kind  teach,  and  are  intended  to  teach,  a  very  impor¬ 
tant  lesson  ;  namely,  the  value  and  dignity  of  that 
established  order  and  mutual  confidence  under  which 
alone  coined  and  paper  currency  can  circulate. 
With  the  prevalence  of  such  order  and  such  mutual 
confidence,  a  nation  may  be  populous,  and  its  inha¬ 
bitants  may  live  in  peace,  ease,  and  comfort.  With¬ 
out  such  order  and  confidence,  the  land  must  be  full 
of  violence  and  mistrust ;  the  inhabitants  few,  and 
comparatively  wretched.  He  who  destroys  the  order 
VOL.  II  cc 


326 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


and  confidence  of  society,  may  be  considered  as  de¬ 
stroying  those  lives,  which,  if  such  crimes  as  his  had 
been  common,  could  never  have  existed.  The  Law 
of  ancient  times  treats  the  Coiner  as  guilty  of  treason 
against  the  Sovereign  ;  but  the  Law,  at  any  time, 
may  treat  the  coiner  and  the  forger  of  money  as  a 
traitor  against  the  Sovereign  Rule  of  Mutual  Confi¬ 
dence,  which  is,  to  a  prosperous  and  wealthy  Nation, 
the  breath  of  life. 

1052.  This  Lesson,  however,  applies  only  to 
the  State  currency  ;  which  necessarily  circulates 
rapidly,  and  is  taken  and  given  with  slight  examina¬ 
tion.  Private  bills  are  to  be  protected  on  other  prin¬ 
ciples.  And  even  with  regard  to  State  currency,  if 
it  can  by  any  means  be  made  impossible,  or  difficult, 
to  forge  or  coin  imitations  of  it ;  it  is  the  business  of 
the  State  to  employ  such  means,  rather  than,  by 
means  of  extreme  punishments,  to  claim,  for  the  ex¬ 
isting  form  of  the  currency,  an  importance  which 
does  not  really  belong  to  it. 

1053.  We  may  observe,  further,  that  as  the 
consideration  of  the  high  value  and  dignity  of  the 
established  order  of  society,  and  of  the  security,  con¬ 
fidence,  and  tranquillity  which  result  from  it,  will 
justify  the  Law  in  asserting  the  claims  of  such  order 
in  the  strong  language  of  capital  punishments,  if  it 
cannot  be  made  intelligible  in  any  other:  so  this  part 
of  the  Law,  no  less  than  any  other,  requires  the 
assent  of  a  good  citizen  ;  and,  in  his  proper  place, 
has  a  moral  claim  to  his  co-operation. 

1054.  It  may  be  that  sometimes  the  long  dura¬ 
tion  of  an  orderly  and  tranquil  state  of  society,  and 
the  comparatively  rare  occurrence  of  capital  punish¬ 
ments,  may  lead  men  to  forget  that  a  disorderly  and 
violent  state  of  society  is  possible,  and  that  the  dan¬ 
ger  of  it  is  kept  off,  only  by  the  existence,  that  is,  by 
the  enforcement,  of  laws.  This  forgetfulness,  and 
the  repugnance  of  the  thought  of  the  death  and  pain 


CHAP.  XIV.] 


PUNISHMENTS. 


327 


of  any  one,  which  a  life  spent  in  tranquil  society 
commonly  produces,  may  lead  men  to  think  with 
dislike  of  the  punishment  of  death,  and  of  other  severe 
bodily  punishments.  But  if  this  dislike  operate  so  as 
to  make  citizens  neglect,  or  violate,  their  duty  of  co¬ 
operating  to  enforce  the  Law,  the  result  will  be  the 
growth  of  crime,  and  the  recurrence  of  a  disordered, 
and  violent  condition  of  society.  Judge,  Jury,  Pro¬ 
secutor,  Witnesses,  are  alike  bound  by  this  Duty ; 
and  alike  chargeable  with  the  consequences  of  its 
neglect. 

1055.  The  degree  of  co-operation  which  the 
State  has  required  of  its  citizens  in  the  enforcement 
of  criminal  Law,  has  been  different  in  different 
times.  Among  the  ancient  Jews,  capital  punish¬ 
ment,  death  by  stoning,  was  inflicted  by  the  hands  of 
the  assembled  people  themselves.  In  modern  Eu¬ 
rope,  and  in  the  world  in  general,  the  infliction  of 
death,  or  mutilation  for  great  crimes,  has  usually 
taken  place  in  public ;  and  has  been  regarded  with 
sympathy,  or  at  least  with  acquiescing  awe,  as  a 
natural  act  of  justice,  necessary  to  the  safety  of 
good  citizens.  The  freedom  and  diversity  of  opi¬ 
nions  which  have  prevailed  on  political  matters  in 
England,  have  rendered  men  less  generally  ready  to 
sympathize  with  acts  of  the  State  against  individuals  ; 
and  thus,  the  sympathy  for  necessary  justice  has 
been  dull,  while  a  sympathy  for  the  individual  is 
lively.  But  this  disproportionate  progress  of  sym¬ 
pathy,  for  the  good  and  the  bad  members  of  society, 
is  a  defect  in  our  national  moral  culture.  The  hu¬ 
manity  is  of  a  partial  and  perverted  kind,  which  is 
attracted  most  by  the  necessary  consequence  of  cri¬ 
minality. 

1056.  The  prevalent  detestation  of  criminals 
has  been,  in  most  states,  one  of  the  holding  points  of 
the  general  avoidance  of  crime ;  and  consequently, 
one  of  the  means  of  a  general  moral  culture.  Some 

cc  2 


328 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


punishments  so  far  take  this  prevalent  feeling  for 
granted,  as  to  make  it  the  instrument  of  punishment ; 
as  when  the  criminal  is  declared  infamous  ;  or  when 
he  is  put  in  the  Pillory ,  which  is  infamy  added  to 
bodily  pain.  These  punishments  are,  undoubtedly, 
very  unequal  in  the  weight  with  which  they  fall 
upon  different  persons,  according  to  the  public  opinion 
respecting  them  ;  and  this  is  a  defect  in  such  punish¬ 
ments.  But  it  does  not  appear  that  orderly  society 
can  subsist  without  assuming,  in  a  great  measure, 
that  agreement  between  public  opinion  and  judicial 
proceedings  which  such  punishments  assume.  If 
acts,  which  are  great  crimes  by  the  law,  cease  to  be 
infamous,  or  to  shock  men’s  minds,  the  law  ought  to 
be  altered  :  if  for  no  other  reason,  yet  for  this  ;  that 
the  evils  attending  the  frequency  of  such  acts,  being 
really  felt,  may  excite  general  anger  against  such 
crimes  and  such  criminals,  and  thus  bring  men’s 
feelings  into  harmony  with  the  law  which  condemns 
them.  If  the  law,  as  a  means  of  moral  discipline, 
lose  its  hold  upon  men,  from  being  too  rigorous,  it 
may  regain  its  hold  by  being  relaxed  :  but  it  is  to  be 
recollected  that  the  hold  thus  gained  consists  in  the 
suffering,  alarm,  and  indignation  which  crime  pro¬ 
duces. 

1 057.  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  render 
punishment  a  moral  Discipline,  not  only  for  society  in 
general,  but  also  for  the  criminal  himself;  to  reform 
him,  while  we  punish.  And  so  far  as  this  is  compa¬ 
tible  with  the  reality  of  punishment,  it  is  a  Duty  to 
aim  at  such  an  object:  not  only  as  a  matter  of  hu¬ 
manity  towards  the  individual,  but  also  as  a  step  in 
the  moral  improvement  of  the  community  :  for  the 
persons  who  are  punished  by  imprisonment,  or  other¬ 
wise,  are,  after  a  longer  or  shorter  time,  liberated  ; 
and  these  form  a  part,  and  in  populous  States,  not  a 
small  or  unimportant  part,  of  those  whose  collective 
moral  character  is  the  moral  character  of  the  com- 


CHAP.  XIV.] 


PUNISHMENTS. 


329 


munity.  How  the  reformation  of  criminals  is  to  be 
aimed  at,  whether  by  solitary  confinement,  by  mak¬ 
ing  the  prisoner’s  subsistence  or  comfort  depend  upon 
his  industry,  or  in  what  other  way,  is  a  question, 
rather  o£  Prison  Discipline  than  of  morality. 

1058.  The  punishments  besides  death  and 
bodily  suffering,  as  Fine,  Imprisonment,  Exile,  De¬ 
portation  to  a  convict  colony,  and  the  like,  differ  much 
in  the  severity  with  which  they  fall  upon  different 
persons,  according  to  their  previous  circumstances, 
and  the  circumstances  of  the  community.  Through 
the  feeling  of  the  repugnance  which  the  infliction  of 
death  excites  in  bystanders,  many  persons  have  been 
led  to  think  that  capital  punishments  ought  to  be  abo¬ 
lished  altogether.  If  other  punishments  could  come 
to  assume  such  a  character  as  to  give  to  men’s 
Rights  their  reality,  capital  punishments  might  cease. 
But  such  an  increase  in  the  efficacy  of  lower  punish¬ 
ments,  such  as  exile,  imprisonment,  and  the  like, 
must  depend,  in  a  great  measure,  upon  the  value  of 
those  benefits  of  social  life  from  which  the  exile  and 
the  prisoner  are  excluded.  If  the  general  lot  of  man 
in  society  could  be  made  so  delightful,  that  it  would 
be  comparative  misery  to  lose  it,  Banishment  or  Im¬ 
prisonment  for  offenders  might  suffice  to  keep  up 
such  a  condition.  But  then,  it  is  to  be  recollected, 
that  one  requisite  for  our  advancing  towards  a  state 
of  society  so  generally  satisfactory,  is  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  Moral  Rules  as  realities :  and  to  this,  at 
present,  there  appears  to  be  no  way,  except  by 
making  Ignominious  Death  the  climax  of  our  scale 
of  Punishments. 

1059.  We  have  said  that  there  are  two  kinds 
of  Laws,  Laws  against  Wrongs  and  Laws  against 
Vice.  What  we  have  hitherto  said  respecting  Pu¬ 
nishments,  applies  mainly  to  the  former  kind.  The 
general  Principle  which  we  have  laid  down  respect¬ 
ing  Punishment  in  such  cases,  namely,  that  it  is  to 


330 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


be  regarded  as  an  Instrument  of  Moral  Education,  is 
still  more  evident  with  regard  to  Punishments  ap¬ 
pointed  for  acts,  which,  though  vicious,  violate  no 
man’s  Right.  Such  are  Laws  against  cruelty  to 
animals  ;  as  we  have  said  (1026)  ;  Laws  against  In¬ 
decency  and  Profligacy  ;  against  Profaneness  and 
Blasphemy  ;  and  the  like.  Punishments  assigned 
to  such  Offences,  evidently  have  it  for  their  purpose 
to  mark  the  judgment  of  the  State  as  to  what  is  right, 
and  what  is  wrong  ;  and  to  call  upon  the  citizens  to 
agree  in  this  judgment.  Such  Laws  are  intended, 
not  to  protect  the  Rights,  but  to  mould  the  Manners 
of  the  citizens  ;  not  so  much  to  prevent  the  acts 
which  they  forbid,  as  to  foster  in  the  community  a 
disposition  the  opposite  of  that  which  such  acts  betray. 
The  State  forbids  cruelty  to  animals,  because  it 
approves,  and  would  cherish,  the  feeling  of  humanity. 
It  puts  down  indecency  and  profligacy,  as  far  as  a 
regard  for  freedom  will  allow  it  to  do  so,  because  it 
respects,  and  would  diffuse,  chastity  and  purity.  It 
condemns  profaneness  and  blasphemy,  because  it  re¬ 
verences  God,  and  would  lead  all  its  members  to  share 
in  this  reverence.  Such  Laws  are  manifestly  Moral 
Lessons.  The  State,  in  promulgating  such  ordi¬ 
nances,  plainly  comes  forward  in  the  character  of  a 
Teacher  of  the  Citizens. 

1060.  But  yet,  this  office  of  teaching  must 
needs  be  very  imperfectly  discharged,  if  the  means 
which  the  State  can  employ  for  this  purpose  are  only 
those  which  we  have  mentioned.  Punishments,  when 
viewed  as  Instruments  of  the  Moral  Education  of  the 
citizens,  may  have  a  significance  which  they  cannot 
have  under  any  other  point  of  view ;  but  still,  they 
are  Instruments  which  can  carry  the  work  but  a  lit¬ 
tle  way.  We  must  have  something  different  from 
the  Axe,  the  Scourge,  the  Chain,  the  Branding  Iron, 
in  order  to  raise  the  minds  of  men  to  any  elevated 
standard  of  morals.  The  use  that  is  made  of  them, 


CHAP.  XV.] 


STATE  EDUCATION. 


331 


may  show  that  Moral  Education  is  a  Duty  which  the 
State  acknowledges,  and  must  needs  acknowledge  ; 
but  we  must  look  in  another  quarter  for  the  only 
effectual  means  by  which  this  Duty  can  be  per¬ 
formed. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

HOW  CAN  THE  STATE  EDUCATE  THE  PEOPLE  ? 

1061.  As  we  have  seen,  the  State  is  necessa¬ 
rily  driven  to  aim  at  the  Moral  Education  of  its 
members,  and  yet  has  no  prospect  of  effectually  pro¬ 
moting  this  object  by  its  ordinary  means  of  action, 
Law  and  Punishment.  For  Law  (460)  deals  with 
external  acts  ;  Morality,  and  therefore  Moral  Edu¬ 
cation,  with  internal  motives  and  intentions;  and 
how  is  the  State  to  penetrate  to  and  to  mould  these  ? 
Education  unfolds  the  Faculties  and  imparts  Belief 
(561).  How  can  the  State  impart  Belief?  The 
foundation  of  Morality  is  a  Knowledge  of  Truth,  and 
especially  of  Religious  Truth  (565).  How  can  the 
State  give  such  a  Knowledge  ?  Religious  Truth  is 
kept  present  to  men’s  minds,  and  effective  in  their 
lives,  by  means  of  Religious  Sympathies  and  Reli¬ 
gious  Ordinances.  How  can  the  State  reach  such 
Sympathies  or  direct  such  Ordinances  ? 

1062.  It  is  plain  that  the  State  cannot  do  these 
things  of  itself ;  and  cannot  do  them  at  all,  except  it 
can  for  that  purpose  obtain  the  aid  of  the  Religious 
Teachers  of  its  people.  If  it  can  induce  them  to  act 
in  conjunction  with  it,  the  State  may,  by  means  of 
Religious  Education,  impart  a  Moral  Education. 
Using  the  term  Church  in  a  general  sense,  as  imply¬ 
ing  the  Teaching  Body  in  every  Religion,  the  State 


POLITY. 


332 


[book  v. 


can  educate  the  people  by  the  aid  of  the  Church,  and 
in  no  other  way. 

1063.  But  if  the  Religion  be  the  Christian  Re¬ 
ligion,  it  would  seem  that  there  are  especial  facilities 
in  the  State  obtaining  this  assistance.  For  theChris- 
tianTeacher,  and  every  Christian,  so  far  as  his  power 
of  Religious  teaching  goes,  is  bound,  and  is  desirous  to 
communicate  his  religious  knowledge,  hopes,  and 
aids,  to  those  around  him  (730).  He  is  zealous  in 
imparting  to  all  within  his  sphere  of  influence  a 
Christian  Education,  which  is  necessarily  also  a  Mo¬ 
ral  Education.  Hence  the  State  will  be  especially 
enabled  to  promote  its  object,  the  Moral  Education 
of  the  people,  if  it  can  employ  for  that  purpose  the 
assistance  of  the  Christian  Church. 

1064.  Being  thus  led  to  look  at  the  relation 
between  the  State  and  the  Church,  a  number  of 
questions  rise  up  before  us,  which  we  must  consider  ; 
especially  the  question  of  the  Terms  on  which  the 
Church  can  give,  and  the  State  receive,  this  assis¬ 
tance.  But  before  we  proceed  to  such  questions,  we 
may  illustrate  somewhat  further  the  assertions 
already  made:  that  the  Moral  Education  of  the 
People  is  necessarily  an  object  of  the  State’s  activity  ; 
and  that  the  State  of  itself  can  act  effectively  in  pro¬ 
moting  this  object. 

1065.  Even  with  regard  to  its  lower  object, 
Self-preservation,  the  State  cannot  avoid  aiming  at 
the  moral  -and  religious  education  of  the  people. 
The  infliction  of  punishment  requires  in  some  cases 
the  co-operation,  in  all  the  acquiescence,  of  the  peo¬ 
ple  ;  and  cannot  be  effective  except  when  it  is  sup¬ 
ported  by  some  popular  sympathy  (1054).  Hence 
the  State,  in  order  to  give  force  to  its  punishments, 
must  desire  a  corresponding  moral  education  of  the 
minds  of  its  subjects.  Again,  the  State  must  neces¬ 
sarily  have  a  Right  (841)  of  requiring  from  its  citi¬ 
zens  Oaths  of  Testimony,  Oaths  of  Office,  and  the 


CHAP.  XV.] 


STATE  EDUCATION. 


333 


like,  as  means  of  securing  a  coincidence  between 
men’s  Obligations  and  their  Duties,  without  which 
Government  would  not  be  possible.  But  oaths  can¬ 
not  produce  their  effect,  if  men’s  minds  be  not  reli¬ 
giously  educated ;  the  State  therefore  must  desire 
the  religious  education  of  its  citizens.  Again :  the 
State,  in  prohibiting  offences  against  Person  and  Pro¬ 
perty,  aims  at  producing  not  only  quiet,  butsecurity.  It 
seeks  not  only  to  prevent  battery  and  robbery,  which 
may,  in  particular  cases,  be  effected  by  mere  force;  but 
also,  to  make  men  feel  secure  that  they  shall  not  be 
beaten  or  robbed  ;  which  can  only  be  done  by  making 
the  citizens  in  general  peaceable  and  honest,  instead  of 
being  pugnacious  and  rapacious.  Even  in  this  part 
of  its  office,  therefore,  the  State  aims  at  a  moral 
Education  of  its  citizens.  And  thus,  even  while  it 
looks  to  its  lower  objects,  the  mere  existence  of  Law, 
Judicial  Process,  and  Individual  Security,  the  State 
cannot  avoid  aiming  at  or  requiring  a  moral  and  re¬ 
ligious  education  of  its  subjects. 

1066.  But  the  State  has  higher  Duties  than  the 
mere  protection  of  Person  and  Property,  as  we  have 
already  seen  (992).  The  existence  of  Laws  con¬ 
cerning  Marriage  necessarily  supposes  that  the  State 
not  only  desires  the  continuance  and  comfort  of  its 
population,  but  aims  also  at  the  encouragement  of 
chastity  and  virtue  (1027).  Such  Laws  are  Lessons, 
as  well  as  Laws.  And  with  regard  to  he  higher 
objects  of  men’s  actions,  their  moral  and  intellectual 
culture  ;  including,  in  this,  their  religious  culture 
also  ;  many  modes  of  conducting  this  culture  and 
gratifying  the  moral,  intellectual,  and  religious 
sympathies,  are  such  as  naturally  draw  men  into 
Associations,  which  exercise  a  great  sway  over  their 
actions.  In  some  respects,  the  convictions  and 
feelings  which  bind  together  such  Associations  may 
be  said  to  exercise  the  supreme  sway  over  men’s 
actions  :  for  so  far  as  men  do  act,  their  actions  are, 


334 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


in  the  long  run,  determined  by  their  conviction  of 
what  is  right  on  moral  and  religious  grounds ;  and  a 
Government  which  is  wrong  on  such  grounds,  will  be 
destroyed,  if  the  subjects  are  free  to  act.  And 
though  men  may,  for  a  long  time,  be  subjugated  by 
a  Government  which  they  think  contrary  to  morality 
and  religion,  this  condition  of  things  cannot  be  looked 
upon  as  one  in  which  the  State  attains  its  objects. 
The  State,  the  Supreme  Authority,  must  have,  on  its 
side,  the  convictions  and  feelings  which  exercise  the 
Supreme  Sway.  It  must  therefore  have,  on  its  side, 
the  convictions  and  feelings  which  bind  men  into 
associations  for  moral,  intellectual,  and  religious 
purposes.  If  this  be  not  so,  the  State  has  objects  in 
which  it  fails,  and  which  are  higher  than  those  in 
which  it  succeeds  ;  and  a  portion  of  its  Sovereignty 
passes,  from  it,  into  the  hands  of  those  who  wield  the 
authority  of  Moral,  Intellectual,  and  Religious  Asso¬ 
ciations.  It  must,  then,  be  an  object  of  the  State,  so 
to  direct  the  education  of  its  subjects,  that  men’s 
moral,  intellectual,  and  religious  convictions  may  be 
on  its  side ;  and  that  Moral,  Intellectual,  and  Reli¬ 
gious  Associations  may  be  duly  subordinate  to  its 
Sovereignty.  Besides  which,  the  Government,  if  it 
be  conducted  by  intelligent,  moral,  and  religious  men, 
will  itself  desire  the  intellectual,  moral,  and  religious 
progress  of  the  nation  ;  and  will  wish  to  educate  the 
people  in  such  a  manner  that  this  progress  may 
constantly  go  on. 

1067.  Thus  the  State,  both  by  its  lower  and  by 
its  higher  objects,  is  necessarily  led  to  aim  at  educa¬ 
ting,  or  directing  the  education  of,  its  people.  But  it 
may  be  asked,  whether  the  State  is  not  competent  to 
discharge  this  office  for  itself.  For,  it  may  be  said, 
Education  must  be  conducted  by  means  of  Masters 
which  the  State  can  appoint,  of  Lessons  which  it  can 
prescribe,  and  of  Rewards  and  Punishments  which  it 
can  assign.  And  examples  may  be  pointed  out, 


CHAP.  XV.] 


STATE  EDUCATION. 


335 


especially  in  the  ancient  world,  where  the  State,  as 
the  State,  has  educated  its  people,  and  educated  them 
in  a  most  effective  and  marked  manner;  modifying 
their  characters  and  moulding:  their  wills  into  a  con- 
formity  with  the  general  purposes  and  will  of  the 
State.  Such  was  the  case  at  Sparta,  under  the 
constitution  Lycurgus.  The  individual  citizens,  in 
virtue  of  the  Education  which  they  received  from  the 
State,  were  in  the  habit  of  controlling  all  the  natural 
impulses  of  men,  in  obedience  to  the  Laws  ;  and  were 
even  ready  to  lay  down  their  lives  when  the  State 
directed  them  to  do  so.  Here,  then,  it  appears  plain 
that  the  State  does  not  need  a  Church,  to  enable  it  to 
educate  its  citizens ;  and  has,  in  fact,  powers  of 
education  as  efficacious  as  any  Religious  Teachers 
ever  had. 

1068.  To  this  we  reply,  that  in  this,  and  in  all 
cases  in  which  the  State  has  been  an  effective 
Educator,  it  has  united  the  Influence  of  Religion 
with  the  influence  of  Reward  and  Punishment.  The 
Legislator  has  either  himself  been  also  a  Religious 
Teacher  ;  or  he  has  taken  to  his  assistance  Religious 
Teachers,  and  has  joined  their  authority  with  his 
own.  There  has  been,  in  such  instances,  an  identi¬ 
fication  or  fusion  of  Law  with  Religion  ;  of  the  State 
with  the  Church.  The  Precepts  of  Religion  have 
been  enforced  by  State  Punishments;  the  Laws 
have  been  supported  by  Religious  Sanctions.  But 
this  condition  of  things  belongs  to  a  very  early  stage 
of  Society.  The  State,  and  the  Religious  Body, 
have  now  long  been  separated,  and  exist  in  distinct 
forms,  with  different  powers  in  various  hands.  We 
can  no  longer,  even  if  it  were  desirable,  expect  to 
see  an  identification  of  Church  and  State  of  this 
kind.  The  two  seats  of  power  are  now  distinct ;  and 
we  must  consider,  not  how  they  may  again  become 
one,  but  in  what  manner,  and  under  what  conditions, 
they  can  best  combine  their  influence. 


336 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


1069.  Moreover,  even  if  we  could  wield  the 
united  powers  of  the  State  and  of  Religion,  in  mould¬ 
ing  men’s  minds  to  such  a  frame  as  we  have  descri- 
bed,  this  would  not  satisfy  us ;  for  this  would  not  be 
the  Education  which  we  contemplate.  Such  a  Dis¬ 
cipline  does  indeed  answer  the  direct  purposes  of  the 
State,  but  it  does  not  answer  the  purposes  of  Morality 
or  Religion.  It  may  make  the  citizen  an  effective 
instrument  for  the  purposes  of  the  State,  but  it  does 
not  make  him  fully  a  man.  In  order  that  a  man’s 
being  may  have  fully  a  moral  character,  he  must 
not  be  merely  shaped  by  laws  from  without,  but  also 
by  a  principle  of  spontaneity  within.  He  must  not 
merely  accept  the  national  morality,  but  must  elevate 
his  own  standard  above  what  he  begins  with.  He 
must  not  merely  repeat  the  National  Creed,  but  he 
must  accept  as  Truth  what  he  sees  as  Truth  (563). 
The  State  may  prescribe  its  lessons,  but  they  are  no 
lessons  for  him,  except  they  become  a  part  of  his 
conviction.  He  is  not  educated  by  repeating  words,  or 
by  forming  outward  habits.  Education  has  to  do 
with  the  development  of  the  faculties,  and  the  culture 
of  mental  powers  ;  with  Belief  and  Knowledge  ;  with 
Speculative  Truth  and  Falsehood;  and  with  these, 
the  State,  as  a  State,  can  have  nothing  to  do ; 
for  the  State  has  no  powers,  no  organs  for  judging  of 
Truth  or  Falsehood,  except  the  men  of  whom  it 
consists  ;  considered,  not  as  political  elements,  hut  as 
moral,  intellectual,  and  religious  beings.  The  State, 
therefore,  as  the  State,  cannot  educate  the  people  ; 
and  can  do  this,  only  by  calling  in  the  Church  to  its 
assistance. 

This  being  established,  we  have  several  questions 
brought  before  us  :  Whether  the  Church  can  accept 
this  office  from  the  State  :  If  accepted  on  Terms, 
What  terms  the  State,  what  terms  the  Church,  can 
agree  to ;  and  the  like.  These  questions  we  shall 
briefly  examine. 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  337 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  RELATIONS  OF  THE  CHURCH  TO  THE  STATE. 

1070.  Man  is  a  political  animal.  Wherever 
he  exists,  he  lives  under  a  Government,  ruling  by 
Laws,  enforcing  the  Laws  by  Punishments ;  the 
Government  being  administered  by  Magistrates  and 
Officers,  subordinate  to  each  other  in  various  degrees. 
Man  is  also  a  religious  creature.  He  everywhere 
believes  in  and  looks  to  a  Divine,  as  well  as  a  human 
Government.  He  has  religious  hopes  and  fears 
which  are  the  sanctions  of  his  morality  :  he  receives 
with  reverence  and  submission  the  lessons  of  his 
religious  Teacher  ;  he  seeks  comfort,  guidance,  and 
encouragement  in  his  earthly  career  from  religious 
sympathies  and  ordinances  ;  he  has,  here  on  earth,  a 
religious  Government  conducted  by  Laws  and  Punish¬ 
ments,  Rulers  and  Ministers,  appointed  according  to 
the  directions  of  his  Religious  Teachers.  He  is  a 
member  of  a  Religious  Community,  as  well  as  of  a 
Civil  Community. 

1071.  Since  man  is  everywhere  a  member  of 
these  two  Communities,  it  becomes  necessary  for  us 
to  consider  in  what  relation  they  stand  to  each  other. 
Using  the  term  Church  in  a  large  sense,  so  as  to 
include  all  religious  Communities,  whatever  their 
belief,  we  may  term  this  the  Relation  of  Church  and 
State.  But  the  term  Church  especially  denotes  the 
Christian  Community  ;  and  when  applied  to  other 
Religions,  might  seem  to  imply  a  closer  analogy  to 
the  Christian  Church  than  we  can  always  find,  or 
need  assume.  The  Relation  of  the  Civil  and  the 
Religious  Community  is  a  point  which  concerns  all 
Communities.  It  is  a  universal  question  of  Polity, 
and  must  at  first  be  treated  of  with  reference  to  all 
cases  ;  though  the  Relation  of  the  State  to  the  Chris- 
vol.  i:.  22  dd 


339 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


tian  Church  is  a  point  of  more  especial  interest  and 
importance  to  us.  We  shall  consider  the  various 
modes  in  which  the  State  may  deal  with  the  Religious 
Community. 

1072.  First,  the  State  may  treat  the  Religious 
Community  with  Indifference.  This  supposes  that 
the  State  does  not  think  it  necessary  to  treat  the 
Religious  Community  with  hostility.  It  supposes, 
therefore,  that  the  Religious  Teacher  does  not  incul¬ 
cate  disobedience  to  the  Civil  Laws  ;  for  if  he  do,  the 
State  must  silence  him,  in  virtue  of  its  Obligation  to 
repress  Sedition  (857).  When  this  is  not  the  case, 
the  State  may  abstain  altogether  from  recognizing  the 
Religious  Community.  It  may  act  as  if  ignorant  of 
the  existence  of  the  Religion  and  the  Body  ;  just  as 
it  may  abstain  from  recognizing  an  association  for 
the  cultivation  of  Science  or  Art. 

1073.  When  there  is  but  one  Religious  Com¬ 
munity  within  the  boundaries  of  the  State,  there  can 
be  little  temptation  for  the  State  to  take  this  course  : 
for  the  State  has,  as  we  have  seen,  very  strong 
reasons  for  desiring  to  have  the  influence  of  Religion 
on  its  side,  and  in  its  service  ;  and  in  such  a  case, 
the  State  will  generally  form,  with  the  Religious 
Community,  an  Alliance  with  one  or  other  of  the 
kinds  which  we  shall  have  to  mention.  But  there 
may  be  great  obstacles  or  impossibilities  in  the  way 
of  the  State  doing  this.  There  may  be  several 
Religious  Communities  within  the  State  ;  and  it  may 
not  be  possible  to  form  an  Alliance  with  all.  The 
Governors  of  the  State  may  have  conquered  the 
Nation  without  having  adopted  its  Religion,  and 
without  being  willing  to  adopt  it,  to  the  extent  which 
an  Alliance  implies.  Or  in  consequence,  of  a  series  of 
historical  events,  several  Religions,  each  embodied  in 
a  Religious  Community,  may  exist  in  the  country. 
Or  there  may  be  several  Religions,  not  in  consequence 
of  external  events,  but  of  the  internal  working  of 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  339 

men’s  minds.  A  part  of  the  people  may  have  made 
such  a  movement  in  religious  thought,  that  they 
have  cast  off  the  old  Religion,  and  established  a  new 
Belief,  with  a  corresponding  Religious  Body.  Or 
finally,  there  may  be  more  than  one  Religion  in  the 
country,  by  the  more  express  working  of  Providence  ; 
as  when  it  introduces  the  true  Religion  into  a  land 
previously  occupied  by  a  false  one  ;  and  the  true 
Religion  may  not  yet  have  reached  the  minds  of  the 
Governors.  In  all  such  Cases,  the  State  may  be 
prevented  from  making  an  Alliance  with  any  Reli¬ 
gious  Community.  It  may,  if  the  Governors  be  not 
incited  to  persecution  by  Religious  feelings  or  politi¬ 
cal  fears,  treat  all  religion  with  neutrality.  The 
State  and  the  Church  may  be  altogether  unconnected. 
Men  may  be  allowed  to  preach  and  to  teach,  to 
worship  and  to  pray,  as  they  are  allowed  to  do  any 
other  indifferent  acts.  They  may  be  allowed  to 
assemble  for  such  purposes,  provided  they  do  not 
create  disturbance  or  inconvenience  by  their  assem¬ 
blies  or  practices.  They  may  have  Temples,  by  the 
same  Right  by  which  they  have  houses  ;  they  may 
celebrate  religious  Festivals,  as  a  Family  may  cele¬ 
brate  its  Birth-days.  They  may  perform  their 
religious  Observances  on  occasions  of  Birth  and 
Marriage,  and  Death,  in  addition  to  the  Forms  which 
the  State  requires.  They  may  settle  their  disputes 
by  the  Arbitration  of  their  own  Officers,  in  all  cases 
where  the  State  does  not  find  it  necessary  to  compel 
them  to  its  own  Tribunals. 

1074.  Such  a  condition  of  things  may  last  for 
a  considerable  time  :  but  from  what  has  already  been 
said,  we  see  how  incomplete  a  State  is,  which  is  on 
these  terms  with  the  Religious  Communities  existing 
within  it.  In  such  a  case,  there  is  a  provision  for 
the  lower  object  of  the  State,  its  preservation,  in  the 
absence  of  all  religious  teaching  of  disobedience  to 
the  Laws.  The  State  is  left  to  protect  itself  by  its 


340 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Punishments.  But  in  doing  this,  it  works  upon  men’s 
outward  fears  alone.  The  people  have  no  sympathy 
with  it.  If  the  Government  is  attacked,  the  people 
are  obedient,  so  long  as  it  can  defend  itself ;  but  they 
are  neutral.  There  is  no  zeal,  no  affection,  on  its 
side.  All  men’s  warmer  and  stronger  feelings, — 
their  loves,  their  hopes,  their  reverence, — are  directed 
to  their  Religious  Community.  It  is  to  that,  that  their 
higher  nature,  their  moral  being,  clings.  If  the  Go¬ 
vernment  perish,  they  care  not ;  for  some  other 
Government  will  succeed,  which,  so  long  as  they 
obey  it,  will  hardly  fail  to  be  at  least  indifferent  to 
them,  as  the  existing  one  is.  But  this  is  not  all  the 
danger.  The  Government  may  think  it  good  policy 
to  treat  Religious  Communities  with  Indifference  : 
but  the  Religious  Communities,  or  some  of  them,  may 
not  think  this  good  policy.  They  may  think  that 
Religion  ought  to  be  considered  in  the  conduct  of  a 
State  ;  and  that  true  Religion  ought  not  to  be  put  on 
the  same  footing  as  false.  They  may  think  that  a 
State  ought  to  aim  at  those  higher  objects,  which  it 
can  promote  only  by  the  aid  of  Religion ;  at  a  mo¬ 
rality,  beyond  mere  legality  ;  at  a  moral,  intellec¬ 
tual,  and  religious  progress.  They  may  look 
eagerly,  though  tranquilly,  for  the  opportunity  of 
carrying  these  views  into  effect.  Or  again  :  the  ex¬ 
isting  state  of  religious  division,  and  the  Polity  of 
Indifference,  may  have  been  preceded  by  a  state  of 
things  in  which  such  religious  views  were  carried 
into  effect ;  by  a  Polity  in  which  the  State  was 
allied  with  their  Religious  Body.  In  this  case,  the 
supporters  of  religious  Polity  look  upon  the  Polity  of 
Indifference,  not  only  as  a  National  Calamity,  but  as 
a  heinous  Wrong  to  themselves.  They  regard  the 
Government  as  an  irreligious  usurpation.  They 
look  to  some  extruded  Dynasty,  some  superseded 
Constitution,  as  the  Instrument  by  which  their  Rights 
are  to  be  restored,  and  the  National  sin  and  misery 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  341 

wiped  out.  Their  hearts  are  always  ready  to  take 
up  again  the  good  old  Cause  of  Church  and  State. 
The  Government  has  a  most  dangerous  foe  within 
the  bosom  of  the  nation  ; — a  body  of  the  people 
united  by  conscious  sympathy  and  familiar  organi¬ 
zation  ;  ready  to  act  against  the  Government  with  a 
courage,  enthusiasm,  and  devotion,  such  as  a  Reli¬ 
gious  Cause  can  inspire,  and  to  which  a  Govern¬ 
ment,  whose  Policy  is  Indifference  to  all  enthusiasm, 
can  oppose  no  corresponding  feeling.  This  is  a 
serious  danger  ;  and  one  which,  in  the  course  of  a 
prolonged  national  history,  can  hardly  fail  to  show 
itself  in  great  national  misfortunes.  And  still  fur¬ 
ther  :  there  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  just  ground  for 
discontents  of  this  kind.  A  State  which  thus  treats 
Religion  with  indifference,  is  really  prevented  from 
promoting  all  the  higher  objects  of  the  existence  of  a 
State.  It  has  no  means  of  educating  the  people,  or 
of  promoting  the  moral,  intellectual,  and  religious 
progress  of  the  nation.  It  cannot  promote  the  moral 
progress,  because,  in  Education  at  least,  morality  can 
only  be  taught  by  inculcating  its  religious  foundation. 
Nor  can  the  State,  in  the  case  supposed,  promote  the 
intellectual  progress  of  the  nation.  For  man’s  Du¬ 
ties  and  his  Destiny,  the  Ends  of  Government,  the 
Precepts  of  Religion,  have  so  much  more  interest  for 
the  Intellects  of  men  in  general,  than  any  other  sub¬ 
jects  ;  that  any  intellectual  teaching  which  excludes 
these  subjects,  would,  on  that  account,  fetter  and 
narrow  the  mind,  far  more  than  enlarge  and  elevate 
it.  Moreover,  the  intellect  could  not  be  much  exer¬ 
cised  on  mere  material  subjects,  to  the  exclusion  of 
moral  and  religious  ones,  without  giving  both  an  un¬ 
due  estimate  of  the  comparative  value  of  the  former, 
and  a  false  view  of  their  bearing  and  connexion. 

Since  then  the  Polity  of  Indifference  towards  Re¬ 
ligion  is  accompanied  with  such  serious  evils,  let  us 
consider  other  modes  of  dealing  with  that  subject. 

dd  2 


342 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


1075.  The  Second  Form  of  Polity  which  we 
shall  consider  is,  when  the  State  takes  the  Religious 
Community  under  its  Protection ,  securing  to  it  cer¬ 
tain  Rights,  and  receiving  from  it,  in  return,  certain 
services.  In  this  form  I  do  not  include  those  cases 
in  which  Religion  is  established  by  the  State,  as  be¬ 
ing  true  ;  but  only  those  in  which  it  is  protected  as 
being  useful.  Such  is  the  condition  of  the  Religion 
of  the  natives  in  India  under  the  English  sway. 
Such  is  the  condition  of  all  forms  of  Religion,  in  the 
United  States  :  all  are  protected  ;  none  is  established. 
Such  also  is  the  condition  of  Religion  in  all  those 
nations  of  Europe  in  which  there  is  no  State  Reli¬ 
gion  ;  although  these  nations  may  differ  much  from 
each  other,  in  the  amount  of  Protection  which  they 
may  afford  to  Religious  Communities,  and  also  in  the 
degree  in  which  the  Governors  of  the  nation  show,  to 
one  Religion  or  another,  in  their  personal  acts,  a 
favour  which  the  Constitution  excludes  in  their  politi¬ 
cal  acts.  Accordingly,  the  Rights,  Privileges,  Encou¬ 
ragement,  and  Influence  of  Religion,  are  very  different 
in  the  different  nations  which  live  under  this  Politv. 

1076.  In  all  such  States,  the  Religious  Com¬ 
munities  which  are  thus  protected  have  the  Right  of 
holding  the  property,  which  is  bestowed  upon  them 
by  their  members ;  in  some,  the  Ministers  or  Clergy 
of  all  or  some  selected  Religions,  receive  pecuniary 
support  from  the  State  itself.  In  return,  they  are 
expected  to  inculcate  the  Duty  of  Obedience  to  the 
Civil  Authority,  which  indeed  is  almost  a  necessary 
condition  of  the  Religion  being  permitted  to  exist  : 
and  they  are  also  expected  to  teach  their  members 
the  religious  Duty  of  a  scrupulous  conformity  to 
Truth  in  declarations,  confirmed  by  Oath,  or  by  some 
equivalent  solemnity.  Sometimes  the  members  of 
the  religious  community  have  additional  privileges 
and  offices  ;  as  when  their  religious  forms  of  mar¬ 
riage  are  accepted  as  constituting  a  legal  marriage  ; 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  343 

and  when  their  Ministers  have  a  definite  part  as¬ 
signed  them  by  the  State,  in  the  education  of  the 
people.  In  this  case,  there  is  expected,  from  the 
ministers  of  Religion,  a  large  but  indefinite  Opera¬ 
tion  in  promoting  that  object  which  the  State,  thus 
protecting  one  or  more  Religious  Communities,  may 
be  supposed  to  have  in  view  ;  namely,  the  general 
Moral,  Intellectual,  and  Religious  Progress  of  the 
Nation  ;  for  the  Statesman  probably  conceives  that 
this  Progress  may  be  understood  in  so  comprehensive 
a  sense,  that  the  Progress  made  by  means  of  anyone 
Religion,  may  be  conceived  as  a  part  of  it ;  and  such 
a  Progress  he  expects  to  result,  not  merely  from  the 
education  of  the  young,  but  from  the  attention  be¬ 
stowed,  at  all  times  of  life,  upon  a  subject,  so  wide, 
pure,  and  lofty,  as  Religion  ;  and  from  the  existence 
of  a  Body  of  Clergy,  who  must  be  persons  of  a  Mo¬ 
ral  and  intellectual  culture,  superior  to  the  common 
herd  of  mankind.  These  views  may  induce  the 
Statesman  not  only  to  protect,  but  to  support  the 
Clergy  from  the  national  fund  ;  and  to  support  the 
Clergy  of  several  different  Religions,  which  prevail 
among  the  people  ;  although  he  himself  is  convinced 
that  one  of  these  Religions  is  true,  and  that  all  the 
others  are  false. 

1077.  But  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  very 
serious  inconveniences  in  the  State  thus  confining 
itself  to  the  Protection  of  Religion  ;  and  still  more, 
in  its  Protecting  several  different  coexistent  Religions. 
For  the  State  cannot  do  this,  without  appearing  to  be 
indifferent  to  the  Truth  or  Falsehood  of  Religion; 
and  this  very  Indifference  implied,  will  neutralize 
the  effect  of  the  Protection  bestowed,  and  will  much 
diminish  the  Influence  of  Religion.  For  if  any  Re¬ 
ligion  be  true,  why  should  not  the  State  adopt  it, 
profess  it,  and  act  upon  its  Precepts  ;  since  they  will 
contain  Rules  of  Action  for  States,  as  well  as  for 
Individuals  ?  And  if  several  Religions  be  thus  pro- 


344 


POLTTY. 


[BOOK  V. 


tected,  the  Indifference  to  Truth  and  Falsehood  is 
more  manifest ;  and  the  Government  is  likely  to 
incur  the  suspicion  of  deeming  all  Religions  equally 
false ;  and  thus  the  State  really  teaches,  as  its  espe¬ 
cial  Lesson,  Disbelief  in  all  Religion.  It  is  true, 
that  the  Governors  themselves  may,  by  their  mani¬ 
fest  piety  in  their  own  personal  Religion,  diminish  the 
evil  of  this  lesson,  and  make  it  appear  that  the  Neu¬ 
trality  of  their  Polity  is  a  consequence  of  the  Divi¬ 
sions  of  the  nation,  and  not  of  their  own  want  of  re¬ 
ligious  earnestness.  But  then,  .so  far  as  this  effect  is 
produced,  there  will  be  excited,  in  the  other  Sects,  a 
suspicion  of  a  latent  hostility  on  the  part  of  the 
Government,  and  a  fear  of  having  the  State  Protec¬ 
tion  withdrawn  from  them. 

1078.  There  are  also  other  evils,  arising  from 
the  share  which,  under  this  Polity,  the  Clergy  take 
in  Civil  business.  If  the  Clergy  are  allowed  to 
legalize  the  Marriages  which  they  celebrate,  they 
may,  by  imposing  their  own  Rules,  and  their  own 
conditions  upon  Marriage,  exercise  upon  the  citizens 
a  constraint  which  the  State  strongly  disapproves. 
The  Clergy  of  one  Sect  may  refuse  to  celebrate 
Mixed  Marriages,  that  is,  Marriages  of  their  Mem¬ 
bers  with  those  of  other  Sects  ;  and  thus,  the  freedom 
of  the  Marriage  choice  may  be  much  narrowed,  and 
in  special  cases,  great  unhappiness  produced.  The 
Clergy  may  exercise  great  severity,  at  least  great 
spiritual  severity,  in  cases  of  Conversion  of  persons 
from  one  Sect  to  another ;  may  interfere  in  the  ma¬ 
nagement  and  disposal  of  children  ;  and  the  like. 
Thus,  collision  between  the  State  and  the  Clergy  may 
easily  exist. 

1079.  Education  is  another  matter  of  great 
difficulty,  under  the  Polity  now  spoken  of.  For,  as 
we  have  said,  intellectual,  moral,  and  religious  edu¬ 
cation  are  so  closely  connected,  that  they  cannot  be 
kept  permanently  separate.  If  we  take  the  Higher 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  345 

Degrees  of  Education,  we  find  it  impossible  to  carry 
them  on,  without  teaching  either  religion  or  irreligion. 
In  the  ancient  world,  Philosophy  was,  for  the  most 
part,  the  adversary  of  the  received  religious  belief, 
in  the  Christian  world  the  higher  education  is  resolved 
into  the  three  Faculties,  Theology,  Jurisprudence, 
and  Medicine  :  of  which,  the  first  conducts  our  men¬ 
tal  culture  with  reference  to  Religion  ;  the  second, 
with  reference  to  the  State  and  its  business;  the 
third,  with  reference  to  the  Material  World,  and 
the  properties  of  its  component  parts.  For  Medi¬ 
cine,  in  its  original  and  comprehensive  sense,  as 
one  of  the  great  divisions  of  human  culture,  must  be 
considered  as  taking  in  the  whole  of  physical  science. 
But  a  person  cultivated  to  the  highest  degree  in  a 
knowledge  of  physical  science,  without  any  moral  or 
religious  education,  would  be  rather  a  powerful  intel¬ 
lectual  machine,  than  an  educated  man.  Again ; 
the  most  exact  knowledge  of  the  positive  Laws  of 
States,  if  not  combined  with  some  cultured  judgment 
of  what  laws  ought  to  be,  would  not  fit  a  man  to  be 
a  statesman ;  still  less  would  it  do  justice  to  his  be¬ 
ing,  as  a  man.  And  when  we  come  to  consider  what 
laws  ought  to  be,  we  are  led  to  contemplate  the  Ends 
of  law,  and  of  human  being  ;  which  cannot  be  rightly 
done  without  the  aid  of  Religion.  Thus  Education 
cannot  go  on,  so  as  to  answer  its  purpose,  without 
including  in  it  Religion  as  a  leading  element. 
Plence,  the  Universities,  the  seats  of  the  Highest  Na¬ 
tional  Education,  must  combine  Theology,  or  at  least 
its  regulating  and  elevating  influences,  with  the  rest 
of  their  studies.  If,  in  the  Universities,  the  “  Facul¬ 
ties  ”  are  altogether  disconnected  ;  if  the  Highest 
Education  consist  merely  of  Jurisprudence  and  Phy¬ 
sics,  Theology  being  excluded  ;  this  Education  can¬ 
not  fail  to  have  an  atheistic  tendency  ;  which,  in  the 
course  of  time,  will  produce  a  decided  effect  upon 
practical  morality. 


346 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


1080.  If  on  the  other  hand,  the  Education  of 
each  Sect  is  made  more  complete,  by  including  in  it 
the  Theology  of  the  Sect,  or  its  elevating  influence, 
then  the  Highest  Education  must  be  divided  accord¬ 
ing  to  Sects,  and  each  Sect  must  have  its  University, 
or  at  least,  its  Theological  Professors  in  the  national 
Universities.  In  such  a  state  of  things,  we  may 
suppose  the  influence  of  theological  teaching  to  be 
so  far  combined  with  other  teaching,  as  to  remove 
all  general  tendency  to  atheism.  But  Statesmen, 
who  must  be  formed  by  such  an  education  as  this, 
since  it  is  the  highest  kind  of  Education,  cannot  de¬ 
rive  from  it  an  intellectual  and  moral  progress,  which 
they  may  manifest  in  their  national  acts  ;  except  we 
suppose  that  Statesmen  learn,  from  this  co-existence 
of  theologies,  a  more  comprehensive  religious  philo¬ 
sophy,  which  includes  the  regulating  and  elevating 
tendencies  common  to  all  the  sects ;  and  that  they 
conduct  the  affairs  of  the  State  according  to  this 
philosophy.  But  to  suppose  this,  is  to  suppose  that 
Statesmen  frame  a  Religion  of  their  own,  in  which 
they  reject  the  peculiar  doctrines  of  each  sect,  as 
not  essential  to  their  purpose.  And  in  this  mode  of 
proceeding,  again,  there  appears  to  be  a  tendency  to 
atheism.  For  if  we  reject  all  peculiar  doctrines  of 
Sects,  there  remains  notning  which  we  believe  ;  since 
there  is  no  doctrine  which  is  not  rejected  by  some 
Sect.  Thus  the  Unitarian  rejects  the  Divinity  of 
Jesus  Christ,  the  Jew  rejects  his  Divine  Mission  ;  the 
Saddueee  rejects  a  future  life.  This  tendency  may 
operate  slowly,  especially  if,  at  the  outset  of  such  a 
Polity,  the  various  Sects  have  been  led,  by  an  ex¬ 
perience  of  evils  residing  in  other  courses,  to  accept 
willingly  a  Polity  which  protects  them  all  ;  but  yet 
it  seems  probable  that  the  time  will  come,  when 
either  the  superior  value  of  one  Religion  will  be 
acknowledged,  and  that  form  will  be  accepted  as  the 
national  guide ;  or  those  who  are  formed  by  the 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  347 

Higher  Education  will  be  led,  by  its  tendencies,  to 
reject  successive  doctrines,  till  they  are  left  without 
religious  belief. 

1081.  But  under  this  Polity,  there  are  also 
great  and  especial  difficulties  in  the  Education  of  the 
People  ;  which  must  necessarily  be  one  of  the  main 
objects  of  enlightened  Governors.  For  if  this  Edu¬ 
cation  be  left  to  the  voluntary  exertions  of  the  seve¬ 
ral  Sects,  there  is  no  security,  nor  even  probability, 
that  it  will  extend  to  the  whole  population  ;  or  that 
it  will  grow  with  the  growth  of  the  population. 
Those  indeed  who  are  themselves  religious,  will  cause 
themselves  and  their  children,  and  perhaps  some  of 
their  neighbours,  to  be  religiously  taught ;  but  when 
people  have  become  careless  about  religion,  they 
are,  under  this  Polity,  in  a  condition  without  hope. 
Those  who  have  a  sense  of  religion,  will  perhaps 
maintain  among  them,  by  voluntary  efforts,  Religi¬ 
ous  Teachers  of  their  own  Sect.  But  those  who  have 
no  Religion,  have  also,  for  the  most  part,  no  con¬ 
sciousness  of  their  need  of  Religion  ;  and  will  not 
expend  money  and  trouble,  on  a  matter  for  which 
they  have  no  care.  Hence  the  Voluntary  System 
of  teaching  religion,  both  with  reference  to  adults 
and  to  children,  is  insufficient  for  the  purposes  of  the 
State,  which  cannot  be  content  to  leave  large  bodies 
of  its  population  altogether  uneducated.  And  if  the 
State  stimulate  and  assist  various  Sects  to  carry  on 
the  Education  of  the  People,  beyond  the  bounds  of 
the  voluntary  demand,  there  will  be  great  difficulty 
in  portioning  out  its  assistance  in  a  satisfactory  man¬ 
ner.  Even  if  any  general  maxim  be  adopted,  as, 
that  All  Sects  are  equal  in  the  eye  of  the  State,  the 
application  of  this  maxim  can  hardly  fail  to  produce 
frequent  dissensions  and  complaints.  And  besides, 
this  equal  treatment,  or  simultaneous  support,  of 
several  Religions,  will,  as  we  have  said  above,  seem 
to  imply  an  indifference  to  religious  Truth  and  False- 


POLITY. 


348 


[book  V. 


hood,  which  will  tend  to  diminish  the  popular  re¬ 
spect,  both  for  Religion,  and  for  the  State. 

1082.  If,  in  order  to  avoid  these  evils,  the 
State  leave  the  religious  education  of  children  to  the 
voluntary  efforts  of  Sects ;  but  try  to  provide  for 
all  of  them  a  secular  education,  so  that  they  may 
not  be  entirely  uneducated  ;  we  are  again  led  to  the 
difficulties  of  which  we  have  spoken,  as  necessarily 
resulting  when  we  attempt  to  separate  intellectual, 
and  moral,  from  religious  education.  These  diffi¬ 
culties  belong  to  popular,  no  less  than  to  the  higher 
education.  There  can  be  no  Education  of  the  Peo¬ 
ple,  which  excludes  Religion,  and  the  traditionary 
influence  of  Religion  upon  other  studies.  If  read¬ 
ing  and  writing,  and  history,  and  natural  his¬ 
tory,  and  languages,  and  poetry,  are  commonly  con¬ 
sidered  as  important  parts  of  education;  they  aie 
so  considered,  only  because  these  studies  have  hither¬ 
to  been  pursued  in  a  moral  and  religious  spirit;  so 
that  everything  which  the  pursuit  of  them  brought 
in  the  learner’s-  way,  co-operated  with  the  influence 
of  religion.  If  this  were  to  cease  to  be  the  case  ; 
if  the  attempt  were  made,  to  exclude  implied  morali¬ 
ty  and  religion  from  such  studies  ;  either  the  studies 
would  become  unfit  for  moral  creatures ;  or  moral 
and  religious  implications  would  still  be  found  la¬ 
tently  retained,  and  would  be  matter  of  controversy 
to  rival  Sects.  And  at  the  same  time,  the  National 
Education,  thus  given,  would  be  very  ineffective, 
compared  with  the  Voluntary  Sectarian  Education  ; 
and  therefore  would  not  tend  to  that  National  Spirit 
of  Union,  which  must  be  one  of  the  enlightened 
statesman’s  objects. 

1083.  If  the  Government,  thus  aiming  at  esta¬ 
blishing  a  Secular  Education,  place,  at  the  head  of 
this  Education,  a  Minister  of  State,  or  a  Council  of 
State,  or  a  Secular  University  ;  it  will  be  difficult  to 
avoid  Collisions  between  this  Ministry  of  Education , 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  349 

and  the  Ministry  of  the  Church.  For  the  Ministers 
of  the  Church  cannot  ever  cease  to  look  upon  the 
Education  of  their  flocks,  both  children  and  adults, 
as  a  matter  which  is  of  the  highest  importance  to 
them,  and  in  which  they  ought  to  be  concerned. 
Religion,  at  least,  they  must  teach  to  young  and  old  ; 
and  with  the  teaching  of  Religion,  how  easily  is  all 
other  teaching  combined  !  If  the  Ministers  of  Re¬ 
ligion  are  required  to  abstain  from  teaching  the 
young  altogether,  they  purchase  the  Protection  which 
they  receive,  at  too  dear  a  rate.  They  are  placed  in 
a  condition  of  intolerable  hardship,  and  dire  fear  for 
the  future.  For  how  can  the  rising  generation  fail 
to  grow  up  irreligious,  if  they  do  not  receive  religious 
instruction  ?  It  is  not  probable  that  the  Ministers 
of  Religion  will  accept  pecuniary  maintenance  or 
nominal  protection  from  the  State,  on  condition  of 
their  being  excluded  from  all  share  in  the  education 
of  the  young.  If  the  Government  were  to  make  an 
attempt  to  force  such  conditions  upon  the  Ministers 
of  any  Religion,  the  attempt  must  be  looked  upon  as 
changing  the  Protection  into  Persecution.  Such  a 
course  of  Policy  could  be  justified  only  by  its  being 
known  that  the  Minsters  of  Religion,  thus  dealt  with, 
were  in  the  practice  of  teaching  disobedience  to  the 
Laws,  or  of  upholding  the  Authority  of  a  Rival 
Government. 

1084.  Thus  the  Polity  of  mere  Protection,  as 
the  Relation  of  the  State  to  the  Church,  implies  In¬ 
difference  to  Religious  Truth,  leads  to  Collisions  be¬ 
tween  the  State  and  the  Clergy,  is  inconsistent  with 
the  Pligher  Education  of  Universities,  and  the  gene¬ 
ral  Education  of  the  People  ;  and  if  such  Educa¬ 
tion  be  attempted,  leads  to  Collisions  between  the 
Ministry  of  Public  Education  and  the  Clergy. 

1085.  The  third  form  of  Polity  which  we  have 
to  consider,  is  that  in  which  the  State  recognizes  an 
Established  Church ;  that  is,  a  Church  accepted  as 

VOL.  II.  EE 


350 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


the  Teacher  of  the  True  Religion  ;  and  therefore 
admitted  to  a  Share  in  the  administration  of  the 
country  ;  as  took  place  when  Constantine  established 
the  Christian  Church  in  the  Roman  Empire.  When 
the  Religion  of  the  Church  is  thus  accepted  as  true, 
since  Religion  is  the  best  of  guides  for  human  con¬ 
duct,  and  religious  influences  the  deepest  and  most 
powerful  grounds  of  human  action,  it  is  very  natural 
that  the  Governors  should  not  only  take  the  Church 
for  their  Ally,  but  acknowledge  it  as  their  Supreme 
Ruler;  and  in  this  case  we  have,  not  merely  an 
Established  Church,  but  an  Ecclesiastical  Suprema¬ 
cy  ;  not  merely  Temporal  Power  given  to  the  Church, 
but  Spiritual  Domination  introduced  into  the  State. 
But  this  latter  kind  of  Polity  must  be  considered 
afterwards ;  and,  without  going  to  this  length,  the 
State  may  acknowledge  the  Church  as  the  Teacher 
of  Religious  Truth  ;  and  may,  on  that  account,  as¬ 
sign  to  it  many  Offices,  which  no  Agent  but  such  a 
Teacher  can  discharge,  and  much  Authority,  which 
such  Offices  necessarily  imply. 

1086.  The  first,  and  perhaps  the  greatest  ad¬ 
vantage,  which  naturally  results  from  the  acknow¬ 
ledgment  of  the  Church,  as  the  Teacher-  of  Reli¬ 
gious  Truth,  is,  that,  this  being  done,  the  State  can 
thenceforth  give  a  religious  character  to  all  its  so¬ 
lemn  Acts.  The  Officers  of  the  State,  from  the 
highest  downwards,  can,  as  its  Representatives,  as¬ 
sign  religious,  as  well  as  political  reasons,  as  the 
grounds  of  their  actions.  They  can  speak  with 
reverence  and  earnestness  of  the  views  involved  in 
such  reasons  :  they  can,  in  their  official  capacity,  join 
in  religious  worship ;  and  can  combine  expressions 
of  religious  seriousness,  and  of  the  hope  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  blessing,  with  the  great  occasions  of  State ; 
such  as  the  accession  of  the  highest  magistrates  to 
their  office,  the  business  of  legislation,  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  the  law  ;  and  with  all  their  efforts  towards 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  351 

the  intellectual,  moral,  and  religious  progress  of  the 
nation.  The  State  is  then  a  religious  State.  It  may 
hope  to  receive,  in  its  acts,  that  respect  which  men 
cannot  give  to  anything  short  of  religious  action. 
It  may  hope  for  that  affection,  and  sympathy,  and 
devotion  to  its  ends,  which  men  do  not  bestow  on  any 
Agent,  which  they  regard  as  devoid  of  religious 
principles.  The  members  of  the  Established  Church 
look  upon  the  State  no  longer  with  indifference,  as 
an  Institution  to  which  they  owe  nothing ;  or  with  a 
limited  gratitude,  as  a  return  for  a  limited  Protec¬ 
tion  ;  they  identify  it  with  themselves.  It  acts  for 
them,  not  only  as  being  lovers  of  justice,  or  of  hu¬ 
manity,  but  as  being  lovers  of  Religion,  and  of  that 
deeper  and  purer  and  loftier  morality,  to  which  Re¬ 
ligion  alone  can  effectually  direct  us.  They  look 
upon  the  State,  not  only  as  an  Ordinance  of  man,  to 
which  Religion  enjoins  them  to  submit  themselves, 
but  as  an  Appointment  of  Providence,  for  the  support 
of  the  Truth,  and  the  improvement  of  mankind. 

1087.  The  highest  objects  of  the  Church  and 
of  the  State  being  thus  identified,  it  becomes  possible 
to  make  many  arrangements  in  the  political  structure 
of  the  nation,  which  may  be  at  the  same  time  sub¬ 
servient  to  these  higher  objects,  and  beneficial  instru¬ 
ments  for  the  lower  ones.  The  Church  must  desire 
to  have  Religious  Teachers,  Places  of  Worship, 
Schools,  diffused  over  the  land  ;  so  that  all  persons 
may  receive  the  benefits  of  these  means  of  religious 
education  and  direction.  For  this  purpose,  no  better 
way  can  be  devised  than  that  the  land  shall  be 
divided  into  small  districts,  and  one  or  more  religious 
Teachers  placed  in  each  ;  that  there  shall  be  Par¬ 
ishes,  and  Parish  Congregations,  and  Parish  Min¬ 
isters.  But  these  Parishes  may  also  form  a  highly 
beneficial  organization  of  the  State.  For  all  the 
great  events  of  life,  Birth,  and  Marriage,  and  Death, 
of  which  the  State  must  take  note,  are,  by  the 


352 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


Church,  invested  with  religious  Ordinances.  And 
as  the  Association  of  the  members  of  a  Parish  serves 
for  religious  teaching,  and  for  the  united  action  of 
the  Congregation  when  that  is  necessary ;  it  may 
serve  also  for  the  promulgation  of  laws  and  acts  of 
the  State,  and  for  the  proceedings  of  local  bodies  of 
the  citizens,  when  the  Constitution  requires  such  pro¬ 
ceedings.  And  though,  for  some  purposes,  there 
may  be  little  apparent  advantage  in  the  coincidence 
of  the  political  with  the  ecclesiastical  subdivisions ; 
for  some  purposes  the  benefit  of  such  coincidence  is 
manifest :  as  for  instance,  for  the  relief  of  the  poor. 
For  it  may  be  supposed  that  in  the  case  of  a  duty  so 
strongly  enjoined  by  religion,  as  well  as  required  by 
humane  State  policy,  associations  of  men  will  act 
with  more  mutual  understanding,  sympathy,  and 
charity,  if  they  are  the  same  associations  who  meet 
to  hear  their  religious  duties  inculcated,  and  to  join 
in  acts  of  worship  which  remind  them  that  rich  and 
poor  are  brothers.  And  in  all  the  acts  of  the  mem¬ 
bers  of  a  Parish  as  such,  since  the  guidance  and  ex¬ 
ample  of  their  religious  teacher  may  be  supposed  to 
have  some  influence  over  them,  we  may  expect  more 
kindness,  moderation,  and  thoughtfulness,  than  if 
they  were  not  thus  connected  ;  since  the  Minister, 
educated  for  his  Office,  and  e  ntrusted  with  weighty 
responsibilities  both  by  the  Church  and  the  State,  is 
less  likely  than  other  men  to  act  with  harshness,  pas¬ 
sion,  or  levity. 

1088.  But  the  Parish  Ministers  will,  by  the 
organization  of  the  Church,  be  placed  under  spiritual 
Governors  and  Directors.  In  all  ages  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Church,  they  have  been  under  Bishops.  And 
this  Institution  affords  to  the  State  additional  advan¬ 
tages,  if  the  Bishops,  or  Ecclesiastical  Rulers,  are 
earnest  in  furthering  the  purposes  of  the  State  ;  for 
these  Bishops  or  Rulers  may  control  and  direct  the 
inferior  clergy,  so  as  to  promote  beneficial  civil,  as 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  353 

well  as  religious,  objects.  But  in  order  that  the 
Bishops  may  thus  participate  zealously  in  the  pur¬ 
poses  of  the  State,  they  must  be  connected  with  the 
State,  and  associated  in  the  Government.  They 
must,  for  instance,  possess  places  in  the  Executive  or 
the  Legislative  Councils ;  they  must  have  the  aid  of 
the  civil  power,  in  enforcing  the  sentences  which 
they,  or  others  acting  for  them,  pronounce  as  Eccle¬ 
siastical  Judges  ;  they  must  have  a  maintenance  and 
rank,  suitable  to  the  place  thus  assigned  them  in  the 
business  of  the  State.  The  Parochial  Clergy,  too, 
must  have,  not  only  a  maintenance,  which  may  en¬ 
able  them  to  give  their  time  and  thoughts  to  their  re¬ 
ligious  duties  (including  the  cost  of  a  corresponding 
education)  ;  but  must  also  have  such  other  kinds  of 
right  and  authority,  in  their  Parish,  as  the  good  order 
of  the  Parish  requires  ;  for  instance,  rights  relative 
to  the  Edifice  of  the  Church,  the  Burial-ground,  and 
the  like. 

1089.  The  Established  Churches  in  the  nations 
of  Europe  have  possessed  such  Rights  as  we  here 
speak  of ;  not  as  Rights  granted  at  any  special  time 
by  the  State  ;  but  as  Rights  which  have  grown  up  in 
the  course  of  historical  changes;  just  as  the  Rights 
of  the  other  classes  of  Society,  which  belong  to  the 
Constitution  of  each  country,  have  grown  up.  At 
an  early  period,  the  Clergy  possessed  much  land, 
given  to  them  by  pious  donors  ;  and  the  Tithe,  or 
tenth  part  of  the  annual  produce,  was  assigned  to 
ecclesiastical  uses.  The  Clergy,  thus  invested  with 
property  and  authority,  asserted  their  Rights  as  a 
Class,  in  the  same  manner  as  other  Classes  at  other 
periods  did  ;  they  obtained  the  privilege  of  exercis¬ 
ing  political  power  in  their  assemblies,  and  thus  they 
became  one  of  the  Estates  of  the  Realm.  For  in¬ 
stance,  in  this  country,  they  claimed  the  right  of  tax¬ 
ing  themselves ;  and  in  many  cases,  they  claimed 
an  exemption  from  the  jurisdiction  of  civil  tribunals. 

VOL.  it.  23  ee  2 


354 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


1090.  The  demands  of  the  Spiritual  Estate 
may  be  pushed  so  far,  that  to  concede  them  would 
produce,  not  an  Established  Church,  but  an  Eccle¬ 
siastical  Supremacy.  In  order  to  counteract  this 
tendency,  an  Established  Church  must  be  placed 
under  Royal  Supremacy,  or  in  some  other  way  sub¬ 
jected  to  the  Sovereignty  of  the  State.  The  Sove¬ 
reign,  who  is  the  Head  of  the  State,  must  also  be  the 
Head  of  the  Church,  so  far  as  its  Government  on 
Earth  is  concerned.  He  must  convoke  and  dissolve 
the  Legislative  Assemblies  of  the  Church,  as  of  the 
State.  He  must  be  the  Supreme  Judge  of  Appeals; 
and  must,  in  other  ways,  be  recognized  as  Sovereign. 
In  the  practice  of  States,  it  has  generally  been  as¬ 
sumed  also  that  the  Sovereign  must  have  a  large 
share  of  power  in  the  appointment  of  persons  to  the 
higher  offices  of  the  Church,  as  Bishops :  although 
the  judgment  of  the  Church  is  rather  that  such  ap¬ 
pointments  should  be  by  election  in  the  Church  it¬ 
self.  The  Church,  by  acquiescing  in  the  appoint¬ 
ments  made  by  the  Sovereign,  avoids  conflicts  con¬ 
cerning  the  political  authority  of  the  Bishops,  which 
can  hardly  fail  to  arise,  if  persons  are  placed  in  that 
office  by  an  authority  independent  of  the  State,  and 
therefore  possibly  hostile  to  it.  The  appointment  of 
the  parochial  clergy,  also,  may  be  modified  by  the 
alliance  of  the  Church  with  the  State.  The  Bishop 
alone  can  bestow  upon  any  man  the  sacred  minis¬ 
try  (823)  ;  but  from  among  persons  so  ordained,  the 
choice  of  a  Minister  fpr  any  particular  Parish,  may 
be  in  the  hands  either  of  the  people  themselves,  or  of 
the  lord  of  the  land  (825),  whose  predecessor  proba¬ 
bly  gave  to  the  Church  the  endowment  which  it  there 
holds ;  and  who,  in  that  as  in  many  other  ways,  may 
be  considered  as  summing  up  in  himself  the  Rights 
and  functions  of  the  tenants  of  the  land.  This  lay- 
patronage  is  not  a  desecration  of  the  ministry  (for 
the  sacred  character  is  bestowed  by  the  Church 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  355 

alone)  ;  it  is  rather  a  consecration  of  property  ;  for 
it  invests  the  holder  of  property  with  a  function  in 
the  Christian  Church,  which  ought  to  be  performed 
in  the  spirit  of  religion. 

1091.  But  as  the  State,  for  its  own  purposes, 
associates  the  Church  in  its  Polity,,  this  Association 
makes  it  necessary  to  give  a  certain  character  to  the 
Polity  for  the  sake  of  the  Church.  The  State  ac¬ 
cepts  the  Church  as  the  Teacher  of  Religious  Truth  ; 
and  upon  this  ground,  joins  with  the  Church,  in  Ec¬ 
clesiastical  Legislation,  and  Ecclesiastical  Appoint¬ 
ments.  This  makes  it  necessary  for  the  Church  to 
demand  that  there  shall  be  some  Test  of  religious 
Truth  agreed  upon,  which  may  be  applied  so  as  to 
prevent  such  legislation  and  such  appointments  as 
would  be  hurtful  to  religious  Truth.  If  the  State  is 
to  legislate  for  the  Established  Church,  the  Legisla¬ 
tors  must  be  of  the  Established  Church  ;  or  at  least, 
must  be  friendly  to  it.  If  the  State  is  to  place  per¬ 
sons  in  offices  in  the  Church,  there  must  be  some 
means  of  ascertaining  that  they  are  of  the  Church. 

1092.  The  various  branches  of  the  Christian 
Church  (among  which  the  question  lies,  in  the  cases 
with  which  we  are  here  concerned)  differ  from  each 
other  in  Liturgies  belonging  to  their  Ordinances,  and 
in  the  Articles  in  which  they  have  summed  up  the 
leading  points  of  their  Theology.  And  these  are  the 
Tests  which  must  be  applied  by  the  State,  if  it  will 
have  an  Established  Church.  The  Articles  and  Li¬ 
turgies  must  be  assented  to,  by  all  who  are  to  hold 
Ecclesiastical  offices  ;  and  these  also,  or  at  least 
those  portions  of  them  which  exclude  Sects  hostile  to 
the  Established  Church,  must  be  assented  to  by  Le¬ 
gislators,  and  other  persons  holding  prominent  offices 
in  the  State.  If  this  is  not  done  ;  if  persons  avow¬ 
edly  hostile  to  the  Established  Church  are  placed  in 
weighty  official  situations,  without  any  effective  tie 
to  prevent  their  using  their  official  power  against  the 


356 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Church  ;  the  Ecclesiastical  Polity  of  the  State  no 
longer  consists  of  an  Established  Church  simply  ; 
but  of  an  Established  Church,  along  with  a  provi¬ 
sion  for  disestablishing  it. 

1093.  This  brings  us  to  a  weighty  disadvan¬ 
tage  of  the  Polity  of  an  Eetablished  Church,  which 
it  possesses,  along  with  all  the  great  advantages 
which  we  have  noticed  :  namely,  the  difficulty  of 
dealing  with  Dissenters  from  the  Church.  When 
we  reject  the  System  of  Spiritual  Domination,  the 
very  energy  and  freedom  of  mind  which  are  requi¬ 
site  for  this  purpose,  lead  to  differences  in  the  Doc¬ 
trine  and  Discipline  of  different  Religious  Communi¬ 
ties.  The  aim  and  plan  of  the  Reformation ,  which 
established  the  Church  of  England  was  to  reject, 
both  the  Polity  of  Ecclesiastical  Supremacy,  and  the 
various  doctrinal  Corruptions  and  Errors,  which  the 
Church  of  later  times  taught,  along  with  that  Polity. 
The  Church  of  England  retained  Liturgies,  and  an 
organized  Church  Government  by  Bishops.  But 
other  Reformers,  the  Presbyterians,  rejected  Bishops; 
others,  the  Independents,  rejected  Church  Govern¬ 
ment  ;  and  both,  for  the  most  part,  rejected  Litur¬ 
gies.  These  Sects,  however,  did  not  professedly  dif¬ 
fer  in  essential  points  from  the  ancient  Belief  of  the 
Christian  Church,  and  are  termed  in  England  Ortho¬ 
dox  Dissenters.  Other  Sects  have  arisen,  rejecting 
more  and  more  of  the  ancient  belief. 

1094.  The  Polity  of  an  Established  Church 
puts  no  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  most  complete 
Toleration  of  Dissenters.  They  may  be  freely  al¬ 
lowed,  under  such  a  Polity,  to  worship  according  to 
their  own  rules,  and  to  teach  their  own  opinions  with¬ 
out  restriction,  so  long  as  they  keep  their  teaching 
clear  of  sedition.  But  if  the  State  wish  to  compel 
the  whole  of  the  population  to  be  educated,  then, 
indeed,  the  question  of  Dissent  becomes  a  very  dif¬ 
ficult  one.  For  to  compel  Dissenters  to  have  their 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  357 

children  taught  by  the  teaching  of  the  Established 
Church,  would  be  a  violation  of  toleration  ;  and  to 
accept  the  teaching  of  Dissenters  as  answering  the 
purposes  of  the  State,  equally  with  the  teaching  of 
the  Church,  is  to  repudiate  the  view  of  the  Church 
which  its  Establishment  implies.  To  give  the 
Church  the  means  of  educating  all ;  and  to  leave 
those  who  reject  its  education  to  their  own  teachers; 
appears  to  be  the  nearest  approximation  to  a  Univer¬ 
sal  Education  of  the  People,  which  can  be  made 
under  the  Polity  of  an  Established  Church. 

1095.  With  regard  to  the  political  position  of 
Dissenters,  there  are  also  considerable  difficulties. 
Among  Dissenters  in  England,  are  found  a  great 
number  of  persons  hostile  to  the  Church  of  England, 
and  to  the  Polity  of  an  Established  Church  in  gene¬ 
ral.  The  State,  having  adopted  the  Established 
Church,  cannot  consistently  arm  with  its  power,  those 
who  would  destroy  that  Church.  The  most  simple 
mode  of  avoiding  such  a  danger  is  to  exclude  Dis¬ 
senters  from  all  offices  of  Trust  or  Power,  whether 
general  or  local.  But  the  temper  of  the  English  Con¬ 
stitution,  both  makes  such  exclusions  with  every  pos¬ 
sible  reserve,  and  leaves,  to  the  persons  excluded, 
many  years  of  labouring  to  get  their  exclusion  mi¬ 
tigated  ;  as  Petitions,  public  writing  and  speaking, 
and  the  like.  Hence,  whatever  the  excluding  bound¬ 
ary  is,  it  is  always  a  matter  of  contest  between  the 
Friends  of  the  Church  and  the  Champions  of  the 
Dissenters.  If  the  Dissenters  were  only  a  small  part 
of  the  population,  the  frontier  of  the  Church  might 
be  defended  with  comparative  ease  and  success;  and 
for  this  purpose,  it  was  desirable,  at  the  first,  to  make 
the  terms  of  Commnnion  with  the  Church  as  compre¬ 
hensive  as  possible.  Whether  this  was  done  as  fully 
as  it  might  have  been,  we  need  not  discuss  :  but  the 
barrier  being  once  pitched,  has  become  the  line  of 


POLITV. 


358 


[book  V. 


angry  conflict,  and  probably  could  not  be  shifted  with 
safety. 

1096.  An  Established  Church  is  the  Church 
of  the  Nation  ;  and  must  retain  that  character,  by 
acting  for  the  Nation.  She  must,  as  far  as  possible, 
consider  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  land  as  belonging 
to  her ;  and  must  exclude  none  who  will  allow  them¬ 
selves  to  be  included.  She  ought  especially  to  make 
provision  of  religious  teaching  for  the  rising  genera¬ 
tions  ;  and  her  parochial  system,  if  complete,  and 
made  always  commensurate  with  the  national  do¬ 
main,  and  with  the  population,  enables  her  to  dis¬ 
charge  this  duty,  if  the  State  duly  support  her  in 
doing  so. 

1097.  Not  only  has  an  Established  Church  a 
peculiar  power,  or  rather  the  only  full  power,  of 
educating  an  expanding  population,  if  she  be  supplied 
with  adequate  means  for  doing  this ;  but  the  Idea  of 
an  Established  Church  is  imperfectly  carried  into 
effect,  if  such  means  be  not  provided.  For  the  State 
has  adopted  the  Church,  as  the  teacher  of  Religious 
Truth;  and  is  desirous  of  having  Religious  Truth 
taught  to  all  its  subjects.  The  religious  teaching  of 
the  Established  Church  is  not  by  permission,  or  un¬ 
der  protection  of  the  State,  as  is  that  of  other  Sects : 
it  is  on  the  part  of  the  State.  The  State,  desirous  of 
teaching  Religious  Truth  to  its  growing  population, 
and  having  the  means  of  doing  this  by  the  machinery 
of  the  Established  Church,  is  inconsistent ,  if  it  do  not 
provide  for  an  extension  of  this  machinery  in  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  extension  of  the  population.  The  State 
should  make  the  teaching  of  the  Established  Church 
keep  pace  with  the  advancing  numbers  of  the  nation. 
If  it  do  not  do  this,  it  incurs,  so  far  as  its  neglect 
operates,  the  evils  of  ignorance,  immorality,  disaf¬ 
fection,  and  Religious  Sedition,  which  it  ought  to 
escape  in  adopting  the  Polity  of  an  Established 


CHAP.  XVI. j  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  359 

Church  ;  and  which  it  might  escape,  or  mitigate,  by- 
adopting  that  Polity  more  cordially. 

1G98.  It  is,  of  course,  not  meant  that  such 
education  should  be  forced  upon  the  people ;  but 
that  Education,  according  to  the  Doctrine  of  the 
Established  Church,  should  be  offered  to  all  who  are 
willing  to  receive  it.  Without  some  provision  for 
doing  this,  the  National  Church  is,  as  we  have  said, 
incompletely  established.  The  existence  of  a  large 
Body  of  Dissenters,  by  no  means  diminishes  the  im¬ 
portance  of  making  such  a  provision.  The  State, 
regarding  the  Church  as  the  Teacher  of  Truth,  will 
naturally,  by  means  of  the  Church,  encourage  and 
facilitate  the  passage  of  men  from  Error  to  Truth.  In 
the  eyes  of  the  friends  of  the  Established  Church,  it 
must  be  a  national  benefit,  when  men  are  converted 
from  Dissent  to  the  Church.  Every  Community  of 
Christians  has,  by  its  Christian  Principles,  a  Mis¬ 
sionary  character  (743).  It  must  endeavour  to  ex¬ 
tend  true  Religion  to  those  whom  it  can  reach.  And 
the  State,  if  it  fully  adopts  and  establishes  the  Church, 
must  also  partake  in  this  Missionary  character  ;  and 
must  look  upon  the  Teachers  of  the  Church,  not  only 
as  the  Religious  Ministers  for  those  who  do  belong  to 
it :  but  as  Home  Missionaries  to  those  who  do  not. 

1099.  But  though  the  consistency  of  the  State, 
which  has  adopted  the  Established  Church  as  the 
Teacher  of  the  Truth,  requires  this  ;  it  may  often  be 
difficult  for  the  Government  to  pursue  this  course. 
For  this  adoption  of  the  Established  Church,  which 
we  suppose  to  take  place  on  the  part  of  the  Nation, 
may  have  been  dissented  from  by  a  part  of  the  Na¬ 
tion  ;  as  has  been  the  case  in  England.  And  this 
being  the  case,  any  public  measures  which  are 
requisite,  in  order  to  carry  into  effect  the  complete 
Polity  of  an  Established  Church,  under  the  successive 
circumstances  of  an  empire  growing  in  population 
and  extent,  may  be  thwarted  by  the  imperfect  na- 


360 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


tional  unity  of  sentiment  on  the  subject.  In  the 
English  Constitution,  the  Government  cannot  carry 
into  effect  any  course  of  policy,  without  having  with 
it,  in  a  large  degree,  the  concurrence  of  the  Nation. 
And  the  enemies  of  the  Established  Church,  acting 
through  the  forms  of  the  Constitution,  may  be  power¬ 
ful  enough  to  prevent  the  organization  of  the  Church 
from  growing  and  expanding,  so  as  to  continue  com¬ 
mensurable  with  the  growth  of  the  nation  and  of  the 
empire. 

1100.  The  success  of  such  a  course  of  opposi¬ 
tion  may  be  looked  upon  as,  to  a  certain  extent,  tend¬ 
ing  to  disestablish  the  Church.  If  the  Governors  are 
really  friends  of  and  believers  in  the  Established 
Church,  they  will  oppose  themselves  to  such  a  course 
of  action.  They  will,  of  course,  follow,  with  cordial 
reverence,  the  guidance  of  the  Constitution,  when  it 
forbids  them  to  act  for  the  nation  without  the  assent 
of  the  nation  ;  but  thinking  the  Established  Church 
to  be  no  less  a  blessing  to  the  Country  than  the  Poli¬ 
tical  Constitution  is,  they  will  never,  through  indif¬ 
ference  or  ignorance,  estimate  too  low  or  represent 
too  feebly  that  portion  of  the  National  Sentiment 
which  is  on  the  side  of  the  Established  Church.  The 
Polity  of  an  Established  Church  requires  to  be  ad¬ 
ministered  in  a  different  spirit  frem  the  Polity  of  the 
mere  Protection  of  Religious  Communities.  Every 
State  act  which  is  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  protect¬ 
ing  all  religions  alike,  is  a  step  from  Establishment 
to  mere  Protection.  It  is  not  that,  in  the  Polity  of  an 
Established  Church,  nothing  is  to  be  done  for  Dis¬ 
senters,  by  the  State.  They  may  receive  from  it, 
not  only  full  Protection,  but  even  such  Assistance, 
as  may  make  their  influence  upon  the  population 
more  beneficial  than  it  would  otherwise  be.  But 
such  assistance  is  given  as  an  act  of  Prudence  :  the 
assistance  given  to  the  Established  Church  is  given 
as  an  act  of  Wisdom  •  for  it  is  given  for  the  support 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  361 

of  the  Truth.  The  policy  of  Government  ought  not 
to  consist  entirely  of  acts  of  prudence,  with  no  acts 
of  wisdom.  If  the  Polity  of  an  Established  Church 
is  to  be  upheld,  there  ought  to  be,  corresponding  with 
every  State  act  of  bounty  or  favour  to  Dissenters, 
some  State  act  recognizing  the  Rights,  and  protect¬ 
ing  the  means  of  action,  of  the  Church. 

1101.  It  may  happen  that  the  Governors  of  a 
Country  are  led,  by  their  views  of  religious  Truth 
and  sound  Policy,  to  establish,  in  it,  the  Church  to 
which  belongs  the  smaller  part  of  the  population. 
If  they  find  that  they  and  those  who  are  of  their 
Church,  though  few  in  number,  are,  by  the  posses¬ 
sion  of  property  in  the  country,  and  by  their  social 
and  jural  superiority,  as  well  as  by  their  possession 
of  religious  Truth,  the  natural  and  inevitable  direc¬ 
tors  and  leaders  of  the  country,  it  does  not  appear 
how  they  can  rightly  shrink  from  the  Duty  of  estab¬ 
lishing  and  promoting  true  Religion.  They  must 
consider  themselves  as  the  natural  instructors  of  the 
Country.  They  see  that  they  are  appointed  to  in¬ 
troduce  into  it  Order  and  Law  ;  and  they  may  natu¬ 
rally  think  themselves  appointed  to  introduce  into  it 
true  Religion  also.  They  may  very  properly  trust 
to  the  superiority  of  Truth  over  Falsehood  ;  and  may 
hope  to  see  the  Established  Church  draw  into  its  fold 
the  extraneous  population,  in  proportion  as  civilisa¬ 
tion  and  knowledge  extend  among  them. 

1102.  When  the  Governors  of  a  State  have 
established,  in  any  portion  of  it,  the  Church  of  the 
Minority,  in  the  belief  of  its  being  the  .best  form  of 
Religion  ;  their  Polity  is  very  incomplete,  if  they 
do  not  constantly  aim,  by  education  and  otherwise, 
at  such  an  extension  of  the  Church.  The  neglect 
of  this  Duty  will  bring  its  own  punishment.  For 
instance  :  if  some  rival  sect  obtain  a  lasting  hold 
upon  the  population,  and  convert  the  greater  part  of 
them  into  Dissenters  ;  the  position  of  the  Established 

VOL.  II.  FF 


362 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Church  is  full  of  difficulty  :  for  the  general  discon¬ 
tent  at  the  exclusions  which  the  preservation  of  the 
Established  Church  requires,  and  at  its  imperfect  na¬ 
tionality,  will  grow  with  the  growth  of  the  national 
intelligence  and  activity.  The  difficulty  is  much 
increased  if  the  Dissenters  be  adherents  of  a  Polity 
of  Spiritual  Domination  ;  and  hence,  subject  to  an 
extra-national  Head.  This  circumstance,  however, 
does  not  diminish,  but  rather  increases  the  value  of 
the  Established  Church  in  such  a  Country  ;  as  an 
anchor  both  of  religious  truth,  and  of  national  govern¬ 
ment. 

1103.  A  State  has,  in  some  cases,  different 
Churches  established  in  different  parts  of  its  Empire  ; 
as  the  Anglican  Church  is  established  in  England 
and  the  Presbyterian  Church  is  established  in  Scot¬ 
land.  This  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of 
an  Established  Church,  if  there  be  no  fundamental 
Error  held  by  any  of  such  Churches  ;  for  then,  they 
may  be  considered  by  the  State  as  teaching  the  Truth 
under  different  forms,  and  in  different  ways.  But 
in  cases  in  which  a  State  maintains  a  Religion  which 
it  believes  to  be  false,  its  Polity  is  no  longer  Esta¬ 
blishment,  it  is  mere  Protection. 

1104.  If  it  be  asked,  who  is  to  judge  for  the 
State,  what  is  true  in  Religion,  and  what  is  false  ; 
we  have  already  answered  this  question,  in  speak¬ 
ing  of  the  Moral  Character  of  the  State  (865).  We 
have  there  stated  that  the  Governors  of  the  State, 
who  act  for  it,  also  judge  for  it,  in  the  manner  and 
degree  whioh  the  Constitution  directs.  They  have 
their  own  convictions  of  religious  Truth  ;  and  to 
these  they  must  wish  the  expressions  of  belief,  on 
the  part  of  the  State  to  conform,  but  still,  in  such  a 
manner  that  they  shall  express  belief  on  the  part  of 
the  State,  and  not  merely  the  belief  of  an  individual. 
The  expressions  of  the  belief  of  the  State  must  be 
the  acts  of  a  continued  existence.  For  instance; 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  363 

if  the  Governors  of  the  State,  and  of  the  Established 
Church,  find  that  the  Church  has  fallen  into  grave 
religious  and  political  Errors  ;  as  for  instance,  has 
been  led  to  assert  the  lawfulness  of  false  oaths;  or 
the  authority  of  an  extra-national  Sovereign  :  the 
Governors  may  undertake  a  Reformation  of  the 
Church.  But  they  must,  if  possible,  effect  the  Re¬ 
formation  by  constitutional  means.  The  Articles 
which  are  to  define  the  Belief,  and  the  Rules  which 
are  to  determine  the  Organization,  of  the  Reformed 
Church,  must  be  decreed  by  the  proper  legislative 
Authorities,  in  the  Church,  and  in  the  State.  Hence 
the  Governors  of  the  State  may  often  be  compelled 
to  make  their  public  acts  hang  far  behind  their  pri¬ 
vate  convictions.  The  belief  of  the  nation  may 
change  ;  but  it  cannot  change  all  at  once ;  and  the 
Governors  must  not  make  the  nation  adopt  a  change 
of  belief,  merely  because  they  themselves  have 
changed.  The  Governors,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
make  any  great  change  for  the  nation,  must  put 
themselves  in  the  condition  of  being  able  to  make  it 
with  the  nation. 

1105.  When  Dissent  has  a  hold  upon  any  con¬ 
siderable  portion  of  the  population,  the  struggle  be¬ 
tween  Churchmen  and  Dissenters  will  make  its  way 
into  all  parts  of  the  nation ;  and  will  combine  with 
any  other  political  contests  which  may  be  going  on ; 
for  instance,  with  the  great  and  constant  struggle 
between  the  Conservative  and  the  Movement  Party, 
of  which  we  have  already  spoken  (947).  And  it  is 
a  misfortune  for  the  Established  Church,  that  the 
cause  of  Freedom  and  Self-government,  always 
very  attractive  and  powerful  names,  appears,  to  a 
common  glance,  to  be  the  cause  of  the  Dissenters. 
Dissenters  are  naturally  of  the  Movement  party,  in 
all  measures  in  which  the  Church  is  concerned  ; 
and  these  measures,  even  if  this  be  all,  are  no  small 
part  of  the  Polity  of  the  State.  And  hence,  again, 


364 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


the  Established  Church  has  for  its  opponents,  not  the 
Dissenters  merely,  but  for  the  most  part,  the  whole 
of  the  Movement  party.  This  party,  speaking  gene¬ 
rally,  have  a  constant  disposition  to  destroy  the 
Established  Church ;  to  reduce  the  Ecclesiastical 
Polity  of  the  Nation  to  a  system  of  mere  Protection 
of  Religious  Communities,  and  Equality  of  Religious 
Sects ;  and  thus,  to  throw  away  all  the  advantages 
which  we  have  stated  as  resulting  from  an  Establish¬ 
ed  Church. 

1106.  Besides  the  Duty  of  acting  at  Home  ip, 
a  Missionary  character  towards  the  dissenting  Popu¬ 
lation,  which  Duty,  as  we  have  said  (1098),  belongs 
to  a  State  in  which  there  is  an  Established  Church  ; 
there  is  also  a  Duty  of  carrying  the  National  Church 
into  the  Colonies,  if  there  be  Colonies  belonging  to 
the  State.  For  the  same  conviction  of  what  is  true 
in  Religion,  and  beneficial  in  Polity,  ought  to  direct 
the  Governors  in  the  administration  of  the  Colonies, 
and  of  the  mother  Country.  Yet  in  this,  as  in  other 
cases,  the  previous  History  of  the  Colony  may  some¬ 
times  make  it  necessary  to  establish  or  protect  a  dif¬ 
ferent  Church  from  that  of  the  Mother  Country. 
But  in  proportion  to  the  estrangement  of  the  two 
Churches,  the  benefits  diminish,  which  would  arise 
from  a  National  Sympathy  between  the  two  Coun¬ 
tries,  fostered  by  the  love  of  a  Common  National 
Church. 

1107.  We  have  already  said  that  the  public 
measures  which  are  requisite  to  carry  into  effect  the 
complete  Polity  of  an  Established  Church  may  often 
be  thwarted  by  the  want  of  national  unity  of  senti¬ 
ment  with  regard  to  the  Church.  On  this  account, 
it  may  be  impossible  for  the  Government  to  extend 
the  teaching  of  the  Church  to  the  young  in  general, 
and  to  the  growing  population.  They  may  not  be 
able  to  direct  the  action  of  the  State  by  constitu¬ 
tional  means,  so  that  it  shall  adopt  the  Missionary 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  365 

Character  of  the  Church,  at  Home  and  in  the  Colo¬ 
nies.  Such  exertions  as  this  Character  implies,  re¬ 
quire  the  appropriation  of  large  sums  of  money. 
And  the  existence  of  a  large  Body  of  Dissenters, 
invested  with  considerable  Political  Power,  may  pre¬ 
vent  the  State  from  employing  the  public  treasure 
for  this  purpose.  But  in  proportion  as  the  consistent 
support  of  the  Established  Church  is  thus  omitted 
by  the  State,  it  falls,  as  an  individual  Duty,  upon 
the  friends  of  the  Church.  If  the  Polity  of  an  Esta¬ 
blished  Church  is  imperfectly  carried  out  in  public 
acts,  it  is  the  business  of  its  members,  by  their  pri¬ 
vate  exertions,  to  supply  the  deficiency.  They  are, 
of  course,  fully  persuaded  of  the  immense  benefits 
which  an  Established  Church  confers  upon  the  Coun¬ 
try,  and  of  the  superiority  of  that  Form  of  Eccle¬ 
siastical  Polity  over  the  Polity  of  mere  Protection  ; 
they  are  therefore  impelled,  by  their  love  of  their 
Country,  to  give  to  its  collective  Acts  the  character 
which  a  complete  Established  Church  would  give. 
What  the  State  omits  in  its  public  Acts,  they  can, 
in  many  respects,  supply  by  private  labours  and 
sacrifices,  and  by  voluntary  Associations.  If  the 
State  will  not  act  in  a  Missionary  Character  for  the 
Church,  they  can  form  themselves  into  societies 
which  act  in  a  Missionary  way,  in  behalf  of  Chris¬ 
tian  Truth,  sound  Doctrine  and  Apostolic  Institu¬ 
tions. 

1108.  The  friends  of  the  Church  have  much 
reason  to  feel  the  force  of  this  Duty.  Because  they 
are  convinced  of  the  value,  and  grateful  for  the 
blessings,  of  their  Church,  they  must  be  ready  to 
give,  with  their  own  hands,  that  which  the  State,  if 
all  the  citizens  were  of  their  mind,  would  take  from 
them  and  give  for  them.  They  are  thankful  to 
Providence  for  the  endowments  of  the  Church,  which 
pious  men,  in  former  times,  have  bestowed  upon  it; 
and  through  which  it  has  been,  for  ages,  a  blessing 

ff  2 


366 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


to  the  Nation  ;  they  may  show  their  gratitude,  by 
being  themselves  the  founders  and  benefactors  of 
new  Schools,  new  Parish-Churches,  new  Bishoprics, 
an  Established  Church  in  the  Colonies,  Missions  by 
which  men  shall  be  brought  to  be  Christians,  and 
the  like.  These  are  ways  in  which  Churchmen 
may  make  the  Church  act  more  like  a  National 
Church  than  the  State  can  do,  however  well  disposed. 
Societies  and  Associations  for  such  purposes  may 
be  considered  as  Institutions  supplemental  to  those 
which  exist  in  the  Established  Church  ;  and  indeed 
such  Associations,  when  they  have  taken  root,  may 
be  recognized  by  the  State  as  National  Institutions. 
And  those  Dissenters  who  are  satisfied  with  their 
condition  as  Dissenters,  and  do  not  wish  to  overturn 
the  Established  Church,  may,  by  similar  Societies, 
with  objects  somewhat  differently  defined,  take  a 
share  in  the  National  work  of  diffusing  Religion  at 
home  and  abroad. 

Objections  are  sometimes  urged  against  an  Esta¬ 
blished  Church  on  religious  grounds :  but  these  we 
will  treat  of  in  the  next  Chapter. 

1109.  We  now  proceed  to  consider  a  fourth 
form  of  Polity,  which  we  have  already  spoken  of  as 
Ecclesiastical  Supremacy ,  or  Spiritual  Domination. 
In  this  Polity,  the  Church  has,  here  upon  earth,  a 
Head  to  which  the  Head  of  the  State  is  subordinate. 
The  pretended  Head  of  the  Church  on  earth  claims 
his  Authority  on  religious  grounds ;  and  if,  as  we 
conceive  may  be  shown,  these  grounds  are  utterly 
delusive,  this  is  an  irreligious  usurpation,  whether 
it  be  a  good  or  bad  form  of  Polity.  But  the  former 
question,  that  of  the  religious  authority  of  the  Spiri¬ 
tual  Domination,  will  be  treated  hereafter.  At  pre¬ 
sent  we  consider  the  question  as  a  political  one  ;  and 
we  have  to  point  out  the  advantages  and  disadvan¬ 
tages  of  this  Polity. 

1110.  The  System  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Su- 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  367 

premacy  possesses  many  of  the  advantages  which 
we  have  noted  as  belonging  to  an  Established 
Church  ;  namely,  the  religious  character  which  can 
be  given  to  all  the  solemn  acts  of  the  State  ;  a  love 
of  the  country  combining  pious  with  patriotic  feel¬ 
ings  :  the  parochial  division  of  the  country  with 
ministers  and  schools  in  each  parish  :  the  distribu¬ 
tion  of  these  parishes  into  dioceses,  under  the  eccle¬ 
siastical  rule  of  their  Bishops.  Indeed,  in  some  re¬ 
spects,  the  system  of  Ecclesiastical  Supremacy, 
supposing  it  cordially  adopted  by  the  State,  would 
contribute,  more  powerfully  than  an  Established 
Church,  to  an  orderly  condition  in  the  Nation,  and  a 
moral  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  State.  For  in 
this  case,  the  State-authorities  are  sanctioned  by  the 
Divine  Authority  of  the  Church  ;  and  the  Eccle¬ 
siastical  Power  authoritatively  directs  the  Temporal 
by  the  best  of  lights,  that  of  Christian  Morality. 

1111.  Moreover,  in  this  Polity,  the  visible 
Head  of  the  Church,  whatever  it  be,  the  Pope  or  a 
General  Council  of  Bishops,  will  naturally  have 
authority  to  settle  disputes  among  the  Temporal 
Sovereigns  who  are  sons  of  the  Church  ;  and  thus 
wars  and  national  quarrels  will  be  superseded  by 
the  reign  of  Christian  peace  and  concord. 

1112.  Such  is  the  Ideal  Aspect  of  this  Polity. 
But  when  we  look  at  the  attempts  which  have  been 
made  to  carry  such  a  Polity  into  effect,  we  see  a 
very  different  spectacle.  Probably  a  complete 
System  of  Spiritual  Domination  has  nowhere  existed, 
except  in  cases  where  the  Religious  Teachers  have 
been,  on  temporal  grounds,  the  natural  rulers  of  the 
Laity  ;  for  instance,  when  the  Laity  have  been 
ignorant  and  unorganized  savages,  or  a  feeble  and 
childlike  race.  Whenever  attempts  have  been  made 
to  establish  a  system  of  Spiritual  Domination  in  nations 
of  energetic  character,  already  swayed  by  their 
political  Governors,  these  attempts  have  led  to  fierce 


368 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


conflicts  between  the  Ecclesiastical  and  Civil  Power  ; 
and  the  Ecclesiastical  Supremacy  has  nowhere  been 
completely  established.  The  Sovereigns  of  every 
Nation  in  Europe  have  succeeded  in  possessing 
themselyes,  practically  at  least,  of  the  greater  part  of 
the  temporal  Authority  which  the  Popes,  in  the  day 
of  the  full  manifestation  of  their  system,  claimed  as 
belonged  to  the  Head  of  the  Church  ;  such  as  the 
Appointment  of  Bishops,  the  Control  of  Ecclesiastical 
Revenues,  the  Authority  of  Supreme  Judge,  and  the 
like.  No  Nation  is  completely  subjected  to  the 
Ecclesiastical  Supremacy.  Those  Nations  which 
recognize  the  Pope  as  the  Head  of  the  Church  on 
earth,  have  still,  in  various  degrees,  asserted  the 
Liberties  of  their  own  Church  ;  and  thus  made  it  a 
National  Church. 

1113.  But  yet,  in  the  degree  in  which  Spiritual 
Domination  has  been  exercised,  we  see  how  little  fit 
men  are  to  be  entrusted  with  Authority  of  such  a 
character.  The  Dignitaries  of  the  Church,  thus 
placed  upon  a  footing  of  equal  negociations,  or  rivalry, 
with  Statesmen,  have  by  no  means  carried  into  action 
that  better  Morality  in  which  we  might  expect 
religious  men  to  excel  politicians.  In  their  political 
acts,  they  have  been,  like  other  statesmen,  selfish, 
ambitious,  false,  violent.  Indeed  it  might  seem  as 
if  the  absence  of  superior  control,  which  belongs  to 
unquestioned  Ecclesiastical  Sovereigns,  tended  to 
make  men  rather  bad  than  good.  Some  of  the  most 
flagrantly  wicked  characters  which  history  presents 
to  our  view,  are  the  Church  Dignitaries,  and  especially 
the  Popes,  just  before  the  Protestant  Reformation.  It 
has  been  made  apparent  that  the  notion  of  a  Christian 
world,  governed  in  a  Christian  spirit,  by  an  Ecclesi¬ 
astical  Body,  under  an  Earthly  Plead,  is  one  which, 
from  the  habitual  conduct  of  men,  must  always  be  a 
mere  dream. 

1114.  In  National  Churches,  acknowledging  the 


CHAP.  XVI.]  RELATIONS  OF  CHURCH  AND  STATE.  369 

Papacy,  in  modern  times,  the  influence  of  Religion  has 
been  very  different,  according  as  there  has  been  a  cor¬ 
dial  understanding  between  the  Church  and  State,  or 
not.  Where  such  an  understanding  exists,  as  in  Austria, 
the  Romish  Religion  produces  some  of  the  good  effects 
of  which  we  have  spoken.  She  adds  to  the  reverence 
for  authority,  and  softens  the  exercise  of  unquestioned 
power.  She  there  appears  the  natural  Ally  of  Despot¬ 
ism.  But  the  Romish  Religion  can  assume  a  very 
different  aspect.  Those  who,  in  various  countries  of 
Europe,  looking  upon  themselves  as  Members  of  the 
Church  of  Rome,  are  not  satisfied  with  the  manner  in 
which  the  Church  is  protected  or  established  in  their 
own  State,  are  very  far  from  inculcating  an  unbounded 
submission  to  civil  authorities.  On  the  contrary, 
their  discontent  with  the  State,  and  their  ecclesiastical 

c 

organization,  make  them  the  natural  leaders  of  an 
opposition  to  the  course  which  the  Government 
follows.  In  such  instances,  the  Romish  Religion 
appears  as  the  natural  Ally  of  Democracy. 

1115.  The  Polity,  of  which  the  result  is,  that 
Religion  assumes  one  or  the  other  of  the  characters, 
is  evil.  In  either  case,  Religion  strengthens  the  side 
which  is  already  too  strong.  She  binds  faster  the 
fetters  which  the  Despot  imposes  :  she  tears  off  the 
bands  of  Civil  Society  when  they  are  already  too 
weak.  The  two  great  and  permanent  Parties,  the 
Conservative  and  the  Movement  Party,  so  long  as 
they  have  temporal  interests  to  deal  with,  preserve  a 
sort  of  progressive  equilibrium,  and  tend  towards  that 
mixture  of  Order  and  Freedom,  for  which  the  nation 
is  fitted  :  but  when  Religion  is  thrown  into  one  scale 
or  the  other,  the  balance  is  destroyed,  and  some 
violent  revolution  may  easily  take  place.  The  Zeal 
for  Order,  the  Love  of  Liberty,  are  calm  impulses  of 
themselves,  when  compared  with  the  fire  and  vehe¬ 
mence  which  the  contract  of  Religious  Enthusiasm 
can  communicate  to  them. 
vol.  11.  24 


370 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


1116.  If,  as  we  conceive  may  be  shown,  the 
claim  of  the  Roman  See  to  be  the  visible  Head  of  all 
Christian  Nations,  be  a  false  view  of  the  designs  of 
Providence  ;  it  is  naturally  to  be  expected,  that  the 
attempt  to  carry  this  view  into  practice,  will  distort 
and  disturb  the  political  relations  of  nations.  By  a 
survey  of  the  political  principles  of  action  among 
men,  we  are  led  to  conceive  that  nations  were 
intended  by  Proyidence  to  work  out  their  political 
Constitution  by  a  combined  operation  of  the  Love  of 
Freedom  and  the  Love  of  Order,  in  the  manner  which 
we  have  already  attempted  to  show  (929,  &c.).  The 
influence  of  an  Extra-national  Power,  acting  by  means 
of  Religious  Enthusiasm,  is  a  needless  and  dangerous 
addition  to  these  principles  of  Political  Power. 

1117.  Thus  by  a  survey  of  the  various  forms 
of  the  relation  of  Church  and  State,  we  are  led  to 
believe,  that  if  a  Nation,  in  virtue  of  its  historical 
circumstances,  can  obtain  and  preserve  the  blessing 
of  an  Established  Church,  it  is  in  by  far  the  happiest 
condition  which  the  Nature  of  Man  and  of  Human 
Society  allows.  If,  in  consequence  of  the  unfortunate 
circumstances  of  the  country,  such  an  Establishment 
is,  for  the  time,  impracticable  ;  the  State  may  be 
driven  to  a  mere  Protection  of  Sects,  on  the  one  side  ; 
or  to  a  recognition  of  Ecclesiastical  Supremacy  on  the 
other.  In  the  one  case,  great  detriment  is  inflicted 
upon  the  National  Influence  of  Religion  ;  in  the 
other  case,  the  National  Independency  is  damaged, 
if  the  Supremacy  be  established  ;  and  the  balance 
of  Order  and  Freedom  is  disturbed,  so  long  as  the 
struggle  is  still  going  on. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  religious  falsity  involved 
in  the  assumption  of  a  visible  Head  of  the  Church  on 
Earth  ;  and  of  the  consistency  of  an  Established 
Church  with  religious  truth.  These  religious  views 
of  the  relation  of  Church  and  State,  we  must  very 
briefly  discuss. 


CHAP.  XVII.]  DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


371 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH  AS  TO  ITS  RELATIONS 
TO  THE  STATE. 

1118.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  only  by  availing 
itself  of  the  aid  of  the  Church,  that  the  State  can 
pursue  its  higher  object ;  the  moral,  intellectual,  and 
religious  progress  of  the  nation.  We  have  seen  also, 
that  in  order  to  derive  the  full  advantage  of  this  aid. 
the  State  must  not  only  protect,  but  establish  the 
Church  ;  must  accept  it  as  the  true  Church  ;  must 
secure  to  its  Ministers  a  maintenance,  with  the  means 
of  teaching  and  directing  the  people  ;  must  invest 
them  with  rights  and  authority  of  a  civil  kind  ;  must 
assign  to  their  Bishops,  or  other  Ecclesiastical 
Governors,  a  place  in  the  Government  of  the  State  ; 
and  must  invest  them  with  rank  and  dignity.  The 
State  has  the  strongest  reasons  to  offer  to  the  Church 
wealth  and  power,  in  order  to  obtain  her  co-operation. 

1119.  But  here,  the  question  occurs,  Whether 
the  Church  can  properly  accept  these  offers  ?  The 
Church  must  direct  her  conduct  by  the  commands  of 
Christ  and  his  Apostles,  and  by  the  Spirit  of  their 
teaching.  And  there  are  texts  which  express,  or 
seem  to  imply,  directions  to  the  Christian  Minister, 
not  to  mix  himself  with  the  business  of  the  State. 
His  concern  is  with  men’s  Souls,  not  with  their  bodies 
or  worldly  condition.  Christ  says,  My  kingdom  is 
not  of  this  world.  He  commands  his  disciples,  when 
they  go  forth  to  preach  his  Gospel  (Matth.  x.,  9. 
Mark  vi.,  8.  Luke  ix.,  3),  To  provide  neither 
gold ,  nor  silver ,  nor  brass ,  nor  scrip ,  nor  two  coats. 
He  warns  them  against  taking  authority  upon  them¬ 
selves  (Matth.  xx.,  25.  Mark  x.,  42).  Ye  know 
that  the  princes  of  the  Gentiles  exercise  dominion  over 
them ,  and  they  that  are  great  exercise  authority  upon 


372 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


them ,  hut  it  shall  not  he  so  among  you.  So  Matth. 
xxiii.,  10,  Be  not  ye  called  masters.  And  the  general 
tendency  of  the  teaching  of  Christ  and  of  the  Apostles 
is,  to  inculcate,  both  an  indifference  to  human  riches 
and  possessions,  and  a  humility,  which  shrinks  from 
human  honours  and  political  power.  It  may  there¬ 
fore  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  Christian  temper 
of  the  Church,  to  accept  such  offers  of  maintenance 
and  authority,  as  we  have  shown  reason  for  the  State 
making  to  her. 

1120.  But  we  may  remark,  in  the  first  place,  that 
the  injunctions,  to  disregard  earthly  possessions  and 
earthly  honours,  are  given,  not  to  Christian  ministers 
in  particular,  but  to  Christians  in  general.  We 
have  already  (620)  considered  the  importance  of 
these  warnings  against  covetousness  ;  but  we  have 
shown  (615)  that  these  warnings  do  not  prohibit,  and 
did  not  in  the  first  ages  prevent,  distinction  of  pro¬ 
perty,  and  differences  of  wealth  among  the  Christians. 
Nor  did  they  prevent  property  being  held  in  a 
permanent  form.  The  injunction  to  take  no  thought 
for  the  morrow ,  was  always  understood  of  such 
thought  as  might  interfere  with  religious  care  about 
spiritual  things.  There  is  no  religious  reason  why 
Christians,  and  the  Clergy  as  well  as  the  rest,  should 
not  possess  property  on  which  they  may  depend  for 
their  subsistence  and  power  of  action,  while  they 
devote  their  time  and  labour  to  their  own  spiritual 
progress,  and  to  the  teaching  and  assisting  of  others. 

1121.  That  the  Christian  Teachers  ought  to  be 
supported  by  their  flocks,  was  a  rule  which  prevailed 
from  the  earliest  times  of  the  Church.  St.  Paul  says 
expressly  (1  Cor.  ix.,  14),  The  Lord  hath  ordained  that 
they  which  preach  the  Gospel  shall  live  hy  the  Gospel ; 
and  he  then  quotes  Christ’s  expressions,  used  when  the 
Apostles  were  sent  forth  (Luke  x.,  7),  The  Labourer  is 
worthy  of  his  hire.  He  further  urges,  as  proof  of  the 
reasonableness  of  this  Rule,  both  the  ordinances  of  the 


CHAP.  XVII.]  DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


373 


Mosaic  Law,  and  the  general  practice  of  mankind  ; 
according  to  which,  the  soldier,  the  wine-grower,  the 
grazier,  live  by  their  respective  employments.  This 
he  urges,  entirely  for  the  sake  of  establishing  the 
Rule  ;  for,  as  he  says,  here  and  elsewhere,  he  rejects 
the  benefit  of  it  in  his  own  case  (1  Cor.  ix.,  7  and  15. 
2  Cor.  xi.,  9.  Gal.  vi.,  6.  2  Thess.  iii.,  9.  Acts 

xx.,  33). 

In  the  earliest  times  of  Christianity,  the  Ministers 
received  their  maintenance  from  the  Hospitality  of 
the  Christians,  dispersed  through  all  parts  of  the 
Empire  :  but  when  the  Empire  itself  became  Chris¬ 
tian,  Churches  and  religious  bodies  were  invested 
with  the  right  of  holding  property.  And  it  has  been 
shown  that  such  a  maintenance  of  the  Clergy  in  the 
form  of  permanent  property,  free  from  the  uncertainty 
and  distraction  of  casual  contribution,  is  opposed  to 
no  dictate  of  Religion  :  if  offered  by  the  State,  it  may 
be  accepted  by  the  Church. 

1122.  In  the  next  place,  as  to  the  Dignity  and 
Power  conferred  upon  the  Christian  Clergy,  it  is 
evident  that  the  injunctions  above  referred  to,  con¬ 
taining  warnings  against  ambition  and  rivalry  among 
Christians,  do  not  apply  to  cases  in  which  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Minister  is  requested  by  his  Christian  brethren 
to  exercise  authority  in  worldly  matters,  in  virtue  of 
the  confidence  they  have  in  his  ministerial  character, 
and  in  authority  exercised  according  to  Christian 
principles.  St.  Paul  rebukes  the  Corinthians  (1  Cor. 
vi.,  1),  while  they  were  but  a  small  part  of  the 
Community,  for  going  to  law  before  unbelievers.  If, 
then,  he  had  lived  in  a  Community  altogether  Chris¬ 
tian,  it  may  be  inferred,  that  he  would  have  invested 
Christians  as  such  with  judicial  powers,  in  the  name 
of  the  State.  The  Bishops  and  Presbyters  were 
Judges  and  Legislators  for  Christians  then  ;  why 
should  they  be  less  so  now,  when  all  persons  profess 
Christianity  ?  If  the  State,  on  the  part  of  the  Chris- 

VOL.  i:.  GG 


374 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


tian  Community,  offer,  to  the  Bishops  and  Presbyters, 
such  dignity  and  authority  as  may  make  them 
valuable  helpers  in  the  business  of  the  State,  there 
appears  to  be  no  ground,  nor  valid  excuse,  for  their 
rejecting  the  offer  ;  especially  when  it  also  tends  so 
much  to  forward  that  religious  Duty,  of  bringing  men 
to  the  knowledge  of  Christ,  which  is  the  highest 
object  of  their  lives. 

1123.  With  regard  to  such  passages  as  have 
been  referred  to,  where  Christ  says  that  his  kingdom 
is  not  of  this  world,  and  warns  his  disciples  against 
exercising  authority  ;  it  is  plain,  from  the  context, 
that  these  expressions  were  employed  to  correct 
erroneous  views  of  the  nature  of  his  kingdom,  and  of 
the  office  of  his  Apostles  and  Disciples.  When  he 
told  Pilate  that  his  kingdom  was  not  of  this  world,  it 
was  in  order  to  disclaim  his  being  a  king,  in  that 
sense  of  rivalry  to  the  Roman  imperial  authority 
which  would  have  made  him  criminal  in  Pilate’s 
eyes.  Accordingly,  Pilate,  after  hearing  this  decla- 
ration,  said  (John  xix.,  4),  I  find  no  fault  in  him. 
And  the  other  warning  is  explained  by  the  occasion 
on  which  it  was  given.  When,  on  his  way  to  Jeru¬ 
salem,  the  disciples  had  had  their  worldly  ambition 
enflamed,  by  misunderstanding  what  he  had  said 
(Matth.  xix.,  23),  that  they  should  sit  upon  twelve 
thrones ,  judging  the  twelve  tribes  of  Israel.  By  this 
error,  the  mother  of  James  and  John  had  been  im¬ 
pelled  to  ask  (Matth.  xx.,  21),  that  they  should  sit 
one  on  his  right  hand ,  and  the  other  on  his  left ,  in  his 
kingdom.  And  he  then  uttered  the  injunction  above 
quoted,  in  order  to  quell  these  ambitious  thoughts  : 
adding,  Whosoever  will  be  great  among  you ,  let  him  be 
your  minister  ;  and  whosoever  will  be  chief  among  you, 
let  him  be  your  servant ;  even  as  the  Son  of  man  came 
not  to  be  ministered  unto ,  but  to  minister.  But  this 
injunction  would  not  answer  the  end  thus  pointed  out, 
if  the  Church  were  so  to  apply  it  as  to  permit  her 


CHAP.  XVII.]  DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


375 


Officers  and  Governors  to  minister  only  in  those 
offices  of  the  State,  in  which  their  services  would  be 
least  valuable.  Bishops  and  Presbyters  minister  to 
the  good  of  Society,  more  by  acting  as  Legislators, 
and  as  the  Guides  of  their  Parishes,  in  Civil,  as  well 
as  Religious  good  works,  than  they  would  do  as  sim¬ 
ple  citizens  :  for,  as  we  have  seen,  without  such  a 
union  of  offices,  the  State  cannot  pursue  its  highest 
objects.  If  the  Church  were  thus  to  repulse  the 
Otters  of  Honour  and  Office  made  to  her  by  the 
State,  as  being  a  State  of  Christian  men  who  believe 
that  she  is  the  true  Church,  and  that,  without  true 
Religion,  there  can  be  no  true  benefit  to  man,  or 
any  blessing  from  God  ;  she  would  sin  against  the 
command,  to  do  good  to  all  men,  especially  to  those 
who  are  of  the  household  of  faith.  With  regard  to 
temporal  honours  and  riches,  she  must  know  both  how 
to  he  abased ,  and  how  to  abound  ;  how  to  be  full ,  and 
how  to  suffer  need  (Phil,  iv.,  12).  And  if,  in  the 
course  of  Providence,  she  has  to  labour  in  conjunc¬ 
tion  with  the  State,  for  the  moral  and  religious  ad¬ 
vancement  of  men,  the  duty  of  Christian  humility 
does  not  exclude  official  authority.  Christ  himself, 
while  he  offers  himself  as  an  exemplary  reproof  of 
unmeet  assumption  of  superiority,  was  rightly  called 
Lord  and  Master  (John  xiii.,  13  ;  Matth.  xxiii.,  3). 
And  St.  Paul,  notwithstanding  such  injunctions,  gives 
various  directions  to  the  Churches,  and  to  his  disci¬ 
ples,  Timothy  and  Titus ;  which  imply  that  he  ex¬ 
pected  to  be  obeyed.  And  (2  Cor.  x.,  4,  &c.)  he 
speaks  strongly  of  the  authority,  which  he  might  find 
it  necessary  to  exercise  at  Corinth.  The  weapons  of 
our  warfare  are  not  carnal ,  but  mighty  through  God  to 
the  pulling  down  of  strong  holds.  And  though  I 
should  boast  somewhat  of  our  authority  which  the  Lord 
hath  given  us  for  your  edif  cation,  I  should  not  be 
ashamed.  The  kind  of  authority  which  a  Christian 
Teacher  might  claim,  in  the  earliest  times,  he  may 


POLITY. 


376 


[book  V. 


accept,  when  offered  by  the  State,  on  the  part  of  a 
Christian  community,  in  all  later  times. 

1124.  Thus  the  Church  must  allow  her  Minis¬ 
ters,  and  her  Governors,  to  be  invested  with  authority 
in  the  State,  in  virtue  of  that  very  injunction  to  hu¬ 
mility  which  has  been  quoted :  Whosoever  will  be 
great  among  you ,  let  him  minister.  The  Church,  in 
accepting  this  lot,  is  not  forgetting  the  declaration  of 
Christ,  that  His  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world  ;  but 
fulfilling  the  prophecy,  that  the  kingdoms  of  this 
world  shall  become  the  kingdom  of  God  and  of  his 
Christ. 

1125.  As  the  Church  may  accept  other  situa¬ 
tions  in  the  State,  so  it  would  appear  that  she  cannot 
refuse  the  highest  situation,  that  of  the  Sovereign 

o  J  o 

Power,  if  it  is  really  offered  her  by  the  whole  com¬ 
munity,  acting  through  its  constitutional  Authorities. 
If  any  nation  were,  in  this  manner,  to  offer  their 
allegiance  to  the  Ecclesiastical  Head  of  the  Church, 
and  if  he  were  persuaded  that  he  could  exercise  such 
authority  with  advantage  to  the  community,  it  would 
seem  to  be  a  Christian  Duty  to  accept  the  office. 
But  this  does  not  at  all  disturb  what  has  already  been 
said,  of  the  evils  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Supremacy 
(1113).  Taking  into  account  what  has  been  said 
of  those  evils,  we  should  judge  that  the  nation  who 
thus  sought  for  a  spiritual  domination  to  be  erected 
among  them,  were  much  mistaken,  and  had  made 
little  progress  in  political  wisdom. 

1126.  Nor  does  it  appear  that  we  could  deny 
the  Right  of  a  nation  to  give  their  allegiance,  even  to 
a  foreign  Ecclesiastical  head  ;  and  his  Right,  and  it 
might  probably  be,  Duty,  to  receive  it.  If  any  Na¬ 
tion,  acting  with  a  full  consent,  and  in  constitutional 
ways,  should  declare  the  Bishop  of  Rome  to  be  supe¬ 
rior  in  authority  to  their  temporal  sovereign,  they  do 
no  more  than,  as  a  Nation,  they  have  a  Right  to  do, 
however  unwisely  they  may  act  in  so  doing.  But 


CHAP.  XVII.]  DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


377 


the  case  is  different,  if  the  Sovereign  himself,  a  King 
for  instance,  acknowledges  the  Bishop  of  Rome  his 
superior;  and  thus  makes  him,  the  Pope,  the  Sove¬ 
reign  of  the  kingdom.  For  the  King  cannot  be  sup¬ 
posed  to  have  been  Sovereign  for  such  a  purpose. 
He  was  Sovereign,  in  order  that  he  might  be  Sove¬ 
reign  ;  not  in  order  that  he  might  hand  over  the 
Sovereignty  to  another.  By  doing  so,  he  has  trans¬ 
gressed  the  limits  of  his  legitimate  power,  in  the  most 
decisive  and  flagrant  manner.  By  giving  his  Sove¬ 
reignty  to  another,  he  has  abdicated  his  throne,  and 
made  it  necessary  for  the  other  branches  of  the  Con¬ 
stitution,  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  State. 

1127.  Hence,  the  pretensions  of  the  Pope, 
which  have  in  former  times  been  put  forward  to  a 
sovereignty  over  kingdoms,  in  virtue  of  cessions  of 
the  kingdoms  made  to  him  by  the  kings,  are  contrary 
to  the  moral  principles  of  Polity.  They  are  as  un¬ 
founded  as  the  claim  which  a  King  of  France  might 
make  to  England,  on  the  ground  of  having  had  the 
island'  ceded  to  him  by  a  former  King  of  England. 

1128.  But  the  Ecclesiastical  Supremacy  of 
the  Pope  over  the  Kingdoms  and  States  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  world,  has  been  asserted  also  on  other  grounds ; 
not  in  virtue  of  their  having  been  ceded  to  him  by 
former  Temporal  Sovereigns,  but  in  virtue  of  a  Di¬ 
vine  Right  to  this  Sovereignty.  It  is  asserted  that  it 
is  the  Duty  of  all  Christian  Nations  to  acknowledge 
the  Bishop  of  Rome  as  their  Ecclesiastical  Head. 

The  Supremacy,  or  Primacy,  which  has  been 
claimed  for  the  Bishop  of  Rome  has  been  grounded 
on  this  argument ;  First :  To  St.  Peter  was  given  by 
Christ  a  Primacy,  or  supremacy  of  official  dignity 
and  power  in  the  Church,  beyond  the  other  Apostles  : 
Second  ;  this  Primacy  was  an  Office  designed  to  be 
permanent  in  the  Church:  Third;  the  Bishop  of 
Rome  is  St.  Peter’s  Successor  in  this  Office. 

1129.  But  every  step  of  this  argument  fails. 

gg  2 


378 


POLITY. 


[book  Y. 


We  do  not  find  in  the  New  Testament  any  Primacy 
ascribed  to  St.  Peter.  Christ  gave  his  promises  of 
future  guidance  and  help,  alike  to  all  the  Apostles. 
The  power  of  the  keys  which  was  given  to  St.  Peter 
(Matth.  xvi.,  19),  was  given  to  the  other  Apostles 
also  (Matth.  xviii.,  18).  The  declaration  (Matth. 
xvi.,  18),  Thou  art  Peter ,  and  upon  this  rock  I  will 
build  my  church  ;  and  the  gates  of  hell  shall  not  pre¬ 
vail  against  it  ;  cannot  be  understood  as  if  Christ’s 
indestructible  church  were  to  be  built  upon  one  par¬ 
ticular  person  different  from  himself:  the  rock  is  the 
previous  declaration  (verse  16),  Thou  art  the  Christ , 
the  Son  of  the  living  God.  Even  many  of  those 
among  the  ancient  Christian  writers  who  apply  to 
St.  Peter  especially  the  terms,  Thou  art  the  rock ,  and 
I  will  give  unto  thee  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of  hea¬ 
ven ,  interpret  it  of  St.  Peter’s  opening  the  preaching 
of  Christ  after  the  resurrection  (Acts  ii.,  22),  and  ex¬ 
tending  his  preaching  to  the  Gentiles.  The  narra¬ 
tive  (Matth.  xx.,  25  ;  Mark  x.,  42)  gives  an  account 
of  the  earnest  warning  which  Christ  gave  to  the 
Apostles,  when  two  of  them,  John  and  James,  sought 
a  superiority  over  the  rest.  In  the  history  of  the 
Apostles,  we  find  no  primacy  ascribed  to  Peter.  St. 
James,  not  St.  Peter,  spoke  in  the  name  of  the  assem¬ 
bled  Apostles  at  Jerusalem.  St.  Paul  withstood  Pe¬ 
ter  at  Antioch,  and  declares  that  he  was  to  be  blamed 
(Gal.  ii.,  11).  And  in  his  enumeration  of  the  offices 
in  the  church,  he  says  (1  Cor.  xii.,  28),  God  hath  set , 
frst ,  Apostles ,  not,  first,  St.  Peter. 

There  is  another  passage,  by  which  the  claim  of 
St.  Peter’s  primacy  is  sometimes  supported  ;  namely, 
when  Christ  says  to  him  (John  xxi.,  13),  Simon ,  son 
of  Jonas ,  lovest  thou  me? ....Feed  my  lambs...  feed  my 
sheep.  But  here,  evidently,  Jesus  Christ  is  not  con¬ 
ferring  a  power  upon  Peter,  but  giving  an  admoni¬ 
tion.  St.  Peter  himself  uses  the  expression  in  the 
same  way  (1  Pet.  v.,  2),  Feed  ihefiock  of  God  which 


CHAP.  XVII. J  DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


379 


is  among  you.  He  also,  in  the  same  place,  implies  a 
condemnation  of  assumed  superiority  :  Not  as  being 
lords  over  God’s  heritage. 

1130.  The  second  assertion,  that  the  primacy 
given  to  St.  Peter  was  intended  to  continue  in  the 
Church  in  after  ages,  is  generally  supported  by 
urging  that  such  a  primacy  is  necessary  to  preserve 
the  Unity  of  doctrine  and  discipline  in  the  Church. 
But  we  must  reject  altogether  the  arguments  of  a 
disputant  who  imagines  to  himself  a  constitution  of 
the  Christian  Church  which  he  conceives  to  be 
necessary  to  its  completeness  ;  and  on  this  ground 
asserts  that  such  a  constitution  has  always  existed. 
We  cannot  assert  anything  to  be  necessary  to  the 
constitution  of  the  Christian  Church  which  Christ 
and  his  Apostles  have  not  declared  to  be  necessary. 
Nor  does  it  appear  that  the  primacy  of  the  Bishop  of 
Rome  is  fitted  to  secure,  or  has  secured,  the  unity  of 
doctrine  and  discipline  in  the  Christian  Church. 

1131.  The  third  assertion  ;  that  the  Bishop  of 
Rome  is  the  successor  of  St.  Peter  in  the  office  of 
Head  of  the  Church  ;  is  contrary  to  the  early  history 
of  the  Church.  The  Bishop  of  Rome  was  always 
recognized  as  the  successor  of  St.  Peter  in  his 
bishoprick.  But  the  claim  of  a  legislative  and  judi¬ 
cial  power  over  other  bishops  and  their  sees,  was 
never  allowed  till  a  much  later  period  ;  and  was 
never  generally  allowed,  even  in  those  churches 
which  agreed  in  doctrine  with  the  Church  of  Rome. 
The  Gallican  Church,  for  instance,  always  strenu¬ 
ously  denied  the  absolute  authority  of  the  Bishop  of 
Rome  as  Head  of  the  Church. 

1132.  It  is  very  natural  for  Christians  to  desire 
to  see  on  earth  a  visible  and  organized  embodiment 
of  the  Universal  Church  of  Christ ; — that  Body  of 
Believers,  united  to  Christ  as  their  Head,  to  which 
are  promised,  as  we  have  said  (590),  unity,  perpe¬ 
tual  existence,  and  the  possession  of  Religious  Truth 


380 


POLITY. 


[book  V. 


through  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit :  to  which 
also  is  committed  the  office  (743)  of  constantly  la¬ 
bouring  to  make  all  men  truly  Christians.  And  the 
defenders  of  the  Romish  Church  represent  their 
Church  as  this  Universal  Church  ;  having  the  Pope, 
guided  on  some  occasions  by  a  General  Council  of 
Bishops,  for  its  earthly  Head ;  and  having  Ecclesi¬ 
astical  Governors  and  Ministers,  of  various  degrees 
and  offices,  acting  in  a  regular  subordination,  in  every 
Christian  Country.  But  the  experience  of  all  his¬ 
tory  shows  that,  as  we  have  already  said,  men  are 
not  sufficiently  pure  and  spiritual  to  be  intrusted 
with  a  Supernatural  Authority.  The  Papacy,  at  an 
early  period,  usurped  temporal  power :  and  ever 
since,  there  has  been  a  struggle  between  the  Eccle¬ 
siastical  and  the  Political  Authority,  in  every  country 
into  which  the  Romish  Church  has  found  admission. 
The  struggle  has,  in  different  ages,  turned  upon  va¬ 
rious  points,  and  been  carried  on  by  various  means  ; 
but  it  has  never  ceased.  The  Pope  has  claimed  and 
exercised,  at  various  times,  the  Right  of  Deposing 
Sovereigns,  of  absolving  Subjects  from  their  Allegi¬ 
ance,  of  excluding  whole  Nations  from  a  participa¬ 
tion  in  the  Ordinances  and  privileges  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Church,  of  sole  Jurisdiction  over  all  ecclesias¬ 
tical  persons,  and  the  like.  Such  claims,  if  allowed 
by  States,  would  render  the  whole  population  of 
Christendom  subjects  of  the  Pope,  in  temporal  as 
well  as  spiritual  matters.  By  the  very  Idea  of  the 
Catholic  Church,  these  claims,  if  they  were  ever 
Rights  of  the  Church,  must  be  so  still ;  and  may  be 
revived,  if  a  favourable  occasion  should  ever  arrive. 
But  in  more  recent  times,  the  struggle  between  the 
Papacy  and  the  National  Government  has  turned 
upon  other  matters,  as  the  appointment  of  Bishops, 
and  their  power  in  the  State ;  but  especially  upon 
the  question  of  Education  :  for  this  is  a  matter  in 
which,  as  we  have  said,  if  the  Church  be  protected 


CHAP.  XVII.] 


DUTY  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


381 


only,  there  must  be  a  struggle  between  the  Church 
and  the  Ministry  of  Education  (1083).  The  Ro¬ 
mish  Church,  wherever  it  is  protected,  must,  by  its 
principles,  seek  to  rule  or  guide  the  State.  It  is  the 
necessary  and  perpetual  rival  of  the  National  Gov¬ 
ernment.  It  does  not  appear  that  any  position  of 
equilibrium  can  be  found,  in  which  the  Romish 
Church  and  the  National  Government  are  balanced. 
It  does  not  appear  that  the  Rights  of  the  National 
Church,  considered  as  a  branch  of  the  Roman  Ca¬ 
tholic  Church,  can  ever  be  so  defined  as  to  produce  a 
tolerable  measure  of  tranquillity.  The  whole  his¬ 
tory  of  Europe,  especially  from  the  time  of  Pope 
Gregory  the  Seventh,  is,  for  the  most  part,  the  history 
of  the  War  between  the  States  of  Europe  and  the 
Papacy.  In  England  this  war  never  ceased  to  agi¬ 
tate  and  torment  the  land,  till  the  time  of  the  Refor¬ 
mation.  Perhaps  in  Countries  where  the  Govern¬ 
ment  is  despotic,  there  may  be  a  treaty  of  alliance 
between  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  the  Despo¬ 
tic  State,  by  which,  expressed  or  understood,  the  sub¬ 
jects  may  be  retained  in  tranquillity  ;  but  this  must 
be  a  tranquillity  which  excludes  all  Political  Free¬ 
dom  and  all  Moral  and  Religious  Progress.  Where 
there  is  a  movement  party,  as  we  have  said,  its  dan¬ 
gers  and  evils  are  greatly  augmented  by  its  combi¬ 
nation  with  a  Romish  Pajrty  in  the  same  Country 
(1114). 

1133.  The  experience  and  apprehension  of  the 
national  evils  belonging  to  the  Romish  System  of  Ec¬ 
clesiastical  Polity,  joined  with  a  conviction  of  its  re¬ 
ligious  errors,  led  many  nations  in  Europe  to  cast  off 
its  yoke,  and  to  establish  National  Churches.  These 
National  Churches  are  members  of  the  Universal 
Church  of  Christ ;  but,  for  the  most  part,  they  have 
no  established  extra-national  relations  and  ties  ;  ex¬ 
cept  so  far  as  religious  sympathy  may  be  deemed  to 
be  such.  They  have  no  extra-national  earthly 


382 


POLITY. 


[BOOK  V. 


Head  ;  if  they  have  a  visible  Head,  it  is  the  Head 
of  the  Nation:  the  Sovereign.  For  since  the  Reli¬ 
gious  cannot  be  made  superior  to  the  Political  Au¬ 
thority,  the  Political  Authority  must  be  superior  to 
the  Religious,  in  matters  in  which  the  Ultimate  Au¬ 
thority  comes  into  play.  In  such  National  Establish¬ 
ed  Churches,  the  Ecclesiastical  Authorities,  as  they 
are  upheld  by  the  State,  derive  their  Authority  in 
some  measure  from  the  State  ;  this  derivation  not  in¬ 
terfering  with  the  Spiritual  Authority  which  they 
have  as  ministers  of  the  Church  of  Christ ;  and 
which  they  derive  from  Christ’s  Commission  (821), 
through  the  channel  of  the  Spiritual  Authorities  of 
the  Church. 

1134.  A  National  Church  affords  a  position  of 
equilibrium  for  the  Relations  of  Church  and  State, 
in  proportion  as  it  is  fully  and  completely  establish¬ 
ed.  If  the  Polity  of  an  Established  Church  be  im¬ 
perfectly  carried  out,  then  there  arise,  as  we  have 
said  (1100  and  1102),  great  difficulties ;  especially 
on  the  question  of  Education.  These  difficulties 
may  draw  the  Polity  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  Polity 
of  mere  Protection  of  the  Church.  But  this  latter 
Polity,  as  we  have  already  said,  has  its  own  difficul¬ 
ties  and  evils,  which  are  far  greater  than  those  of  an 
Established  Church. 

1135.  By  the  views  which  we  have  explained 
in  the  present  and  the  preceding  Chapter,  we  are  led 
to  the  conviction  that  the  Polity  of  an  Established 
Church  is  the  intermediate  position  of  national  safety, 
national  morality,  and  national  progress,  between  the 
system  of  an  equal  Protection  of  religious  truth  and 
falsehood,  which  can  never  satisfy  a  religious  nation  ; 
and  the  System  of  Spiritual  Domination,  which  is 
inconsistent  with  national  tranquillity  and  freedom. 


BOOK  VI. 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 

BIGHTS  AND  OBLIGATIONS  BETWEEN 

STATES. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW. 

113G.  We  have  already  spoken  of  States  as 
Moral  Agents,  and  have  treated  of  their  Rights, 
their  Obligations,  and  their  Duties.  We  have  hith¬ 
erto  spoken  of  these,  only  so  far  as  they  belong  to 
the  relation  between  each  State  and  its  own  mem¬ 
bers.  But  States  have  also  relations  towards  each 
other.  States  are  Nations,  acting  through  an  orga¬ 
nized  Government;  and  Nations,  as  well  as  Indi¬ 
viduals,  may  commit  acts  of  violence,  make  agree¬ 
ments  of  mutual  advantage,  possess  property  with 
its  appendages,  and  the  like.  Jn  such  actions,  there 
must  be  a  difference  of  right  and  wrong  :  Morality 
must  apply  to  the  dealings  of  Nations  with  each 
other  ;  and  before  quitting  the  subject,  we  shall  treat 
briefly  of  that  branch  of  Morality. 

1137.  In  the  Morality  of  Nations,  as  of  indi¬ 
viduals,  Duties  must  depend  upon  Rights  and  Obli¬ 
gations  ;  and  Rights  and  Obligations  cannot  exist 
without  being  defined. 


384 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


The  Rights  and  Obligations  of  individuals  are  de- 
fined  by  actual  existing  Laws  :  they  have  their 
form  and  limits,  in  each  State,  given  them  by  the 
National  Law  ;  but  their  general  conditions  are  the 
subject  of  an  especial  branch  of  Morality  which  we 
have  termed  Jus .  The  Rights  and  Obligations  of 
Nations  must  also  be  defined  by  actually  existing 
Laws.  The  body  of  Law  which  gives  them  their 
form  and  limits  is  International  Law.  But,  inas¬ 
much  as  there  exists  no  single  definite  seat  of  au¬ 
thority,  from  which  such  International  Law  can  be 
promulgated,  in  the  way  in  which  the  National  Law 
is  promulgated  by  the  National  Government;  the 
Rights  and  Obligations  of  Nations  are  determined,  in 
a  great  degree,  by  a  consideration  of  their  general 
conditions;  that  is,  by  International  Jus.  And 
hence,  we  give  to  this  part  of  our  subject,  rather 
the  latter  name,  implying  a  Doctrine  of  International 
Rights  and  Obligations  according  to  their  nature, 
than  the  more  usual  name,  of  International  Law , 
which  appears  to  imply  a  Code  of  such  Law,  already 
established  by  adequate  authority. 

1138.  But  it  may  be  asked  ;  If  no  Code  of 
International  Law  exists,  how  can  International 
Rights  and  Obligations  exist  ?  and  how  can  the  Mo¬ 
rality  which  assumes  their  existence  be  real  1  since 
we  have  already  shown  that  Rights  cannot  ac¬ 
tually  exist  without  being  defined,  and  cannot  be  de¬ 
fined  except  by  Law.  To  this  we  reply,  that  though 
there  is  no  Code  of  International  Law,  promulgated 
by  any  single  Authority,  there  are  many  Rules, 
Maxims,  and  Principles,  which  have  been,  at  various 
times  and  on  various  occasions,  delivered  by  various 
authorities;  and  which,  being  accepted  and  sanc¬ 
tioned  by  the  assent  of  Nations  in  general,  do  com¬ 
pose,  in  some  degree,  a  body  of  International  Law. 
It  may  be  added,  that  in  so  far  as  this  body  of  Law 
is  loose  and  imperfect,  Rights  and  Obligations  are 


CHAP.  I.] 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW. 


385 


also  loose  and  imperfect,  and  the  grounds  of  Inter¬ 
national  Morality  shake  under  us.  It  may  be  added 
further,  that  the  body  of  International  Law,  in  the 
course  of  the  jural  and  moral  progress  of  Nations, 
constantly  becomes  more  and  more  exact,  more  and 
more  complete  :  and  that,  along  with  this  improve¬ 
ment  and  extension  of  International  Law,  Interna¬ 
tional  Morality  becomes  more  and  more  firm  in  its 
basis.  Nations  have  the  power  of  pushing  onwards 
their  moral  and  intellectual  progress  in  this  direc¬ 
tion,  no  less  than  in  others. 

1139.  International  Law  is  sometimes  called 
The  Law  of  Nations :  meaning,  by  this  phrase,  the 
Law  between  Nations.  But  this  phrase  may  create 
confusion,  from  its  resemblance  to  the  phrase  Jus 
Gentium ,  which  is  used  by  the  Roman  Lawyers,  to 
denote,  not  International  Law,  but  Positive  or  Insti¬ 
tuted  Law,  so  far  as  it  is  common  to  all  Nations. 
When  the  Romans  spoke  of  International  Law,  they 
termed  it  Jus  Feciale,  the  Law  of  Heralds,  or  Inter¬ 
national  Envoys. 

1140.  The  Jus  Gentium ,  the  Instituted  Law 
common  to  all  Nations,  is  sometimes  put  in  opposi¬ 
tion  to  Jus  Naturce ,  the  Law  of  Nature,  a  Law  which 
it  was  conceived  might  be  deduced  from  necessary 
Principles.  Thus  Grotius*  asserts  that  jure  naturce , 
subjects  are  not  bound  by,  nor  responsible  for,  the 
acts  of  the  Sovereign,  but  that  jure  gentium,  they  are. 
But  from  what  has  been  said  already,  we  see  that 
this  distinction  cannot  be  maintained.  For,  as  we 
have  said,  no  Jus ,  no  doctrine  concerning  Rights  and 
Obligations,  can  exist  without  Definitions  of  Rights 
and  Obligations  ;  and  such  definitions  must  be  given 
by  historical  fact,  and  not,  by  mere  reasoning  from 
ideas,  as  the  conception  of  a  Jus  Naturce  assumes. 
And  as  this  general  reasoning  shows  that  there  can 

*  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads ,  m.,  2.,  1. 

VOL.  IT.  25  HH 


386 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


be  no  force  in  distinctions  like  the  one  just  quoted, 
so  we  can  easily  show  the  distinction  is  untenable  in 
the  special  instance.  The  reason  which  Grotius  as¬ 
signs  for  the  distinction  is  this  :  Mero  nuturce  jure,  ex 
facto  alieno  nemo  tenetur  nisi  qui  bonorum  successor 
sit  :  “  By  the  law  of  nature,  no  man  is  bound  by 
another’s  act,  except  he  have  the  succession  to  his 
goods.”  To  this  argument  we  reply,  that  children 
are  bound  by  the  acts  of  a  parent,  not  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  any  special  expectation  of  succeeding  to 
his  goods,  but  in  virtue  of  the  general  tie  of  the  Fa¬ 
mily  ;  and  that  subjects  are,  in  like  manner,  bound 
by  the  acts  of  the  Sovereign,  in  virtue  of  the  gene¬ 
ral  tie  of  the  State.  The  State  is  a  bond  which 
unites  men  Jure  Naturce,  in  the  same  sense  in  which 
the  Family  does.  Man,  considered  as  a  moral  agent, 
can  no  more  divest  himself  of  the  bonds  of  social, 
than  of  domestic  society.  The  assumption  of  a  State 
of  Nature  in  which  family  ties,  and  their  bearing,  on 
property,  exist,  while  political  ties  do  not  exist,  is  al- 
togethei  arbitrary.  We  see  this  arbitrary  character 
strongly  marked  in  the  argument  of  Grotius.  To  say 
that,  by  the  Law  of  Nature,  the  succession  of  chil¬ 
dren  to  the  goods  of  the  parent  is  recognized,  but  the 
authority  of  the  sovereign  is  not  recognized,  is  to  as¬ 
sume  a  Law  of  Nature  at  variance  with  the  most 
general  Laws  of  Nations:  for  all  Nations  have  in- 
forced  the  latter  Rule,  but  many  have  rejected,  or 
limited  and  modified  the  former. 

1141.  But  though  we  are  thus  led  to  reject  the 
Jus  Naturce,  as  a  source  of  Rights  separate  from, 
and  opposed  to,  the  Jus  Gentium  ;  we  are  not  to  lose 
sight  of  the  truths  which  Jurists  have  endeavoured 
to  express  by  this  separation  and  opposition.  And 
these  truths  are  of  two  classes.  In  some  of  the  con¬ 
trasts  of  this  kind,  the  Law  of  Nations  stands  above 
the  Law  of  Nature,  as  being  a  source  of  more  full 
and  definite  Rights.  Such  is  the  case  in  the  instance 


CHAP.  I.] 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW. 


387 


just  noticed :  for  there,  the  bond  that  unites  the  So¬ 
vereign  and  the  Subject  is  spoken  of  as  something 
added,  by  the  Law  of  Nations,  to  Rights  and  Obli¬ 
gations  which  man  has  by  the  Law  of  Nature.  And 
the  truth  here  involved  is,  that  however  imperfect 
political  Society  may  be,  we  can  conceive  man  to  ex¬ 
ist  in  a  State  in  which  political  ties  are  still  weaker, 
and  yet  not  quite  to  lose  his  moral  nature.  If,  hy¬ 
pothetically,  we  take  away  the  mutual  relations  of 
the  State  and  its  subjects,  we  can  still  conceive  the 
relations  of  Family  to  remain  ;  and  even  Property  to 
exist :  although,  in  truth,  on  this  hypothesis,  Pro¬ 
perty  can  exist  only,  in  so  far  as  the  Family  takes 
the  place  of  the  State. 

1142.  But  in  another  class  of  such  contrasts, 
the  Law  of  Nature  stands  above  the  Law  of  Na¬ 
tions ;  as  being  a  source  of  a  higher  morality  than 
may  be  exemplified  by  any  given  rude  state  of  Law. 
Thus  we  may  say,  that,  among  the  ancients,  by  the 
Law  of  Nations,  the  inhabitants  of  a  conquered 
country  became  slaves :  but  that  there  is  a  Law  of 
Nature,  the  bond  of  a  common  humanity,  which  ab¬ 
rogates  this  cruel  Law.  And  the  general  truth 
involved  in  such  assertions  is,  that  the  Law  of  Na¬ 
tions,  whatever,  at  any  particular  time,  it  may  be, 
may  always  be  made  more  just  and  humane  ;  and 
ought  to  be  made  more  just  and  humane,  in  order 
to  correspond  to  man’s  moral  nature.  As  in  the 
former  contrast,  it  was  implied,  that  the  Law  of  Na¬ 
tions  is  never  so  bad  as  to  divest  man  of  his  moral 
nature ;  so  here  it  is  implied,  that  the  Law  of  Na¬ 
tions  is  never  so  good  as  fully  to  satisfy  man’s  moral 
nature. 

1143.  The  Law  of  Nations,  including,  in  this, 
International  Law,  is  subject  to  the  conditions  of 
which  we  have  already  spoken  as  belonging  to  the 
Law  of  any  one  Nation.  It  is  capable  (457)  of 
Progressive  Standards  :  it  is  fixed  for  a  given  time, 


388 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


and  obligatory  while  it  is  fixed  :  but  it  must  acknow¬ 
ledge  the  Authority  of  Morality  (461),  and  must,  in 
order  to  conform  to  the  moral  nature  of  man,  be¬ 
come  constantly  more  and  more  moral.  The  pro¬ 
gress  of  International  Law  in  this  respect,  is  more 
slow  and  irregular  than  that  of  a  well-guided  Na¬ 
tional  Law ;  and  this  circumstance,  as  well  as  the 
feebler  and  more  mixed  character  of  the  authority 
of  International  Law,  may  sometimes  make  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  Moral  principles  more  obscure  in  this 
than  in  other  departments  of  Morality.  Yet  a  brief 
survey  of  International  Jus,  in  the  form  in  which  it 
is  presented  by  some  of  the  most  generally  esteemed 
writers  on  the  subject,  will  show  that  it  is,  in  fact, 
an  important  part  of  Morality,  and  depends  mainly 
upon  the  Principles  which  we  have  already  esta¬ 
blished. 

1144.  We  have  said  that  International  Law, 
in  its  rudest  form,  involves  a  recognition  of  the  moral 
nature  of  man.  To  illustrate  this,  we  may  remark, 
that  in  the  rudest  form  of  International  Law,  we 
have  a  distinction  of  the  states  of  War  and  Peace. 
This  distinction  implies  a  limitation,  by  common  un¬ 
derstanding  or  agreement,  of  the  state  of  universal 
war  of  every  man  against  every  man,  which  we 
must  conceive  to  prevail,  if  we  consider  man  as  a 
creature  impelled  merely  by  desire  and  anger. 
Among  animals,  we  have,  properly  speaking,  neither 
war  nor  peace.  Some  live  together  harmlessly, 
some  are  in  constant  conflict,  according  to  their  in¬ 
stincts.  There  may  be  pauses  of  the  struggle,  aris¬ 
ing  from  mutual  fear,  or  satiety.  But  there  is,  in 
such  creatures,  no  consciousness  of  a  common  Rule, 
no  apprehension  of  Rights  vested  in  the  parties  by 
such  a  Rule.  The  conception  of  the  Rights  of  War 
introduces  the  moral  nature  of  man.  In  our  survey 
of  International  Rights  we  shall  therefore  first  speak 
of  these. 


CHAP.  II.] 


RIGHTS  OF  WAR. 


389 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  RIGHTS  OF  WAR. 

1145.  History  give  us  a  glimpse  of  an  an¬ 
cient  state  of  things  in  which  the  distinction  of  War 
and  Peace  had  not  been  established  for  nations  in 
general.  The  occupation  of  the  Pirate,  who  plunders 
all  whom  he  can  overpower,  was  not  less  honourable 
than  other  occupations  ;  and  States  granted  to  other 
States,  or  to  particular  persons,  a  protection  from 
spoliation  (ao-vXia)  as  an  exception  to  a  general  Rule. 
When  peaceable  relations  were  permanently  esta¬ 
blished  among  the  Greek  States,  this  was  still  looked 
upon  as  the  result  of  a  Convention,  which  included 
them  only.  In  Livy,*  the  Macedonian  ambassadors 
say,  “Cum  barbaris  eternum  omnibus  Grsecis  hel¬ 
ium  est,  eritque.”  A  like  state  of  things  is  indi¬ 
cated  by  the  Latin  word  “  hostis,”  which  signified 
alike  u  a  stranger  ”  and  “  an  enemy. ’’f  The  intro¬ 
duction  of  the  term  “  perduellis,”  an  enemy  proprio 
nomine ,  indicated  the  establishment  of  a  distinction 
between  the  two,  though  Cicero  interprets  the  fact 
the  opposite  way  ;  namely,  that  the  open  enemy  was 
called  a  stranger  as  a  gentler  term,  “  lenitate  verbi 
tristitiam  rei  mitigante.” 

1146.  It  was  an  important  step  in  Interna¬ 
tional  Law,  to  establish  this  distinction  between 
War,  and  Piracy,  the  practice  of  general  spoliation. 
And  for  this  purpose,  it  is  proper  to  give  a  definition 
of  War.  A  definition  which  has  been  given,  and 
which  may  serve  as  the  basis  of  our  remarks,  is 
this4  “  Bellum  est  contentio  publica,  armata,  justa.” 
It  is  necessary  to  attend  to  each  of  these  three  con¬ 
ditions.  War  is  a  'public  contest :  it  is  the  act  of  the 

*  B.  xxi.,  c.  29.  f  Cic.  Off.,  i.,  12. 

X  Albericus  Gentilis,  Be  Jure  Belli.  1589. 

HH  2 


390 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


State  towards  another  State  ;  not  an  act  of  or  to¬ 
wards  individuals.  Hence,  a  contest  with  Pirates 
and  Robbers,  who  are  lawless  individuals,  is  not  a 
War  ;  nor  do  the  Rights  of  War  belong  to  such  per¬ 
sons.  Again,  War  is  an  armed  contest:  for  States, 
having  no  common  superior  who  can  decide  their 
dispute,  have  no  other  ultimate  authority  to  which 
they  can  appeal.  On  this  account  War  has  been 
termed  “  ultima  ratio  regum.”  But  still,  though  the 
contest  is  an  armed,  it  is  a  just,  that  is,  a  professedly 
just  one.  Though  War  is  appealed  to,  because 
there  is  no  other  ultimate  tribunal  to  which  States 
can  have  recourse,  it  is  appealed  to  for  justice.  It 
may  easily  happen  between  States,  as  between  liti¬ 
gating  individuals,  that  each  has  a  just  cause.  Thus, 
when  Attalus  left  his  kingdom  by  testament  to  the 
Romans,  the  heir  had  the  Right  of  legitimate,  the 
Romans,  the  Right  of  testamentary  succession.  It 
is  necessary  that  a  State  should  have  on  its  side 
some  such  asserted  Right,  in  order  that  its  War  may 
be  consistent  with  International  Law.  A  State 
which  should  make  war  upon  its  neighbours,  with¬ 
out  asserting  any  claim  of  Right,  professing  only  a 
desire  of  conquest,  a  hatred  of  its  enemy,  or  a  love 
of  war  for  its  own  sake,  would  have  no  just  claim  to 
the  Rights  of  War  ;  and  might  most  fitly  be  declared 
a  Common  Enemy,  by  all  States  which  acknowledge 
the  authority  of  International  Law. 

Under  the  above  conditions,  States  have  a  Right 
to  make  War,  as  we  have  already  said  (835).  This 
Right  may  be  unjustly,  that  is  immorally,  used ;  as 
individuals  may  use  their  Rights  immorally,  and 
may  employ  the  forms  of  justice  for  unjust  ends. 

1147.  War,  so  understood,  is  conceived  as  a 
state  in  which  the  hostile  parties  have  mutual  Rights 
and  Obligations,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  they  are 
making  for  each  other’s  damage  or  destruction.  The 
Rights  of  War,  among  the  ancients,  extended  to  the 


C1IA1\  II. J 


RIGHTS  OF  WAR. 


391 


Right  of  enslaving  or  putting  to  death  all  who  were 
taken  prisoners  in  battle,  and  even  all  the  inhabi¬ 
tants  of  a  conquered  country.  Yet  the  same  Laws 
of  War  condemned  those  conquerors  who  refused 
Sepulture  to  the  dead  bodies  of  their  enemies ;  the 
same  Laws  required  a  reverence  for  the  Heralds 
who  acted  as  international  envoys,  and  an  exact 
fidelity  in  observing  Truces  and  Treaties.  Moralists 
have  been  blamed  for  saying  that  to  enslave  van¬ 
quished,  and  to  kill  captive  enemies,  is  not  contrary 
to  the  Natural  Rights  of  War.  Yet  we  see  how 
natural  such  practices  are,  for  they  occur  in  all  na¬ 
tions  at  the  early  periods  of  their  jural  career.  The 
proper  condemnation  of  these  practices  is,  not  that 
they  are  contrary  to  the  Natural  Rights  of  War, 
but  that  they  are  the  Rights  of  War  in  a  rude  and 
savage  condition  of  nations,  and  are  condemned  by 
International  Law,  when  it  has  made  any  considera¬ 
ble  progress  in  humanity. 

1148.  In  ancient  Greece  and  Rome,  every 
citizen  was  considered  as  a  soldier  ;  but  in  modern 
times  the  combatant  is  distinguished  from  the  non- 
combatant  part  of  the  nation,  and  there  are  different 
classes  of  Rights  of  War  applicable  to  these  differ¬ 
ent  classes  of  persons. 

1149.  The  Rights  of  War,  as  they  affect 
Combatants ,  are  purified  from  much  that  was  savage 
and  cruel  in  their  earlier  form,  by  taking  into  ac¬ 
count  the  general  conception  of  War;  that  it  is  the 
use  of  the  public  Force  of  the  State  in  order  to  en¬ 
force  its  asserted  Right.  The  public  Force,  Armies, 
and  Navies  with  their  munitions,  act  so  as  to  damage, 
defeat,  and  destroy  the  Armies  and  Navies  of  the 
enemy.  Armies  are  defeated  by  destroying  their 
organization  ;  and  hence,  as  soon  as  a  man,  or  a 
body  of  men,  by  surrendering,  has  ceased  to  belong  to 
the  organization  of  the  army,  he  is  no  longer  an  ob¬ 
ject  of  active  hostility.  He  is  a  prisoner.  The 


392 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


same  is  the  case,  when  a  ship,  in  a  fleet,  strikes  her 
colours.  In  the  seige  and  capture  of  a  fortress,  the 
amount  of  severity  exercised  upon  the  defenders  of 
the  place,  depends  upon  the  obstinacy  of  the  strug¬ 
gle  between  them  and  the  assailants.  If  the  defence 
have  been  very  obstinate,  and  the  place  is  taken  by 
storm,  the  practices  of  War,  up  to  the  most  modern 
times,  partake  of  the  savage  and  cruel  habits  of  the 
rudest  nations.  But  though,  on  such  occasions,  un¬ 
resisting  men  and  helpless  women  may  suffer  death 
or  violence  in  hot  blood,  the  voice  of  all  civilized 
nations  condemns,  as  violators  of  the  Rights  of  War, 
the  soldiers  who  commit  such  deeds  in  cold  blood. 
Sometimes  severities  are  inflicted  upon  a  captured 
garrison,  professedly  on  account  of  a  resistance  too 
long  protracted.  In  such  cases,  the  severity  may 
be  considered  as  a  punishment  which  the  Laws  of 
War  entitle  the  victor  to  inflict,  in  return  for  damage 
and  delay  which  the  defenders  have  needlessly  oc¬ 
casioned  him,  since  their  ultimate  success  was  hope¬ 
less.  The  Romans  spared  the  garrison  of  a  place, 
if  it  surrendered  before  the  battering-ram  struck  the 
walls.  To  put  to  the  sword  the  garrison  of  a  cap¬ 
tured  place,  in  order  to  strike  terror  into  other  places, 
and  paralyze  their  resistance,  is  a  course  which  has 
an  aspect  of  savage  cruelty  ;  yet  it  is  asserted  to  be 
conformable  to  the  Laws  of  War;  and  has  even 
been  defended,  as  humane,  because  it  tends  to  bring 
the  War  to  an  end.  In  like  manner,  the  putting 
prisoners  to  death  in  the  way  of  retaliation,  or  of 
punishment  for  violated  faith,  has  a  most  cruel  as¬ 
pect  ;  yet  if  this  be  not  done,  how  is  the  cruelty, 
when  commenced  on  one  side,  to  be  punished  or 
stopped  1  and  how  can  there  be  any  value  in  the 
giving  of  Hostages  for  the  performance  of  a  treaty  ? 
That  War  has  necessarily  inhuman  features,  such 
as  these,  shows  us  how  much  the  cause  of  humanity 
requires  that  the  operation  of  War  should  be  super¬ 
seded  in  all  possible  cases. 


CIIAP.  II.] 


RIGHTS  OF  WAR. 


393 


1150.  The  Laws  of  War  which  limit  the 
modes  of  action  of  the  combatants,  flow  from  the 
conception  of  War, — that  it  is  the  Action  of  one 
State  against  another  State,  to  enforce  justice  by  its 
public  force.  The  force  used  is  to  be  public  ;  hence 
assassins,  poisoners,  secret  incendiaries,  are  pro¬ 
hibited.  Damage  done  by  such  means,  cannot  be 
avowed  by  a  State ;  and  hence,  cannot  be  a  part  of 
the  conduct  by  which  the  State  publicly  seeks  jus¬ 
tice.  Also,  such  damage  cannot  be  used  so  as  to 
make  a  State  alter  its  conduct,  and  therefore  cannot 
be  used  so  as  to  obtain  justice.  But  this  view  does  not 
prohibit  operations  which  are  clandestine  for  a  time,  as 
an  ambush,  or  a  mine ;  for  these  are  works  of  an  army, 
and  have  the  same  results  as  other  acts  of  warfare. 

1151.  Stratagems  are  frequently  employed  in 
warfare ;  and  it  may  appear  difficult  to  reconcile 
some  of  these  with  Good  Faith  ;  as  when  a  general 
allows  his  enemy  to  get  hold  of  letters,  or  informants, 
purposely  contrived  to  deceive.  But  it  is  to  be  recol¬ 
lected,  that  the  Rules  of  Good  Faith  apply  only  to 
those  modes  of  communication  with  regard  to  which 
there  is  a  Mutual  Understanding.  Soldiers  are  bound 
in  Good  Faith  to  respect  a  truce,  a  flag  of  truce,  a 
demand  of  parley,  or  any  other  recognized  mode  of 
communication  between  combatants :  for  these  pro¬ 
ceedings  are  conformable  to  known  Laws  of  War, 
and  tend  to  the  termination  of  hostilities.  But  when 
a  general  judges  of  his  enemies’  intentions  by  his 
motions, — the  information  of  neutral  persons,  inter¬ 
cepted  letters,  and  the  like, — he  rests,  not  upon  a 
mutual  understanding,  but  upon  his  own  sagacity 
and  vigilance,  in  detecting  the  truth  from  the  appear¬ 
ance.  At  the  same  time,  the  Laws  of  War  allow 
him  to  visit,  with  the  utmost  severity,  any  person  who 
intentionally  misleads  him  by  false  intelligence. 

1152.  It  appears,  at  first,  an  inconsistency  in 
the  Laws  of  W ar,  that  though  they  do  not  forbid  a 


3-94  INTERNATIONAL  JUS.  [BOOK  VI. 

general  to  use  Spies,  or  to  tempt  the  enemy’s  soldiers 
to  desert,  they  visit  with  immediate  death  any  one 
found  engaged  in  such  attempts.  But  it  is  to  be 
recollected  that  in  War,  the  infliction  of  death  is  not 
a  punishment,  but  a  means  to  an  end.  A  general 
must,  from  a  regard  to  his  own  safety  and  success, 
make  the  task  of  spies  and  seducers  as  difficult  and 
dangerous  as  possible. 

1153.  By  the  progress  of  the  Laws  of  War, 
from  their  ancient  to  their  modern  forms,  much  has 
been  done  to  make  Warfare  more  humane,  or,  as  it 
is  termed,  more  civilized.  In  the  middle  ages,  the 
practice  was  introduced  of  sparing  the  lives  of  con¬ 
quered  foes,  and  giving  them  their  liberty,  on  the 
payment  of  ransom.  In  more  recent  times,  when 
soldiers  yield,  they  ask  for  quarter ,  and  are  made 
prisoners  of  war.  Such  prisoners  are  often  ex¬ 
changed  between  the  two  hostile  parties  by  a  cartel 
or  agreement.  And  even  before  a  prisoner  of  war  is 
liberated  or  exchanged,  he  often  has  his  liberty 
allowed  him,  on  giving  his  parole,  or  word  of  honour, 
that  he  will  not  serve  as  a  soldier  till  the  War  is  ended. 

1154.  In  War,  as  we  have  said,  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  men  is  used  as  means  to  an  end  ;  but  every 
step,  in  the  Laws  of  War,  by  which  bloodshed  and 
violence  are,  in  their  extent,  limited  to  their  end,  the 
attainment  of  just  terms  of  peace,  is  a  gain  to 
humanity.  Hence  it  is  to  be  desired  that  the  Laws 
of  War  should  condemn  that  wanton  and  aimless 
inhumanity  which,  as  has  been  mentioned,  is  often 
perpetrated  in  hot  blood  on  the  storming  of  a  fortress. 
It  is  therefore  very  satisfactory  to  find  an  eminent 
military  writer*  expressing  an  opinion,  that  the  plun¬ 
der  of  a  town  after  an  assault  ought  to  be  made 
criminal  by  the  Articles  of  War. 

1155.  In  the  treatment  of  Non-combatants 

*  Napier,  Hist,  of  the  War  in  the  Peninsula,  Vol.  vi., 
p.  215. 


CHAP.  II.] 


RIGHTS  OF  WAR. 


395 


especially,  the  modern  Laws  of  War  are  more  hu¬ 
mane  than  those  of  ancient  times.  When  an  enemy 
invades  the  territory  of  a  hostile  State,  it  strikes  at 
the  State,  not  at  individuals.  Its  object  may  be  to 
take  permanent  possession  of  the  territory  on  the  part 
of  its  own  State  ;  but  at  any  rate,  its  operations  sup¬ 
press  and  exclude  the  authority  of  the  hostile  State  ; 
and  thus  do  violence  to  it  as  a  State.  Hence,  the 
invading  army,  so  far  as  it  succeeds,  supersedes  the 
higher  functions  of  the  State  in  the  invaded  country. 
It  respects  private  property  ;  but  it  assumes  the  right 
of  taxation,  and  exercises  it,  as  in  a  case  of  exigency, 
by  levying  a  heavy  Contribution.  If  the  inhabitants 
pay  this  contribution,  by  the  Laws  of  War  they  are 
not  to  be  further  molested  ;  and  are  to  be  protected 
in  the  exercise  of  agriculture,  trade,  and  art.  In 
such  cases,  the  usual  Tribunals  are,  to  some  extent, 
superseded  by  Military  Law  ;  because,  as  we  have 
said,  the  invading  Army  assumes  the  functions  of  the 
invaded  State. 

1156.  In  War,  though  Private  Property  is  re¬ 
spected  on  Land,  it  is  not  spared  at  Sea.  Merchant- 
vessels  and  their  freight,  belonging  to  citizens  of 
hostile  States,  become  the  prize  of  their  captors. 
There  is  an  evident  reason  for  this  difference  of  the 
Laws  of  War,  on  Land  and  on  Sea;  for  a  mer¬ 
chant’s  vessel  at  Sea  is  not  under  the  protection  of 
the  State,  in  the  same  manner  as  his  warehouse  on 
land.  To  make  prize  of  a  merchant-ship,  is  an  ob¬ 
vious  way  of  showing  that  its  own  State  is  unable  to 
protect  it  at  sea;  and  thus,  is  a  mode  of  attacking 
the  State.  It  has  sometimes  been  proposed  that,  in 
time  of  war,  Private  Property  should  be  protected  at 
sea,  as  well  as  on  land  ;  but  there  are  great  difficul¬ 
ties  in  carrying  such  a  Rule  into  effect.*  Conven¬ 
tions  have,  however,  sometimes  been  made  between 
nations  to  this  effect. 

*  Manning,  Law  of  Nations,  B.  hi.,  c.  iv. 


396 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


1157.  On  the  other  hand,  States  often  grant  to 
private  persons,  who  are  willing  to  fit  out  a  ship  at 
their  own  expense,  letters  of  marque ,  authorising  them 
to  carry  on  warlike  operations  against  the  enemy. 
Such  persons  are  called  privateers.  Such  authority 
is  sometimes  given  under  the  name  of  reprisals ,  as  a 
means  of  obtaining  redress  for  private  wrongs.  Such 
practices  make  a  kind  of  partisan  warfare  at  sea. 

1158.  In  many  other  cases,  as  well  as  in  that 
of  merchants,  the  fortune  of  non-combatants  is  inex¬ 
tricably  mixed  up  with  that  of  the  combatants ;  thus, 
when  a  town  is  besieged,  the  inhabitants  necessarily 
suffer  by  the  attempts  which  the  besiegers  make  to 
overpower  the  garrison.  And  sometimes  the  greatest 
weight  of  the  misery  thus  produced  may  fall  upon 
the  peaceable  inhabitants ;  as  for  instance,  when  a 
town  is  reduced  to  yield  by  famine.  The  horror  ex¬ 
cited  by  such  cases  has  led  to  the  suggestion  that  it 
should  be  one  of  the  Laws  of  War  that  all  non-com¬ 
batants  should  be  allowed  to  go  out  of  a  blockaded 
town  ;  and  that  the  general  who  should  refuse  to  let 
them  pass  should  be  regarded  in  the  same  light  as 
one  who  should  murder  his  prisoners,  or  should  be 
in  the  habit  of  butchering  women  and  children.* 

1159.  In  order  that  countries  which  are  the 
seat  of  W ar  may  enjoy  the  advantage  of  the  Laws 
of  civilized  warfare,  it  is  necessary  that  they  them¬ 
selves  should  attend  strictly  to  the  distinction  of 
Combatants  and  Non-combatants.  If  the  inhabitants 
of  the  invaded  country  carry  on  what  is  called  a 
guerilla  or  partisan  warfare  against  the  invaders  ;  the 
inhabitants,  individually,  destroying  them  and  their 
means  of  action,  in  any  way  that  they  can  ;  such  a 
country  cannot  be  treated  according  to  the  more  hu¬ 
mane  Laws  of  War;  for  the  inhabitants  themselves 
destroy  the  foundation  of  such  Laws,  the  distinction 
of  Combatants  and  Non-combatants.  And  this  re- 

*  Arnold,  Lectures  on  History ,  Lect.  iv.,  p.  220. 


CHAP.  II.] 


RIGHTS  OF  WAR. 


397 


striction  need  not  interfere  with  the  patriotic  zeal 
which  the  inhabitants  feel,  to  repel  the  invaders. 
For  they  may  enlist  in  the  organized  army  of  their 
own  country ;  and  supply  the  Government  with 
resources  for  its  defence  to  the  utmost  of  their  power. 

1160.  It  may  be  asked,  whether,  on  these 
principles,  the  Laws  of  War  allow  the  bombardment 
of  an  undefended  town,  or  the  laying  waste  a  pro¬ 
vince  with  fire  and  sword.  Such  proceedings  are 
condemned  as  odious  by  international  jurists  ;*  who, 
however,  do  not  venture  to  pronounce  these  violations 
of  the  Rights  of  War.  It  is  evident  that,  like  de¬ 
stroying  ships,  such  acts  show  that  the  suffering 
State  cannot  defend  its  subjects.  But  they  belong  to 
a  savage  and  cruel  form  of  war,  which  all  humane 
and  civilized  men  must  desire  to  see  utterly  abrogated. 

1161.  As  War  has  its  Laws,  it  has  also  its 
Formalities,  which  are  requisite  as  a  justification  of 
warlike  acts.  It  ought  to  be  preceded  by  a  Demand, 
of  Redress,  and  begun  by  a  Declaration  of  War. 
This  formality  the  Romans  called  Clarigatio.  When 
a  place  is  blockaded,  neutral  persons  have  no  longer 
a  Right  to  carry  thither  Munitions  of  War ;  and 
hence  the  Rights  of  Neutrals  are  affected  by  de¬ 
claring  a  place  in  a  State  of  Blockade.  The  Block- 
aders  have  a  Right  of  Search,  in  order  that  they  may 
ascertain  whether  the  Blockade  is  violated.  The 
Conflict  of  the  Rights  of  Belligerents  and  of  Neu¬ 
trals,  in  this  and  the  like  cases,  give  rise  to  many 
questions  of  International  Jus.  Others  arise  from 
doubts,  whether  enemy’s  vessels  captured  were 
taken  in  time  of  War  or  not,  and  the  like.  For  the 
decision  of  such  questions,  there  have  been  estab¬ 
lished  Courts,  in  which  International  Law  is  ad¬ 
ministered ;  Courts  of  Prize  ;  Courts  of  Admiralty  ; 
Courts  of  Maritime  Law. 

*  Vattel,  B.  hi.,  §  169. 

II 


VOL.  II. 


398 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


1162.  Having  thus  spoken  of  the  Rights  of 
War,  1  must  now  notice  the  International  Rights 
which  subsist  during  Peace.  These  I  must  enume¬ 
rate  very  briefly,  by  the  aid  of  well-esteemed  writers 
on  the  subject :  for  my  object  is  only  to  give  such  a 
sketch  as  may  show  the  place  which  International 
Jus  occupies  in  a  System  of  Morality. 

I  shall  arrange  the  Rights  of  which  I  have  to 
speak,  as  International  Rights  of  Property,  Inter¬ 
national  Rights  of  Jurisdiction,  International  Rights 
of  Intercourse. 


CHAPTER  III. 

INTERNATIONAL  RIGHTS  OF  PROPERTY. 

1163.  We  have  already  said  (832)  that  every 
State  has  a  Right  to  the  National  Territory.  This 
is  an  International  Right ;  and  is  absolutely  and  com¬ 
pletely  valid,  as  excluding  Rights  of  other  States. 
With  regard  to  the  citizens  of  the  State  itself,  the 
Right  to  any  part  of  the  Territory  is  not  simple 
ownership,  but  that  permanent  proprietorship  which 
is  called  Dominium  Eminens  (144),  by  which  the 
State  prescribes  the  condition  on  which  individuals 
are  to  hold  and  enjoy  their  possessions. 

1164.  Nations  have  come  into  possession  of 
their  present  territories  by  the  migrations  of  the  vari¬ 
ous  tribes  of  mankind  (930) ;  and  by  various  other 
historical  events,  as  conquests,  colonies,  and  the  like. 
Their  present  Rights  rest  upon  these  previous  facts ; 
and  the  fact  of  the  national  possession  of  any  Terri¬ 
tory,  continued  and  unquestioned,  of  itself  constitutes 
a  Right  of  possession.  Prescription ,  which  is  a  mode 


CHAP.  III.]  RIGHTS  OF  PROPERTY. 


399 


of  acquiring  a  Right  for  individuals  (151),  holds  also 
for  States.* 

1165.  European  nations  have  recognized  a 
national  property  in  uncultivated  countries,  founded 
upon  the  Right  of  Discovery.  Where  the  land  so 
claimed  is  inhabited  by  savages,  such  a  claim  of 
Right  goes  upon  the  supposition  that  a  population  of 
savages  do  not  form  an  organized  State  which  can 
have  International  Rights.  But  this  limitation  of  In¬ 
ternational  Law,  and  consequently  of  Morality,  is 
rejected  by  the  more  humane  views  of  modern  times. 
The  claims  of  European  States  to  possessions  in 
America,  Africa,  and  Asia,  originally  founded  on 
discovery  or  colonization,  now  rest,  not  only  upon 
prescription,  but  also,  for  the  most  part-,  upon  sub¬ 
sequent  compact. 

1166.  The  Right  of  Conquest,  when  it  is  stated 
barely  as  constituting  rightful  possession,  belongs  to  a 
condition  of  International  Jus  more  rude  and  arbitrary 
than  now  prevails.  A  State  which  would  assert  the 
mere  Right  of  Conquest,  would  also  make  war  for 
the  mere  sake  of  Conquest ;  which,  as  we  have 
said,  would  justify  civilized  States  in  declaring  such 
a  State  a  Common  Enemy  (1146).  But  a  Conquest, 
made  in  a  just  war,  may  rightly  be  considered  as  in 
the  light  of  indemnity  for  wrong  suffered  ;  and  may 
be  either  retained,  or  used  in  the  negociations  for 
peace,  in  order  to  obtain  just  terms. 

1167.  There  prevail  among  nations  several 
Rules  and  maxims  with  regard  to  the  Rights  of 
national  territory.  These  Rules  have  been  established 
by  the  gradual  usage  and  successive  agreements  of 
nations  and  jurists;  and  are  to  be  found,  with  the 
reasonings  respecting  them,  in  works  on  International 
Law.  It  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  subject  if  I 
extract  some  of  these  Rules ;  which  I  shall  do, 

*  Wheaton,  International  Law,  Part  i.,  ch.  iv.,  p.  206. 


400 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


principally  following  Mr.  Wheaton’s  Elements  of 
International  Law ,  and  Mr.  Manning’s  Commentaries 
on  the  Law  of  Nations. 

1168.  “  The  maritime  territory  of  every  State* 
extends  to  the  ports,  harbours,  bays,  mouths  of  rivers, 
and  adjacent  parts  of  the  sea  enclosed  by  headlands 
belonging  to  the  same  State.”  These  must  be 
included,  in  order  to  make  the  territorial  jurisdiction 
continuous. 

1169.  “  The  general  usage  of  nations  super¬ 
adds  to  this  extent  of  territorial  jurisdiction,  a  distance 
of  a  marine  league,  or  as  far  as  a  cannon-shot  will 
reach  from  the  shore,  along  all  the  coasts  of  the 
State.  Within  these  limits,  its  right  of  property  and 
territorial  jurisdiction  are  absolute,  and  exclude  those 
of  every  other  nation. ’’f  “  The  rule  of  law  on  this  sub¬ 
ject  is  terra  dominium  finitur  ubifnitur  armorum  vis.” 

1170.  “  The  exclusive  territorial  jurisdiction 
of  the  British  Crown  over  the  enclosed  parts  of  the 
sea  along  the  coasts  of  the  islands  of  Great  Britain, 
has  immemorially  extended  to  those  bays  called  the 
King’s  Chambers  ;  i.  e.  portions  of  the  sea  cut  off  by 
lines  drawn  from  one  promontory  to  another.  A 
similar  jurisprudence  is  also  asserted  by  the  United 
States  over  the  Delaware  Bay,  and  other  bays  and 
estuaries  forming  portions  of  their  territory.”  Such 
regulations  are  justified  on  the  ground  of  their  being 
essentially  necessary  to  the  security  and  interests  of 
the  State. 

1171.  Besides  such  regulations,  “  a  jurisdiction 
and  right  of  property  over  certain  other  portions  of 
the  sea  have  been  claimed  by  different  nations,  on 
the  ground  of  immemorial  use.  Such,  for  example, 
was  the  sovereignty  formerly  claimed  by  the  republic 
of  Venice  over  the  Adriatic.  The  maritime  supre- 

*  Wheaton,  Part  it.,  chap.  iv. 
t  See  also  Grotius,  J.  B.  et  P.  lib.  ii.,  c.  iii.,  §  10. 


CHAP.  III.] 


RIGHTS  OF  PROPERTY. 


401 


macy  of  Great  Britain  over  what  are  called  the 
Narrow  Seas,  has  generally  been  asserted  merely  by 
requiring  certain  honour  to  the  British  flag,  in  those 
seas.”  The  Baltic  Sea  is  claimed  as  mare  clausum, 
by  the  powers  bordering  on  its  coasts ;  and  the 
Euxine  was  so  claimed  by  Turkey,  so  long  as  she 
exclusively  possessed  its  shores.  Denmark  asserts  a 
supremacy  over  the  Sound,  and  the  Two  Belts,  which 
form  the  outlet  of  the  Baltic.  In  opposition  to  such 
claims,  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  is  asserted  by  other 
States.  They  have  asserted  the  Right  to  navigate 
the  High  Sea  ( mare  liberum ),  as  being  essential  to 
the  Right  of  Commerce  which  belongs  to  all  States. 

1172.  It  is  said  by  the  jurists,  that  when  a 
river  flows  through  the  territories  of  Different  States, 
the  innocent  use  of  it  for  commercial  purposes  belongs 
to  all  the  nations  inhabiting  the  different  parts  of  its 
banks  ;  but  that  this  is  an  imperfect  Right ,  and  must 
be  regulated  by  convention.*  Such  conventions  have 
been  established,  for  instance,  with  respect  to  the 
Rhine  and  the  Scheldt.  We  have  already  said  (89) 
that  imperfect  Rights  are  improperly  called  Rights  ; 
and  are  really  moral  claims  indicating  what  the 
other  party  ought  to  grant  or  to  do.  And  it  is  plain  that 
the  general  Duty  of  Humanity  would  lead  a  State  to 
allow  its  neighbours  to  make  such  use  of  its  rivers 
and  straits  as  should  be  accompanied  with  no  incon¬ 
venience  to  itself.  But,  as  we  have  already  said,  by 
some  a  general  Right  of  Commerce  is  asserted,  which 
goes  beyond  this  appeal  to  humanity. 

1173.  In  time  of  War,  this  Right  of  Commerce 
comes  in  conflict  with  the  Rights  of  War;  and  the 
conflict  has,  in  modern  times,  given  rise  to  many 
questions  of  international  jurisprudence  ;  and  espe¬ 
cially  as  regards  Colonies  of  the  belligerent  parties. 
For  it  has  been  assumed,  by  modern  European  States, 

*  Wheaton,  P.  n.,  c.  iv.,  §  12. 

VOL.  II.  26  II  2 


402 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


that  they  have  a  Right  to  direct  and  limit  the  trade 
of  their  Colonies,  as  well  as  of  the  ports  of  the  Mother- 
country. 

1174.  The  question  of  which  we  have  spoken, 
between  the  Rights  of  War,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
Rights  of  Commerce  on  the  other,  implies,  among  the 
Rights  of  War,  the  Right  of  seizing  the  private 
property  of  the  citizens  of  the  hostile  State  captured 
at  sea.  To  this  Right,  of  which  we  have  already 
spoken,  belligerents  have  added  the  Right  of  seizing 
also  the  property  of  neutrals,  when  taken  in  hostile 
ships  :  and  they  have  expressed  their  Rule  in  the 
maxim,  “  Enemy’s  ships  make  enemy’s  goods.”  This 
Maxim  is  consistent  with  what  has  already  been  said 
of  the  nature  of  War.  All  property  is  in  some  one’s 
custody  ;  this  is  in  the  enemy’s  custody.  We  deny 
their  power  of  custody  of  property  on  the  sea,  and 
we  strike  a  blow  at  them  as  a  maritime  State,  by 
showing  that  they  do  not  possess  this  power.  The 
Neutral  must  attend  to  this,  and  must  not  place  his 
goods  in  our  enemy’s  vessels,  except  he  is  willing  to 
share  their  fate. 

1175.  The  Rights  of  Commerce  are  asserted  in  a 
Maxim  similar  in  form  to  the  one  just  stated  ;  namely 
this:  “  Neutral  ships  make  neutral  goods;”  or,  “Free 
bottoms,  free  goods.”  But  it  is  plain  that  this  maxim 
must  be  limited  and  modified,  or  it  might  be  used  as 
a  powerful  mode  of  warfare.  Thus*  belligerents 
have  a  Right  to  prevent  neutrals  from  carrying  to  an 
enemy  munitions  of  war.  It  is  no  interference  with 
the  Right  of  a  third  person  to  say  that  he  shall  not 
carry  to  my  enemy  instruments  with  which  I  am  to 
be  attacked.  On  the  contrary,  such  Commerce  is  a 
deviation  from  neutrality  ;  (or  at  least  would  be  so, 
if  it  were  the  act  of  the  State).  If  we  allow  neutral 
ships  to  be  inviolable  when  they  carry  to  the  enemy 


*  Manning,  B.  hi.,  c.  vii. 


CHAP.  III.]  RIGHTS  OF  PROPERTY.  403 

the  means  of  warfare,  they,  though  professedly  not 
parties  to  the  contest,  may  greatly  damage  one  of  the 
belligerents,  and  transfer  the  success  to  the  other 
side.  Hence,  belligerents  have  a  Right  to  prevent 
neutrals  to  carry  to  either  party  goods  which  do  not 
affect  him  in  his  belligerent  character  ;  but  military 
stores  are  prohibited,  under  the  title  of  Contraband  of 
War. 

1176.  Again,  belligerents  have,  by  the  Laws 
of  War,  a  Right  to  put  a  place  in  a  state  of  blockade , 
and  then  to  prohibit  neutrals  from  entering  it. 
Neutrals,  who  violate  this  Rule,  are  liable  to  confisca¬ 
tion  for  breach  of  blockade.  According  to  modern 
practice,*  in  order  that  a  party  may  be  liable  to 
punishment  for  breach  of  blockade,  three  things  are 
requisite  to  be  proved  : — the  actual  existence  of  the 
blockade  : — that  the  party  offending  knew  of  it  : — that 
he  commit  some  act  which  was  a  breach  of  it.  The 
definition  of  blockade  is  given  in  various  Treaties. 
It  is  generally  agreed,  that  a  mere  declaration  cannot 
constitute  a  blockade :  it  must  be  actually  enforced 
by  a  continued  circuit  of  troops  and  ships. 

1177.  The  maxim,  that  “free  ships  make  free 
goods,”  has  been  a  subject  of  much  discussion  in 
modern  times,  having  been  asserted  by  Confederacies 
calling  themselves  “  Armed  Neutralities,”  in  opposi¬ 
tion  to  the  claims  of  Belligerents.  Belligerents, 
seizing  the  property  of  an  enemy  on  board  a  neutral 
ship,  have,  on  their  side,  both  the  ancient  authorities, 
and  the  usually  received  Principles  of  the  Law  of 
Nations.  In  opposition  to  the  Right  of  Commerce, 
urged  on  the  side  of  the  above  maxim,  it  is  replied, 
that  the  Rights  of  War  suspend  many  of  the  Rights 
of  Commerce,  as  when  they  authorize  seizure  of 
contraband  of  war,  or  confiscation  of  a  ship  for  breach 
of  blockade.  And  the  general  Rule  must  be,  that 


*  Manning,  B.  hi.,  c.  ix. 


404 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


all  Rights  of  Commerce  are  suspended,  which,  being 
nominally  neutral,  are  really  favourable  to  one  of 
the  belligerent  parties.  Now  to  carry  goods  for  an 
enemy,  who  is  so  weak  at  sea,  as  not  to  be  able  to 
carry  for  himself,  is  to  give  him  a  great  advantage. 
It  deprives  the  stronger  naval  power  of  the  benefit  of 
his  superiority.  The  Belligerent  cannot  be  required 
to  allow  this.  When  it  is  urged,  on  the  other  side, 
that  a  Neutral  has  a  Right  to  trade  with  both  parties  ; 
it  is  replied,  that  he  may  trade  with  both,  but  not  for 
one.  If  he  gives  his  protection  to  the  property  of 
one  of  the  belligerents,  who  is  too  weak  to  protect  it 
himself,  he  makes  himself  his  Ally,  and  is  no  longer 
neutral.  An  argument  sometimes  urged  on  this 
side  is,  that  a  ship  is  like  a  part  of  the  territory  of 
the  state  to  which  it  belongs,  and  as  such,  not  to  be 
violated  by  the  belligerent :  but  it  is  plain  that  this 
analogy  is  too  loose  to  be  of  any  force.*  If  the 
doctrine  were  true,  it  would  be  a  violation  of  neutral 
Rights  to  seize  contraband  of  war  in  the  ship,  or  to 
resist  breach  of  blockade.  And  it  is  plain  that  the 
analogy  does  not  hold  in  other  cases  ;  for  when  a 
ship  comes  into  a  foreign  port,  she  and  all  on  board 
are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  foreign  state. 

1178.  There  is  another  kind  of  limitation  of 
the  maxim,  “  free  vessels  make  free  goods,”  which 
has  also  excited  much  discussion  in  modern  times. 
This  limitation  has  been  termed  the  “  Rule  of  1756,”* 
and  is  thus  stated  :  “  Neutrals  are  not  allowed  to 
engage  in  a  trade  with  the  colonies  of  belligerents 
during  war,  which  trade  is  not  allowed  them  during 
peace.”  In  virtue  of  this  Rule,  the  Stronger  Naval 
belligerent  power  enforces,  during  war,  in  order  to 
distress  its  enemy,  the  same  restrictions  on  commerce 
with  the  Colonies  of  the  Weaker,  which  the  Weaker 
itself  had  during  peace  enforced,  in  order  to  its  own 


*  Manning,  B.  hi.,  c.  v. 


CHAP.  III.]  RIGHTS  OF  PROPERTY. 


405 


advantage.  For,  in  all  cases,  European  governments 
have,  during  peace,  excluded  other  countries  from  the 
carrying  trade  between  them  and  their  colonies.* 
But  in  the  Seven-years’  War,  begun  in  1756,  the 
French  were  prevented,  by  the  maritime  superiority 
of  the  British,  from  carrying  on  their  colonial  trade 
themselves.  Upon  this,  they  threw  open  the  trade  to 
neutrals  ;  but  Great  Britain  denied  that  neutrals  had 
a  Right  to  such  a  trade,  and  therefore  acted  upon  the 
Rule  of  1756  just  stated.  The  consistency  of  the 
Rule  with  the  common  Rights  of  war,  is  evident. 
Such  an  interposition  of  neutrals  as  was  here  attempted, 
was  a  manifest  assistance  to  France.  It  enabled 
Colonies  to  hold  out,  which  must  otherwise  have 
surrendered  ;  supplied  the  mother-country  with 
colonial  produce  and  revenue  ;  and  enabled  her  to 
withdraw  sailors  from  her  merchant-service  to  man 
her  fleet.  It  was  a  trade  which  the  neutral  had  not 
possessed  before  the  war  ;  and  possessed,  during  the 
war,  only  in  virtue  of  the  British  naval  superiority  ; 
and  which  they  would  lose  again  on  the  restoration 
of  peace.  The  neutrals  exercise  such  a  trade  under 
the  protection  of  the  stronger  naval  power,  and 
entirely  to  his  damage.  The  prohibition  of  such  a 
trade  is  no  doubt  a  limitation  of  the  Rights  of  Com¬ 
merce  ;  but,  in  this  respect,  the  prohibition  of  a 
neutral  supplying  the  suppressed  colonial  trade  of 
the  weaker  naval  belligerent,  does  not  differ  from  the 
prohibition  of  a  neutral  supplying  a  blockaded  town 
with  food,  or  a  defeated  belligerent  with  arms.  In 
such  cases,  the  Rights  of  War  supersede  the  Rights 
of  Commerce,  in  order  that  the  operations  of  War 
may  not  become  futile. 

1179.  The  Right  of  Visitation  or  Search  of 
neutral  vessels  at  sea,*j*  is  a  belligerent  Right,  essen¬ 
tial  to  the  exercise  of  the  Right  of  capturing  ene- 


*  Ibid. 


f  Wheaton,  P.  iv.,  c.  iff.,  §  26 


406 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


mies’  property,  contraband  of  war,  and  vessels  com¬ 
mitting  breach  of  blockade.  Even  if  the  Right  of 
capturing  enemies’  property  be  ever  so  strictly  limit¬ 
ed,  and  the  Rule  of  “  free  ships,  free  goods,”  be 
adopted,  still  the  Right  of  Visitation  and  Search  is 
essential,  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  ships 
themselves  are  neutral.  It  is  conformable  to  the  Law 
of  Nations  to  detain  a  neutral  vessel,  in  order  to  as¬ 
certain,  not  by  the  flag  merely,  which  may  be  fraud¬ 
ulently  assumed,  but  by  the  documents  on  board, 
whether  she  is  really  neutral.  Indeed,  the  practice 
of  maritime  Capture  could  hardly  exist  without  this 
Right.  Accordingly,  the  writers  on  the  subject  con¬ 
cur  in  recognizing  the  existence  of  this  Right.  But 
it  is  to  be  observed,  that  we  here  speak  of  it  only  as  a 
Right  of  Belligerents. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

INTERNATIONAL  RIGHTS  OF  JURISDICTION. 

1180.  Within  its  own  territory,  every  State 
has  complete  and  exclusive  jurisdiction.  The  Laws 
are  made,  and  the  administration  of  them  directed, 
by  the  State  ;  and  speaking  generally,  this  adminis¬ 
tration  extends  to  foreigners,  so  long  as  they  are  in 
the  territory,  no  less  than  to  natives.  The  practice 
and  Treaties  of  nations  may  have  introduced  excep¬ 
tions  ;  but  this  is  the  general  Rule. 

1181.  How  far  the  jurisdiction  of  a  State  ex¬ 
tends  over  its  subjects,  when  they  are  out  of  the 
limits  of  all  States,  as  for  instance,  when  they  are  in 
a  ship  on  the  High  Seas,  is  a  question  of  International 
Law.  As  we  have  already  said,  it  is  maintained  by 
some  writers  that  the  ship,  wherever  it  may  be,  is  to 


CHAP.  IV.] 


RIGHTS  OF  JURISDICTION. 


407 


be  considered  as  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  State  : 
a  sort  of  floating  Colony.  This  is  one  mode  of  ex- 
pressing  a  Rule  which  is  assented  to  by  all  :* — That 
both  the  public  and  private  vessels  of  every  nation, 
on  the  high  seas,  and  out  of  the  territorial  limits  of 
another  State,  are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
State  to  which  they  belong.  But  if  we  say  that  this 
is  because  the  vessel  is  a  part  of  the  national  terri¬ 
tory,  we  express  this  Rule  in  such  a  way  as  to  con¬ 
tradict  other  Rules  generally  agreed  to.  For  if  the 
ship  were  really  national  territory ;  contraband  of 
war,  or  enemy’s  goods,  could  not  rightfully  be  seized 
within  it ;  which,  by  acknowledged  International 
Law,  they  may. 

1182.  A  State  has  an  exclusive  jurisdiction 
over  its  vessels  on  the  high  seas,  so  far  as  respects 
offences  against  its  own  laws.  But  there  are  certain 
offences  which  are  violations,  not  of  the  Law  of  any 
single  State,  but  of  International  Law  ;  as  Piracy. 
The  offence  of  depredating  on  the  high  seas  without 
being  authorized  by  any  Sovereign  State.  This  is  a 
crime,  not  against  any  particular  State,  but  against 
all  mankind  ;  and  may  be  punished  by  the  compe¬ 
tent  tribunal  of  any  country  where  the  offender  may 
be  found,  or  into  which  he  may  be  carried,  though 
committed  on  the  high  seas. 

1183.  Hence,  when  a  State  declares  an  of¬ 
fence  Piracy,  it  declares  that  persons  committing  this 
offence  may  be  lawfully  captured  on  the  high  seas  by 
the  armed  vessels  of  any  State,  and  carried  within 
the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  captors  for  trial. 
And  if  the  nations  of  Europe  and  America  were  to 
agree  in  declaring:  an  offence,  the  Slave-trade,  for 
instance,  to  be  Piracy,  vessels  detected  in  the  prac¬ 
tice  of  the  Slave-trade  might  be  captured  and  con¬ 
demned  by  any  State  which  had  the  means  of  doing 
this. 


*  Wheaton,  Yol.  i.,  152. 


408 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


1184.  The  International  Law  of  Europe  and 
America  appears  to  be  approaching  this  point,  but  has 
not  yet  reached  it.  The  Slave-trade  has  been  de¬ 
clared  a  crime  by  every  Christian  nation.  It  has 
been  declared  piratical  by  many  treaties  between 
nations.  An  American  vessel  engaged  in  the  trade 
has  been  condemned  by  an  English  prize-court.* 
For  the  trade  having  been  prohibited  by  the  Laws  oi 
both  countries,  and  having  been  declared  to  be  con¬ 
trary  to  the  principles  of  justice  and  humanity,  the 
Judge  decided  that  it  was  necessarily  illegal.  But 
in  more  recent  cases,  it  has  been  decided  by  Judges 
that  the  Slave-trade  is  not  a  criminal  traffic  by  the 
general  law  of  nations ;  that  each  person  can  be 
judged  for  it  only  by  the  tribunals  of  his  own  coun¬ 
try,  except  so  far  as  the  treaties  of  nations  provide 
other  jurisdictions.  The  Judge j"  said  that  no  one 
nation  had  a  Right  to  force  a  way  to  the  liberation  of 
Africa  by  trampling  on  the  independence  of  other 
States ;  or  to  procure  eminent  good  by  means  that 
were  unlawful ;  or  to  press  forward  to  a  great  prin¬ 
ciple,  by  breaking  through  other  great  principles  that 
stood  in  the  way.  But  it  must  be  remarked,  on  the 
other  side,  thai  there  is  great  moral  inconsistency  in 
those  States  which  declare  the  Slave-trade  to  be  a 
crime,  and  express  horror  at  the  atrocities  to  which 
it  leads ;  and  who  yet  refuse  to  join  in  such  an  im¬ 
provement  of  International  Law,  as  would  enable 
the  powerful  maritime  nations  altogether  to  suppress 
this  traffic. 

1185.  The  suspicion  of  a  piratical  character 
in  a  vessel,  authorizes  a  stronger  vessel  to  search 
the  suspected  ship.  For  if  merely  showing  the  flag 
of  a  State  at  peace  with  that  of  the  stronger  vessel, 
would  suffice  to  pass  the  suspected  ship  unquestioned, 
no  pirate  need  ever  submit  to  be  taken.  Hence,  the 


*  Wheaton,  P.  ii.,  c.  xi.  §  17.  |  Lord  Stowell. 


CHAP.  IV.]  RIGHTS  OE  JURISDICTION. 


409 


question  as  to  whether  the  Slave-trade  is  to  be  treat¬ 
ed  as  being  Piracy  by  International  Law,  leads  to  the 
question  whether  the  Right  of  Search  for  the  sup¬ 
pression  of  the  Slave-trade  exists  by  International 
Law.  The  Right  of  Mutual  Search  for  this  purpose 
has  been  established  by  treaties  between  several  na¬ 
tions  in  modern  times  ;*  and  probably  the  Moralists 
of  all  Countries  will  agree  with  the  English  Moral¬ 
ist, f  who  said  that  he  felt  a  pride  in  the  British  flag 
being,  for  this  purpose  alone,  subjected  to  search  by 
foreign  ships.  It  had,  he  said,  risen  to  loftier  honour 
by  bending  to  the  cause  of  justice  and  humanity. 

1186.  Besides  its  jurisdiction  over  its  subjects 
on  the  high  seas,  there  are  cases  in  which  by  the 
usage  of  nations,  the  jurisdiction  of  one  State,  more 
or  less  modified,  extends  into  the  territory  of  another. 
Thus,  the  person  of  a  Sovereign  going  into  the  terri¬ 
tory  of  a  foreign  State  in  time  of  peace,  is,  by  the 
general  usage  and  Comity  of  Nations,  exempt  from 
the  ordinary  local  jurisdiction.  And  the  person  of 
an  Ambassador,  whilst  within  the  territory  of  the 
State  to  which  he  is  delegated,  is  in  like  manner  ex¬ 
empt  from  the  local  jurisdiction.  His  residence  is 
considered  as  a  continued  residence  in  his  own  coun¬ 
try  :  and  he  retains  his  national  character,  unmixed 
with  that  of  the  country  where  he  locally  resides. 
Also  by  particular  treaties  between  Countries,  the 
Consuls,  and  other  Commercial  Agents,  which  a 
State  appoints  in  a  foreign  country,  are  authorized 
to  exercise  a  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  the  State 
which  appoints  them.  The  nature  and  extent  of  this 
jurisdiction  depends  upon  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaties.  Among  Christian  nations,  it  is  generally 
confined  to  civil  causes  among  merchants  and  sea¬ 
men,  to  matters  relating  to  Contracts  and  Wills,  and 
the  like.  But  the  resident  Consuls  of  Christian 

*  Manning,  B.  in.,  ch.,  xi.,  p.  37G. 

VOL.  II.  '  KK 


f  Mackintosh. 


410 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


powers  in  some  Mohammedan  Countries,  exercise 
both  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction  over  their  Coun¬ 
trymen  ;  though  this  jurisdiction  is  of  a  limited 
kind.  To  these  cases  of  exceptions  to  the  territorial 
jurisdiction  of  a  State,  are  added  a  foreign  army, 
marching  through  the  country,  or  stationed  in  it ; 
and  foreign  ships  of  war  in  its  ports,  the  two  States 
being  in  amity.  But  the  private  vessels  of  one  State 
entering  the  ports  of  another,  are  not  exempt  from 
the  local  jurisdiction,  except  so  far  as  compact  ex¬ 
empts  them. 

1187.  With  the  exceptions  just  stated,  the  two 
leading  Maxims  of  International  Law,  as  it  regards 
Jurisdiction,  are  generally  admitted:  First ,  that  the 
Laws  of  a  State  have  force  within  the  limits  of  its 
own  government,  and  bind  all  the  subjects  thereof, 
but  have  no  force  beyond  those  limits:  Second,  that 
all  persons  who  are  found  within  the  limits  of  a  gov¬ 
ernment,  whether  their  residence  is  permanent  or 
temporary,  are  to  be  deemed  subjects  thereof.* 

1188.  Thus  the  inhabitants  of  each  State  are 
ruled  by  their  own  Laws.  But  this  does  not  suffice 
for  all  the  occasions  of  human  action.  Men  of  dif¬ 
ferent  countries  have  intercourse  of  various  kinds 
with  each  other.  Men  travel  from  one  country  to 
another.  As  they  move,  they  carry  with  them  cha¬ 
racters  and  attributes  which  have  been  assigned  to 
them  by  the  laws  of  their  own  country  ;  as  rank, 
wealth,  wife,  legitimate  children,  contracts.  We 
cannot  avoid  inquiring  how  far  these  characters  and 
attributes  are  modified  by  the  transition  from  one 
country  to  another,  in  which  the  Laws  respecting 
them  are  different.  And  here,  we  find  that  States  in 
general  have  agreed  to  a  Maxim  which  gives,  in  all 
common  cases,  stability  and  permanence  to  the  con¬ 
ditions  and  relations  of  men.  This  Maxim  (the 


*  Story’s  Conflict  of  Laivs ,  p.  30. 


CHAP.  IV.]  RIGHTS  OF  JURISDICTION. 


411 


Third  in  addition  to  the  First  and  Second  which  we 
have  mentioned)  is  as  follows.  The  Laws  which  are 
of  force  within  the  limits  of  a  State  are  allowed  to 
have  the  same  force  in  other  States  also,  so  far  as 
they  do  not  interfere  with  the  powers  or  rights  of 
those  States  or  of  their  citizens.  This  extra-terri¬ 
torial  efficacy  is  granted  to  the  Laws  of  States,  by  a 
general  disposition  to  further  each  other’s  ends, 
which  is  called  the  Comity  of  Nations. 

1189.  It  has  been  thought  by  some  jurists* 
that  the  term  “  Comity  ”  is  not  sufficiently  expres¬ 
sive  of  the  Obligation  of  a  Nation  to  give  effect  to 
the  Laws  of  foreign  nations  when  they  do  not  inter¬ 
fere  with  its  own.  It  has  been  said  that  it  is  not  a 
matter  of  Comity,  or  Courtesy,  but  of  Duty.  And 
undoubtedly  it  is  a  Duty  of  every  State  to  give  effect 
to  the  Laws  of  other  States,  so  far  as  they  are  means 
of  promoting  Justice,  Humanity,  Truth,  Purity, 
Order.  But  this  Duty  cannot  be  said  to  amount  to 
an  Obligation  (of  the  kind  often  called  a  perfect  Ob¬ 
ligation)  ;  for  if  withheld,  it  cannot  be  enforced. 
One  Nation  cannot  assert  a  Right  to  have  its  Laws 
made  effective  within  the  territory  of  another  State, 
and  without  the  State’s  Consent.  The  practice  of 
giving  to  Laws  this  extra-territorial  effect  prevails, 
not  in  virtue  of  the  Rights  of  Nations,  but  of  their 
Moral  Claims  on  each  other,  and  of  their  Mutual 
Duty.  And  this  Duty  is  called  Comity ,  rather  than 
by  any  name  implying  a  higher  Morality,  because  a 
State,  in  carrying  into  effect  the  Laws  of  a  foreign 
nation,  does  not  pretend  that  they  are  necessarily 
good  and  moral  Laws ;  which,  with  regard  to  its 
own  Laws,  it  does  pretend.  The  great  ends  of  Law, 
the  security  of  person  and  property,  the  observance 
of  good  faith,  the  stability  of  family  ties,  these  are 
the  common  objects  of  all  States  in  their  Laws  and 


*  Story’s  Con/.,  33. 


412 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


Administration.  The  Laws  of  foreign  States,  with 
regard  to  Protection,  and  Property,  and  Contracts, 
and  Marriages,  may  be  different  from  our  own.  We 
(the  State)  cannot  pretend  to  say  that  they  are  good 
in  the  same  manner  that  our  own  are ;  but  we  will 
not  dwell  upon  this  doubt ;  we  will  take  for  granted 
that  they  answer  the  ends  of  Law  ;  we  will  recog¬ 
nize  and  assist  their  operation  on  that  assumption. 
This  is  the  spirit  in  which  nations  adopt  the  Maxim 
which  we  have  stated  ;  and  this  spirit  of  action  ap¬ 
pears  to  be  better  described  by  calling  it  the  Comity 
or  Courtesy  of  Nations,  than  if  we  were  to  say  that 
such  a  practice  is  followed  in  virtue  of  the  Mutual 
Rights  of  Nations  ;  for  these  Rights  are  not  acknow¬ 
ledged  to  this  extent;  or  in  virtue  of  their  Mutual 
Duties  :  for  this  would  imply  that  it  would  be  wrong 
not  to  accept  the  foreign  Law ;  a  doctrine  which 
would  too  much  infringe  the  special  respect  with 
which  the  State  looks  upon  its  own  Law.  Courtesy 
is  a  Duty,  but  a  Duty  which  must  give  way,  when  it 
comes  into  conflict  with  higher  Duties,  in  which  the 
distinction  of  right  and  wrong  is  concerned  :  and 
such  a  Duty  is  the  Comity  of  Nations. 

1190.  Since  there  are  thus  many  Cases  to 
which  foreign  as  well  as  domestic  Laws  apply,  it 
must  often  happen  that  doubts  and  apparent  contra¬ 
dictions  occur,  as  to  which  Law  is  to  be  followed  in 
a  particular  Case  ;  there  will  be  a  Conjlict  of  Latvs. 
Examples  of  such  difficulties  occur  in  the  following 
Questions  :  May  a  Contract  which  is  valid  by  the 
Laws  of  the  country  when  it  is  made,  be  enforced  in 
a  country  where  such  Contracts  are  invalid,  or  ille¬ 
gal  ?  May  a  Marriage  between  persons  of  full  age, 
according  to  the  laws  of  one  country,  be  dissolved 
by  their  removing  into  another  country  by  whose 
laws  they  are  still  minors  ?  If  a  person  has  Property 
in  one  country  and  Debts  in  another,  according  to 
what  laws  are  his  creditors  to  be  paid  ?  Such  ques- 


CHAP.  IV.]  RIGHTS  OF  JURISDICTION. 


413 


tions  arise  in  endless  number.  They  cannot  be  de¬ 
cided  without  the  establishment  of  some  general 
maxims  on  the  subject  of  the  Conflict  of  Laws.  To 
lay  down,  however,  and  to  apply  such  Maxims,  is 
the  office  of  works  written  expressly  on  this  subject, 
and  to  them  we  must  refer.  I  may  notice,  as  a 
work  of  great  value  on  the  subject,  Judge  Story’s 
Conflict  of  Laws  ;  and  in  this,  the  reader  will  find 
the  other  standard  works  on  the  subject,  quoted  and 
discussed. 

1191.  I  may  however  very  briefly  state  some 
of  the  Maxims  which  have  been  generally  accepted 
on  this  subject. 

With  regard  to  immovable  property  (land  and  the 
like)  the  law  of  the  place  where  it  is  situate,  governs 
in  everything  relating  to  the  tenure,  the  title,  and  the 
forms  of  conveyance.  Hence,  a  deed  or  will  of  real 
property,  executed  in  a  foreign  country,  must  be 
executed  with  the  formalities  required  by  the  local 
laws  of  the  State  where  the  land  lies.  This  Rule  is 
termed  Lex  loci  rei  sitce* 

1192.  With  regard  to  movable  property  (mo¬ 
ney  and  goods),  the  modes  of  conveyance  and  the 
like  are  principally  governed  by  the  home  or  domi¬ 
cile  of  the  party.  This  Rule  is  the  Lex  domicilii. 

1193.  It  becomes  necessary  to  lay  down  some 
Rule  for  the  determination  of  the  National  Domicile 
of  a  person  ;  for  there  may  be  instances  in  which, 
from  change  of  residence,  or  from  having  several 
places  of  abode,  a  person’s  domicile  may  be  doubtful. 
The  definition  given  by  jurists]*  is,  that  the  Domicile 
is  a  person’s  principal  residence,  to  which,  when  ab¬ 
sent  from  it,  he  always  retains  an  intention  of  return¬ 
ing  ( animus  revertendi).  To  this  general  Rule, 
others,  applicable  to  particular  cases,  are  subordinate, 
but  we  need  not  dwell  upon  such  details. 

*  Wheaton,  Vol.  i.,  136. 

HH  2 


f  Story,  §  41. 


414 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


1194.  With  regard  to  Contracts,  the  general 
Rule  is,  that  a  Contract  valid  by  the  Law  of  the 
place  where  it  is  made,  is  valid  everywhere  else. 
This  Rule,  established  by  the  general  comity  and 
mutual  convenience  of  nations,  is  termed  Lex  loci 
contractus. 

1195.  But  again,*  every  sovereign  State  has 
the  exclusive  right  of  regulating  the  proceedings  in 
its  own  courts  of  justice.  This  Rule  is  Lex  fori. 
And  the  Lex  loci  contractus  of  another  country  can¬ 
not  apply  to  such  cases  as  are  properly  determined 
by  the  Lex  fori  of  that  State  where  the  contract  is 
brought  in  question.  Thus,  if  a  Contract  made  in 
one  Country  is  attempted  to  be  enforced,  or  comes 
incidentally  in  question  in  the  judicial  tribunals  of 
another,  everything  relating  to  the  forms  of  proceed¬ 
ing,  the  rules  of  evidence,  and  of  limitation  or  pre¬ 
scription,  is  to  be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  State 
where  the  suit  is  pending,  and  not  of  that  where  the 
Contract  was  made. 

1196.  The  municipal  laws  j*  of  most  countries 
prohibit  foreigners  from  holding  Land  within  the  ter¬ 
ritory  of  the  State,  because  in  most  countries  the 
Rights  of  Government  are  connected  with  the  tenure 
of  land,  as  was  the  case  in  Europe  under  the  feudal 
system.  In  that  case,  the  acquisition  of  land  in¬ 
volved  the  notion  of  allegiance  to  the  Sovereign 
within  whose  dominions  it  lay,  which  might  be 
inconsistent  with  the  allegiance  which  the  proprietor 
owed  to  his  native  sovereign. 

1197.  The  right  of  Succession,  like  the  right 
of  real  property,  was  conceived  to  depend  on  the 
State,  and  to  be  a  creature  of  the  State.  Hence,  this 
right  was  denied  to  foreigners  dying  in  the  Country  ; 
and  the  Sovereign  of  the  Country  took  their  property. 
This  Right  of  the  Sovereign,  as  it  existed  in  France, 


* 


AVheaton,  i.,  149 


f  Wheaton,  p.  138. 


CHAP.  IV.]  RIGHTS  OF  JURISDICTION. 


415 


was  termed  jus  albinatus  ( alibi-natus ),  and  in  French, 
droit  d'aubaine.  In  such  cases,  the  property  was 
also  said  to  escheat  or  fall  ( escheoir )  to  the  King. 

1198.  Thus  Laws  which  concern  Property 
are,  in  their  international  application,  mainly  gov¬ 
erned  by  the  place.  On  the  other  hand,  the  laws 
which  determine  the  Character  and  Condition  of  a 
person  do,  for  the  most  part,  accompany  him  with 
their  effects  into  all  places,  wherever  he  may  travel 
or  reside.  In  general*  the  Laws  of  the  State,  appli¬ 
cable  to  the  civil  condition  and  personal  capacity 
( status )  of  its  citizens,  operate  upon  them,  even  when 
resident  in  a  foreign  country.  Such  are  the  univer¬ 
sal  personal  qualities  which  take  effect,  either  from 
birth,  as  citizenship,  legitimacy,  illegitimacy  ;  or  at 
a  fixed  time  after  birth,  as  idiocy  and  lunacy,  bank¬ 
ruptcy,  marriage,  and  divorce,  as  ascertained  by  the 
judgment  of  a  competent  tribunal.  The  laws  of  the 
State  affecting  these  personal  qualities  of  its  subjects, 
travel  with  them  wherever  they  go,  and  attach  to 
them  in  whatever  country  they  are  resident. 

1199.  With  regard  to  Marriage,  indeed,  it  has 
two  aspects,  since  it  may  be  considered  either  as  a 
contract,  or  as  a  personal  status ;  and  will  be 
governed  by  the  Lex  loci  contractus ,  or  by  the  original 
country  of  the  parties,  as  the  one  view  or  the  other 
is  taken  :  the  Law  of  England  adopts  the  former 
cause.  A  clandestine  marriage  in  Scotland,  of  par¬ 
ties  originally  domiciled  in  England,  who  resort  to 
Scotland  for  the  sole  purpose  of  evading  the  English 
marriage  act  (which  requires  the  consent  of  parents 
or  guardians),  is  considered  valid  in  the  English 
ecclesiastical  courts.  The  same  principle  has  been 
recognized  between  the  different  States  of  the  Ame¬ 
rican  Union.  By  the  French  Law,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  age  of  consent  which  is  required  by  the 


*  Wheaton,  Vol.  i.,  141. 


416 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  VI. 


code  is  considered  as  a  personal  quality  of  French 
subjects,  following  them  wherever  they  remove ; 
and  consequently,  a  marriage  by  a  Frenchman 
within  the  required  age,  will  not  be  regarded  as 
valid  by  the  French  tribunals,  though  the  parties 
may  have  been  above  the  age  required  by  the  law 
of  the  place  where  it  was  contracted. 

1200.  With  regard  to  Penal  Laws,  it  is  a  prin¬ 
ciple  generally  acknowledged  among  jurists,*  that 
the  penal  Laws  of  one  State  have  no  operation  in 
another  State.  Plence  a  person  convicted  as  a 
criminal  in  one  country  is  not,  on  that  account  to  be 
treated  as  a  criminal  by  the  Government  of  another 
country.  Nor  does  it  appear  to  be  a  Right  generally 
acknowledged,  or  a  part  of  the  Law  and  Usage  of 
Nations,  that  offenders,  charged  with  a  high  crime, 
who  have  fled  from  the  country  where  the  crime  has 
been  committed,  should  be  delivered  up  and  sent 
back  for  trial,  by  the  Sovereign  of  the  Country  where 
they  are  found.  But  though  this  Extradition  of 
Criminals  may  not  be  a  matter  of  general  Interna¬ 
tional  Law,  it  is  often  a  matter  of  compact  between 
States.  It  is  voluntarily  practised  by  certain  States, 
as  a  matter  of  general  convenience  and  comity. 
And  it  is  held  by  moralists-]*  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  Government  where  the  criminal  is,  to  deliver 
him  up  ;  and  that  if  it  refuses  to  do  so,  it  becomes, 
in  some  measure,  an  accomplice  in  the  crime. 

1201.  There  are  some  offences  which  alter 
their  character,  according  as  they  are  committed  by 
a  subject  or  an  alien.  Thus  an  alien  who  bears 
arms  against  the  Sovereign  of  the  Country  is  dealt 
with  by  the  laws  of  war  ;  but  the  subject  who  does 
so  is  guilty  of  treason.  He  violates  his  Allegiance. 
Hence  it  becomes  important  to  determine  from  whom 


*  Story,  §  620. 


f  Story,  §  627. 


CHAP.  IV.] 


RIGHTS  OF  JURISDICTION. 


417 


Allegiance  is  due  to  each  Sovereign,  and  how  far 
this  tie  may  be  cast  aside  or  transferred. 

1202.  There  are  two  extreme  opinions  on  this 
latter  point.  According  to  one,  the  tie  which  con¬ 
nects  a  man  with  his  country,  like  the  tie  which 
connects  him  with  his  family,  can  never  be  abolished. 
His  original  country  is  his  Mother,  in  spite  of  all 
that  he  can  do.  According  to  the  other  view,  a 
man’s  connexion  with  any  Community,  is  of  a  volun¬ 
tary  kind.  At  a  mature  age,  and  with  due  formali¬ 
ties,  he  may  choose  a  country  for  himself.  But  this 
latter  view,  though  it  has  been  asserted  by  theoreti¬ 
cal  writers,  has  never  been  recognized  in  the  prac¬ 
tical  legislation  of  States.  The  ancient  Jurists  had 
a  maxim  that  no  one  can  divest  himself  of  his  coun¬ 
try  :  Nemo  potest  exuere  patriam .  The  Common 
Law  of  England  was  to  the  same  effect,  that  all  the 
King’s  natural  born  subjects  owed  him  an  allegiance 
which  they  could  not  cast  off.  It  is  held*  that  it  is 
not  in  the  power  of  any  private  subject  to  shake  oft* 
his  allegiance,  and  to  transfer  it  to  a  foreign  prince : 
nor  is  it  in  the  power  of  any  foreign  prince,  by  na¬ 
turalizing  or  employing  a  subject  of  Great  Britain, 
to  dissolve  the  bond  of  Allegiance.  Entering  into 
a  foreign  service  without  consent,  is  a,  misdemean¬ 
our  :  taking  a  commission  from  a  foreign  prince, 
and  acting  against  the  King,  is  treason.  The  United 
States  of  America,  and  other  new  States,  have  made 
various  provisions  for  admitting  new  citizens  into 
their  community.  But  they  have  not,  in  general, 
left  their  citizens  at  liberty  arbitrarily  to  cast  off  the 
tie  which  connects  them  with  their  country.  The 
Federal  Courts  of  the  United  States  have  had  the 
subject  before  them  and  the  Opinion  which  there 
prevails  is,  that  a  citizen  cannot  renounce  his  alle¬ 
giance  to  the  United  States,  without  the  permission 

*  Kent’s  Coimnent (tries,  n.,  42.  f  Kent,  ii.,  48. 

vol.  ii-  27 


418 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


of  government,  to  be  declared  by  law.  Also  the 
Law  of  France  does  not  allow  a  Frenchman  so  far 
to  expatriate  himself  as  to  bear  arms  against  his 
country. 

1203.  It  may  be  inquired,  From  whom  is  this 
Allegiance  due  ?  Who  are  the  subjects  of  a  State  ? 
According  to  the  old  Law  of  England,  all  persons 
born  within  the  King’s  dominions  are  his  natural 
born  subjects,  and  all  persons  born  abroad  are  aliens. 
But  more  recent  laws  have  given  the  rights  of  na¬ 
tural  born  subjects  to  all  children,  born  out  of  the 
King’s  liegeance,  whose  fathers,  or  grandfathers  by 
the  father’s  side,  were  natural  born  subjects.* 
Rules  more  or  less  resembling  this  prevail  in  other 
States. 

1204.  Besides  this  natural  allegiance,  juristsf 
recognize  a  Local  Allegiance ,  which  is  due  from  an 
alien  or  stranger,  so  long  as  he  continues  within  the 
dominions,  and  therefore  under  the  protection  of  the 
State.  And  as  this  Allegiance,  by  which  they  are 
required  to  abstain  from  injuring  the  State  in  which 
they  reside,  is  demanded  of  strangers  ;  so  are  they 
allowed,  in  a  temporary  manner,  some  of  the  Rights 
of  citizens.  Thus  a  subject  of  one  country  may, 
for  commercial  purposes,  acquire  the  Rights  of  the 
citizen  of  another.  He  has  a  Commercial  Domicile, 
and  this  domicile  determines  the  character  of  the 
party  as  to  trade. 


*  Blaekst.,  i.,  373.  f  Blackst.,  i.,  370.  $  Kent,  ii.,  49. 


CHAP.  V.] 


RIGHTS  OF  INTERCOURSE. 


419 


CHAPTER  V. 

INTERNATIONAL  RIGHTS  OF  INTERCOURSE. 

1205.  According  to  International  Jus,  nations 
are  regarded  as  distinct  moral  agents,  capable  of 
acting  for  or  against  each  other,  of  contracting  with 
each  other,  and  the  like.  Hence  they  must  have 
certain  National  Modes  of  Intercourse  with  each 
other  ;  not  merely  such  as  consist  in  the  citizens  of 
one  State  communicating  with  the  citizens  of  another ; 
but  in  the  States  themselves  communicating  with 
each  other,  by  persons  who  speak  and  act  on  their 
part.  Such  Intercourse  is  naturally  under  the  di¬ 
rection  of  the  Executive  branch  of  the  Government, 
as  being  that  branch  which  acts  for  the  State.  But, 
for  the  most  part,  the  communications  with  foreign 
States  are  not  made  directly  by  the  Sovereign,  as  a 
part  of  his  general  administrative  office,  but  by  Am¬ 
bassadors  or  other  Ministers  of  the  State,  deputed 
for  that  express  purpose. 

1206.  Every  State  considered  as  an  Inde¬ 
pendent  State,  has  the  power  of  negotiating  and  con¬ 
tracting  Public  Treaties  with  other  Independent 
States.  For  this  purpose,  every  Independent  State 
has  a  right  to  send  Public  Ministers,  and  to  receive 
Ministers  from  any  other  Sovereign  State.  No  State 
is,  strictly  speaking,  obliged,  by  the  positive  Law 
of  Nations,  to  send  or  receive  public  ministers.  But 
universal  usage,  the  result  of  the  Comity  of  Nations, 
has  established  this  as  a  reciprocal  Duty.  Such 
being  the  Duty  of  every  nation  on  the  ground  of 
Comity,  it  is  what  has  been  called  an  Imperfect 
Obligation.  It  may  not  and  cannot  be  enforced  as 
a  Right ;  but  the  State  which  refuses  to  conform  to 
the  usage,  has  no  longer  any  claim  to  receive  the 


420 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[BOOK  VI. 


benefits  of  the  Law  of  Nations.  The  Right  of  Le¬ 
gation  is  a  part  of  existing  International  Law. 

1207.  When  States  are  not  absolutely  sove¬ 
reign  and  independent,  but  semi-sovereign,  or  depen¬ 
dent,  or  united  by  federations  of  various  kinds,  it 
must  be  determined,  by  their  relation  to  their  supe¬ 
rior,  or  their  compact  with  each  other,  how  far  they 
possess  this  Right  of  Legation.  Thus  England,  or 
Ireland,  or  Scotland,  cannot  send  Ambassadors  or 
Ministers  to  a  foreign  State,  distinct  from  the  Min¬ 
isters  of  Great  Britain.  Nor  can  the  Colonies,  as 
Canada  or  Australia.  The  United  States  of  North 
America,  though  each,  for  many  internal  purposes, 
sovereign,  are  restrained  by  their  federal  Union  from 
treating  separately  with  foreign  powers.  But  the 
States  of  the  German  Federation  send  their  separate 
ambassadors.  When,  in  the  course  of  historical 
events,  several  States  coalesce  into  one,  as  by  legis¬ 
lative  union,  or  by  conquest ;  or  when  one  State  is 
divided  into  several,  as  by  revolt,  revolution,  or  com¬ 
mon  consent ;  it  is  the  business  of  other  States  to  de¬ 
termine  when  each  new  State  assumes  a  distinct  and 
real  existence  ;  and  they  recognize  this  existence  by 
receiving  Ministers  from  it  and  sending  Ministers  to 
it.  The  same  is  the  mode  of  recognizing  the  actual 
authority  of  a  new  Government,  in  a  State  which 
has  undergone  an  internal  Revolution. 

1208.  In  deciding  upon  such  recognitions  of 
new  States  and  new  Governments,  the  Governors  of 
a  Nation,  if  they  would  act  for  the  Nation  in  its 
highest  character  of  a  moral  agent,  capable  of  Jus¬ 
tice,  Humanity,  Magnanimity,  Love  of  Order,  and 
Love  of  Liberty,  will  not  make  their  recognition  of 
the  New  Government  depend  upon  mere  caprice,  or 
upon  any  low  views  of  their  national  interest :  but 
will  regard  it  as  a  jural  and  moral  question  :  as  a 
point  to  be  decided  according  to  the  best  existing 
Rules  of  International  Law,  and  without  losing  sight, 


CHAP.  V.]  RIGHTS  OF  INTERCOURSE. 


421 


in  the  decision,  of  the  prospect  of  raising  the  standard 
of  International  Law ;  for  this  prospect,  all  States 
must  have  before  them,  as  the  highest  aim  of  their 
actions. 

1209.  The  modern  usage  of  Europe  has  in¬ 
troduced  into  the  customary  Law  of  Nations  certain 
distinctions  of  various  kinds  of  Public  Ministers  : 
and  at  the  Congresses  of  Vienna  and  of  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle  an  uniform  Rule  was  adopted  for  this  subject. 
By  this  Rule  public  ministers  are  divided  into  the 
four  following  classes  :* 

1.  Ambassadors  and  Papal  Legates  or  Nuncios. 

2.  Envoys  Extraordinary,  Ministers  Plenipotenti¬ 
ary,  and  Internuncios. 

3.  Ministers  Resident  accredited  to  Sovereigns. 

4.  Charges  d’affaires  accredited  to  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 

1210.  Ambassadors  possess  a  representative 
character ;  they  are  considered  as  representing  the 
Sovereign  or  State  by  whom  they  are  delegated,  and 
receive  peculiar  honours  on  this  ground.  Formerly 
a  Solemn  Entry  of  the  Ambassador  was  customary, 
but  they  are  now  received  at  a  private  audience,  in 
the  same  manner  as  other  Ministers. 

1211.  The  Powers,  Credentials,  Privileges, 
and  Modes  of  acting  for  their  nation  which  belong  to 
its  Public  Ministers  abroad,  need  not  be  here  dwelt 
upon.  The  Right  of  directing  their  actions,  of  nego¬ 
tiating  and  concluding  Treaties,  belongs,  as  we  have 
said,  to  the  Executive  at  home.  But  though  the 
Executive  thus  makes  the  Contracts  of  the  State  with 
other  States,  the  assent  and  co-operation  of  the  Le¬ 
gislature  may  often  be  requisite  to  give  effect  to  such 
Contracts.  Thus,  in  Treaties  requiring  the  appro¬ 
priation  of  monies  for  their  execution,  it  is  the  usual 
practice  of  the  British  Government  to  stipulate  that 

*  Wheaton,  i.,  263. 

LL 


VOL.  II. 


422 


INTERNATIONAL  JUS. 


[book  V. 


the  King  will  recommend  to  Parliament  to  make  the 
grant  necessary  for  that  purpose.  Under  the  Con¬ 
stitution  of  the  United  States,  by  which  treaties 
made  and  ratified  by  the  President,  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  are  declared  to  be  “  the 
Supreme  Law  of  the  land,”  it  seems  to  be  under¬ 
stood  that  Congress  is  bound  to  redeem  the  national 
faith  thus  pledged,  and  to  pass  the  laws  necessary  to 
carry  the  treaty  into  effect..* 

1212.  The  General  Contracts  between  nations 
are  divided  into  two  classes :  Transitory  Conventions , 
such  as  treaties  of  cession,  boundary,  exchange  of 
territory,  and  the  like ;  and  Treaties  properly  so 
called,  Feeder  a ;  such  as  those  of  friendship  and 
alliance,  commerce  and  navigation.  The  first  class 
are  perpetual  in  their  nature  ;  and  once  carried  into 
effect,  subsist,  notwithstanding  revolutions  within  the 
State,  and  wars  without.  The  second  class  are  in- 

_  terrupted  by  war,  and  extinguished  by  the  extinction 
of  one  of  the  contracting  parties  as  an  Independent 
State.  Most  international  Compacts  contain  Articles 
of  both  kinds  ;  such  is  the  case  especially  with  most 
Treaties  of  Peace.  Treaties  of  Alliance  are  either 
Defensive,  when  each  ally  engages  to  assist  the  other 
in  repelling  aggression  ;  or  Offensive,  when  an  ally 
engages  to  co-operate  with  the  other  in  a  specified 
kind  of  hostilities.  When  the  Alliance  is  Defensive, 
one  of  the  allies  cannot  claim  the  assistance  of  the 
other  in  an  aggressive  war ;  such  a  war  is  not  the 
casus  feeder  is.  f 

1213.  The  Convention  of  Guarantee  is  one  of  the 
most  usual  international  Contracts.  It  is  an  engage¬ 
ment  by  which  one  State  promises  to  aid  another, 
when  interrupted,  or  threatened  to  be  disturbed,  in 
the  peaceable  enjoyment  of  its  Rights,  by  a  third 
Power.  Guarantee  may  be  applied  to  every  species 


*  Wheaton,  i.,  29G. 


f  Ibid,  i.,  306. 


CHAP.  V.]  RIGHTS  OF  INTERCOURSE. 


423 


of  Right  and  Obligation  which  can  exist  between 
nations :  to  the  possession  and  boundaries  of  terri¬ 
tories,  the  Sovereignty  of  the  State,  the  right  of 
Succession,  &c. 

1214.  But  if  a  State  assumes  the  character  of 
Guarantee  for  one  of  the  Parties  in  another  State  ; 
if,  for  instance,  it  engages  to  protect  the  Sovereign 
against  the  revolt  of  the  Subjects,  or  the  Subjects 
against  the  tyranny  of  the  Sovereign,  the  transaction 
is  then  of  another  kind.  It  is  an  Intervention  which 
necessarily  interferes  with  the  independence  of  the 
State  thus  dealt  with.  Such  an  Intervention  may  be  ne¬ 
cessary  for  the  safety  of  neighbouring  States  ;  but 
is  only  justifiable  in  a  Case  of  Necessity,  and  is  not 
to  be  looked  upon  as  one  of  the  ordinary  Cases  of 
International  Jus.  A  Sovereign  may  be  wrongfully 
dethroned,  and  a  foreign  State  may  aid  him  as  his 
ally  against  a  hostile  faction.  He  may  be  rightly 
dethroned,  and  a  foreign  Sovereign  may  probably  aid 
those  who,  in  a  Case  of  Necessity,  deprive  him  of 
his  office.  A  nation  may  resist  a  usurper,  and  a  fo¬ 
reign  Sovereign  may  properly  aid  the  nation  in  such 
a  cause  ;  or  a  nation  may  proclaim  doctrines  which 
make  all  exercise  of  international  jus  impossible, 
and  other  nations  may  hence  refuse  international  in¬ 
tercourse  with  this,  and  may  thus  be  driven  into 
war.  All  these  are  Cases  in  which  Intervention  may 
possibly  be  justified  by  necessity,  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  Case.  But  for  these,  as  for 
other  Cases  of  Necessity,  it  is  impossible  to  lay  down 
Rules  beforehand. 

1215.  States  have  hitherto  been  much  impelled 
in  their  public  transactions  by  their  views  of  their 
own  particular  interest.  Yet  there  have  not  been 
wanting,  in  the  history  of  nations,  many  acts  of  jus¬ 
tice,  of  magnanimity,  and  of  humanity.  The  nego¬ 
tiations  of  States  and  the  reasonings  of  jurists  seem 
to  show,  that  International  Law  rises  gradually  to  a 


424  INTERNATIONAL  JUS.  [BOOK  V. 

higher  moral  Standard.  The  declarations  of  all 
civilized  States  against  the  Slave-trade,  although 
hitherto  imperfectly  carried  into  effect,  are  a  recog¬ 
nition  of  the  principle  of  Humanity  in  the  public 
Law,  to  an  extent  which  places  modem  far  before 
ancient  times,  in  this  respect.  The  abolition  of 
Slavery  in  the  West  Indies,  carried  into  effect  by 
Great  Britain  at  a  very  great  cost,  is  another  strong 
evidence  of  the  growing  influence  of  such  Principles 
in  public  acts.  On  several  occasions  in  recent  times, 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  have  acted  and  negoti¬ 
ated  as  if  they  deemed  themselves  bound,  by  a  tacit 
Convention,  to  guarantee  the  Liberty  and  Order  of 
Nations,  and  the  preservation  of  Peace. 

1216.  If  States  continue  firmly  and  consistent¬ 
ly  to  pursue  this  Course,  applying  to  themselves  the 
same  Rules  of  Justice  and  Humanity  which  they  re¬ 
quire  their  weaker  neighbours  to  observe  ;  there  ap¬ 
pears  to  be  no  reason  to  despair  of  the  realization 
of  the  most  equitable  and  moral  codes  of  Inter¬ 
national  Law  which  Jurists  have  ever  promulgated; 
nor  of  the  indefinite  moral  elevation  and  purification 
of  such  Codes,  in  proportion  as  the  characters  of  Na¬ 
tions  are  elevated  and  purified  by  the  practice  of  the 
political  virtues. 


THE  END. 


